Subsection 251.2(1)
Investment Fund
Articles
Josh Jones, Jeffrey Love, "Recent Developments in Asset Management", draft 2023 CTF Annual Conference paper
Permanent tainting if momentary breach of any condition (p. 26)
- A trust breaching any of the conditions in paras. (a) or (b) of the definition of investment fund, even momentarily, will permanently lose its investment fund status.
Need under para. (a) to qualify units in year of trust creation (pp. 26-27)
- By virtue of the para. (a) requirement that a post-2013 trust must have a class of units that are qualified for distribution to the public in accordance with Reg. 4801(a) in the same calendar year in which it was created, a trust created in December in order to file a final prospectus in December, but whose units are not distributed until January will not meet that requirement and, therefore, be permanently disqualified from investment fund status.
Additional requirements where already an MFT (p. 27)
- In practice, if a trust which (leaving aside the 150 beneficiary requirement) qualified as a mutual fund trust, failed to qualify as an investment fund, this would likely occur under s. (b)(iii) or (b)(vi)(D).
Investment diversification test in s. (b)(iii) (p. 27)
- Regarding the requirement in s. (b)(iii) of following “a reasonable policy of investment diversification,” a fund should be able to satisfy this test by investing in a bottom fund that itself satisfies this test and should be evaluated in the context of the fund’s objectives - for example, in the case of a long federal bond fund, it could mean holding a portfolio of 15 different federal bonds.
Concentration test in s. (b)(vi)(D) (p. 28)
- In practice, it is possible for funds to violate the concentration test in (b)(vi)(D) by investing in a bottom fund that is a partnership, a Canadian resident trust that is not an investment fund, or a non-resident trust or corporation, given that the fund might have obtained exemptive relief in this regard from the application of NI 81-102.
Subsection 251.2(2)
Paragraph 251.2(2)(a)
See Also
Birchcliff Energy Ltd. v. The Queen, 2017 TCC 234
A newly-launched public corporation ("Birchcliff") sought to access the losses and credits of a lossco ("Veracel"). A substantial subscription receipt offering by Veracel closed about one month before the implementation of a Plan of Arrangement under which the subscription receipts were converted into Class B common shares and then immediately converted on the amalgamation of Vercel with Birchcliff into common shares of the amalgamated corporation. As these investors received a majority voting equity interest in Amalco, the loss streaming rules otherwise engaged by ss. 256(7)(b)(iii)(B) and 111(5)(a) were avoided.
In rejecting a Crown submission that the Class B shareholders, by subscribing to buy those shares and by giving a proxy to a promoter of the transaction, formed a group of persons having acquired control of Veracel immediately prior to the amalgamation, Jorré J stated (at paras 107 and 110):
…[T]he entire structure of the transaction makes it impossible to exercise the proxy for Class B shares since those shares are replaced at the same time as they are created. …
At the most, the proxy links them as Class B shareholders to assist in implementing the plan of arrangement; it does not give them the ability to change the direction of Veracel and it does not give them control of Veracel.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - General Concepts - Sham | ephemeral transactions under a Plan of Arrangement were not a sham | 215 |
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 245 - Subsection 245(3) | series of transactions found to be an avoidance transaction | 306 |
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 245 - Subsection 245(4) | raising share equity through a lossco immediately before its amalgamation was abusive | 278 |
Crystal Beach Park Limited v. The Queen, 2006 DTC 2845, 2006 TCC 183
In finding that two business associates (Tiburzi and Gelder) were not a group of persons, Sheridan J. noted that their past business dealings with each other had not engendered the kind of relationship that might cause one or the other of them to be able to influence the other to vote in accordance with his wishes, and that there were no agreements by them to act in concert. Accordingly, they did not represent a group that had acquired control of the taxpayer.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - General Concepts - Onus | 49 | |
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 111 - Subsection 111(5) - Paragraph 111(5)(a) | the essence of a property was as a recreational property, so that addition of a marina and residential component did not create a new business | 218 |
Administrative Policy
10 October 2024 APFF Roundtable Q. 17, 2024-1028981C6 - Acquisition de contrôle
Situation 1
A, B and C were three unrelated individuals. A and B, who were the sole shareholders of Opco, each holding 50% of the common shares, each sold 1/3 of their shares to C, for FMV consideration.
Would a new group (A, B and C) be considered to have acquired control of Opco, or would CRA consider that the group formed by A and B still controlled the corporation, so that there was no acquisition of control?
CRA indicated:
- The CRA position as per Folio S1-F5-C1 is that the shareholders of a private corporation are presumed to act in concert to control the corporation (the “control group presumption”); and that, in almost all cases where the voting rights in a corporation are exercised equally by two shareholders, the corporation will be controlled by the group formed by those two shareholders.
