Comparison of Provisions

Cases

Schwartz v. Canada, 96 DTC 6103, [1996] 1 SCR 254

presumption of consistent expression within same statute

In finding that the reference to employment in the definition of retiring allowance referred only to the loss of current employment rather than the loss of prospective employment given that s. 80.4(1) specifically contained an additional reference to "intended" employment, LaForest J. stated (at para. 61):

"It is a well-established principle of interpretation that words used by Parliament are deemed to have the same meaning throughout the same statute ... ."

The Queen v. Gulf Canada Ltd., 92 DTC 6123, [1992] 1 CTC 183 (FCA)

presumption that word's meaning is consistent

In interpreting the word "production" the Court noted (p. 6126):

"There is a strong, indeed overwhelming, presumption that Parliament, having used the same word three times in the same subsection, intended it to bear the same meaning each time."

Mattabi Mines Ltd. v. Ontario (Minister of Revenue), [1988] 2 CTC 294, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 175

"income" has same meaning in different sections

In response to a submission of the Minister that in the absence of a separate definition for the section, "income" had a different meaning in s. 106 of the Corporations Tax Act from its meaning in Part II of that Act in which the section appeared, Wilson J. stated:

"The difficulty with this position, as I see it, is that a taxing statute is a highly technical piece of legislation which requires an interpretation that will ensure certainty for the taxpayer. Many of the words used carry a very specific and technical meaning because they identify the fundamental concepts underpinning the legislation. 'Income' is one of those fundamental concepts."

AEL Microtel Ltd. v. The Queen, 84 DTC 6374, [1984] CTC 387 (FCTD), rev'd 86 DTC 6348, [1986] 2CTC 108 (FCA)

"[W]here in the same Act, and in relation to the same subject matter, different words are used such choice of different words must be considered intentional and indicative of a change in meaning or a different meaning." It was considered significant that s. 13(7.1) as it read at the relevant time used the phrase "investment allowance" rather than the phrase "investment tax credit" appearing elsewhere in the Act.

Bank of Nova Scotia v. The Queen, [1980] CTC 57, 80 DTC 6009 (FCTD), aff'd 81 DTC 5115, [1981] CTC 162 (FCA)

The Court was affected by the consideration that "it is more consistent that the same measure be applicable to subparagraphs (a) and (b) of section 126(1), than to have two different methods of calculating tax credits in the same section".

The Queen v. Guaranteed Homes Ltd., 78 DTC 6510, [1978] CTC 636 (FCTD)

"Words used more than once in a statute may not always have the same meaning, but they are normally considered to have the same meaning unless the context shows they are being used in a different sense." No such difference was found in the use of "place of business" in ss.20(1)(ee) and 230(1).

See Also

Prestcost (Central) Ltd. v. Minister of Labour, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 89 (C.A.)

(Referred to in Schwartz v. The Queen, 93 DTC 555 (TCC).)

At 97:

"... [T]he habit of a legal draftsman is to eschew synonyms. He uses the same word throughout the document to express the same thing or concept, and consequently if he uses different words the presumption is that he means a different thing or concept. Another habit, relevant to this case, is that a legal draftsman aims at uniformity in the structure of his draft. If he has thought it desirable to qualify what he has stated in one part of the document and has omitted to qualify a statement of a similar kind in another part of the document, the presumption is that the latter statement is to be understood as not being subject to a similar qualification ...".

Administrative Policy

11 January 2005 Internal T.I. 2004-0104341I7 - Reclassify CDE of partnership to CEE

The word "taxpayer" in subsection 66.1(9) of the Act and in paragraph (e) of the definition of CEE should be interpreted as referring only to a partner of a partnership and not to the partnership, whereas in order to determine whether a partnership has incurred expenses referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition of CDE in its fiscal period, the word "taxpayer" in the preamble of the definition and in paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition should be read as referring to the partnership.