CAMERON,
J.:—This
is
an
information
in
which
the
plaintiff
claims
from
the
defendant
payment
of
the
sum
of
$265,196.92
for
sales
tax
in
respect
of
sales
of
salted
peanuts
and
cashew
nuts
in
the
period
May
19,
1948,
to
September
30,
1949,
penalties
for
non-payment
thereof,
and
costs.
The
defendant
carries
on
business
in
Canada
and
has
its
head
office
at
Toronto.
The
defendant
admits
that
during
the
said
period
it
was
a
producer
or
manufacturer
of
salted
peanuts
and
cashew
nuts
and
that
such
were
sold
and
delivered
in
Canada.
It
denies,
however,
that
it
is
liable
to
payment
of
any
tax,
on
the
ground
that
salted
peanuts
and
cashew
nuts
are
(a)
vegetables,
or
alternatively,
(b)
fruit,
within
the
meaning
of
Schedule
IIT
of
The
Excise
Tax
Act,
and
are,
therefore,
exempt
from
tax.
A
commission
or
sales
tax
of
8
per
cent.
on
the
sale
price
of
all
goods
produced
or
manufactured
in
Canada
is
imposed
by
section
86(1)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
ch.
179
R.S.C.
1927,
and
amendments.
It
is
not
disputed
that
if
the
defendant
is
liable
therefor,
the
amount
now
claimed
for
tax
is
the
amount
payable
by
the
defendant.
Section
89(1)
of
that
Act
is
as
follows:
"89.
(1)
The
tax
imposed
by
section
eighty-six
of
this
Act
shall
not
apply
to
the
sale
or
importation
of
the
articles
mentioned
in
Schedule
III
of
this
Act.’’
Schedule
III
includes
a
large
number
of
articles
under
various
classifications,
and
under
the
heading
^Foodstuffs”
there
appear,
inter
alia,
the
following:
4
Fruit,
fresh,
canned,
frozen
or
dehydrated,
not
including
pickles,
relishes,
catsup,
sauces,
olives,
horseradish,
mustard
and
similar
goods.’’
[sic]
The
first
question
for
determination,
therefore,
is
whether
or
not
salted
peanuts
and
cashew
nuts
fall
within
the
category
of
either
‘‘fruit’’
or
‘‘
vegetables.”
Dr.
Marvin
Bannan,
B.A.,
Ph.D.,
Assistant
Professor
in
the
Department
of
Botany
at
the
University
of
Toronto,
gave
evidence
on
behalf
of
the
defendant.
His
work
as
Departmental
Plant
Anatomist
and
Morphologist
has
to
do
with
the
form
and
structure
of
plants.
Technically
and
strictly
from
the
botanical
point
of
view,
he
said
that
a
vegetable
is
any
plant,
but
that
in
more
common
parlance
"‘vegetable’’
refers
to
edible
plants
or
the
parts
of
edible
plants.
Again,
in
a
botanical
sense,
he
said
that
"‘fruit’’
was
a
division
of
a
larger
field
of
"‘vegetable’’
and
that
a
fruit
is
a
mature
ovary
together
with
such
tissue
as
may
be
intimately
associated
with
it.
Fruits,
again,
are
divided
into
dry
fruits
and
fleshy
fruits,
the
latter
being
again
subdivided
into
twenty
or
more
categories
depending
upon
the
nature
of
the
envelope,
internal
structure,
etc.
Peas
and
beans
have
a
fruit
of
a
type
termed
a
legume
or
pod.
The
peanut
plant,
known
as
arachis
hypogaea
is
a
member
of
the
pea
family,
its
fruits
being
legumes
or
pods.
Its
pod
is
a
cone
called
ovary
which
usually
splits
along
two
sutures
and
contains
two
or
more
seeds,
and,
as
in
the
case
of
other
members
of
the
pea
family,
a
slight
pressure
of
the
fingers
will
open
the
pod.
Speaking
as
a
botanist,
therefore,
he
was
of
the
opinion
that
the
peanut
was
within
the
general
category
of
‘‘vegetable’’
and
fell
also
within
the
special
category
of
‘‘fruit’’.
,
Again
he
said
that
from
a
botanical
point
of
view
the
peanut
is
not
a
nut.
