Subsection 6(1.1) - Parking cost

Subsection 6(2) - Reasonable standby charge

See Also

Szymczyk v. The Queen, 2014 TCC 380 (Informal Procedure)

separate personal use kilometers required for each vehicle used in year

The taxpayer's employer, General Motors of Canada Limited, assigned a new vehicle to the taxpayer and about 350 other senior managers or executives no less frequently than every three months for their personal and business use, but on the basis that they would identify shortcomings in the models and promote them to friends and acquaintances. The Minister authorized GM in 1982 to use a simplified method which computed the s. 6(1)(e) benefit based on the average cost of all GM passenger vehicles sold in Canada.

The taxpayer's appeal with respect to the Minister's assessment of an imputed benefit under ss. 6(1)(e) and 6(2) was allowed as the taxpayer was delivered a new vehicle every three months, the Minister's assumption that the taxpayer had 20,004 kilometers per year of personal use did not recognize that "the legislation requires that personal use be calculated separately for the periods that each automobile was made available" (para. 70), and no evidence as to actual personal use was advanced.

See also summaries under s. 6(1)(k) and General Concepts – Estoppel.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Estoppel Minister's authorization should not be set aside too readily as being contrary to law 317
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Onus Minister's "partly arbitrary" assumptions did not remove onus from taxpayer 317
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 6 - Subsection 6(1) - Paragraph 6(1)(k) late designation not permitted/rule-of-thumb method invalidated by s. 6(1)(k) 189

Keefe v. The Queen, 2003 DTC 1526, 2003 TCC 791 (Informal Procedure)

The taxpayer, who was the principal of a family company that was engaged in the supply and installation of commercial floor coverings, used a company-supplied vehicle to service clients (often after hours) within a 100-kilometre radius of his business premises and drove the vehicle approximately 40,000 kilometres per taxation year of which 7,500 kilometres were for non-employment purpose uses. Sheridan J. found that the taxpayer had satisfied the "substantially all" test in paragraph (d) of A in s. 6(2).

Words and Phrases
substantially all

Guignard v. The Queen, 2002 DTC 2092 (TCC)

The taxpayer and the Minister had agreed that the personal use by the taxpayer was 3,000 kilometres and that the total use was 19,000 kilometres, so that 84% of the use of the vehicle by the taxpayer (who was an automobile salesman) was in the exercise of his duties as an employee. Before finding that the taxpayer was not entitled to pro-ration under the formula in s. 6(2) (as modified by s. 6(2.1)), Hershfield T.C.J. indicated (at p. 2095) that since the primary focus of the provisions was to impute a benefit on the basis of availability of the vehicle, not its use, "it is arguable that limiting the full kilometre benefit deemed for availability to cases where personal use does not exceed 10% is arguably somewhat generous to the taxpayer" and that "in this context 'little' might just as arbitrarily be 1% or 2%". He also tentatively indicated (at p. 2097) that the pro-ration formula in s. 6(2) appeared to calculate all distances travelled by the vehicle regardless of who drove it.

McDonald v. The Queen, 98 DTC 2151 (TCC) (Informal Procedure)

The taxpayer, who was employed as a safety manager, was required to attend on a daily basis various parks and recreational facilities in the greater Toronto area, in addition to attending from time-to-time at an office downtown. The taxpayer's travel between his home and the various park locations was found to be business use given that it was more efficient and cost effective for his employer for him to begin or end such trips at his home. Furthermore, even if such trips were treated as personal use so that they amounted to 15% of the total use of his car, 85% of the total distances travelled represented "substantially all" of such distances give the elasticity of the word "substantially".

Deputy Minister of Revenue (Quebec) v. Rodrigue, 95 DTC 5475 (Que. C.A.)

The Court affirmed the trial judge's finding that an automobile had not been made available by the employer to the taxpayer for his personal use (for purposes of s. 41 of the Income Tax Act (Quebec)) when the automobile in question had been used 95% of the time for corporate purposes, as well as by other corporate employees for an undetermined proportion of the time, and that, as a matter of common sense, it could be seen that the vehicle had been provided to him primarily for the purposes of his employment.

Administrative Policy

7 October 2016 APFF Roundtable Q. 5, 2016-0652861C6 F - Véhicules électriques - rabais

Quebec government assistance does not reduce cost of purchased vehicle, but treated as compensation to dealer-lessor prorated over term of lease

By virtue of a program put in place by the Quebec government, a subsidy, which can amount to $8,000, is offered where an electric vehicle is purchased or rented. Where the car dealer is a partner in this "Drive Electric Program" and the participant authorizes the government to pay the rebate directly to the dealer, this assistance is actually a deposit paid or to be paid to the dealer on the purchase or lease. In determining the taxable benefit from employee use, should the purchase price (or rental cost) be determined before or after the application of the rebate? (b) What is the incidence of the subsidy on CCA where the pre-tax cost of the vehicle is $25,000, $35,000 or $45,000? CRA responded:

[I]n the case of a purchased electric vehicle… the "cost of the automobile to the employer" in the formula in subsection 6(2) would not be reduced by the amount of financial assistance provided… .

[I]n the case of a leased electric vehicle… it would be reasonable to consider that the deposit is an amount payable to the lessor. Thus, the amount of the financial assistance paid would be a lump sum payment that should be prorated over the term of the lease for the purposes of calculating the “total amount that can reasonably be regarded as payable to the lessor” in subsection 6(2).

Finally, where the participant receives the rebate directly from the Québec government…the financial assistance would not reduce the reasonable standby charge for use of an automobile.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 6 - Subsection 6(1) - Paragraph 6(1)(e) use of manufacturer’s electricity-use standard 88
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 13 - Subsection 13(21) - Undepreciated Capital Cost - A installation cost included 31
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 13 - Subsection 13(7) - Paragraph 13(7)(g) vehicle assistance paid indirectly (to dealer) covered 225
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 13 - Subsection 13(21) - Undepreciated Capital Cost - A cost not reduced under general principles by government assistance 137

18 February 2015 External T.I. 2012-0471731E5 F - Déductibilité du droit d’usage pour automobile

no reduction in benefit amount for benefits provided by employee to employer

The “Employer” provides a commissioned sales person (who satisfies the s. 8(1)(f) conditions) with an automobile, and includes in the computation of the employee's income a taxable benefit for the use of the automobile. However, the automobile is painted an unusual color and displays the logo of the Employer for promotional reasons.