- Consequently, here, unless it can be shown that neither A nor B controlled Opco prior to the disposition to C and that the decision-making process in the corporation was effectively at a standstill, A and B would be presumed to form a group of persons that controlled Opco.
- Whether the acquisition of a minority interest in a corporation results in an acquisition of its control by a new group of persons is generally determined based on such factors (set out in IT-302R3, para. 7) as who previously controlled the corporation, the number or percentage of shares purchased, the method of acquisition, common interests and concerted actions.
- At the 1984 CTF Roundtable, Q.42, regarding the same situation, CRA indicated that the two original shareholders would still be in a position to control the corporation after the disposition of the shares, but that to the extent that the two original shareholders would cease to act in concert to control the corporation, the disposition of the shares could result in the acquisition of control of the corporation. CRA now further commented that that it would be reasonable to consider there to be an acquisition of control by a group of which C was a member if A or B withdrew from control of Opco and that this “could also be the case if, after the disposition of the shares, it was determined that A, B and C formed a group of persons that controls Opco.”
Situation 2
A to D (being four unrelated individuals) each held 25% of the shares (being common shares) of Opco. Would the repurchase by Opco of D’s shares result in an acquisition of control of Opco?
CRA indicated that such repurchase would result in an acquisition of control by a group consisting of the three remaining shareholders unless the control group presumption could be rebutted by demonstrating, for instance, that control of Opco was exercised by the same group before and after (e.g., by the group consisting only of A to C).
4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable Q. 4, 2024-1003461C6 - Acquisition of Control
Has there been any change to the position in IT-302R3 that a change of executor, administrator or trustee of an estate does not result in an acquisition of control of a corporation controlled by the estate, if the replacement results from a death or inability to fulfill the function of an executor, administrator or trustee.
CRA indicated that where the executor, administrator, or trustee of an estate is replaced as a result of that person’s death or inability to fulfill their function, control of the corporation would not be acquired solely as a result of that replacement. This position is not conditional on the replacement trustee being related or otherwise connected to the executor, administrator or trustee being replaced.
4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable Q. 3, 2024-1003471C6 - Acquisition of Control
If a controlling shareholder of a corporation becomes incapable and an unrelated person (or persons) starts acting on the shareholder’s behalf under a power of attorney, does that constitute a loss restriction event for the corporation, and would there be a further such event on a future change of attorney?
After indicating that an agreement that is not a unanimous shareholders agreement would not generally be considered in determining the de jure control of the corporation (except where the shares were held in trust), CRA stated that a power of attorney under which a designated attorney exercises the voting rights of a controlling shareholder of a corporation as a consequence of the incapacity of that shareholder who continues to be the legal and beneficial owner of those shares would not constitute an external document that has to be taken into consideration in determining the de jure control of the corporation. This confirmed the response in 2012 APFF Roundtable Q.17, 2012-0454111C6.
A power of attorney may be relevant in applying s. 251(5)(b) or s. 256(1.4),
15 June 2022 STEP Roundtable Q. 6, 2022-0928191C6 - Acquisition of control
A Canadian corporation is wholly owned by a trust, which is a discretionary trust, so that s. 256(7)(i) does not apply. Is there an acquisition of control of the corporation if:
(a) The sole trustee resigns and is replaced by a related trustee,
(b) The same as (a) except that the replacement trustee is unrelated.
(c) The trust has two trustees, who are required by the trust deed to make their decisions unanimously. One of them (E) resigns and is replaced by an individual related to E.
(d) The same as (c) except that the replacement is unrelated to E.
(e) The trust has three trustees, H, I and J. The trust requires majority decision making. J resigns and is replaced by K. Each of H, I, J and K are not related.
CRA indicated that, based on Consolidated Holding, where the majority of the voting shares of the corporation are held by a trust, it is the trustees of the trust who have legal ownership of the shares, who have the right to vote those shares, and who therefore control the corporation. Where a trust has multiple trustees, the determination as to which trustee or group of trustees controls the corporation can only be made after a review of all the pertinent facts including the terms of the trust documents.