He
said
that
a
“nut”
is
a
different
type
of
fruit.
It
has
a
very
hard
outer
covering,
does
not
split
unless
pressure
is
applied
mechanically
during
the
later
growth
processes
of
the
seedling,
and
inside
the
hard
covering
before
there
is
a
single
seed.
Examples
of
‘‘nuts’’
are
the
acorn,
beechnut,
pecan,
walnut
and
filbert.
He
pointed
out
that
from
the
technical
point
of
view
there
was
no
difficulty
in
differentiating
between
“fruits”
and
“vegetables,”
but
that
in
popular
usage
the
terms
were
used
quite
loosely
in
that
one
person
might
call
a
tomato
a
‘‘fruit’’,
and
another
term
it
a
’“vegetable”
;
and,
that,
therefore,
it
was
difficult
to
erect
a
precise
definition
of
either
as
the
terms
are
used
by
different
people.
Speaking,
however,
of
edible
plants,
he
said
that
if
the
meaning
of
‘‘fruit’’
were
confined
to
its
strictly
botanical
sense,
the
term
“vegetable”
would
apply
to
the
stems,
leaves
and
roots.
From
that
point
of
view
he
would
include
as
vegetables,
the
potato,
beets,
lettuce,
rhubarb,
celery,
etc.;
and
in
the
category
of
fruits
the
tomato,
apples,
peaches,
pears,
plums
and
the
like.
On
that
basis
the
peanut,
in
his
opinion,
would
be
a
‘‘fruit’’.
Dr.
Bannan
knew
of
the
cashew
nut
only
from
botanical
tests.
Botanically
it
has
a
structure
akin
to
the
type
of
fruit
known
as
a
dry
drupe,
like
the
coconut.
A
drupe
is
a
fruit
derived
from
an
ovary
which
is
one-celled
and
has
one
seed
in
it.
The
peach
is
an
example
of
a
fleshy
drupe.
In
describing
the
cashew
nut
Dr.
Bannan
said:
‘Well,
the
fruit
in
the
cashew
is
rather
unique.
It
has
first
of
all
the
association
of
the
fleshy
stalk
with
the
ovary
proper,
such
as
occurs
in
some
fruits,
as
for
instance
an
apple,
but
in
the
apple
of
course
the
fleshy
parts
surround
the
core.
There
is
no
special
botanical
name
for
the
type
of
compound
fruit
such
as
occurs
in
the
cashew,
as
in
the
case
with
the
apple
and
some
other
types.
As
to
the
terminal
portion,
the
so-called
nut,
it
does
not
fall
within
the
category
‘nut’,
because
during
their
development
nuts
are
derived
from
ovaries
which
have
more
than
one
cell
and
usually
more
than
one
ovule
or
seed,
and
in
those
respects
the
cashew
does
not
fall
within
the
category
‘nut’;
it
is
more
similar
to
the
drupe,
the
dry
drupe,
where
the
ovary
is
initially
one-celled
and
where
the
ovary
18,
as
we
say
botanically,
superior,
that
is,
on
the
end
of
the
stalk
or
above
the
point
of
insertion
of
the
other
floral
parts.
Because
of
those
characteristics
the
terminal
portion
is
more
in
the
nature
of
a
drupe
than
a
nut.
‘
‘
He
distinguished
the
cashew
from
the
true
"nut’’
in
that
the
latter,
while
also
having
one
nut
at
maturity,
had
in
the
earlier
stages
of
development
more
than
one.
From
the
botanical
point
of
view,
therefore,
the
evidence
indicates
that
both
the
peanut
and
the
cashew
nut
are
vegetables
in
the
wider
meaning
of
that
word,
that
each
is
a
"fruit",
the
former
belonging
to
the
same
class
as
peas
or
beans
and
the
latter
to
the
dry
drupe
classification
like
the
coconut,
and
that
neither
is
a
"‘nut.’’
This
evidence
is
not
disputed.
The
only
other
witness
at
the
trial
was
P.
J.
McGough,
who
since
1930
has
been
vice-president
and
managing-director
of
the
defendant
corporation,
and
who
prior
to
that
date
was
associated
with
the
parent
company
at
Suffolk,
Virginia,
for
many
years.
He
described
the
planting
and
harvesting
of
peanuts,
the
growth
of
the
plant
and
development
of
the
peanut.