May the taxable benefit to the employee, for the use of automobiles, be reduced to reflect the fact that the employer has a commercial advantage? If not, may the employee deduct an amount for advertising in the calculation of employment income? CRA responded:

[T]he fact that there is a commercial benefit to the employer does not change in any way the calculation of the benefit to be included in the employee's income under paragraph 6(1)(e) and 6(1)(k). In essence, this calculation takes into account the amounts that the employee (or a person related to the employee) refunds to the employer (or a person related to the employer) for a reasonable fee for the right of use of the automobile and for the reasonable cost of operation of the automobile, respectively. Thus no exception, such as the one you described in your application, is specified in these provisions which would allow a reduction of the taxable benefit to the employee.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 8 - Subsection 8(1) - Paragraph 8(1)(f) reduced auto enjoyment not an expenditure 144

27 June 1995 T.I. 950505 (C.T.O. "Automobile Benefits")

Where a corporate employer has entered into a three-year agreement with an automobile dealer whereby the dealer agrees to make an automobile available to the corporation at no cost to the corporation in order that the use by the corporation of the automobile will provide publicity for the automobile dealer, then the value of the consideration paid by the employer for the automobile will be considered to be the fair market for lease of the automobile where the value of the publicity or advertising has not itself been qualified.

5 November 2014 External T.I. 2014-0529991E5 F - Avantage pour automobile-personne liée

standby charge computed based on cost to auto owner which is related to employer

The board members of a Quebec non-share corporation that is exempt under s. 149(1) ("Entity") are appointed by "Municipality." During a Municipality employee’s temporary assignment to a position of employment with Entity, Municipality agreed to continue making an automobile available to such employee (“Employee”) in connection with such temporary employment.

After assuming that Municipality was related to Entity, and after noting that where an employer or a related person makes an automobile available to an employee which can be used for personal purposes, a standby charge benefit must computed under ss. 6(1)(e) and 6(2), as well as an automobile operating expense benefit under s. 6(1)(k), CRA stated:

With respect to…the standby charge… it is the cost of the automobile, or the cost of renting the automobile, to the person who makes the automobile available to the taxpayer, which enters into the computation of the benefit. Since…Municipality is a person related to the Entity and it will make the automobile available to Employee, the standby charges will have to be computed using the cost of the automobile to Municipality.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 251 - Subsection 251(2) - Paragraph 251(2)(b) - Subparagraph 251(2)(b)(i) control of non-share corp references who can appoint board 131

15 February 1994 T.I. 933573 (C.T.O "Automobile Standby Charges")

Re: Consequences of the sale of an automobile for fair market value proceeds by the employer to a related corporation, after which the automobile continues to be made available to the employee.

Subsection 6(2.1) - Automobile salesperson

Subsection 6(2.2)

Administrative Policy

88 C.R. - "Automobile Rules" - "Employee Benefits"

RC considers "primarily" to be more than 50% - generally, by reference to the number of kilometres driven.

Subsection 6(3) - Payments by employer to employee


S. 6 expands the scope of what otherwise would be considered to be income from and office or employment, albeit not radically so. In the Curran case, Martland J. indicated that a predecessor of s. 6 (s.24A of the 1948 Act) "was essentially a provision dealing with onus of proof and deemed certain payments as therein defined to be payments within s. 5, unless the recipient could establish affirmatively that a payment did not reasonably fall within the provisions of paras. (i), (ii) or (iii) of s. 24A" (now s. 6(3)(c), (d) or (e)).

S. 6 potentially is engaged where an individual receives an amount while an officer of, or while in the employment of the payer (s. 6(3)(a)) or on account of, in lieu of payment or in satisfaction of an obligation arising out of an agreement made by the payer with the individual immediately prior to, during or immediately after a period the individual was an officer of, or in the employment of, the payer (s. 6(3)(b)). Where either of these conditions is satisfied, the amount received will be deemed for purposes of s. 5 to be remuneration for services rendered as an officer or during the period of employment (so that the amount will be included in income as income from an office or employment) unless it is established that irrespective of the form or legal effect of the agreement under which the amount was received, it cannot reasonably be regarded as having been received as described in any of ss. 6(3)(c) to (e).

S. 6(3)(c) refers to an amount received as consideration (or partial consideration) for accepting the office or entering into the contract of employment.

S. 6(3)(d) refers to an amount received as remuneration (or partial remuneration) for services as an officer or under the contract of employment.

S. 6(3)(e) refers to an amount received in consideration (or partial consideration) for a covenant with reference to what the officer or employee is, or is not, to do before or after the termination of the employment.

S. 6(3)(e) will result in the recognition of employment income when an employee receives a sum on termination of employment in consideration for giving a covenant not to solicit clients of the former employer (Morissette), or some other form of non-compete covenant. However, if the terminated employee agrees to provide a non-compete covenant in circumstances where he or she already has a clear contractual entitlement to receive a specific sum of liquidated damages for the termination of employment, the liquidated sum of damages will not be taxable under s. 6(3)(3) (Girouard). Furthermore, the giving of a restrictive covenant by an individual may not result in an income inclusion under s. 6(3)(e) if no amounts paid to the taxpayer are allocable to the giving of the covenant (115 cf. Richstone).

Where an amount received by an individual for the giving of a restrictive covenant is included in his or her income under s. 6(3)(e), it will not also be included in his or her income under draft s. 56.4(2): draft s. 56.4(3)(a). In the absence of these provisions, a lump sum received by a taxpayer for agreeing in his or her contract of employment to a restrictive covenant might not be taxable as employment income (see Beak v. Robson).

Where on the sale of shares of a company by the owner-manager, monthly payments thereafter received by the individual from his form employer will not be taxable under s. 6(3)(d) or (e) if the payments in substance are not consideration for services or restrictive covenants provided by the former employee (Wilson), even perhaps if the parties purported to agree that the payments would be consideration for consulting services that they had no intention of requesting or providing, as the case may be (Beaupré Estate).

Incentive arrangements or pre-emptive rights that likely would have been taxable in any event under s. 6(1)(a) have also been found to be deemed by s. 6(3)(c) or (d) to give rise to taxable remuneration (Markin, Moss).


Morissette v. Canada, 2008 DTC 6513, 2007 FCA 16

non-solicitation covenant taxable

A lump sum received by the taxpayer, who was an investment advisor employed by a Canadian securities firm, on the termination of his employment was found to constitute consideration for his covenant (contained in the termination agreement) not to solicit clients given that "the non-solicitation covenant is at the heart of the termination agreement, which makes no mention of any sale of assets" (para. 16).

Markin v. The Queen, 96 DTC 6483 (FCTD)

The taxpayer's employer granted him and other employees a contractual right to receive an undivided 0.5% of net profits attributable to the interest of the employer in oil and gas properties. The amount received by the taxpayer upon his termination of employment and his exercise of the previously granted right to exercise an option to require his employer to purchase his rights under the relevant agreements for cancellation was deemed by ss.6(3)(b) and (d) to be an employment benefit: the amount was received by him in satisfaction of an obligation arising out of the agreements made by him and the employer during the taxpayer's employment by it, and the amount could reasonably be regarded as remuneration or partial remuneration for services under his contract of employment.

