News of Note
CRA confirms that, in Audit’s discretion, it may provide relief where GST/HST has been double-collected
Email this ContentA resident proprietor provided short-term accommodation through the platform of a non-resident company and, as a GST/HST “regular” registrant, charged and collected GST/HST on the rentals. After the introduction of the accommodation platform rules pursuant to s. 211.13(3), the platform commenced to also charge GST/HST on the taxpayer’s supplies of accommodation – which was incorrect, given the proprietor’s registration.
Regarding whether the taxpayer could receive a refund of the “double paid” GST/HST, CRA stated:
Under Policy Statement P-131R, Remittance of tax collected by a person other than the supplier in limited circumstances, the CRA confirmed that it does not intend to collect tax twice on the same supply, and where the supplier and another person are both required to account for the tax, the liability to account for the tax of the supplier or the other person will be discharged where one of them accounts for the tax in its net tax calculation and remits the tax to the CRA.
Policy Statement P-131R is subject to certain exceptions and its application is at audit's discretion at the time of an audit … .
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 18 July 2024 GST/HST Interpretation 245851 under ETA s. 211.13(3) and s. 225(1) – A(a),
Wong – Tax Court of Canada engages in a detailed weighing exercise to determine that two ex-spouses were shared custody parents
After initially denying the Canada child benefit (CCB) claims of the taxpayer in full (on the basis that it was her ex-husband who primarily fulfilled the care responsibilities for their son), CRA assessed her on the basis that they were “shared custody parents,” so that she was entitled to 50% of the CCB amounts.
In affirming that the taxpayer was a shared custody parent, Bocock J found inter alia that the son lived with each parent one-half of the time, that the provision of medical care was not as uneven as she claimed (e.g., he took his son to medical appointments and exclusively handled COVID vaccinations) and her exclusive provision and payment for various extra-curricular activities related to his view that “unregulated, unstructured play and home-centered activities were sometimes preferable given the son’s fairly young age”.
It is peculiar that the ITA administration of a routine personal credit may often require intricate determinations of fact.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Wong v. The King, 2025 TCC 24 under s. 122.6 – shared-custody parent.
We have translated 7 more CRA interpretations
We have translated a CRA interpretation released last week and a further 6 CRA interpretations released in January of 2001. Their descriptors and links appear below.
These are additions to our set of 3,117 full-text translations of French-language Technical Interpretation and Roundtable items (plus some ruling letters) of the Income Tax Rulings Directorate, which covers all of the last 24 years of releases of such items by the Directorate. These translations are subject to our paywall (applicable after the 5th of each month).
Phantom deductions might increase safe income through offsetting phantom income or non-deductible cash outflows
CRA, departing from Kruco, is now considering that “phantom” income (i.e., income for ITA purposes not resulting in tangible cash inflows) should no longer be included in computing safe income. Although CRA has not publicly addressed the treatment of phantom deductions (i.e., deductions reducing net income but not corresponding to a cash outflow), the ARQ has indicated that no adjustment should be made in computing safe income by taking a phantom deduction into account.
However, it could be argued that a phantom deduction can offset an element that otherwise reduces safe income. For example, where a corporation had income of $1 million, phantom income of $60,000, and a phantom deduction of $80,000 (so that its net income was $980,000), it would seem unreasonable to exclude the $60,000 of phantom income from safe income without offsetting it by at least an equivalent portion of the phantom deduction ($60,000): all the net income of $980,000 can reasonably be regarded as contributing to the capital gain on the shares.
In a second example, where Opco has revenue of $1 million, tangible expenses of $200,000 and a phantom deduction of $150,000 so that its net income is $650,000, and it pays taxes of $150,000, one can consider that the phantom deduction offsets the taxes payable (which otherwise would reduce the safe income attributable to the shares), and that $650,000 ($650,000 net income + [$150,000 phantom deduction − $150,000 tax]) is the resulting safe income contributing to the capital gain on the shares.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Marc-Antoine Mongrain and Jean-François Thuot, “Income, Phantom Income, and Phantom Deductions,” Canadian Tax Focus, Vol. 15, No. 1, February 2025, p. 2 under s. 55(2.1)(c).
DAC – Federal Court of Appeal refuses to allow a third party to intervene in the DAC (avoidance of CCPC status) case
The moving party (“QPG”) sought an order pursuant to Rule 109 of the Federal Courts Rules to permit it to intervene in the Crown’s appeal of the DAC decision, which found that there was no GAAR abuse in DAC continuing to the British Virgin Islands so as to cease to be a Canadian-controlled private corporation (CCPC).
In the DAC appeal, the parties had not put in issue the Minister’s designation of DAC as a CCPC in its notice of reassessment (nor was this relevant to or even mentioned by the Tax Court) whereas QPG wished to intervene on the issue of whether such a designation overrode the legislative criteria imposed by the Act for determining CCPC status.
Before dismissing the motion to intervene, Stratas JA stated that “[t]he issue raised by QPQ … seeks to reinvent the theory of the case” and that “[t]his is a classic case of a proposed intervention that, if allowed, will commandeer the parties’ case.”
