News of Note

Six further full-text translations of CRA technical interpretations are available

The table below provides descriptors and links for six French technical interpretation released in January of 2014, as fully translated by us.

These (and the other full-text translations covering the last 4 years of CRA releases) are subject to the usual (3 working weeks per month) paywall. You are currently in the “open” week for February.

Bundle Date Translated severed letter Summaries under Summary descriptor
2014-01-22 9 December 2013 External T.I. 2013-0507931E5 F - Financing fees Income Tax Act - Section 20 - Subsection 20(1) - Paragraph 20(1)(e) cash pool utilization fees could be deductible under s. 20(1)(e)
Income Tax Act - Section 18 - Subsection 18(1) - Paragraph 18(1)(b) - Capital Expenditure v. Expense - Financing Expenditures intragroup cash pool utilization fees are capital expenditures
Income Tax Act - Section 20 - Subsection 20(1) - Paragraph 20(1)(e.1) annual internal cash pool utilization fees likely are deductible under s. 20(1)(e.1)
2014-01-15 30 October 2013 External T.I. 2013-0500831E5 F - Frais de bureau à domicile Income Tax Act - Section 8 - Subsection 8(13) inapplicable where corporation uses its individual shareholder's office
Income Tax Act - Section 18 - Subsection 18(1) - Paragraph 18(1)(a) - Income-Producing Purpose to deduct applicable home expenses, individual shareholder must charge rent to corporation using home office
Income Tax Act - Section 45 - Subsection 45(1) - Paragraph 45(1)(c) incidental rental use of home does not result in part disposition
15 October 2013 External T.I. 2013-0498001E5 F - Transfert de sommes inutilisées entre régimes Income Tax Act - Section 248 - Subsection 248(1) - Private Health Services Plan transfer from individual healthcare spending account to another PHSP is permitted
18 December 2013 External T.I. 2013-0479421E5 F - Section 30 and Cranberry Farm Income Tax Act - Section 18 - Subsection 18(1) - Paragraph 18(1)(b) - Capital Expenditure v. Expense - Improvements v. Repairs or Running Expense initial cranberry plant planting is a cost of land
Income Tax Act - Section 30 costs of clearing, levelling and draining lands, but not of constructing basins, for a cranberry farm are currently deductible
Income Tax Regulations - Schedules - Schedule II - Class 17 costs of constructing cranberry farm basins included in Class 17
Income Tax Regulations - Schedules - Schedule II - Class 6 costs of constructing irrigation pond included
Income Tax Regulations - Schedules - Schedule II - Class 8 irrigation system included, drainage costs deductible under s. 30
28 November 2013 External T.I. 2013-0504221E5 F - Fin d'années réputées Income Tax Act - Section 249 - Subsection 249(3.1) Amalco not a continuation of predecessors for election purposes
8 October 2013 External T.I. 2011-0428931E5 F - Assurance-invalidité Income Tax Act - Section 18 - Subsection 18(1) - Paragraph 18(1)(a) - Income-Producing Purpose non-deductibility of disability insurance premiums
Income Tax Act - Section 9 - Exempt Receipts/Business proceeds received as a result of business credit card insurance were not income

Oxford Properties – Federal Court of Appeal finds that using the s. 88(1)(d) bump on newly-formed rental property LPs to avoid indirect recapture income under s. 100(1) was abusive

When Oxford Properties was sold to an OMERS subsidiary, the purchaser first negotiated that Oxford would drop various properties down into LPs on a s. 97(2) rollover basis, with those partnership interests subsequently being bumped under s. 88(1)(d) (which, in 2001, did not prohibit bumping interests in partnerships holding appreciated buildings). After the acquisition, those bumped costs were then pushed down onto the cost of interests in property-specific LPs (which had been formed following the acquisition), by winding-up the upper-tier LPs under s. 98(3) and using the s. 98(3)(c) bump. After the three-year s. 69(11) period, some of the property-specific LPs were then sold to tax exempts.

Noël CJ reversed the findings of D’Arcy J that these transactions did not abuse ss. 97(2) and 100(1). Respecting s. 97(2), he stated that “the only reason why Parliament would preserve the tax attributes of property that is rolled into a partnership is to allow for the eventual taxation of the deferred gains and latent recapture,” so that a series of transactions that instead ensured “that deferred gains and recapture will never be taxed frustrates the object, spirit and purpose of subsection 97(2).” Somewhat similarly, he stated, respecting s. 100(1):

Parliament wanted tax to be paid on the latent recapture which would otherwise go unpaid on a subsequent sale of the depreciable property by the tax-exempt purchaser.