The Queen v. Blanchard, 95 DTC 5479 (FCA)

As part of an offer of a position at the Fort McMurry processing plant of Syncrude Canada Ltd., the taxpayer was given the option of participating in a housing program which, among other things, provided that upon the cessation of his employment with Syncrude Canada, he would be guaranteed a market for the sale of his Fort McMurray home at no commission and at a price not to be less than a stipulated minimum price. It was found that because the agreement arising from the taxpayer's participation in the housing program was truly intended in order to induce the taxpayer to accept employment, a payment received by the taxpayer for his agreement to terminate participation in this program was deemed to be employment income under s. 6(3), i.e., the payment was in satisfaction of a (contingent) obligation of Syncrude Canada arising out of an agreement made by Syncrude Canada entered into between him and Syncrude Canada either at the time of or before the period of his employment.

McNeill v. The Queen, 86 DTC 6477, [1986] 2 CTC 352 (FCTD)

A Quebec air traffic controller received from his employer, the federal government, the sum of $15,571 to compensate for house mortgage expenses that he might incur outside Quebec, and the sum of $2,155 which was computed as a percentage of his income, as part of a Department of Transport policy to seek to relocate controllers with anglophone ancestry outside Quebec so as to avoid labour relations problems. "Money paid as an incentive to compensate for a capital loss brought about by an involuntary transfer while remaining in the employ of the same employer and providing no economic benefit to either party is not caught by subsection 6(3)."

Moss v. MNR, 63 DTC 1359 (Ex Ct)

Under the agreement pursuant to which the taxpayer became sales manager of his employer ("Prairie Cereals"), Prairie Cereals and its controlling shareholder agreed that in the event that Prairie Cereals agreed to sell its assets, the taxpayer would have a pre-emptive right to purchase those assets for 90% of the stipulated price. Approximately a year later, while the controlling shareholder was negotiating an asset sale by Prairie Cereals, the taxpayer agreed with Prairie Cereals and the shareholder that in consideration for the payment to him of $34,600 upon completion of the sale, he would release Prairie Cereals and the shareholders from the terms of the previous agreement.

Thorson P. found that the $34,600 was taxable under s. 25 of the pre-1972 Act. The release agreement pursuant to which it was paid was made while the taxpayer was employed by Prairie Cereals, and the amount paid pursuant to that agreement related back to the taxpayer's prior and pre-emptive right under the agreement pursuant to which he became an employee. That pre-emptive "right was as much part of the consideration for accepting the office of sales manager and entering into the contract of employment and as much remuneration for services as an officer or under the contract of employment as the regular monthly remuneration (p. 1365). Accordingly, the $34,600 could reasonably be regarded as having been received by the taxpayer as partial consideration for his acceptance of the office of sales manager, or as partial remuneration for services as an officer of Prairie Cereals or under his contract of employment.

Curran v. Minister of National Revenue, 59 DTC 1247, [1959] S.C.R. 850

Martland J. indicated (at p. 1253) that s. 24A of the 1948 Act "was essentially a provision dealing with onus of proof and deemed certain payments as therein defined to be payments within s. 5, unless the recipient could establish affirmatively that a payment did not reasonably fall within the provisions of paras. (i), (ii) or (iii) of s. 24A".

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 3 185

See Also

Desmarais c. La Reine, 2008 DTC 3830, 2006 TCC 417

A lump sum of $350,000 that was paid to the taxpayer, who was a broker at Nesbitt Burns, upon his signing an employment contract with another broker (Desjardins) was found to be includable in the taxpayer's income under s. 6(3) given that the sum was paid to him as an incentive to sign the employment contract and given that there was no evidence that the sum was paid to acquire the taxpayer's goodwill and (para. 10) "in any case, clients are free to choose their advisor".

Richstone v. MNR, 72 DTC 6232, [1972] CTC 265 (FCTD), briefly aff'd 74 DTC 6129 (FCA)

The taxpayer sold their shares pursuant to a deed of sale that provided that $150,000 was paid at the time of signing the deed of sale as the purchase price for their shares, and that a further $150,000 was payable in ten annual instalments in consideration for the sale by them of their right to engage in the bakery business and their right to use the name "Richstone" in relation to the business for a 25-year period. A further clause stipulated that further consideration for the ten $15,000 instalments was the vendor's covenant not to engage in the bakery business for 25 years within Quebec or Ontario and not to use the Richstone name for 25 years within that territory. In finding that the $15,000 deposit were taxable under s. 25 of the pre-1972 Act, Collier J. found that the non-compete covenant was of value to the purchaser (rather than, as alleged, a "mere appendage" to the share sale), that any unenforceability of the non-compete covenant did not detract from its binding character pending any challenge, that the lack of intention of the taxpayers ever to go into business again was irrelevant, and that the taxpayers were employees of one of the five payors of the instalments until the time of the deed of sale.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Illegality covenant respected until invalidated 73
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 6 - Subsection 6(3) - Paragraph 6(3)(e) 70

Wilson v. MNR, 60 DTC 115 (TAB)

At the same time as the taxpayer entered into an agreement for the sale of his majority interest in a company for a cash sum, he entered into an agreement with the company for the payment of $12,000 in monthly instalments of $200 and agreed to resign as president and director of the company. Mr. Fordham, in finding that the monthly payments were not taxable under s. 25 of the pre-1972 Act, stated (at p. 117) that "I can find nothing that is not merely indicative of a plain sale and purchase and must hold that nothing pointing to any services rendered, or to be rendered by the appellant, is discoverable".

Administrative Policy

S2-F3-C1 - Payments from Employer to Employee

Requirement for payments to have the nature of remuneration

1.6 In addition to the conditions described in [the paraphrase of s. 6(3) above], the payment must have the nature and quality of salary, wages, commissions, or remuneration. The method of calculating the amount or any steps taken to enforce payment under the terms of the contract (including lawsuits) do not change how subsection 6(3) is to be applied.

Dual-purpose payments


Where a payment is made for more than one purpose and part of the payment does not have the nature and quality of salary, wages, commissions, or remuneration or is not in respect of a covenant, that part of the payment is not included in the individual's employment income. …

Example 1: inclusion of signing bonus subject to repayment

As an inducement to a prospective employee to accept an employment offer, an employer agrees to make a payment when the individual signs the employment contract. The individual starts work immediately and agrees to work for the employer for a minimum of two years. Their arrangement is that if the individual does not meet all the requirements of the employment contract, the full amount of the inducement payment will have to be repaid. Since the payment is made based on an agreement signed immediately before the individual's employment and is paid for entering into the employment contract, subsection 6(3) deems the payment to be employment income.

