Words and Phrases - "refund"
984274 Alberta Inc. v. The Queen, 2019 TCC 85, rev'd 2020 FCA 125
The taxpayer (“984”) reported a capital gain on its 2003 sale of land on the basis that it had acquired it from its parent (Henro) on a rollover basis, paid the computed capital gains tax and was assessed as filed. In 2010, the Minister assessed the Henro (to include an income account gain) and 984 (to reverse the previously reported capital gain and refund the capital gains tax, plus interest, totalling $1.7M) on the basis that the 2003 drop-down had occurred on a non-rollover basis – but its assessment of 984 was found to be void as being statute-barred. In a 2015 settlement agreement of the Minister with Henro and 984, it was agreed that the 2010 reassessments of both 984 and Henro would be reversed. However, the resulting 2015 reassessment of 984 could not be justified as valid based on s. 169(3) because the 2010 assessment was itself invalid – hence, 984 was not an appealing “taxpayer” referred to in s. 169(3) (as it was not engaged in a valid appeal procedure).
This meant that the only basis for justifying the 2015 assessment of 984 was that, pursuant to s. 160.1(1), the 2010 refund represented an amount that had been “refunded to a taxpayer … in excess of the amount to which the taxpayer was entitled as a refund under this Act.”
Preliminarily to considering this issue, Smith J determined that there had been no “overpayment” by 984 for purpose of s. 164(1) because the 2010 assessment purporting to refund the capital gains tax was void, so that there was no reduction in the capital gains tax amount, and there therefore had been no overpayment thereof. Accordingly, there had been no refund pursuant to s. 164(1) of an overpayment. It followed that the related interest was not interest described in s. 164(3).
Turning now to s. 160.1(1) and after noting (at para. 105) that “the wording of subsection 160.1(1) does not support the Appellant’s position that the taxpayer must ‘claim’ a refund in order for section 160.1 to apply,” Smith J went on to find (at para. 107) “that in order to reassess a taxpayer pursuant to subsection 160.1(1) and (3), the amount refunded must be pursuant to a provision of the Act” – and, as noted, the refund had not occurred pursuant to s. 164. He stated (at para. 118):
Since the Payment was not made pursuant to a provision of the Act, it was a payment made in error in that it was made without any statutory authority. It follows that the Minister was not entitled to reassess the Appellant under subsection 160.1(1) and (3).
He went on to find that if he were incorrect that the payment was required to be made pursuant to a specific provision of the Act in order to qualify as a refund for s. 160.1(1) purposes, the 2010 payment was not a “refund” in the ordinary sense of the word, stating (at para. 133) that this term referenced “the return of an overpayment.” Accordingly, “either way subsection 160.1(1) would not apply” (para. 134).
The appeal was allowed.
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 152 - Subsection 152(4) - Paragraph 152(4)(a) - Subparagraph 152(4)(a)(ii) | reassessment made pursuant to late waiver was void | 34 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 152 - Subsection 152(8) | reassessment made pursuant to late waiver could not be cured by s. 152(8) | 47 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 169 - Subsection 169(3) | voidness of assessment against 2nd taxpayer to a settlement agreement meant that it could not be assessed under s. 169(3) | 285 |
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 164 - Subsection 164(1) | invalid reassessment could not establish a refund amount | 263 |
Tawa Developments Inc. v. The Queen, 2011 DTC 1324 [at at 1837], 2011 TCC 440
The taxpayer failed to apply for its dividend refund for a taxation year within the three year time-limit, and its dividend refund that year was therefore denied. Hogan J. found that the taxpayers' RDTOH was not reduced by the amount of the unclaimed dividend refund. The ordinary meaning of "refund" is the repayment of a sum of money (paras. 33-34). The meaning of "dividend refund" likewise refers to an amount actually paid rather than the notional amount the taxpayer is entitled to apply for, because the alternative would be arbitrarily punitive (paras. 49-50).
Canada Safeway Ltd. v. R., 98 DTC 6060, [1998] 1 CTC 120 (FCA)
In finding that a refund of federal sales tax that predecessors of the taxpayer previously had paid in error did not qualify as a reimbursement for purposes of s. 12(1)(x)(iv), Létourneau J.A. noted that Westcoast Energy had found that “in all of the examples of the word reimbursement [provided to the court], there exists a flow of benefits between the respective parties.” He then stated (at p. 6063):
"In the case of a refund of sums paid by error, there is, in my view, no flow of benefits between the respective parties: the money is simply returned to the payer. In addition, while the notion of reimbursement generally involves the intervention of a third party, that of refund implies the mere return of money between two parties."
| Locations of other summaries | Wordcount | |
|---|---|---|
| Tax Topics - Income Tax Act - Section 9 - Timing | 35 |