Certainty

In connection with finding that the “business conducted” by a Barbados subsidiary of the taxpayer did not include its activities of raising capital from its shareholder (the taxpayer), Côté J stated (at para. 61, after having made the same point at greater length at para. 41):

[I]f taxpayers are to act with any degree of certainty, then full effect should be given to Parliament’s precise and unequivocal words.

In finding that there should not be an expansive interpretation of what constitutes de facto control in s. 256(5.1), Ryer JA stated (at paras 49-50):

…An interpretation of subsection 256(5.1) that encompasses “operational” control would import a degree of subjectivity into the de facto analysis that, in my view, would lead to unpredictability, rather than predictability, as mandated by the Canada Trustco [2005 SCC 54, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601] interpretative approach.

In indicating that judges should not apply taxation policies that are not grounded in the specific provisions of the Act, McLaughlin C.J. and Major J. stated (at p. 5530) that such an approach "would run counter to the overall policy of Parliament that tax law be certain, predictable and fair, so that taxpayers can intelligently order their affairs. Although Parliament's general purpose in enacting the GAAR was to preserve legitimate tax minimization schemes while prohibiting abusive tax avoidance, Parliament must also be taken to seek consistency, predictability and fairness in tax law. These three latter purposes would be frustrated if the Minister and/or the courts overrode the provisions of the Income Tax Act without any basis in a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of those provisions."

Before finding that for purposes of the requirement in s. 20(1)(c)(i) that money must have been borrowed for an income-producing purpose in order to give rise to deductible interest, "income" referred to income before deductions, Iacobucci J. stated (at p. 5515):

"Nowhere in the language of the provision is a quantitative test suggested. Nor is there any support in the text of the Act for an interpretation of 'income' that involves a judicial assessment of sufficiency of income. Such an approach would be too subjective and certainty is to be preferred in the area of tax law."

In finding that the proceeds of disposition of a property to the taxpayer were established by the actual sale price rather than by the formula in s. 79(c) of the Act, Linden J.A. stated (at p. 6575) that "normally, the Income Tax Act taxes someone on the basis of what has actually been received, not on the basis of some theoretical formula.".

Major J. accepted the following comments in P.W. Hogg's Notes on Income Tax:

"It would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income Tax Act if clear language and a detailed provision of the Act were to be qualified by unexpressed exceptions derived from a court's view of the object and purpose of the provision ... . When a provision is couched in specific language that admits of no doubt or ambiguity in its application to the facts, then the provision must be applied regardless of its object and purpose."

In finding that a federal sales tax refund should not be considered to have been receivable by the taxpayer until the Minister had given some public irrevocable indication thereof, Hugessen J.A. stated (p. 6128):

"The decision creates rights and starts time running and it is as much in the public interest as in that of those immediately concerned that there be a basic minimum of certainty as to when it is made and what it is. A decision in Pectore would be an abomination in law."

Nöel A.C.J. stated (at p. 5427) that in order for an accountant's report to give the taxpayer a general picture of his affairs "it is not necessary for the profit shown to be exact but it must be reasonably close, while the Income Tax Act requires it to be exact, and it is thus necessarily arbitrary".