Example 2: non-inclusion of scholarship received before employment

An individual receives a corporate-sponsored scholarship but does not work for the corporation at the time the scholarship is received. Several years later, after graduating, the individual accepts employment with the corporation that funded the scholarship. In this case, since the employer-employee relationship did not exist at the time the scholarship was received, subsection 6(3) does not apply to deem the scholarship to be employment income. However, the payment is considered scholarship income.

Example 3: non-inclusion of termination damages

An individual and an employer sign an employment contract that…does not provide for any payments at or after the end of employment. After a few years, the employer terminates the employment contract. The individual sues the employer. The lawsuit is settled and the individual receives a lump-sum amount to compensate for the loss of employment. Since the lump-sum amount was not provided for in the employment contract, subsection 6(3) does not apply… . However, since the amount was compensation for the loss of employment, the payment is considered a retiring allowance… .

Example 4: post-employment inclusion of amounts negotiated during employment

Based on an agreement negotiated during employment, an employee receives a monthly payment from the employer for inventions and designs that the employee creates during employment. The agreement specifies that the employer will retain the rights to these inventions and designs. The employee quits, but continues to receive the monthly payments for several years. Because the payments are based on an agreement made during employment for work completed during employment, subsection 6(3) deems the payments received after the end of employment to be employment income.

Example 5: inclusion of payment for client list on employment termination

At the time of hiring, an employee and an employer verbally agree that the employer will purchase, at the end of employment, any client list that the employee develops during employment. The purchase will ensure that the employee does not compete against the employer in the future. At the end of employment, the employer pays the employee an amount for the client list. Because the payment is provided for in an agreement made during employment in consideration for what the employee is not to do after the end of employment, subsection 6(3) deems the payment to be employment income.

IT-196R2 "Payments by Employer to Employee"

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Payment & Receipt 37

Paragraph 6(3)(b)


Greiner v. The Queen, 81 DTC 5371, [1981] CTC 477 (FCTD), aff'd 84 DTC 6073, [1984] CTC 92 (FCA)

A $200,000 payment received by Greiner pursuant to an agreement which he had entered into with the payer corporation approximately 2 months before becoming president of the payer corporation (and thereafter managing the operations of the corporation of which he had, up until that time, been an employee) was fully taxable.

Quance v. The Queen, 74 DTC 6210, [1974] CTC 225 (FCTD)

The taxpayer was dismissed without notice and paid his regular salary for 9-1/2 months. Although the taxpayer's solicitor had demanded more, the taxpayer determined that the costs of litigation did not merit bringing an action. Cattanach, J. held that the amounts received by the taxpayer fell within s. 6(3) because they were received in satisfaction of an obligation arising out of the employment contract, namely, the obligation to give reasonable notice or salary in lieu thereof. In addition, it was stated that since the damage payments were intended to replace the employment income of which he had been deprived, they had the quality of income.

Paragraph 6(3)(c)


The Queen v. Lao, 93 DTC 5251 (FCTD)

An allowance of $22,500 which the taxpayer received to compensate him for a portion of the higher price he would have to pay for a house on moving from Edmonton to Toronto on the commencement of employment with his employer, was found not to be an employment benefit under s. 6(1)(a) or an amount referred to in s. 6(3)(c).

Administrative Policy

Inducements received to change employment


When an employee receives an amount which is intended as an inducement to leave his or her present employment and accept new employment, the payment is included in the recipient's income. Subsection 6(3) will normally apply to include in income such an inducement paid to an employee by a prospective employer. Furthermore, regardless of who pays the amount, any payment received by an employee as an inducement to accept new employment is considered to be for the purpose of acquiring that taxpayer's experience and capabilities and to be by its nature an income item. For example, in a situation in which a payment is made by a shareholder to induce an individual to resign a managerial position and accept new employment, the payment would be included in the individual's income.

Paragraph 6(3)(d)


Choquette v. The Queen, 74 DTC 6563 (FCTD)

The taxpayer received a lump sum in consideration for relinquishing his rights under his existing employment contract, and it was agreed that he would continue on with the company as an employed consultant. In finding that the sum was taxable under s. 25 of the pre-1972 Act, Décary J. found that, in applying s. 25(a) and subparagraph (ii), the payment could reasonably be regarded as having been received in accordance with an employment contract.

MNR v. Beaupré Estate, 73 DTC 5255, [1973] CTC 316 (FCTD)

After a disagreement, the vice-president ("Beaupré) of a company was told by the president ("Phillips") that he didn't want to see him any more. Two agreements were signed under which Beaupré sold his shares in the company to Phillips for $12,000 and agreed to be a consultant for consideration of $48,000 consisting primarily of monthly payments to be made by the company which could continue after Beaupré's death. When the company ceased to make the payments, Beaupré obtained a judgment in the Quebec Superior Court ordering the making of the payments on the basis that the consultancy contract was fictitious and that in reality there was one contract for the sale of shares. Since the payments were received for the sale of shares and not to prevent competition, s. 25 of the pre-1972 Act (now s. 6(3)) also did not apply to include them in his income.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Evidence 43

See Also

Gowling v. MNR, 78 DTC 1624 (TRB)

Following the termination of the taxpayer's employment, but before he ceased performing his duties, he agreed with his employer that in addition to receiving $3,500 in full settlement of all claims he might have arising from his dismissal, he should be paid a consulting fee of $6,000 in advance for the following 12 months pertaining to any consulting work required of him by his former employer. In fact, no such consulting services were requested of him. Mr. Tremblay found that the taxpayer had failed to establish that the $6,000 could not reasonably be regarded as having been received by the taxpayer as remuneration for services as an officer or under the contract of employment.

Paragraph 6(3)(e)


Girouard v. The Queen, 80 DTC 6205, [1980] CTC 284 (FCA)

After dismissing its financial director but before the effective date of the dismissal, a private hospital, by its board, resolved to pay him $30,000 as liquidated damages as it was obligated to do pursuant to his employment contract and on the following day executed with him a second contract confirming the payment to him of $30,000 as liquidated damages and containing his covenant not to work for another private hospital in Quebec for two years, and not to criticize the hospital. It was held that s. 6(3)(e) did not apply because at the time of entering into the second contract the hospital already owed him (and admitted owing him) $30,000, and the $30,000 accordingly should not be regarded as consideration for his covenant.