CRA considers there to be a rebuttable presumption that all of the trustees would constitute a group that controls the corporation so that there would be an acquisition of control in situations (b), (d) and (e) of the question. For situations (a) and (c), s. 256(7)(a)(i)(A) may apply to deem there to be no acquisition of control where the shares are acquired by a person related to the former trustee provided that the replacement trustee is appointed concurrently with the resignation of the former trustee.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 256 - Subsection 256(7) - Paragraph 256(7)(a) - Subparagraph 256(7)(a)(i) - Clause 256(7)(a)(i)(A) | application of s. 256(7)(a)(i)(A) where trustee is replaced by related trustee | 202 |
2021 Ruling 2020-0874931R3 F - Post-mortem Pipeline
The statement of facts indicated (at para. 35) that the resignation and replacement of the executor of an estate resulted in a deemed taxation year end for the corporations controlled by the estate.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 84 - Subsection 84(2) | pipeline using a joint Newco of children and estate | 415 |
3 April 2019 Internal T.I. 2018-0787561I7 - Partnership and the Meaning of "Related"
In the course of a routine response, CRA noted its position that “when a partnership owns shares in a corporation … [t]he partnership agreement and the equity interest of the members must be examined to determine which member(s) of the partnership can exercise voting rights in respect of the shares of the corporation. In the case of a limited partnership … it is usually the general partner that can exercise these rights.” 2000-0038055 F and 2013-0484031E5 are similar.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 251 - Subsection 251(2) - Paragraph 251(2)(c) - Subparagraph 251(2)(c)(i) | partnership agreement consulted to determine whether partner controls a corporation held by the partnership | 134 |
15 October 2014 External T.I. 2014-0547551E5 F - Acquisition of Control
The common shares of Opco are held as follows: A-20%; B-9%; C-10%; D-25%; E-10%; F-13%; G-13%. A, B and C are a related group as are E, F and G. D is unrelated to the others. All the shareholders act in concert to control Opco.
Will there be an acquisition of control of Opco if: (i) A acquires the shares of E, F and G; (ii) such shares instead are acquired by a Holdco wholly-owned by A; or (iii) A, B, C and D acquire the shares of E, F and G in proportion to their respective existing percentage ownership? CRA responded (TaxInterpretations translation):
[B]y acquiring the common shares…held by E, F and G, A would hold 56% of the common shares of Opco. Consequently, A would control Opco. In these circumstances, the jurisprudence recognizes that control by one person excludes simultaneous control by a group [citing Southside and Emory]… .
Respecting your second question…the control of Opco also would have been acquired by A. With his direct and indirect (through Holdco) interest in Opco, A would control Opco after the share transfer. …
Respecting your last question, the described acquisition of the shares … of Opco by A, B and C and would establish respective interests of 31%, 14%, 16% and 39%. …[T]he related group comprising A, B and C would have an interest of 61%... .That could ["pourrait"] represent a sufficient common link to indicate that a new group controlled Opco. In such determination, it also is necessary to take into account that a significant number of the shareholders of Opco (three out of seven) would cease to be such and the total interest of the departing shareholders would represent a significant percentage (36%) of the totality of the shares of Opco. This situation differs significantly from the case of a departing shareholder with little or no common link or common interest with the other shareholders with which it did not act in concert, and thus did not form part of the control group. …[I]t is quite likely ["fort probable"] that there would be a resulting acquisition of control of Opco… .
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 249 - Subsection 249(4) | reduction in CCPC shareholders from 7 to 4 likely would result in AOC | 287 |
18 December 2013 External T.I. 2013-0511101E5 F - Substantial interest - Part VI.1
An inter vivos trust (Trust), with three individual trustees holds Class A non-voting common shares and C special voting shares of Corporation. An estate (the “Succession”), whose three executors are the same individuals, holds non-voting Class B preferred shares. In order to convert the estate's interest into a substantial interest for Part VI.1 purposes, they cause Corporation to redeem the Class C voting shares which, in turn, causes the Class B preferred shares to become voting pursuant to s. 48(2) of the Quebec Business Corporations Act (a provision which effectively deems all shares to become voting whenever none is voting).
In finding that “there will be no acquisition of control upon the redemption of the Class C Shares of the capital stock of Corporation,” CRA stated:
[T]he same persons (D, F and G) controlled Corporation before and after the redemption of the Class C shares of the capital stock of Corporation because the trustees of Trust who controlled Corporation before the redemption were the same persons as the executors of Succession that controlled Corporation after the redemption.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 191 - Subsection 191(3) | creation of substantial interest through redemption of special voting shares | 414 |
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 248 - Subsection 248(1) - Disposition | no disposition of shares that became voting by operation of law (due to cancellation of voting shares) | 171 |
Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 249 - Subsection 249(4) | voting rights shifted to 2nd trust with same trustees: no control change | 179 |
5 October 2012 APFF Roundtable Q. 17, 2012-0454111C6 F - Power of attorney and acquisition of control
Mr. X, who is the sole shareholder of XYZ Inc., signs a mandate (power of attorney) in favour of his accountant (with whom he deals at arm's length) to become effective in the event of his incapacity.
