News of Note

Income Tax Severed Letters 12 June 2024

This morning's release of six severed letters from the Income Tax Rulings Directorate is now available for your viewing.

CRA indicates that a disposition by a bare trust, or the trust’s winding-up, generally is not a disposition under the ITA

Even before taking into account the introduction of s. 150(1.2), s. 150(1.1)(b)(ii) required a trust which disposed of capital property in a year to file a T3 return for that year. Would a bare trust, that complied with the low-asset test in s. 150(1.2)(b), be required by s. 150(1.1)(b)(ii) to file a T3 return by virtue of a Canadian-dollar bond held by it maturing in the year?

CRA noted that under s. 104(1), the bare trust was not a trust for purposes of the definition in s. 248(1) of “disposition,” other than ss. (b)(v) and (k) of that definition, which were not relevant in this context, so that there would be no disposition by the bare trust of the bond.

If in the year of the maturity of the bond, the bare trust is wound up and the cash proceeds from the bond are transferred to the beneficiary, would this result in a disposition by the bare trust pursuant to s. (b)(v) of the definition of “disposition” (which refers to a bare trust ceasing to act as agent for a beneficiary with respect to any dealing with any of the trust’s property)?

CRA indicated that, notwithstanding the wording of s. (b)(v) of the definition of “disposition”, the exclusion in s. (e) of that definition (re no change in beneficial ownership) would apply. In particular, the bare trust would not be considered to be a trust for the purposes of s. (e)(ii) of the definition of “disposition” (which excludes from (e) any transfer from a trust to a beneficiary) and the s. (e) exclusion would apply provided that the property is transferred directly to the beneficiary.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.8 under s. 150(1.1)(b)(ii).

Burlington Loan Management – Upper Tribunal finds that Irishco’s purchasing a UK interest claim from Caymansco at a tax arbitrage price did not have Treaty-reduction as a main purpose

BLM was a substantial Irish-resident investment company, which had been acquiring proved claims in the administration of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) ("LBIE" – a UK resident) since 2011. In 2018, an unrelated Caymans company (“SICL”), which was in liquidation, instructed a third-party broker to market its claim for post-administration interest from LBIE (the “SAAD Claim”). As a result, BLM purchased the SAAD Claim for a cash amount which exceeded the expected cash payment from LBIE as reduced by the UK withholding tax of 20% but, after receiving a refund of such withholding tax pursuant to Art. 12(1) of the UK-Ireland Treaty, would generate an 8% profit. There would have been no refund of the UK withholding tax had the SAAD Claim continued to be held by SICL when paid.

HMRC denied BLM’s refund claim on the basis of Art. 12(5) of that Treaty, which excluded the application of Art. 12 “if it was the main purpose or one of the main purposes of any person concerned with the … assignment … to take advantage of … Article [12].”

In confirming the conclusion of the First-tier Tribunal that the assignment did not engage Art. 12(5), the Upper Tribunal indicated that it did not discern reviewable errors in the findings of the FTT, which most relevantly, and as summarized by the UTT, were that:

  • It was evident from the OECD commentaries that Art. 12(5) should be regarded as aimed at transactions involving conduits or treaty shopping.
  • Here, by contrast, SICL did not retain any direct or indirect entitlements in respect of the SAAD Claim, and it “was Ireland who had full taxing rights over the interest beneficially owned by BLM” and “from BLM's perspective, it regarded its beneficial ownership of the interest in respect of the SAAD Claim in the same way as it regarded its beneficial ownership of all the other interest in respect of all the other debt claims in the LBIE administration” which it had acquired and whose eligibility for the Treaty reduction had not been challenged.
  • Furthermore, "for BLM the existence of the UK-Ireland treaty was simply the setting in which the Assignment took place”.
  • “It was appropriate for the FTT to have had regard to the fact that there were potential purchasers of the SAAD Claim for whom UK WHT would not have been an issue and for whom the UK-Ireland treaty would not have been relevant [e.g., UK purchasers with tax losses, or pension plans] … who were prepared to pay a price higher than 80% of the interest on the SAAD Claim for reasons wholly unconnected to the UK-Ireland treaty”.
  • “SICL's only purpose in entering into the transaction was to sell the SAAD Claim for the best available price”, and similarly the “’sole purpose of BLM in acquiring each such claim, including the SAAD Claim, was to realise a profit by reference to the difference between its purchase price and the cash flows that it received as result of its acquisition of the relevant claim’”.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Revenue & Customs v Burlington Loan Management DAC [2024] UKUT 152 under Treaties – Income Tax Conventions – Art. 12.