He
also
described
the
uses
to
which
the
peanut
is
put
by
farmers
who
grow
them;
that
when
harvested
they
can
be
used
in
the
same
way
as
green
peas.
They
can
also
be
used
in
many
other
ways,
for
example
in
soups,
and
also
can
be
baked
in
the
same
way
as
beans.
He
described
the
process
of
making
salted
peanuts.
After
harvesting
and
threshing
the
vines
are
sold
as
cattle
feed.
The
peanuts
are
then
cleaned,
shelled
and
graded.
About
15
per
cent.
are
used
for
oil,
the
smaller
ones
are
used
for
peanut
butter
and
the
remainder
are
used
for
salted
peanuts.
The
latter
process
involves
blanching,
and
boiling
in
oil
for
the
purpose
of
sterilizing
and
preserving
them
and
also
to
create
and
preserve
a
nutritious
flavour.
Later,
butter
and
salt
are
added
and,
for
merchandising
purposes,
they
are
packed
in
vacuum
packed
tins
and
in
glaseen
airtight
bags
to
preserve
the
special
flavour.
For
many
years
the
defendant
has
widely
advertised
its
peanut
product
as
the
‘‘nickel
lunch’’
in
order
to
convey
to
the
public
that
fact
that
it
has
food
value.
It
stresses
the
fact
that
peanuts
contain
protein,
carbohydrates,
vegetable
oils
and
minerals.
The
defendant
imports
shelled
peanuts
from
the
United
States
and
other
countries
and
processes
them
in
Canada
as
I
have
above
described.
About
70
per
cent.
of
the
defendant’s
sales
are
of
peanuts
in
5
and
10
cents
bags,
the
remainder
being
sold
in
tins
of
varying
sizes.
While
not
disagreeing
with
Dr.
Bannan’s
opinion
that,
from
a
botanical
point
of
view,
peanuts
are
fruits,
Mr.
McGough
considered
them
to
be
vegetables
and
in
his
thirty-five
years’
experience
has
considered
them
to
be
such.
The
words
‘‘fruit’’
and
"‘vegetable''
are
not
defined
in
the
Act
and
so
far
as
I
am
aware
they
are
not
defined
in
any
other
Act
in
pari
materia.
They
are
ordinary
words
in
every-day
use
and
are
therefore
to
be
construed
according
to
their
popular
sense.
In
Craies
on
Statute
Law,
4th
Ed.,
p.151,
reference
is
made
to
the
judgment
of
Lord
Tenterden
in
Att-Gen.
v.
Winstanley
(1831),
2
D.
&
Cl.
302
in
which
at
p.
310
he
said
that
the
"‘words
of
an
Act
of
Parliament
which
are
not
applied
to
any
particular
science
or
art’’
are
to
be
construed
"‘as
they
are
understood
in
common
language.’’
The
author
referred
also
to
Grenfell
v.
I.R.C.
(1876),
1
Ex.
D.
242,
248
in
which
Pollock,
B.
stated
that
if
a
statute
contains
language
meaning
of
the
language
contained
in
it,
but
is
to
be
construed
in
its
popular
sense,
meaning,
of
course,
by
the
words
‘popular
sense’
that
sense
which
people
conversant
with
the
subject
matter
with
which
the
statute
is
dealing
would
attribute
to
it.’’
In
Cargo
ex.
Schiller
(1877),
2
P.D.
145,
161,
James,
L.J.,
expressed
the
same
ideas
in
these
words:
"‘I
base
my
decision
on
the
words
of
the
statute
as
they
would
be
understood
by
plain
men
who
know
nothing
of
the
technical
rule
of
the.
Court
of
Admiralty,
or
of
flotsam,
lagan
and
jetsam.”
Reference
may
also
be
made
to
Milne-Bingham
Printing
Co.
Lid.
v.
The
King
[1930]
S.C.R.
282,
283,
in
which
Duff,
J.,
(as
he
then
was)
when
considering
the
meaning
of
the
word
^magazines”
as
contained
in
the
Special
War
Revenue
Act,
1915,
said:
""The
word
‘magazine’
in
the
exception
under
consideration
is
used
in
its
ordinary
sense,
and
must
be
construed
and
applied
in
that
sense.”