Richstone v. MNR, 72 DTC 6232, [1972] CTC 265 (FCTD), briefly aff'd 74 DTC 6129 (FCA)

After difficult negotiations, the taxpayers agreed to sell their shares in a bakery company to their brothers for $150,000, plus a further $150,000 for a non-compete covenant. Notwithstanding submissions of the taxpayers that they regarded their shares as being worth more than $300,000 and that the covenant likely was unenforceable, it was found that the covenant had value to the purchasers and that the payments in consideration of the covenant were employment income.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Illegality covenant respected until invalidated 73
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 6 - Subsection 6(3) 208

See Also

No. 115 v. MNR, 53 DTC 338 (ITAB)

On the sale of shares of a company of which the taxpayer was the controlling shareholder ("Company A") for $540,000, Company A agreed to pay the taxpayer $250,000 per month for 20 years in consideration for his agreement not to engage in the lobster business in two particular counties during the 20-year period. Almost ten years later, a new company ("Company B", of which the taxpayer eventually became the president) was formed, purchased the assets of Company A and assumed the obligation to continue paying $250 per month to the taxpayer in consideration for his covenant to continue observing the non-compete covenant.

Mr. Monet found that neither Company B nor the taxpayer were engaged or even interested in the lobster business, that the covenant was inserted only to make the obligation to make the monthly payments legally enforceable, and that the payments received by the taxpayer from Company B were not paid to him in consideration or partial consideration for the non-compete covenant. He further observed but for the words "irrespective of ... the form or legal effect thereof", the taxpayer would not have had any case at all.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Substance 101

Beak v. Robson (1942), 15 TC 33 HL

In finding that a lump sum of £7,000 paid to the taxpayer in consideration for his agreeing, in his contract of employment, to a restrictive covenant, was not taxable as a "profit from the office" of director and manager, Viscount Simon L.C. stated (at p. 41):

"The sum of £7,000 is not paid for anything done in performing the services in respect of which Mr. Robson is chargeable under Schedule E. The consideration which he has to give under the covenant is to be given not during the period of his employment, but after his termination."

Administrative Policy

27 June 2014 External T.I. 2014-0526931E5 F - Vente d'une liste de clients par un employé

payment to retiring employee for customer list

An employer agrees to purchase the customer list of an employee prior to his cessation of employment. CRA stated (TaxInterpretations translation):

[F]rom the viewpoint of the employee…the amount received from the employer…for a client list is deemed to be remuneration by virtue of subsection 6(3). …[E]ven if the amount paid by the employer could qualify as an eligible capital expenditure for it, this does not detract from the source deduction obligation which normally applies when the amount received by the employee constitutes remuneration… .

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 14 - Subsection 14(5) - Eligible Capital Expenditure payment to retiring employee for customer list 47

20 December 2002 Internal T.I. 2002-0147967 -

Upon the termination by a REIT of a management advisory agreement, an individual who previously worked for the advisor became the CEO of the REIT and a portion of the amount paid by the REIT on the termination of the agreement was allocated to the individual as consideration for a non-compete covenant in his employment contract rather than as termination damages to the management advisor. The Directorate indicated that, given the non-compete covenant was an essential component of the employment agreement of the individual, the amount allocated to him for that clause was income under s. 6(3)(e).

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 54 - Proceeds of Disposition 25
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 9 - Compensation Payments termination of advisory agreemment with external MFT manager gave rise to capital receipt 267

9 November 1999 External T.I. 5-991265 -

The Agency indicated that an amount paid to a dismissed employee to secure a confidentiality agreement would be described by s. 6(3)(e) as consideration for a covenant with reference to what an officer or employee would not do after the termination of the employment.

17 October 1997 Ruling 97110

No amounts will be included in a executive's income under s. 5(1) as a result of a non-funded supplementary retirement arrangement under which, if he retired after 12 years of active service, he would be entitled to annual pension benefits equal to 30% of his average annual compensation during the 36 month period immediately preceding retirement, notwithstanding that benefits would be forfeited for any involvement by him in a competitive business within 18 months of terminating employment with the company or retiring.

8 February 1991 TI

Respecting the situation where a shareholder with a controlling interest in a corporation sold those shares and also received amounts for entering into a non-competition agreement, the Department stated:

"When the facts and circumstances indicate the payment relates to salary or wages or is in replacement thereof the amount will be treated as employment income ... . We agree with your view that, as indicated in IT-196R2 paragraph 2, unless the non-competition payment is considered to be in respect of salary and wages it would not be subject to subject to subsection 6(3) of the Act."

Subsection 6(3.1) - Amount receivable for covenant

Administrative Policy

S2-F3-C1 - Payments from Employer to Employee

1.9 Where an amount in respect of a covenant (described in [s. 6(3)] is receivable by an employee at the end of the year, subsection 6(3.1) deems the amount to be received at the end of that year, if:

  • the amount receivable was not included in the employee's income as part of a salary deferral arrangement as defined in subsection 248(1); and
  • the employee agreed to the covenant more than 36 months before the end of that year.

The amount is taxed as employment income at the end of that year.

1.10 If an amount in respect of a covenant is included in the employee's income as described in ¶1.9 and the amount becomes a bad debt in a later year, the employee may claim a deduction from income under paragraph 60(f) in that later year. An amount generally becomes a bad debt if it remains unpaid after the employee has exhausted all means to collect it or where the employer has become insolvent and has no means of paying it.

Subsection 6(4) - Group term life insurance

Administrative Policy

Employee contributions


Employee contributions to a group term life insurance policy reduce the annual benefit that is included in income under subsection 6(4). ...

December 1992 B.C. Tax Executives Institute Round Table, Q.9 (October 1993 Access Letter, p. 480)

Re consequences of changing a policy year from November 30 to January 31.

December 1992 B.C. Tax Executive Institute Round Table, Q.8 (October 1993 Access Letter, p. 479)

Separate calculations of the benefit under s. 6(4) for different groups of employees of the same employer will only be permitted where, under the terms of the policy, the premium, dividends and experience rating refunds in respect of each group are determined separately and independently.

14 April 1992 T.I. (Tax Window, No. 18, p. 16, ¶1858)

Where a group term life insurance policy that provides benefits over $25,000 requires an additional premium to be paid by the employer to ensure continued coverage under the group policy of employees who are disabled (and who do not pay premiums during disability), the premium will be considered to be "payable in respect of the policy year ending in the year" and, therefore, will be included in the calculation of taxable benefits to the employees under s. 6(4).

Subsection 6(6) - Employment at special work site or remote location


Truemner v. The Queen, 89 DTC 5149 (FCTD)

The taxpayer received a hardship allowance of $35 per day for working as a derrick hand at various locations in Alberta which admittedly were within 25 miles of established communities having a population of at least 1,000. An argument that the taxpayer could not reasonably be expected to maintain an apartment in the various communities was rejected, because those communities had vacancies, and the taxpayer made no attempt to find apartments in those communities.