In stating that there is no acquisition of control when the power of attorney is homologated (becomes effective following such incapacity), CRA stated, after referring to Duha:
...[N]otwithstanding the homologation of this power of attorney governed by the Quebec Civil Code, the ownership of that number of shares conferring a majority of the votes for the election of the board of directors is part of the patrimony of Mr. X. Furthermore, we are of the view that a power of attorney granted with a view to incapacity should be considered to be an "external document" (in relation to the constating documents of the corporation) in the determination of the de jure control of a corporation.
It is emphasized however that the rights of an attorney (“mandataire”) pursuant to a power of attorney in contemplation of incapacity could, in certain circumstances, engage paragraph 251(5)(b) and subsection 256(1).
8 October 2010 Roundtable, 2010-0373131C6 F - Présomption d'action concertée
What is the basis for the presumption that the three unrelated shareholders of a private corporation will act together to control the corporation, given that it can be demonstrated that no one individually controls the corporation and that the decision-making process is not deadlocked? What if there are 4 or 5 shareholders? CRA responded:
[Although] the CRA effectively presumes that the three shareholders are acting together to control the corporation and therefore form a controlling group … the CRA may consider that the three shareholders do not form a group of persons who control the corporation if it is demonstrated that there is no common bond or interest between the three shareholders or that they are not acting together for the purpose of controlling the corporation.
Whether a group of unrelated persons controls a corporation and, if so, the composition of that group, in situations where a private corporation has more than three unrelated shareholders, none of whom individually controls the corporation, is a question that the CRA generally determines after a review and analysis of all the facts, legal documents and circumstances … .
21 March 2005 Internal T.I. 2005-0119961I7 F - CCPC STATUS
USco disposed of 50% of the shares of Canco to another corporation ("Holdco" – that was a Canadian-owned Canadian corporation), "retroactive" to a particular date. After commenting on the effectiveness or not of the stated effective date, the Directorate went on to address whether there was a resulting acquisition of control, stating:
[T]his disposition would likely have resulted in an acquisition of control of Canco. Indeed, prior to the disposition of the shares, Canco would appear to be controlled by a single person, namely USco. From the disposition of the shares, Canco would appear to be controlled by a group of persons consisting of USco and Holdco. The CRA's position on this point is that in almost all cases where the voting rights in a corporation are exercised equally by two shareholders, the corporation will be controlled by the group composed of those two shareholders. To rebut this presumption of control by the group, it would be necessary to show that no shareholder controls the corporation and that the decision-making process in the corporation is effectively deadlocked. Such a situation would be very exceptional. It could, however, occur when the two shareholders cannot agree on how to manage the corporation and therefore go to court to authorize the dissolution of their corporation.
Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
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Tax Topics - General Concepts - Effective Date | effective date of transfer of shares (entailing acquisition of control) cannot precede determination of essential contract elements | 145 |
Paragraph 251.2(2)(b)
Articles
Josh Jones, Jeffrey Love, "Recent Developments in Asset Management", draft 2023 CTF Annual Conference paper
ETF difficulty in detecting whether a unitholder has become a majority-interest beneficiary (pp 25-26)
- A fund can conclude that it did not experience a loss restriction event in a year (with a resulting deemed taxation year) by virtue of being an investment fund - or by virtue of monitoring unit acquisitions by its unitholders (which may not be practicable for an ETF since the requirement under NI 62-104 to provide early warning of an acquisition of 10% or more of a class of securities of a reporting issuer generally does not apply to ETFs, and most ETFs generally rely on exemptive relief from NI 62-104 requiring disclosure of securities subject to an offer plus existing securities which constitute 20% or more of the securities of a class).
Subsection 251.2(3)
Paragraph 251.2(3)(b)
Articles
Elie Roth, Tim Youdan, Chris Anderson, Kim Brown, "Taxation of Trusts Resident in Canada", Chapter 3 of Canadian Taxation of Trusts, (Canadian Tax Foundation), 2016.
Application where trustees vest all interests of a beneficiary (pp. 154-155)
Paragraph 251.2(3)(b) provides that variations or amendments to a trust and the exercise or failure to exercise a power do not give rise to a loss restriction event for the trust, provided that each majority-interest beneficiary or member of a majority-interest group of beneficiaries is affiliated with the trust immediately before the variation, amendment, or failure to exercise a power. This exception should apply when the trustees of a discretionary trust vest all of the income or capital interests in a beneficiary, because the trust is affiliated with the discretionary beneficiary immediately before the exercise of discretion pursuant to paragraph 251.1(4)(d).