In
The
King
v.
Montreal
Stock
Exchange,
[1935]
S.C.R.
614,
616;
[1935-37]
C.T.C.
107,
a
case
involving
the
interpretation
of
the
word
‘‘newspapers’’
as
used
in
schedule
III
of
the
Special
War
Revenue
Act,
Kerwin,
J.
said:
"‘In
the
instant
case,
the
word
under
discussion
is
not
defined
in
any
statute
in
pari
materia
and
it
remains
only
to
give
to
it
the
ordinary
meaning
that
it
usually
bears.’’
He
then
referred
to
the
definition
of
the
word
as
contained
in
Webster’s
New
International
Dictionary.
Again,
in
Atty
.-Gen.
v.
Bailey
(1847),
1
Ex.
281,
it
was
held
that
the
word
"‘spirits’’,
being
a
word
of
known
import
.
.'
.
is
used
in
the
Excise
Acts
in
the
sense
in
which
it
is
ordinarily
understood.’’
In
that
case
the
Court
said
at
p.
292:
“We
do
not
think
that,
in
common
parlance,
the
word
‘spirits’
would
be
considered
as
comprehend
a
liquid
like
‘sweet
spirits
of
nitre’
which
is
itself
a
known
article
of
commerce
not
ordinarily
passing
under
the
name
of
spirits’.”
It
is
of
some
interest,
also,
to
note
the
rule
of
interpretation
in
the
United
States
in
construing
Excise
Acts.
As
stated
in
Craies
on
Statute
Law,
p.
152,
the
rule
is
that
the
particular
words
used
by
the
Legislature
in
the
denomination
of
articles
are
to
be
understood
according
to
the
common
commercial
understanding
of
the
terms
used,
and
not
in
their
scientific
or
technical
sense,
"‘for
the
legislature
does
not
suppose
our
merchants
to
be
naturalists,
or
geologists,
or
botanists.”
(200
Chests
of
Tea,
(1924),
9
Wheaton
(U.S.)
435,
per
Story,
J.)
A
perusal
of
the
consumption
or
sales
tax
sections
of
the
Act
(Part
XIII)
and
of
the
list
of
exemptions
set
out
in
Schedule
III
is
sufficient
to
indicate
that
Parliament,
in
enacting
the
sections
and
the
schedules,
was
not
using
words
which
were
applied
to
any
particular
science
or
art,
and
that,
therefore,
the
words
are
to
be
construed
as
they
are
understood
in
common
language.
To
the
words
‘‘fruit’’
and
"
"
vegetables
”,
therefore,
there
must
be
given
the
meaning
which
they
would
have
when
used
in
the
popular
sense—that
sense
which
people
conversant
with
the
subject-matter
with
which
the
statute
is
dealing
would
attribute
to
it.
Now
the
statute
affects
nearly
everyone,
the
producer
or
manufacturer,
the
importer,
wholesaler
and
retailer,
and
finally,
the
consumer
who,
in
the
last
analysis,
pays
the
tax.
Parliament
would
not
suppose
in
an
Act
of
this
character
that
manufacturers,
producers,
importers,
consumers,
and
others
who
would
be
affected
by
the
Act,
would
be
botanists.
The
object
of
the
Excise
Act
is
to
raise
revenue,
and
for
this
purpose
to
class
substances
according
to
the
general
usage
and
known
denominations
of
trade.
In
my
view
therefore,
it
is
not
the
botanist’s
conception
as
to
what
constitutes
a
‘‘fruit’’
or
""vegetable”
which
must
govern
the
interpretation
to
be
placed
on
the
words,
but
rather
what
would
ordinarily
in
matters
of
commerce
in
Canada
be
included
therein.
Botanically,
oranges
and
lemons
are
berries,
but
otherwise
no
one
would
consider
them
as
such.
I
think
it
can
be
asserted
that
in
Canada
both
the
peanut
and
cashew
nut
are
considered
by
almost
everyone
(except
possibly
by
botanists)
as
falling
within
the
category
of
"nuts''.
Like
other
nuts
such
as
the
walnut,
hickory,
pecan
and
almond,
they
have
a
pod
or
shell
enclosed
in
which
is
the
edible
seed.
