News of Note
CRA indicates that the “short-cut method” for short-circuiting a Pt III assessment is “generally” available
Email this ContentIn 2011-0412071C6 F, CRA indicated that if the corporation informs the local Tax Services Office that it wishes s. 184(3) to apply, the TSO will apply the "short-cut” method under which no Part III assessment will be issued to the corporation and only the shareholders will be reassessed to include the taxable dividends in their income.
When asked whether the short-cut method is generally available or only in exceptional circumstances, CRA indicated the former, stating that “this administrative practice is still in effect and the CRA is generally prepared to apply it to a file, both at the taxpayer's request and during an audit of an election under subsection 83(2),” but that “the use of this method, however, remains in the discretion of the CRA to determine whether the circumstances of a file are appropriate for its application.”
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 6 October 2017 APFF Roundtable, Q.5 under s. 184(3).
CRA will accommodate a s. 88(2)(b)(i) capital dividend election based on an estimated CDA balance
We have prepared brief summaries of the questions posed at the 6 October 2017 APFF Roundtable, and are providing translations of the CRA preliminary written answers on a piecemeal basis, starting with Q.4 to Q.9, and expect to be finished translating the answers by Sunday. We will also provide complete translations of the questions posed when they are officially released by CRA, towards or about year end.
Turning to Q.4, where the assets of a corporation, that is wound-up under s. 88(2) are portfolio investments or other assets with a fluctuating value, it may not be possible to know in advance of the moment of the winding-up what will be the capital dividend account (based on the gains realized on the winding-up) at the time of the winding-up, so that it will be impossible to file a completely accurate capital dividend election in advance of the winding-up time.
In these circumstances, CRA will expect the election to be filed based on the corporation’s best estimate. If CRA then comes to a different determination of the CDA, it will without further ado adjust the amount of the dividend deemed to come out of the CDA accordingly, as well as the amount shown on the election for (T2054). CRA also stated:
While the CRA usually expects a resolution to refer to the total amount of a dividend subject to an Election, which should correspond to that indicated in the Form T2054, the CRA will accept, in these particular circumstances, such amount not being specifically stated in the resolution.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 6 October 2017 APFF Roundtable, Q.4 under s. 88(2)(b)(i).
Insta-chèques – Quebec Court of Appeal finds that a company in a cheque-cashing business was a listed financial institution under the ETA
A Quebec company whose business was to cash cheques was found to be a financial institution under ETA s. 149(1)(a)(iii), namely, a person “whose principal business is as a … dealer in … financial instruments.” This meant that it was subject to Part IV.1 tax under the Taxation Act.
The principal issue was whether the company was a “dealer.” The Court stated:
[T]he author Simon Labrecque properly states that the term “dealer” … relates to a person “whose business consists of dealing in financial instruments for its own account…” where this is for the purpose of profit. This entails, according to him, “an elevated level of transactions, in volume and frequency.”
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 2441-0946 Québec Inc. (c.b.a., Insta-chèques) v. Agence du revenu du Québec, 2017 QCCA 1491 under ETA s. 149(1)(a)(iii) and s. 123(1) – debt security.
CRA appears to accept a negative covenant in a TFSA declaration that supports a loan made to the TFSA holder
A TFSA holder can pledge his or her TFSA interest as security for a loan on arm’s length terms – but, per 2013-0514261E5, the loan may not also be secured by the TFSA assets.
However, in a more recent letter, CRA did not seem to be troubled by having a negative covenant inserted in the TFSA declaration requiring that the TFSA maintain a minimum asset level so as to indirectly support the loan to the TFSA holder.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of 27 June 2017 External T.I. 2017-0708951E5 F under s. 146.2(4).
Shenanigans Media – Tax Court of Canada finds that expenditures on actor’s clothing used in promotions were not deductible
The expenses of a teenage actor, who “had to maintain a certain image,” for clothing that was available for him to wear to auditions and promotional appearances, were not deductible by him or his company, given that the evidence “showed ordinary clothes that might well be worn by anyone of Mr. Everett’s age.” Jorré J stated:
Because of the inherently personal nature of clothing, it is accepted in the case law that normally clothing can only be claimed if it is not suitable for general wear or if it has special features uniquely necessary for the work. Thus, items such as period costumes, chef’s uniforms, lawyer’s gowns, jackets with company names or logos and safety related clothing are deductible. However, clothing that is generally worn is not deductible and, for this purpose, it does not matter what an individual prefers to wear when not at work.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Shenanigans Media Inc. v. The Queen, 2017 TCC 180 under s. 18(1)(h).
Iberdrola - ECJ (1st Chamber) finds that a developer was entitled to VAT credits for reconstructing a sewage plant for free, as this advanced its own project
A developer (Iberdrola) contracted with a Bulgarian municipality to reconstruct, for free, a waste-water pumping station serving a holiday village at which it was building apartment buildings. At issue was whether Iberdrola was entitled to deduct the VAT borne by it on the pumping-station reconstruction work in accordance with a European VAT provision, which provided such a deduction for inputs to “goods and services [that] are used for the purposes of the taxed transactions of a taxable person.” The First Chamber of the European Court of Justice stated:
It is clear … that, without the reconstruction of that pump station, it would have been impossible to connect the [apartment] buildings …to that pump station, with the result that that reconstruction was essential for completing that [apartment] project… .
Those circumstances are likely to demonstrate the existence of a direct and immediate link between the reconstruction service in respect of the pump station belonging to the municipality … and a taxed output transaction by Iberdrola since it appears that the service was supplied in order to allow the latter to carry out the construction project… .