Given this, the inevitable conclusion is that the object, spirit and purpose of subsection 100(1) was frustrated by the result achieved in this case as the latent recapture in the depreciable property … will forever go unpaid.

Most interestingly, he found that the same broad brush that was applied in determining that the transactions were abusive insofar as they avoided recognition in taxable hands of recapture should also be applied to determine that GAAR should be applied only to recognize a taxable capital gain (effectively under s. 100(1)) equal to that recapture (of $116M) and not a taxable capital gain equal to the accrued capital gain on the buildings of $21M and the accrued capital gain on the land of $11M – i.e., “the Crown cannot have it both ways” and be able to apply s. 100(1) in a technical manner once, on broader grounds, it had been found to be abused. In this regard, he stated:

[F]ailure to recognize a cost that has been actually incurred but which would disappear on a vertical amalgamation or a partnership dissolution goes against the integrity of the capital gains system because it allows for the subsequent realization of a capital gain in circumstances where there has been no economic gain.

Neal Armstrong. Summaries of The Queen v. Oxford Properties Group Inc., 2018 FCA 30 under s. 245(4), s. 69(11), s. 88(1)(d) and s. 171(1).

Joint Committee asks Finance to review the s. 55(2) issues previously raised with CRA

In April, the Joint Committee provided approximately 90 pages of slides to the Income Tax Rulings Directorate on s. 55(2) issues. CRA was able to deal only with some of the issues, which were subsequently discussed at the 2017 Annual CTF Roundtable, and the Joint Committee has now asked for Finance’s consideration of these issues.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Joint Committee, “Subsection 55(2) Amendments – Follow-Up to Our Meeting with Canada Revenue Agency,” 19 January 2018 Joint Committee Submission to Finance respecting s. 2015 s. 55(2) Amendments including appended 20 April 2017 letter to Randy Hewlett on such amendments under s. 55(2).

The Joint Committee suggests that there are preferred approaches for the inevitable Finance response to Green

The Joint Committee has suggested that, under the Finance response to Green (respecting the flow-through of lower-tier LP losses to upper-tier partners), there be an ability to carry over unused limited partnership losses to future years in which the upper-tier partnership has an at-risk amount respecting the lower-tier partnership. For example, a provision could be added to allow partnerships to claim a deduction in computing their income in circumstances similar to where a taxpayer is allowed a deduction in computing taxable income under s. 111(1)(e).

Although s. 40(3.12) is intended to address the problem of negative ACB arising from interim distributions before ACB is increased by year-end income, it is not an ideal solution. The Committee suggests that the s. 40(3.111) relief accorded to professional partnerships be extended.

Neal Armstrong. Summaries of Joint Committee, “Response to Green case” 19 January 2018 Joint Committee Submission to Finance respecting the Green case under s. 111(1)(e) and s. 40(3.12).

FTQ – Tax Court of Canada finds that a “gift” that relieved the taxpayer of an obligation to invest the gifted funds was not a gift

The corporate taxpayer agreed with the City of Chandler that it would no longer use any loan repayment proceeds received by it from a City-owned corporation - that had failed in an costly attempt to restart a paper mill close to the City – to invest in a prospective replacement economic-development LP to be sponsored by the City, but would instead make a “gift” of the loan repayment proceeds (which ended up totalling $9.3 million) to the City, for which it received charitable receipts. From a CRA perspective, what might have been troubling about this was that, broadly speaking, this $9.3 million was not really the taxpayer’s money as, in the absence of its “gift,” it would have been received subject to an obligation to “invest” in what might likely be or become a worthless enterprise with ugly financial statements.

Ouimet J found that there was no “gift” and, thus, no s. 110.1(1)(a) deduction, stating:

Since the payment of the sums … to the City of Chandler had the effect of freeing the appellant of its obligation to negotiate in good faith to create a limited partnership, the consideration received by the appellant in exchange for such payment was the amount by which that obligation was extinguished.

He also rejected the taxpayer’s alternative argument that the payments qualified for current deduction consistently with the s. 18(1)(a) income-producing purpose test given that their purpose instead was to avoid involvement in the proposed LP and to leave to the City alone the responsibility of using the sums to economically develop the region.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Fonds de solidarité des travailleurs du Québec (F.T.Q) v. The Queen, 2018 CCI 3 under s. 110.1(1)(a) and s. 18(1)(a) – income-producing purpose.