They
are
bought,
sold
and
used
in
the
same
manner
and
can
be
found
in
any
of
the
numerous
"‘nut
shops’’.
The
following
definition
of
"‘nut''
appears
in
Webster
f
s
New
International
Dictionary
and
in
my
opinion
correctly
describes
the
word
as
it
is
generally
understood
in
Canada:
"‘A
hard
shelled
dry
fruit
or
seed
having
a
more
or
less
distinct
separable
rind
or
shell
and
interior
kernel
or
meat.
Also
the
kernel
or
meat
itself,
loosely
used,
and
including
many
kinds,
as
almonds,
peanuts,
brazil
nuts,
etc.
.
.
.
not
botanically
true
nuts.”
And
in
Vol.
16
of
the
Encyclopedia
Britannica
at
p.
645,
"‘nut''
is
defined,
and
then
follows
an
enumeration
of
the
more
important
nuts
and
of
products
passing
under
that
name
and
used
either
as
articles
of
food
or
as
sources
of
oil;
included
in
that
enumeration
are
both
the
peanut
and
the
cashew.
It
is
equally
clear
to
me
that
when
in
Canada
the
words
‘‘
fruit”
and
“vegetables”
are
used,
their
obvious
and
popular
meaning
would
not
include
‘‘nuts’’
of
any
sort,
or
the
peanuts,
salted
peanuts
or
cashews
sold
by
the
defendant.
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
suggested
a
test
which
I
think
apposite.
Would
a
householder
when
asked
to
bring
home
fruit
or
vegetables
for
the
evening
meal
bring
home
salted
peanuts,
cashew
nuts
or
nuts
of
any
sort?
The
answer
is
obviously
‘‘no.’’
Vegetable
has
been
defined
in
many
ways.
In
the
World
Book
it
is
defined
as
follows:
"‘In
the
usual
sense,
the
word
vegetable
is
applied
to
those
plants
whose
leaves,
stalks,
roots
or
tubers
are
used
for
food,
such
as
lettuce,
asparagus,
cabbage,
beet
and
turnip.
It
also
includes
several
plants
whose
fruits
are
the
edible
portions,
as
peas,
beans,
melons
and
tomatoes.’’
In
the
Concise
Oxford
Dictionary,
Third
Edition,
p.
1365,
it
is
defined
as:
"‘Plant,
esp.
herbaceous
plants,
used
for
culinary
purposes
or
for
feeding
cattle,
e.g.,
cabbage,
potato,
turnip,
bean.’’
Again
in
Webster’s
International
Dictionary,
vegetable
is
defined
as:
"A
plant
used
or
cultivated
for
food
for
man
or
domestic
animals,
as
the
cabbage,
turnip,
potato,
bean,
dandelion,
etc.,
also
the
edible
part
of
such
a
plant,
as
prepared
for
market
or
the
table.
Vegetables
and
fruits
are
sometimes
loosely
distinguished
by
the
usual
need
of
cooking
the
former
for
the
use
of
man,
while
the
latter
may
be
eaten
raw;
but
the
distinction
often
fails,
as
in
the
case
of
quinces,
barberries,
and
other
fruits,
and
lettuce,
celery,
and
other
vegetables.
Tomatoes
if
cooked
are
vegetables,
if
eaten
raw
are
fruit.
‘
‘
In
the
Encyclopedia
Britannica,
Vol.
23,
vegetable
is
defined
as:
"‘A
general
term
used
as
an
adjective
in
referring
to
any
kind
of
plant
life
or
plant
product,
viz.
‘vegetable
matter.’
More
commonly
and
specifically,
in
common
language,
the
word
is
used
as
a
noun
in
referring
to
those
generally
herbaceous
plants
or
any
parts
of
such
plants
as
are
eaten
by
man.
The
edible
portions
of
many
plants
considered
as
vegetables
are
in
a
botanical
sense,
fruits.
The
common
distinction
between
fruits
and
vegetables
is
often
indefinite
and
confusing,
since
it
is
based
generally
on
how
the
plant
or
plant
part
is
used
rather
than
on
what
it
is.”
And
fruit
is
defined
in
the
Encyclopedia
Britannica,
Vol.
9,
as
:
"'Fruit,
in
its
popular
sense
is
any
product
of
the
soil
that
can
be
enjoyed
by
man
or
animals;
in
the
Bible
the
word
is
often
extended
to
include
the
offspring
of
man
and
of
animals.