The Queen v. Demers, 81 DTC 5256, [1981] CTC 282 (FCTD)

The monthly amounts paid to the taxpayer while employed by the Organization of American States included the monthly pro-rated portion of the sum of$4,280, which was intended to help compensate him for the high cost of living in Haiti during his 12-month posting there. This amount did not qualify for exclusion from his income under s. 6(6) given that it was not an "allowance" and given the absence of evidence that it was in respect of the items referred to in s. 6(6).

The Queen v. Forestell, 79 DTC 5289, [1979] CTC 370 (FCTD)

An extra $100 per week received by the taxpayer to compensate him for his additional living expenses while inspecting construction sites in Toronto 129 miles from his home, was held to be an allowance that was exempt by virtue of s. 6(6).

See Also

Spannier v. The Queen, 2013 TC 40

The taxpayer lived in a house in Kelowna from 2005 to 2011, except for a period in 2007 and 2008 where she stayed 20 out of every 28 days in Fort McMurray for work at a job site there (she spent most of the balance in Kelowna). The Minister assessed her for an employee benefit on her housing allowance for Fort McMurray, on the basis that she had not satisfied the conditions of s. 6(6) - in particular, that her Kelowna accommodation:

  1. was not a self-contained domestic establishment;
  2. was not her principal place of residence; and
  3. was not maintained by her.

Graham J. found that the conditions had been satisfied and granted the taxpayer's appeal.

The Minister's arguments relating to the first two points were based chiefly on the eight days spent at the taxpayer's alleged principal residence to her 20 days spent near her job site. In rejecting these arguments, Graham J. stated (at para. 24):

The purpose of subsection 6(6) is to ensure that taxpayers who are forced to incur expenses because of temporary work away from their homes are not taxed on a reasonable allowance provided by their employer to cover such expenses. Taxation on such an allowance would leave the taxpayer worse off for having traveled for work as they would have to pay for their temporary accommodations with after tax dollars.

He found that the purpose of s. 6(6) would be frustrated if the taxpayer's appeal were denied.

Regarding the third point, Graham J. stated (at para. 43):

I find that in the context of subsection 6(6), "maintain" means "preserve for use" or "keep available". ... The intention of the subsection is that the relief is only available to taxpayers who keep a residence available for their use while they are away on work. A taxpayer who does not keep such a residence available has, in essence, moved to the remote work site.

Under that interpretation, it was clear that the taxpayer had maintained her Kelowna accommodations for the purpose of s. 6(6), notwithstanding that the house belonged to a family friend and she stayed there free of charge.

Words and Phrases

Bergeron v. The Queen, 2011 DTC 1098 [at 534], 2010 TCC 56

The taxpayer was paid over $60,000, equal to half his salary, as a living allowance to cover his increased costs of living while in France. Lamarre J. found that, because the taxpayer could not establish that the allowance was not in excess of a reasonable amount, the allowance could not be excluded from income under s. 6(6).

Dupuis v. The Queen, 2009 DTC 1386, 2009 TCC 220 (Informal Procedure)

The taxpayer, who was an education specialist, was retained as a consultant by a Cree community under an employment contract with an initial term of two years (but with the contract being renewed several times). Under the contract, he was provided with, and resided in, a residence on the reserve with his family, although he continued to maintain a separate residence off the reserve as well.

In finding that the taxpayer held a temporary possession at the reserve, and that he was in a location remote from any established community, Tardif, J. noted that the taxpayer had no rights to the premises at which he lodged at the reserve since the location was under the absolute jurisdiction of the Band Council and that the Cree community lacked the quality of an established community.

Words and Phrases

Pozumiak v. The Queen, 2006 DTC 2165, 205 TCc 811

The taxpayer, who was transferred by the Vancouver Port Authority to the Chicago area for over two years to solicit business, was viewed by the Authority and him as there on a temporary assignment. The renting of an apartment there at the Authority's expense did not give rise to a taxable benefit.

Guilbert v. MNR, 91 DTC 740 (TCC)

The taxpayer accepted a position as editor in chief of Le Soleil in Quebec City in the expectation that it would be a temporary position (although, in the event, he stayed at the position for approximately three years) and was given free accommodation in an apartment. Dussault J. found that the newspaper's premises were not "a special work site" within the ordinary meaning of that phrase.

Administrative Policy

12 February 2015 External T.I. 2014-0550771E5 F - Allocation à des bénévoles - chantier particulier

mission work under 2 years in LDCs

A registered charity sends volunteers on missions to developing countries and pays them an allowance of $X per day based on the National Joint Council Travel Directive. After finding that, in any event, "remuneration that is quite unrepresentative of the services rendered would not be taxable," CRA stated respecting s. 6(6)(a) (TaxInterpretations translation):

[W]ork generally will be of a temporary nature if one can reasonably anticipate that its expected duration will not exceed two years. … Furthermore, the CRA generally considers that the rates…established by the Council…to be fair and reasonable.

See summary under s. 5(1).

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 118.1 - Subsection 118.1(1) - Total Charitable Gifts mission work volunteers foregoing allowances 96
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 3 - Business Source/Reasonable Expectation of Profit modest compensation to volunteers qua independent contractors not income 98
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 5 - Subsection 5(1) quite unrepresentative remuneration: exempt 98

15 December 2014 Internal T.I. 2014-0544121I7 F - Chantier particulier

work engagement ceased to be temporary based on a change in circumstances

Regarding a situation where the taxpayer was hired temporarily to help address a temporary work backlog at a remote work site but then was retained once it became clear that another worker had definitively left the work site, the Directorate stated that the determination as to whether a work engagement is temporary generally must be made at its commencement based on the following factors:

  • the nature of the duties to be performed by the employee (certain types of work are, by their nature, short term engagements, such as repair work or trades which are involved only during a certain phase of a project);
  • the overall time estimated for a project, or a particular phase of a project, on which the employee is engaged to perform duties; and
  • the agreed period of time for which the employee was engaged according to the employment contract or other terms of the engagement.

Consideration should also be given, inter alia, to the possibility that the employment contract may be renewed and evidence of an intention to work there temporarily or otherwise.

As indicated in the Bulletin, should these factors change after employment commences, it may be necessary to redetermine whether the duties undertaken by the employee are considered to be of a temporary nature for the purposes of the special work site exclusion.

In relation, to the particular situation, the Directorate indicated that the work engagement ceased to be temporary at a redacted juncture.

Words and Phrases
temporary nature

30 December 2013 External T.I. 2013-0502641E5 - Transportation Allowance

reasonable travel allowance

"[A]n allowance that approximates the transportation expenses to be incurred by the employee would generally be considered reasonable for purposes of subparagraph 6(6)(b)(i)… ."