The fact that the municipality of Tsarevo also benefits from that service cannot justify the right to deduct corresponding to that service being denied to Iberdrola if the existence of such a direct and immediate link is established … .
This case may assist in thinking about ETA s. 141.01(4), which deems the occurrence of impenetrable consequence “to the extent that” a supplier acquires a property or service “for the purpose of making the free supply of that property or service or for consumption or use in the course of making the free supply.” It might be considered that Iberdrola was not incurring the pumping-station reconstruction costs for the purpose of or in the course of making a free supply to the municipality but, rather, as inputs to its own apartment project.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Director of the ‘Appeals and Tax and Social Insurance Practice’ Directorate of Sofia v. Iberdrola Inmobiliaria Real Estate Investments, C-132/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:683 (European Court of Justice (First Chamber)) under ETA s. 141.01(4).
Development Securities – U.K. First-Tier Tribunal finds that a Jersey sub, whose Jersey board approved a decision contrary to the sub’s interests, resided in the U.K.
A U.K. tax avoidance scheme, which entailed Jersey subsidiaries (a majority of whose directors were Jersey residents who also served as directors of numerous other client companies) acquiring assets from their UK parent (DS Plc) or its U.K. subsidiaries at prices corresponding to the assets’ historical cost plus an inflation-indexation adjustment and then, after the Jersey-resident directors had resigned, selling those assets back to the DS group at their much lower fair market value, thereby triggering a tax loss that could be used in the DS group. The scheme depended on considering that these subs had their central management and control in Jersey at the time of the acquisitions. In finding that the subs instead were resident in the U.K., Morgan J stated:
Unlike Wood v Holden… this was not a case where the board considered a proposal and, having taken appropriate advice, decided that it was in the best interests of the companies to enter into it. Given that the transaction was clearly not in the interests of the companies and indeed could only take place with parental approval, the inescapable conclusion is that the board was simply doing what the parent, DS Plc, wanted it to do and in effect instructed it to do. In the circumstances, the line was crossed from the parent influencing and giving strategic or policy direction to the parent giving an instruction. The Jersey board were simply administering a decision they were instructed to undertake by DS Plc, in checking the legality of the plan and then administering the other consequent actions prior to handing over completely to the UK group.
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Development Securities (No. 9) Ltd & Ors v HMRC, [2017] UKFTT 565 (TC) under s. 2(1).
Joint Committee provides its submissions on draft ss. 84.1(2)(a.1) and 246.1
The expanded s. 84.1 rule produces a greater impediment to the transfer of family businesses from one member to another, whether from one generation to another or between siblings (and during lifetime or post‐mortem), with the result that the tax system would favour third‐party sales. In the case of a post-mortem transfer, this is because neither the estate nor the child can now use pipeline planning to avoid double tax on death, as for purposes of s. 84.1 the ACB to the estate or the child will be reduced by the capital gain deemed to be realized by the deceased, and because solving this is very difficult.
An inter vivos example is where Bob sells the shares of Opco (having a FMV of $6 million and nominal PUC and ACB) directly to his children, and receives a $6 million promissory note as consideration. The children subsequently transfer the Opco shares into a new holding company and repay the promissory note to Bob over time using cash flow and the debt capacity of Opco. Under proposed s. 84.1, on the transfer by the children of the Opco shares to the holding company, the children’s ACB for s. 84.1 purposes would be reduced from $6,000,000 to nil because of the capital gain realized by Bob, a non‐arm’s length party. As a result, they would be deemed to receive a taxable dividend on the $6,000,000 ultimately paid to them to fund payments under the promissory note.
A few comments on draft s. 246.1:
- It is unclear if, for example, there is receipt of, say, a promissory note, there is a deemed dividend on such receipt or only on subsequent distributions (principal payments).
- The Explanatory Notes indicate that the amount receivable by an individual subject to s. 246.1 could be received indirectly through a trust. In many (or perhaps most) cases, though, the rule could apply to the trust itself, i.e., there is an issue of potential double application.
- Under ss. 246.1(2)(c)(i) and (ii) (re dispositions of property and changes in paid‐up capital) it appears possible for arm’s length transactions to be the basis for the application of s. 246.1.
- One of the purposes of the transaction or series must be to effect a significant “reduction or disappearance” of assets. The language of the provision suggests that assets for this purpose are to be determined on some type of consolidated or look‐through approach but there is no guidance on the manner in which this is to be done.
The Joint Committee has also released its submissions on the 18 July 2017 passive income proposals, and on the split income proposals which we will partially summarize at another juncture.
Neal Armstrong. Summaries of 2 October 2017 Joint Committee Submission on 18 July 2017 Finance Proposals re Converting Income into Capital Gains under s. 84.1(2)(a.1) and s. 246.1.
Income Tax Severed Letters 4 October 2017
This morning's release of four severed letters from the Income Tax Rulings Directorate is now available for your viewing.
Wynter – Federal Court of Appeal defines “wilful blindness” as deliberate ignorance
In the context of a routine gross negligence case, Rennie JA stated:
[R]equiring an intention to cheat to establish wilful blindness [as contended by the taxpayer] is inconsistent with the well-established jurisprudence that wilful blindness pivots on a finding that the taxpayer deliberately chose not to make inquiries in order to avoid verifying that which might be such an inconvenient truth. The essential factual element is a finding of deliberate ignorance, as it “connotes ‘an actual process of suppressing a suspicion’”: Briscoe [2010 SCC 13]… .
Neal Armstrong. Summary of Wynter v. Canada, 2017 FCA 195 under s. 163(2).