Similar Statutes

The Court of Appeal applied (at para. 34) "the principle of the presumption of coherence between statutes" in finding that the due diligence defences under s. 227.1(3) of the Income Tax Act and s. 323(3) of the Excise Tax Act held a director to the same standard.

Robertson J.A. applied the "'presumption of coherence in enactments of the same legislature'" to derive assistance in the interpretation of s. 227.1(3) of the Income Tax Act by referring to s. 122(1)(b) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

Muldoon J. found that the provisions of the Expropriation Act and of the Income Tax Act dealing with an individual's residence were not in pari materia given their different purposes.

In connection with finding that a statement in the Excise Tax Act that taxes payable thereunder were recoverable "at any time" meant that no statute of limitations barred any claim for taxes in the current proceedings, Clement DJ stated (at p. 5293, DTC):

Both counsel referred to a wide assortment of statutes that employ the phrase "at any time" in a variety of contexts. Construing the phrase in the context of its use in other statutes is merely an exercise in the production of irrelevancies unless the project can be fairly said to come within the canon of construction known as in pari materia. I accept the following passage in Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, page 134:

Where Acts of Parliament are in pari materia, that is to say, are so far related as to form a system or code of legislation, the rule as laid down by the twelve judges in Palmer's Case, is that such Acts "are to be taken together as forming one system, and as interpreting and enforcing each other".

If such relation does not exist between the statutes, then the passage at page 133 is applicable:

In the interpretation of statutes the courts decline to consider other statutes proceeding on different lines and including different provisions, or the judicial decisions thereon.

There has been no discernible effort at Bar to show that the assortment of statutes brought to the notice of this Court are in pari materia, nor do their disparate titles and legislative sources inspire hope that such an effort would avail.

It was suggested that since, at the time of drafting of s. 231(4) of the Act, s. 443(1) of the Criminal Code was available "as a ready model of search and seizure legislation, it is reasonable to think that S.231(4), having regard to its special subject matter, was not drawn to achieve the same effect as s. 443(1)," i.e., the differences in its wording from s. 443(1) were deliberate.

S.37 of the Corporation Capital Tax Act (B.C.) was interpreted in light of the context of similar or identical provisions appearing in the Logging Tax Act (B.C.), the Mining Tax Act (B.C.), the Mineral Resource Tax Act (B.C.), the Insurance Premiums Tax Act (B.C.), the Mineral Land Tax Act (B.C.), the Taxation Act (B.C.) and predecessor statutes. It accordingly was found that the word "imposed" in s. 37 had the meaning that it had in the comparable provisions of the other statutes.

"The Income Tax Act and the Dominion Succession Duty Act are not strictly statutes in pari materia yet they both have the ultimate objective of imposing a tax based upon the fair market value of an asset. Therefore, in this instance, I can see no logical reason for ascribing other than a uniform meaning to the words 'fair market value' as used in the Dominion Succession Duty Act and as used in section 14(2) of the Income Tax Act."

After finding that marble slabs which were cut, reinforced and finished (through rough and fine polishing) were “goods produced or manufactured in Canada” within the meaning of s. 30(1)(a) of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, Spence J found that this view was confirmed by Schedule III to the Excise Tax Act, which referred to the production of cut flowers, straw, raw furs and wool not further prepared than washed, and by two Customs Tariff items, one of which referred to “marble, not further manufactured than sawn,” stating (at pp. 148-9, SCR):

In at least two recent decisions, the Court has considered the schedules to the Customs Act as being a revenue statute in pari materia and therefore an aid in the interpretation of words in the Excise Tax Act. In Bradshaw v. Minister of Customs and Excise, [1928] S.C.R. 54… Duff C.J., when considering the phrase “nursery stock” as used in subs. (4) of s. 19BBB of c. 8 of the Statutes of Canada, 5 Geo. V, pointed out that in the Customs Tariff the words used were “trees, plants and shrubs, commonly known as nursery stock” and in The King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Ltd., [1951] Ex. C.R. 122, [1951] C.T.C. 16, Cameron J., at p. 130, said:

It is of considerable interest, also, to note that in the tariff rates under The Customs Act (which, as a revenue Act, I consider to be in pari materia), separate items are set up for fruits, for vegetables, and also for “nuts of all kinds, not otherwise provided, including shelled peanuts”. This would seem to indicate that in the minds of the legislators, nuts were not included in the categories of fruits or vegetables, and also that peanuts fell within the category of nuts.

When one calls in aid of the construction of the words “manufactured” and “produced” in s. 30(1)(a) of the Excise Tax Act, the provisions of the Customs Tariff, items 306(b) and 306(c)…it would appear that the legislators regarded mere sawing of both building stone and marble as being the manufacture thereof. I view these considerations of both the exemptions in Schedule C of the Excise Tax Act and the items in the Customs Act as being confirmatory of my view… .

In commenting on the relevance of cases decided under the Finance Act, 1894 (U.K.) to the interpretation of the Dominion Succession Duty Act (Canada), Judson J. stated (p. 1168):

"The two Acts differ so widely in structure and incidence of taxation that cases decided under one Act are of little assistance to the interpretation of the other and it is of no help that sections of one Act may have been copied from the other. The Dominion Succession Duty Act must be construed independently and the caution expressed in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Perry, [1934] A.C. 477, [1934] 4 DLR 65, [1934] 3 W.W.R. 35, against a consideration of statutory origins and evolutions as an aid to interpretation is particularly appropriate here where the two Acts differ so fundamentally."

In finding that sales by the taxpayer of salted peanuts and cashew nuts were not exempted from sales tax under the Excise Tax Act as sales of “vegetables” or “fruit” Cameron J, after referring to the botanical expert evidence that they were both, stated

when in Canada the words “fruit” and “vegetables” are used, their obvious and popular meaning would not include “nuts” of any sort

and went on to state:

It is of considerable interest, also, to note that in the tariff rates under The Customs Act (which, as a revenue Act, I consider to be in pari materia), separate items are set up for fruits, for vegetables, and also for “nuts of all kinds, not otherwise provided, including shelled peanuts”. This would seem to indicate that in the minds of the legislators, nuts were not included in the categories of fruits or vegetables, and also that peanuts fell within the category of nuts.

In the course of finding that sales by florists of potted plants were not exempted from the sales tax imposed by s. 19BBB of the Special War Revenue Act, 1915 as being sales of "nursery stock," Duff C.J., stated:

As to potted plants—"nursery" implies a place devoted to the cultivation of trees, shrubs, and plants—for the purpose of transplantation; bringing them to a degree of maturity in which that is practicable.

That this is the signification of the word as used in the phrase in question is indicated by the quotation made from the Customs Tariff Act at page 4 of Mr. Lafleur's factum [f.n. 3 Trees, plants and shrubs, commonly known as nursery stock”… .] and this view of the effect of the phrase is also borne out by the French version, in which nursery stock is described as "plants de pépinière."