Consistency

After finding that an initial director had not satisfied the requirement under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) that a replacement director be appointed by virtue of an OBCA provision that deemed a de facto director to be a director, Gleason JA went on to state (at para. 16):

This textual interpretation is also supported by the interpretive presumption of consistent expression, which would require, unless the context dictates otherwise, that the terms “elected” and “appointed” be given a meaning in subsection 119(2) that is consistent with other provisions in the OBCA where these terms are used … .

Before finding that a marginal note to s. 149(1)(c), which paragraph had similar wording to s. 149(1)(d.5), illuminated the interpretation of the latter provision, Mactavish JA stated (at para. 56):

[I]t is … a basic principle of statutory interpretation that where the same words appear in different parts of a statute, the presumption is that they are to be given the same meaning: R. v. Zeolkowski, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378 … at para. 19.

In the context of his view that the determination of whether “Notes” held by an offshore fund in which the taxpayer was invested constituted “debt” should be determined in light of the text, context and purpose of the particular provision at issue (s. 94.1(1)(a)) rather than such determination being made for purposes of the Act as a whole, Noël CJ stated (at paras. 52-53):

The parties also proceeded on the assumption that the meaning of debt is the same throughout the Act regardless of the provision in which this word is used … . The presumption of consistent expression supports this approach … .

However, this presumption is not absolute. As explained in Thomson v. Canada (Deputy Minister of Agriculture), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 385, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 218, at page 400, “[u]nless the contrary is clearly indicated by the context, a word should be given the same interpretation or meaning whenever it appears in an act”. That the same word can have a different meaning depending on the context in which it is used is particularly so when dealing with the Act, a statute known for its specificity and technical complexity (Will-Kare, para. 33). This case illustrates the importance of examining the particular provision in issue when dealing with the Act.

In connection with finding that an appellate standard of review (e.g., of correctness where there is a question of law) should be applied to judicial review of an administrative decision from which there is a statutory right of appeal, the Court stated (at para. 44):

[T]here is no convincing reason to presume that legislatures mean something entirely different when they use the word “appeal” in an administrative law statute than they do in, for example, a criminal or commercial law context. Accepting that the word “appeal” refers to the same type of procedure in all these contexts also accords with the presumption of consistent expression, according to which the legislature is presumed to use language such that the same words have the same meaning both within a statute and across statutes … .

Before finding that the textual meaning of "medical service" specified in s. 118.2(2)(a) should inform the meaning of that term in ss. 118.2(2)(g) and (h), Ryer JA stated (at para. 34):

A contextual interpretative approach favours a consistent interpretation of that term in each of those provisions. As noted by Fish J. in R. v. Clark, 2005 SCC 2, [2005] S.C.J. No. 4 at para. 51, "Parliament could not have intended that identical words should have different meanings in two consecutive and related provisions of the very same enactment."

The taxpayer produced a movie in Canada for which it would have qualified for B.C. film tax credits, except that its application therefor was not filed on a timely basis. The federal portion of the credits was allowed because the federal Minister ("MNR") and CRA applied a "deemed" filing date to the necessary documents. However, the same administrators did not apply the deemed filing date to the provincial application.

Davies J allowed the taxpayer's provincial claim. Although differently worded, the applicable federal and provincial provisions were substantively identical. Therefore, it was not open to the CRA officials to deny B.C. credits, as they had allowed the federal credits on the same facts. Davies J stated (at para. 143):

[T]he CRA and MNR effectively approbated and reprobated the same conduct by the Appellant and thereby reached inconsistent decisions by failing to apply the same considerations and deemed facts to both applications.

In rejecting the Minister's claim that a specific anti-avoidance provision (s. 95(6)(b), contained in the subdivision i foreign affiliate rules rather than being included with the more general provisions in Part XVI) should be interpreted broadly so that it could be "applied in a variety of circumstances where a taxpayer has engaged in what the Minister considers to be abusive tax planning involving foreign corporations" (para. 62), Stratas JA stated (at para. 64) that this "creates the spectre of similarly-situated taxpayers being treated differently for no objective reason," and (at para. 67):

...I would be loath to interpret paragraph 95(6)(b) in a way that gives the Minister such an unlimited and ill-defined discretion - a standardless sweep - as to whether or not tax is owing, limited only by her view of unacceptability. It would be contrary to fundamental principle. It would also promote inconsistent and arbitrary application, the bane of consistency, predictability and fairness.