Cases
Contact Lens King Inc. v. Canada, 2022 FCA 154
The zero-rating for contact lenses in Sched. VI, Pt. II, s. 9 required that the contact lenses be supplied under the authority of a prescription by an authorized practitioner, but did not explicitly require that the supplier obtain and retain copies of such prescriptions. LeBlanc JA, found contrary to the Tax Court, found that no such requirement should be inferred. In this regard, he stated (para. 27, TaxIntepretations translation):
There is therefore a risk here that the interpretation adopted by the TCC judge would add to the text of Section 9, which the courts must avoid doing. In other words, the courts, under the pretext of interpreting it, cannot insert into the text of the Act terms that are not there. This is the role of the legislature, not the courts … .
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Schedules - Schedule VI - Part II - Section 9 | a requirement to make supplies pursuant to a prescription did not require obtaining a copy of the prescription | 462 |
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 286 - Subsection 286(1) | no particular form of documentary evidence required by s. 286(1) | 228 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 230 - Subsection 230(1) | taxpayer flexibility to determine corroborative documents | 103 |
CIBC World Markets Inc. v. Canada, 2011 FCA 270
As ETA s. 141.01(5) did not stipulate that the choice of an ITC allocation method was irrevocable; irrevocability was not to be inferred.
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Excise Tax Act - Section 141.01 - Subsection 141.01(5) | no implied irrevocability of choice of method | 177 |
| Tax Topics - Statutory Interpretation - Interpretation Act - Subsection 45(2) | subsequent provision illustrates the missing words in current provision | 112 |
Friesen v. Canada, 95 DTC 5551, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 103
After characterizing the Crown's proposed interpretation of the definition of "inventory" in s. 248(1) of the Act as a request to treat the definition as if it contained additional words, Major J. stated (at para. 27):
"It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation that the Court should not accept an interpretation which requires the insertion of extra wording where there is another acceptable interpretation which does not require any additional wording. Reading extra words into a statutory definition is even less acceptable when the phrases which must be read in appear in several other definitions in the same statute."
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 10 - Subsection 10(1) | loss recognized on decline in value of land held as an adventure | 142 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 248 - Subsection 248(1) - Inventory | property held in an adventure was inventory | 83 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 9 - Capital Gain vs. Profit - Real Estate | undeveloped land held in speculative venture | 142 |
| Tax Topics - Statutory Interpretation - Certainty | clear language and detailed provisions not to be qualified by unexpressed exceptions derived from views as to a provision's purpose | 97 |
| Tax Topics - Statutory Interpretation - Drafting Style | 95 | |
| Tax Topics - Statutory Interpretation - Ordinary Meaning | common usage of a technical term given weight | 80 |
| Tax Topics - Statutory Interpretation - Resolving Ambiguity | 97 | |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 248 - Subsection 248(1) - Business | s. 10(1) applied to an adventure in the nature of trade even if that deemed business was not “carried on” | 75 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 45 - Subsection 45(1) - Paragraph 45(1)(a) | property not generating income does not convert to capital property unless s. 13(7) or 45(1) applies | 209 |
MacMillen Bloedel Limited v. Her Majesty the Queen, [1991] 1 CTC 204
In determining that it was inappropriate to effectively rectify an anomaly in the wording of ETA s. 27(1), which made it impossible to calculate the federal sales tax imposed on imported diesel fuel, unless it were interpreted as containing the words "or on the volume," which had been added by a subsequent amendment, McNair J. stated (at p. 212):
... I must stress first of all that the rectification of a legislative text is a drastic step for any court to undertake. ... [T[he present case is one where Parliament may well have intended to levy a sales tax on imported diesel fuel, but failed to do so in sufficiently clear terms on the present wording of subsection 27(1) and paragraph 27(1.1)(c) of the Act, before the amendment. Moreover, I am of the opinion that any judicial power of rectification with respect to legislation ought only to be exercised in the rarest of circumstances, that is, where absolutely necessary to achieve the clear manifestation of legislative intent in the face of obstacles created by very minor and patently obvious imperfections of language. To fill the gap by writing in the words "or on the volume" would constitute, in my opinion, an arbitrary and unwarranted intrusion on the role of Parliament.
See Also
Veracity Capital Corp. v. The Queen, 2017 BCCA 3
In the course of her analysis of the B.C. GAAR (s. 68.1(1)), MacKenzie JA found it telling that s. 68.1(1)(d), unlike s. 68.1(1)(c), did not refer to the reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax under the B.C. Act or “under any other federal or provincial Act.” In this regard, she stated (at para. 78):
It is clearly not the role of the courts to add language that is not there, especially when interpreting tax legislation, where the Supreme Court has recognized that legislatures choose their words carefully to balance delicate, competing policy interests: Shell Canada Ltd. v. Canada, 1999 CanLII 647 (SCC), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 622 at para. 43. This is especially true with the GAAR, which strikes a balance between the well-recognized right of taxpayers to organize their affairs in accordance with the statute to minimize taxes, and the right of the government not to be deprived of its revenues due to abusive tax avoidance: Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. Canada, 2001 SCC 62 (CanLII) at para. 39. Also apposite in this balancing are the principles of consistency, predictability and fairness in tax law (Canada Trustco at para. 42, Copthorne at para. 67)… .
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 245 - Subsection 245(4) | avoidance of provincial capital gains tax was not GAARable in B.C. as there was no abuse of the B.C. Act itself | 881 |
Canadian Occidental U.S. Petroleum Corp. v. The Queen, 2001 DTC 295 (TCC)
The taxpayer lent money on an interest-free basis to a non-resident wholly-owned subsidiary in 1988 and then, in November 1994, transferred the shares of the subsidiary to a sister company so that the borrower ceased to be a subsidiary controlled corporation of the taxpayer. The Minister assessed on the basis that the loan thereupon ceased to qualify for the exemption in former s. 17(3), which was available to a loan that "was made to a subsidiary controlled corporation."
Bowman A.C.J. rejected this position on the basis that it had the effect of adding the words "and throughout the period in which the loan was outstanding the corporation continued to be a subsidiary controlled corporation" to s. 7(3). He stated (at p. 297):
"French and English are linguistic instruments capable of great precision of expression. Parliamentary drafters are presumed to have mastered one or both of those languages and to be able to say what they mean and to mean what they say."