We have translated 6 more CRA interpretations

We have translated a further 6 CRA interpretations released in November and October of 2001. Their descriptors and links appear below.

These are additions to our set of 2,858 full-text translations of French-language Technical Interpretation and Roundtable items (plus some ruling letters) of the Income Tax Rulings Directorate, which covers all of the last 22 2/3 years of releases of such items by the Directorate. These translations are subject to our paywall (applicable after the 5th of each month).

Bundle Date Translated severed letter Summaries under Summary descriptor
2001-11-23 21 November 2001 Internal T.I. 2001-0094527 F - PERTE REPUTEE NULLE-BRYAN Income Tax Act - Section 50 - Subsection 50(1) - Paragraph 50(1)(a) no partial bad debt recognition under s. 50(1)(a)
Income Tax Act - Section 40 - Subsection 40(2) - Paragraph 40(2)(g) - Subparagraph 40(2)(g)(ii) Byram now followed re loss on non-interest-bearing shareholder loan to corporation
16 November 2001 Internal T.I. 2001-0095617 F - ACCORD ECRIT RETROACTIF GARDE D'ENFANTS Income Tax Act - Section 118 - Subsection 118(5) subsequent letter was not an agreement eliminating a support obligation in respect of one of the two children
Income Tax Act - Section 56.1 - Subsection 56.1(4) - Support Amount “agreement” must correspond “to the reality of a situation of shared financial and parental responsibilities and … [be] a valid contract … creating mutual obligations”
2001-11-09 21 November 2001 External T.I. 2000-0062895 F - BOURSE D'ETUDES OU REVENU D'EMPLOI Income Tax Act - Section 5 - Subsection 5(1) “scholarships” that had to be repaid if the student did not then work for the employer were received qua employee – but could be non-taxable as primarily for employer’s benefit
9 November 2001 External T.I. 2001-0101685 F - APPLICATION DE 16.1 ET DE 85(1) Income Tax Act - Section 85 - Subsection 85(1) a property for which an s. 16.1(1) election has been made cannot be transferred on a rollover basis under s. 85(1)
Income Tax Act - Section 16.1 - Subsection 16.1(1) - Paragraph 16.1(1)(f) s. 16.1(1)(f) does not accommodate an s. 85(1) disposition to a corporation
21 November 2001 External T.I. 2001-0104785 F - CONTRIBUTION A UN RPA SERVICES PASSES Income Tax Act - Section 147.2 - Subsection 147.2(4) - Paragraph 147.2(4)(c) counts as a service year even if only one day of services
2001-10-26 16 November 2001 External T.I. 2000-0054435 F - BIENS AGRICOLES ADMISSIBLES Income Tax Act - 101-110 - Section 110.6 - Subsection 110.6(1) - Interest in a Family Farm or Fishing Partnership - Paragraph (a) ownership of the farm operating corporation by the partnership meant that the partnership interests were not qualified farm property

CRA indicates that the settlor can be one of three trustees of an alter ego trust without engaging s. 75(2)

The trust deed for an alter ego trust provided that no capital distributions, including any capital gains, could be made while the settlor (who also was a trustee) was alive, that all decisions were by a majority vote of the three trustees, and did not include any provision granting the settlor the power to direct the future distributions that were to be made following the settlor’s death.

CRA indicated that, in general, these provisions did not engage s. 75(2). In particular, the settlor had no capital interest in the trust, and the settlor being one of the trustees acting by majority vote was permissible. However, s. 75(2) could still apply where the trust deed expressly required the settlor’s consent or direction with respect to any decision made by the trustees, including where decisions were made by the majority of trustees provided that that settlor-trustee was one of that majority.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.7 under s. 75(2).