.
.
.
More
often
it
is
employed
to
denote
a
group
of
edible
parts
of
plants,
as
contrasted
with
another
group
termed
*
vegetable’.
But
the
term
is
a
loose
one,
including,
e.g.,
the
stalks
of
the
rhubarb.
In
its
strict
botanical
sense
the
fruit
is
developed
from
the
ovary
of
the
flower
as
a
result
of
fertilization
of
the
contained
ovule
or
ovules.”
It
will
be
noted
that
these
definitions
of
‘‘fruit’’
and
""vegetable”
(except
in
the
strictly
botanical
sense)
include
‘‘nuts’’
of
any
sort.
It
is
of
considerable
interest,
also,
to
note
that
in
the
tariff
rates
under
The
Customs
Act
(which,
as
a
revenue
Act,
I
consider
to
be
in
pari
materia)
separate
items
are
set
up
for
fruits,
for
vegetables,
and
also
for
‘‘nuts
of
all
kinds,
not
otherwise
provided,
including
shelled
peanuts’’.
This
would
seem
to
indicate
that
in
the
minds
of
the
legislators,
nuts
were
not
included
in
the
categories
of
fruits
or
vegetables,
and
also
that
peanuts
fell
within
the
category
of
nuts.
I
do
not
think
that
their
view
of
the
matter
differs
at
all
from
the
common
understanding
of
the
words.
My
finding
must
be
that
as
products
and
as
general
commodities
in
the
market,
neither
salted
peanuts
nor
cashews,
or
nuts
of
any
sort,
are
generally
denominated
or
known
in
Canada
as
either
fruits
or
vegetables.
I
think
it
may
be
assumed,
therefore,
that
if
Parliament
had
intended
to
include
‘‘nuts’’
among
the
exempted
foodstuffs,
the
word
‘‘nuts’’
would
have
appeared
in
the
schedule.
That
being
so,
it
must
follow
that
salted
peanuts
and
cashew
nuts,
which
as
I
have
said
above
are
considered
generally
in
Canada
to
be
within
the
category
of
‘‘nuts’’,
do
not
fall
within
the
exemptions
provided
for
fruit
and
vegetables
in
Schedule
III.
I
have
not
overlooked
the
argument
advanced
by
defendant’s
counsel
that
‘‘peanuts’’
are
used
as
food
and
may
be
used
and
at
times
are
used
in
the
form
of
soups
or
vegetables,
or
as
substitutes
for
meat,
and
that,
therefore,
they
are
‘‘foodstuffs’’.
But
while
the
heading
of
this
part
of
Schedule
III
is
“Foodstuffs”,
it
is
quite
apparent
that
not
all
foodstuffs
are
included
therein.
In
general,
it
would
seem
that
the
exemption
from
tax,
insofar
as
it
applies
to
foodstuffs,
is
confined
to
those
articles
of
food
which
are
commonly
in
use
as,
or
are
used
in
the
preparation
of,
ordinary
staple
table
foods.
Condiments
such
as
are
derived
from
vegetables
are
particularly
excluded
from
the
exemption.
Nor
do
I
need
to
consider
the
question
as
to
whether
the
defendant’s
products
were
‘‘canned’’,
having
found
that
they
were
neither
‘‘fruit’’
nor
‘‘vegetables’’
within
the
meaning
of
those
words
in
Schedule
III.
In
the
result,
the
plaintiff
is
entitled
to
judgment
against
the
defendant
in
the
amount
claimed
for
sales
tax,
namely,
$265,196.92;
for
penalties
for
non-payment
thereof
up
to
December
31,
1949,
the
sum
of
$16,767.55;
for
such
additional
sums
aS
may
have
accrued
for
penalties
thereon
after
Decem-
eer
31,
1949,
to
this
date,
as
provided
for
in
section
106(4)
of
The
Excise
Act,
and
for
costs
to
be
taxed.
The
penalties
provided
for
in
section
106(4)
are
mandatory
in
the
event
of
nonpayment
within
the
time
provided
for
in
section
106(3)
and
there
is
no
power
in
the
Court
to
waive
such
penalty.
Judgment
accordingly.