17 July 2012 Internal T.I. 2011-0421921I7 - Special work site and remote work location

2 year guideline

After referring to the statements in para. 6 of IT-91R4 that CRA will generally accept that an employee's duties are of a temporary nature at a particular work site if it can reasonably be expected that the employee is not continuously employed at that location beyond a two year period, CRA then stated:

...provided a particular employee in the situations described otherwise meets the conditions noted above, the fact that the employee is required to carry on his or her duties at one of the Employer's work sites in excess of the two year guideline mentioned in IT-91R4 would not automatically preclude the application of subsection 6(6)....

21 August 1996 Memorandum 961857 [coast guard vessel away for under 36 hours]

coast guard vessel away for under 36 hours

An individual employed as a watch-keeping officer on a Canadian coast guard vessel would not qualify for the special work site exclusion under s. 6(6)(a)(i) because his duties were not of a temporary nature. In order to qualify for the remote work location exclusion under s. 6(6)(a)(ii) the vessel would have to be at sea for a period of at least 36 hours.

30 June 1995 Memorandum 951108 (C.T.O. "Special Work Site Travel and Accommodation Allowance")

Where an employer has moved the workplace to another location and some employees who are within two years of retirement are provided with interim accommodation and travel allowances for a short time at the new work location rather than being required to relocate, s. 6(6) will apply provided the employees can satisfy the "temporary" requirement and there is factual certainty on this point at the outset.

17 February 1994 T.I. 932533 (C.T.O. "Special Work Sites")

Discussion of whether s. 6(6) is available where an individual who currently owns a residence in a European country and will continue to own that residence in anticipation of her return to that country, moves to Canada for a period of employment of two or three years by a Canadian affiliate of her previous European employer and will receive rent-free accommodation for her and her family during that period.

17 November 1993 Memorandum 932243 (C.T.O. "Special Work Site")

Free board and lodging received by student counsellors living fulltime at summer camps would not be exempt because they would not be paying expenses of a house or apartment and therefore would not be "maintaining" such a residence.

23 March 1992 T.I. (Tax Window, No. 18, p. 16, ¶1826)

A city in eastern Europe may qualify as a special worksite.

2 April 1990 Memorandum (September 1990 Access Letter, ¶1406)

"Established community" means a concentration of dwellings, or an organized area in which families live, and can encompass a community established by the employer. An amount that is non-taxable by virtue of s. 6(6)(a)(ii) will not reduce the amount of the deduction allowed by s. 110.7(1).

88 C.R. - F.Q.1

Any amount paid by the employee to the employer in respect of a benefit received would correspondingly reduce the amount of the benefit provided.


Novek, "Employment Benefits May be Tax-Free If Provided in Connection with Special Worksite or Remote Location", Taxation of Executive Compensation and Retirement, October 1991, p. 505.

Paragra;h 6(6)(a)

Administrative Policy

19 January 2015 External T.I. 2014-0549061E5 F - logement des employés

permanent duties in a precarious field are not temporary duties/"remote" means over 80 km.

The corporate Employer offered temporary housing in the municipality where it carried on business to employees who had homes elsewhere. Employees performed shifts of at this location while staying at the temporary accommodation, and followed by; days off and were transported both morning and evening between the temporary lodging and their homes on the shift/days-off transitions for security reasons.

In finding that the value of the temporary lodging provided by the Employer should be included in computing the employees’ income under s. 6(1)(a), CRA stated:

[F]or subparagraph 6(6)(a)(i) to apply … the duties performed by the employee at the special work site [must be] of a temporary nature…. [Y]our question… concern[s]… duties that are permanent in a precarious field. The fact that the duration of employment is uncertain as a result of market conditions does not, on its own, result in temporary employment. …

[S.. 6(6)(a)(ii) is unavailable as] generally, a location is considered remote if the nearest established community of 1,000 or more is at least 80 kilometers (50 miles) by the most direct route normally taken in the circumstances.

Subsection 6(11) - Salary deferral arrangement

Administrative Policy

29 April 2015 External T.I. 2015-0565181E5 - Amendment to DSU plan

termination of Plan contrary to DSU rules triggered retroactive application of SDA rules

After finding that an amendment to a deferred share unit plan giving participants the option to be paid the value of their awards in instalments over a maximum of six years after retirement or termination of employment would cause the plan to cease to qualify under Reg. 6801(d), CRA noted:

If it is determined based on the facts that a DSU plan was never intended to provide for payments within the time parameters of paragraph 6801(d)… the SDA rules would apply retroactively. For example, … where a DSU plan was terminated and all outstanding awards were redeemed in cash…[a]s the early redemption did not involve extraordinary circumstances…we took the position that the SDA rules applied retroactively with respect to any outstanding awards.

...The effect of these rules [in ss. 6(1)(a)(v), 6(11) and 248(1) - "deferred amount"] is to bring into income the current value of any rights that exist under an SDA at the end of each year that were not previously included in income. If an amount was includable in income in a year that is now statute-barred, … [this] result[s] in the amount being brought forward and included in income in the earliest non-statute-barred year.

See also summary under Reg. 6801(d).

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Regulations - Regulation 6801 - Paragraph 6801(d) termination of Plan contrary to DSU rules triggered retroactive application of SDA rules 191


David Nathanson, "Included Versus Reported", Canadian Tax Highlights, Vol. 24, No. 9, September 2016, p. 5

Quigley treats “included” as “reported” or “assessed” (p. 5)

[T]he [Quigley] decision assumes that "included" means "reported" or "assessed as income," but paragraph 20(l)(j) allows a deduction for "such part of any loan . . . [that was] repaid by the taxpayer in the year as was by virtue of subsection 15(2) included in computing the taxpayer's income for a preceding taxation year." The wording seems to indicate that the operative event is the inclusion in income by a provision of the statute and not the inclusion in income by the minister's; assessment or by the taxpayer's reporting.

CRA position that SDA benefit can be included in 1st non-statute-barred year (p. 5)

[A] contribution to an RCA is not included in the individual taxpayer's income; a contribution to an SDA is income from employment in the year of receipt, not a subsequent year. But the CRA takes the position that because the contribution was not reported by the individual in the year of receipt, 'it was not "included" in the computation of the individual's income for that year "to that extent" As a consequence, the CRA says that the amount can be included in income by reassessment of the individual's first year that is not statute-barred. This conclusion is not true if an amount is included in income only because it is required by the Act and not because the taxpayer reported it as income.

…The Act provides no such statutory election to the minister.

