Section 160.1

The taxpayer (“984”) reported a capital gain on its 2003 sale of land on the basis that it had acquired it from its parent (Henro) on a rollover basis, paid the computed capital gains tax and was assessed as filed. In 2010, the Minister assessed the Henro (to include an income account gain) and 984 (to reverse the previously reported capital gain and refund the capital gains tax, plus interest, totalling $1.7M) on the basis that the 2003 drop-down had occurred on a non-rollover basis – but its assessment of 984 was found to be void as being statute-barred. In a 2015 settlement agreement of the Minister with Henro and 984, it was agreed that the 2010 reassessments of both 984 and Henro would be reversed. However, the resulting 2015 reassessment of 984 could not be justified as valid based on s. 169(3) because the 2010 assessment was itself invalid – hence, 984 was not an appealing “taxpayer” referred to in s. 169(3) (as it was not engaged in a valid appeal procedure).

This meant that the only basis for justifying the 2015 assessment of 984 was that, pursuant to s. 160.1(1), the 2010 refund represented an amount that had been “refunded to a taxpayer … in excess of the amount to which the taxpayer was entitled as a refund under this Act.”

Preliminarily to considering this issue, Smith J determined that there had been no “overpayment” by 984 for purpose of s. 164(1) because the 2010 assessment purporting to refund the capital gains tax was void, so that there was no reduction in the capital gains tax amount, and there therefore had been no overpayment thereof. Accordingly, there had been no refund pursuant to s. 164(1) of an overpayment. It followed that the related interest was not interest described in s. 164(3).

Turning now to s. 160.1(1) and after noting (at para. 105) that “the wording of subsection 160.1(1) does not support the Appellant’s position that the taxpayer must ‘claim’ a refund in order for section 160.1 to apply,” Smith J went on to find (at para. 107) “that in order to reassess a taxpayer pursuant to subsection 160.1(1) and (3), the amount refunded must be pursuant to a provision of the Act” – and, as noted, the refund had not occurred pursuant to s. 164. He stated (at para. 118):

Since the Payment was not made pursuant to a provision of the Act, it was a payment made in error in that it was made without any statutory authority. It follows that the Minister was not entitled to reassess the Appellant under subsection 160.1(1) and (3).

He went on to find that if he were incorrect that the payment was required to be made pursuant to a specific provision of the Act in order to qualify as a refund for s. 160.1(1) purposes, the 2010 payment was not a “refund” in the ordinary sense of the word, stating (at para. 133) that this term referenced “the return of an overpayment.” Accordingly, “either way subsection 160.1(1) would not apply” (para. 134).

The appeal was allowed.

Pursuant to s. 160.1, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer to effect the return of refunds that the taxpayer claimed and was not entitled to. The taxpayer appealed on the basis that she had been the victim of identity theft, and had not claimed the false refunds herself. The Minister argued that the Tax Court's jurisdiction over refunds is restricted to the determination of the amount of refunds payable, and not over whether refunds or returns of refunds were in fact owed.

Boyle J. found that the Tax Court did have jurisdiction over refunds owed. He stated (at para. 3):

[The] wording in section 160.1, and the express conferral of appeal jurisdiction on this Court in subsection 160.1(3), indicates Parliament intended this Court to have jurisdiction to decide if the excess amounts were refunded to a taxpayer.

He also stated that this finding was "largely moot," given the unlikelihood, in this day and age, that a person could do as the taxpayer had alleged - walk into tax preparer's office with a forged signature and driver's licence, and collect false refunds (para. 10).