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Canada v. DAC Investment Holdings Inc., 2025 FCA 37 under Federal Courts Rules, Rule 109.
CRA indicates that expenditure limits of associated CCPCs should be converted into a functional currency based on the spot exchange rate at year end
The annual “expenditure limit” of CCPCs (which is gradually reduced as the total of their taxable capital employed in Canada (“TCEC”) increases above $10 million) must be allocated between them. When the associated CCPCs of the taxpayer report their Canadian tax results in Canadian dollars, and the taxpayer reports its Canadian tax results in its elected functional currency, how will the TCEC of the associated corporations be converted into the functional currency?
Although CRA indicated that one possible interpretation would require the associated CCPCs to so convert each component of their TCEC computation (which “would be administratively burdensome”), it concluded:
The day the TCEC of the associated corporation is considered to “arise” for the purposes of determining the conversion rate according to paragraph 261(5)(c) is the last day of the taxation year of the associated corporation for which it is computed because that is the day when the amount of the TCEC is determined pursuant to section 181.2 (hence when an amount relevant to computing the Taxpayer’s Canadian tax results is created).
CRA further stated:
If prior to the date of this letter the Taxpayer was consistently using a different method for converting the TCEC of its associated corporation in its elected functional currency and claimed additional ITC which would not have been available if the Taxpayer used the conversion method put forward in this letter, the CRA will not challenge the computation for those periods.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 25 November 2024 External T.I. 2023-0974111E5 under s. 261(5)(c).
CRA finds that s. 143.2(15) authorized it to open-up a statute-barred year to deny the carryback of a loss which it will deny under s. 143.2
An individual's 2019 taxation year will be reassessed under s. 143.2 to deny a loss, which he had carried back to his 2016 year, on the basis that it resulted from abusive tax planning representing a tax shelter investment.
S. 143.2(15) provides that, notwithstanding ss. 152(4) to (5), “such assessments … may be made as are necessary to give effect to this section.” In finding that, by virtue of s. 143.2(15), the individual’s 2016 taxation year could be reassessed beyond the normal reassessment period to deny the carried-back loss, the Directorate stated that “such carryback is closely linked to an adjustment in connection with a tax shelter investment and is necessary and required for the purposes of section 143.2.”
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 18 June 2024 Internal T.I. 2024-1006551I7 F under s. 143.2(15).
Income Tax Severed Letters 19 February 2025
This morning's release of three severed letters from the Income Tax Rulings Directorate is now available for your viewing.
Matte – Tax Court of Canada finds that the settlement of forgivable advances to an employee for less than the outstanding amounts produced s. 6(15) income
The taxpayer, who was employed at a wealth management firm, had received over $1 million in interest-free loans (evidenced by promissory notes) from predecessors of his employer which, by their terms, were forgivable in the employer’s discretion as to 10% each year, and were required to be repaid as to the balance on termination of his employment. When he resigned, his employer sued him for the balance owing, and a settlement agreement was later reached pursuant to which the loans were discharged on payment of an agreed portion of their remaining balances (with part of such payments made by way of set-off against damages found to be owing by his employer to him.)
Ouimet J found that the difference between the amount so agreed to be paid and the balances owing constituted a taxable benefit to the taxpayer pursuant to ss. 6(15) and 6(1)(a) at the time of the release pursuant to the settlement agreement.
In rejecting a submission that, based on Merchant, the “loan” advances to the taxpayer had, in fact, been advances on his salary (which had been received in taxation years that were now statute-barred), Ouimet J noted that, unlike here, in Merchant “an entire year’s work [took] the form of cheques entered into the accounting records as loans” and “the employee in Merchant did not have to repay the amount from any source available to him.”
Neal Armstrong. Summaries of Matte v. The King, 2025 TCC 16 under s. 6(15), s. 12(11) – investment contract and s. 248(26).
Structures GB – Quebec Court of Appeal finds that corporate reorganization documents could not be rectified to correct for an unforeseen Pt. IV tax issue
The shareholders of a Canadian-controlled private corporation (“Structures”) implemented a reorganization that was intended to crystallize the capital gains deduction (CGD). However, the transactions for first "purifying" Structures of investment assets entailed the issuance of some preferred shares, which caused the shareholding in Structures of three of the holding companies to be diluted from 10% to below 10%, so that Structures was no longer connected to them and so that they were subject to significant Part IV tax on dividends received from Structures.
In reversing a Quebec Superior Court rectification order which made extensive changes to the reorganization steps so as to eliminate the Part IV tax, the Court of Appeal applied the principle that:
If the agreement is consistent with what the parties agreed to but simply produces unforeseen tax consequences, due to an error by the tax planners in the design of the tax planning, rectification cannot be granted.
In particular, there was nothing about the implementation of the reorganization (whose object was to maximize CGD deductions) which indicated that the parties were thinking about Part IV tax.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Agence du revenu du Québec v. Structures GB Ltée, 2025 QCCA 134 under General Concepts – Rectification.