Parliament did not make year of inclusion contingent (p. 5)

The orthodox view is that the word "included" means reported or assessed. However, in many if not all circumstances, the word specifically means amounts that are included by the statue and not by any act of the taxpayer or of the minister. If Parliament intended to make a tax result depend on the action of the taxpayer or the minister, the statute should expressly provide for that contingency.

Words and Phrases

Jim Kahane, Uros Karadzic, Simon Létourneau-Laroche, "A Fresh Look at Retirement Compensation Arrangement: A Flexible Vehicle for Retirement Planning", Canadian Tax Journal (2013) 61:2, 479 – 502.

Consequences of SDA (p. 484)

If a plan is characterized as an SDA, adverse tax consequences result. The amounts contributed to the plan would be considered to be deferred income, taxable immediately to the employee in the taxation year in which the contributions are made by the employer. [fn 20: Subsection 6(11).] Although the employee would be immediately subject to income tax on the contributed amount, the cash would not be available since it would remain with the custodian of the plan.

Comparison with employee benefit plan (p. 484)

Finally, where a funded unregistered arrangement is neither an SDA nor an RCA, it will likely constitute an EBP where the arrangement involves a custodian. In the case of post-employment compensation, an EBP may be used to deliver incentive awards or provide benefits to former employees. The EBP rules allow the tax to be deferred until the employee receives the benefit payment. In this way, the EBP rules may be viewed as less harsh than the SDA rules, which require immediate income recognition even where the amount has not been received. However, the RCA offers more flexibility in providing benefits than either an EBP or an SDA.

Subsection 6(13) - Application


Miller, "Tax Considerations for U.S. Citizens Moving to Canada", 1993 Corporate Management Tax Conference Report, c. 16.

Subsection 6(15) - Forgiveness of employee debt

Administrative Policy

12 October 2016 Internal T.I. 2016-0637781I7 - Employee loan or debt extinguished or settled

writing-off a statute-barred debt of an employee or remitting for financial hardship triggers benefit

An organization (apparently, a federal Crown corporation or agency) may “write off or remit” an employee debt based on employee financial hardship or bankruptcy, or as a result of collection of the debt becoming statute-barred. Will s. 6(15) apply?

Respecting where the debt is remitted under s. 23(2.1) of the Financial Administration Act for reasons of financial hardship, CRA stated:

Since the debt is settled or extinguished because of the organization’s decision and not the operation of another law… the benefit is connected to the employee’s employment…[and] would be included…under paragraph 6(1)(a).


[W]here… the employee debt is extinguished as a result of… bankruptcy proceedings, the benefit is not connected to the employee’s employment and the amount of the debt extinguished is not included in the employee’s income.

After having already stated that an employee debt is settled or extinguished where the “employer writes off or remits” it, CRA addressed the statute-barring situation:

[T]he debt is not settled or extinguished by operation of the [statute-barring]…. Where your organization writes off a debt because it is not legally enforceable… the benefit is connected to the employee’s employment. …[T]he amount of the debt written off would be included in the employee’s employment income under paragraph 6(1)(a).

Words and Phrases
Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 80 - Subsection 80(2) - Paragraph 80(2)(a) writing-off debt was its settlement 34

10 February 1992 T.I. (Tax Window, No. 16, p. 12, ¶1742)

Where an employee receives a loan from his employer to acquire shares of his employer (a public corporation) on the basis that the shares will be held by a trustee until the loan is repaid, s. 6(15) will apply, if the employee leaves his employment and forfeits his shares, to the extent that the fair market value of the shares is less than the amount of the loan at the time he leaves. Where the stock is traded actively, the fair market value of the shares will be the average trading price on the day in which the payment is made.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - General Concepts - Fair Market Value - Shares 24

4 November 1991 Memorandum (Tax Window, No. 13, p. 11, ¶1585)

Where an employee has declared bankruptcy after receiving a loan from his employer and later receives a discharge, the amount of the unpaid loan will be included in his income. S.6(15) also applies when a loan to the employee is settled after the bankruptcy of the employer.

Locations of other summaries Wordcount
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 80.4 - Subsection 80.4(1) 29

Subsection 6(15.1) - Forgiven amount

See Also

Rémillard v. The Queen, 2011 DTC 1286 [at 1617], 2011 TCC 327

The taxpayer was the sole director and an employee of a company ("RCI"), who lent the taxpayer $5 million and then forgave the debt at the behest of a potential purchaser of RCI. McArthur J. found that the taxpayer realized a corresponding benefit under s. 6(15). The taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that s. 6(15) did not apply because the debt was not a commercial obligation and the s. 80(1) definition of "forgiven amount" excludes debts that are not commercial obligations.

This argument was untenable in light of s. 6(15.1). The reference in that provision to the debt being a commercial obligation was an assumption which it imposed, rather than the stipulation of a condition which was required to be satisfied.

Subsection 6(22) - Eligible housing loss

See Also

Thomas v. The Queen, 2005 DTC 1527, 2005 TCC 613

When the taxpayer's employment was terminated, he was reimbursed by his employer for the cost of his home notwithstanding that that cost exceeded the fair market value of the home at the time by $91,870. He then relocated to Ottawa.

Given that the taxpayer sold his home to his employer because his employment was terminated and not because he relocated to Ottawa, the loss for which he was reimbursed was not an eligible housing loss, and was deemed to be a benefit under s. 6(19).

Administrative Policy

S2-F3-C2 - Benefits and Allowances Received from Employment

eligible housing loss

2.39 An eligible housing loss is defined in subsection 6(22) as a housing loss in respect of an eligible relocation of an employee or an individual who does not deal at arm’s length with the employee. An employee can designate only one residence for purposes of the eligible housing loss. An eligible relocation in respect of an individual is a relocation that occurs to enable the individual to be employed at a new work location, where the new residence is located at least40 kilometres closer to the new work location than the old residence. When an employer compensates an employee for an eligible housing loss, the first $15,000 of the compensation is not included in the employee’s income. However, one-half of the compensation that exceeds $15,000 is deemed by subsection 6(20) to be a benefit received from employment and included in the employee’s income under paragraph 6(1)(a). For examples of how to calculate an eligible housing loss benefit, go to Examples - housing loss.

Subsection 6(23) - Employer-provided housing subsidies

Administrative Policy

25 May 2001 External T.I. 2001-007831 -

The payment or reimbursement by an employer to an employee of reasonable temporary living expenses incurred while waiting to occupy a new, permanent form of accommodation would not fall within the preview of s. 6(23).

The Queen v. Proulx, 2010 DTC 5028 [at 5609], 2010 FCA 261

In accordance with Lefebvre, the Court found that the taxpayer, being a pastoral agent of the Roman Catholic Church, was not a "regular minister of a religious denomination" and therefore ineligible for s. 8(1)(c) deductions.