CRA indicates that the activity test in s. s. 84.1(2.31)(f)(ii) or 84.1(2.32)(g)(ii) can be met by successive children and regarding only one out of multiple businesses

One of the requirements under the inter-generational transfer rules in proposed s. 84.1(2.31) (dealing with an immediate intergenerational business transfer) or proposed s. 84.1(2.32) (dealing with gradual intergenerational business transfers) is that the child, or at least one member of the group of children, be actively engaged on a regular, continuous and substantial basis within the meaning of s. 120.4(1.1)(a) in the relevant business of a subject corporation or in relevant group entities. This condition (the “activity threshold”) must be satisfied from the time of the disposition of the subject shares by the parent until 36 months later in the case of an immediate intergenerational business transfer, or until 60 months later in the case of a gradual intergenerational business transfer.

CRA indicated regarding this activity threshold test (in s. 84.1(2.31)(f)(ii) or 84.1(2.32)(g)(ii)):

  • Assuming that a group of children are the indirect purchasers of the subject shares, it need not be the same individual amongst them who meets the activity threshold throughout the 36 or 60 month period (i.e., in a sense, they can take turns).
  • Consistent with the stated purpose of ensuring the continued involvement of the taxpayer’s children in the acquired business, any previous engagement or involvement by a child prior to the disposition of the subject shares by the parent to the purchaser corporation would not count for purposes of satisfying the test.
  • Where there are multiple businesses being carried on by several different corporations, a child need only meet the activity threshold in any relevant business of a subject corporation or relevant group entity in relation to that subject corporation.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.6 under s. 84.1(2.31)(f)(ii).

CRA confirms that the replacement of an executor due to death or inability does not result in a loss restriction event

CRA confirmed the position in IT-302R3 (archived) that where the executor, administrator, or trustee of an estate is replaced as a result of that person’s death or inability to fulfill their function, control of a corporation held by the estate would not be acquired solely as a result of that replacement. This position is not conditional on the replacement trustee being related or otherwise connected to the executor, administrator or trustee being replaced.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.4 under s. 251.2(2)(a).

CRA indicates that an individual exercising power of attorney for a controlling incapacitated shareholder does not have de jure control of the corporation

CRA confirmed 2012-0454111C6 in finding that a power of attorney under which a designated attorney exercises the voting rights of a controlling shareholder of a corporation as a consequence of the incapacity of that shareholder would not constitute (in contrast to a unanimous shareholders agreement) an external document that has to be taken into consideration in determining the de jure control of the corporation - so that the grant or exercise of such a power of attorney would not give rise to a loss restriction event.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.3 under s. 251.2(2)(a).

CRA relies on s. 248(28) to avoid double taxation under s. 15(1) and s. 5

A corporation pays wages to an individual employee who is not a shareholder but does not deal at arm’s length with a shareholder and a portion of the wages is subsequently determined to be unreasonable pursuant to s. 67. CRA indicated that the overpayment would not be included in the individual’s income under s. 15(1) because the benefit had not been conferred on the individual in a capacity of shareholder. There also would be no deemed inclusion under s. 15(1.4)(c) because the same amount had been included in the individual’s employment income.

Where such non-arm’s length employee was also a shareholder, although the overpayment would otherwise be income under s. 15(1), s. 248(28) would exclude the application of s. 15(1), so that there was no double taxation. (This seems like a departure from the traditional approach of determining whether a benefit was received qua employee or qua shareholder, and then only applying the more applicable provision.) Again, s. 15(1.4)(c) would not apply because of the s. 5 inclusion.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.2 under s. 15(1).

CRA indicates that a contribution to a spousal trust after the spouse’s death would not cause it to cease to be a spousal trust or affect the deemed disposition dates for its property

We have published the questions which were posed, and summaries of the preliminary oral responses given, at the 2024 STEP CRA Roundtable.

In Q.1, CRA indicated that a contribution to a spousal or common-law partner trust (a “spousal trust”), made after the death of the spouse beneficiary, by a person other than the individual who had settled the trust, would not cause it to cease to be a spousal trust. In addition, the contribution would not have any effect on the timing of the deemed disposition of all the capital property of the trust: on the death of the spouse beneficiary (which had already occurred); and every 21 years thereafter pursuant to s. 104(4)(b)(iii) or (c).

Neal Armstrong. Summary of 4 June 2024 STEP Roundtable, Q.1 under s. 104(4)(a).

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