The new split income rules rest on a conceptually flawed foundation

The concept under the expanded split-income rules of linking business income or gains to individual contribution based on a “reasonable return” thereon is inherently intractable:

Returns are random, often yielding unintended results, from large gains to bankruptcy. There's often no demonstrable way to connect the results back to the contributions of specific people. The notion that one can do so is closely related to the … Marxist … labour theory of value – an intuitive notion that has since been thoroughly debunked… .

Paradoxically, the rules do not accommodate family members adjusting their relative gains to accord with the new normative standard. Suppose that a corporation that is owned 50-50 by two spouses is sold, and that their relative contribution to the success of the company is considered to be 60-40:

In this scenario, 20 per cent of one spouse's gain is split income, and taxed at the highest rate. There is no way around this, except to manipulate the price paid by the vendor to each spouse. That tax-guided manipulation may not be acceptable, or even possible because of the attribution rules.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Kevyn Nightingale, "Private Company Income-Splitting Proposal Part 3: The Government Responds", Tax Topics (Wolters Kluwer), No. 2389-90, December 21, 2017, p. 1 under s. 120.4(1) – reasonable return – para. (b).

IP can be valued using the relief-from-royalty method

One common approach to valuing intellectual property is the relief-from-royalty method under which it is valued as the present value of the royalties that would have been paid, had the IP been licensed in an arm's length transaction. This entails significant judgment respecting the selection of the royalty rate to apply to the cash flows generated by the IP, and the selection of the discount rate to apply to the royalty stream.

[T]here are several "rules of thumb" which can be utilized in determining an appropriate royalty rate. One such rule is the "25 per cent profit split valuation method" which determines a royalty rate in order to allocate 25 per cent of the licensee's profits to the licensor. Although this may serve as a useful starting point to begin consideration of the value of IP, courts have been reluctant to accept this methodology.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Peter Neelands and Suzy Lendvay, "Valuation of IP based on a royalty stream", The Lawyer's Daily (LexisNexis Canada), January 24, 2018 under General Concepts – FMV – Other.

Income Tax Severed Letters 31 January 2018

This morning's release of 16 severed letters from the Income Tax Rulings Directorate is now available for your viewing.

Stadion Amsterdam – ECJ finds that a single supply of composite items is subject to a single rate of VAT

The operator of a soccer stadium had been found to be making a single supply of tours notwithstanding that participants were entitled at the conclusion of their tour to visit an on-site museum free of additional charge. The ECJ found that this single supply was subject to the general rate of VAT rather than in part being eligible for the lower VAT rate applicable to museum admissions, notwithstanding that the separate value of the two components of the supply could be readily identified.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Stadion Amsterdam CV v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (Secretary of State for Finances, Netherlands), [2018] EUECJ, Case C-463/16 (18 January 2018) (9th Chamber) under ETA s. 165(1).

Barker v Baxendale Walker - Court of Appeal of England and Wales finds that a tax solicitor was negligent in not warning that his interpretation might be wrong

A tax solicitor charged £2.4 million for his advice on a tax avoidance scheme. His interpretation of the key statutory provision (including the meaning to be accorded to “is” and “at any time”) was found by the Court of Appeal to likely be incorrect, so that the taxpayer was not to be faulted for settling with HMRC for £11.3 million. The taxpayer would have proceeded with the scheme if he had merely been given a “general health warning” (i.e., that any tax avoidance scheme was subject to a risk of successful challenge), but not if he had been given a specific warning of the significant risk of the particular point of interpretation being successfully challenged.

In finding that the tax solicitor was negligent in failing to warn of this specific risk, Asplin LJ stated:

[I]t is perfectly possible to be correct about the construction of a provision or, at least, not negligent in that regard, but nevertheless to be under a duty to point out the risks involved and to have been negligent in not having done so … .

…There was a significant risk that the … advice was wrong and in all the circumstances, a reasonably competent solicitor would have gone beyond his own view and set out the risks.

Neal Armstrong. Summary of Barker v Baxendale Walker Solicitors (a firm) & Anor, [2017] EWCA Civ 2056 under General Concepts – Negligence and Statutory Interpretation – Interpretation Act – s. 10.

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