Docket: IMM-445-17
Citation:
2017 FC 999
Ottawa, Ontario, November 6, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Gascon
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BETWEEN:
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WAQAS SHAHZAD
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The applicant, Mr. Waqas Shahzad, is from
Pakistan. He wished to be sponsored by his spouse, a first cousin who had
previously hosted him at her home, for permanent residence in Canada. In a
decision dated January 12, 2017 [Decision], an immigration officer [Officer] dismissed
Mr. Shahzad’s application on the grounds that the marriage was not genuine, and
that the couple had entered into their relationship primarily for the purpose
of obtaining status or privilege under the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. Following the interview of the couple, the
Officer found Mr. Shahzad not to be credible as a result of various discrepancies
and omissions comparing his evidence and that of his spouse, as well as from
the details he provided regarding the transition of the relationship from one between
first cousins into a primarily romantic one. Therefore, he could not qualify as
a member of the spouse or common-law partner in Canada class and be eligible
for sponsorship by his cousin, as provided by subsection 4(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227.
[2]
Mr. Shahzad has applied to this Court for
judicial review of the Decision. He argues that the decision is unreasonable
because it erroneously assessed the evidence he had provided on the genuineness
of his marriage, misconstrued the facts and evidence presented, and notably
erred in considering the evidence on his spouse’s miscarriage, the development
of their relationship and their cohabitation. Mr. Shahzad asks this Court to
quash the Decision and to send it back for redetermination by a different immigration
officer.
[3]
The only issue raised by Mr. Shahzad’s
application is whether the Officer’s Decision is unreasonable. However, as a
preliminary matter, Mr. Shahzad also claims that the affidavit of Officer Gail
Ross [Ross Affidavit] submitted by the Minister does not constitute admissible
evidence in the context of this judicial review.
[4]
Having considered the evidence before the
Officer and the applicable law, I can find no basis for overturning the Officer’s
Decision. The Decision was responsive to the evidence and the outcome is
defensible based on the facts and the law. It falls within the range of
possible, acceptable outcomes. In my opinion, the
reasons for the Decision adequately explain how the Officer concluded that Mr. Shahzad’s
marriage is not genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of
obtaining immigration status in Canada. I must therefore
dismiss Mr. Shahzad’s application for judicial review. However, I agree with
Mr. Shahzad that the Ross Affidavit is inadmissible, and it has not been
considered for the purpose of this decision.
II.
Background
A.
The factual context
[5]
Mr. Shahzad entered Canada in January 2010, originally
sponsored by his current spouse’s ex-husband.
[6]
Mr. Shahzad spent two years living with his
spouse-to-be and her ex-husband, before moving out on his own. He claims to
have witnessed domestic abuse during his stay with them. It is apparently once
his first cousin and her husband separated that Mr. Shahzad became close to her.
After spending more extensive amounts of time together, the relationship
eventually grew romantic (though seemingly platonic until the day of the
wedding), and Mr. Shahzad proposed a marriage. Mr. Shahzad’s spouse has three
children from her previous marriage.
B.
The Decision
[7]
In her Decision, the Officer analyzed the
genuineness of Mr. Shahzad’s marriage through several factors before finding that
the marriage was not genuine and was entered into primarily for the purpose of
acquiring status or privilege under the IRPA. In her interview notes (which
form part of the Decision), the Officer described her credibility concerns and
noted many discrepancies between the testimony given by Mr. Shahzad and that of
his spouse.
[8]
First, Mr. Shahzad was unable to corroborate
where the children slept in the home. The Officer judged that it was reasonable
to expect that a person who states that he resides in a home with his wife and
three stepdaughters would know facts such as where each child sleeps, whether a
bed has been moved, whether the eldest child would have her own bedroom, and
whether or not the youngest sleeps with Mr. Shahzad and his spouse.
[9]
Second, the Officer noted a discrepancy
regarding whether the eldest child was at home or college the day before the
interview. In his defense, Mr. Shahzad said he had misunderstood the questions
and that it was hard for him to keep track of time and dates because of stress.
However, the Officer determined that it was reasonable to expect a person to
describe activities having taken place on the day prior to the interview,
particularly when both he and his spouse were home that day.
[10]
Third, there was a discrepancy as to the time
and reasons why Mr. Shahzad’s spouse had stopped working. Again, the Officer
thought it was reasonable to expect a husband to know that his wife effectively
stopped working in January 2016, as opposed to July 2016 as recalled by Mr.
Shahzad. Furthermore, the Officer noted that Mr. Shahzad’s spouse stopped
working because of health concerns relating to a stone in the pancreas, and not
because of a miscarriage, as mentioned by Mr. Shahzad. According to the
Officer, the details Mr. Shahzad did remember about his wife’s miscarriage,
like the name of her physician, were probably gleaned from his review of his
spouse’s medical notes. Yet, as the Officer noted, he could not recall the
timeframe of this event.
[11]
Fourth, the Officer also referred to the vague
recollection that Mr. Shahzad had of his spouse’s miscarriage. Mr. Shahzad
initially indicated that the miscarriage occurred in December 2016, whereas it
effectively happened two years before, in 2014. The Officer also noted the
discrepancy between Mr. Shahzad’s and his spouse’s recollection of the timing
and means of transportation to go to the hospital when the miscarriage
occurred.
[12]
Finally, the Officer observed that, according to
their testimonies, Mr. Shahzad and his spouse had not expressed any romantic
feelings between them until the proposal. The Officer did not find the
relationship development as described by Mr. Shahzad to be credible.
[13]
The Officer further mentioned in her notes that
Mr. Shahzad and his spouse had submitted various documents showing mail going
to the same address as well as the addition of Mr. Shahzad to the housing
contract. However, given the serious credibility concerns, the Officer was not
satisfied that Mr. Shahzad and his spouse had demonstrated that they resided
together or that the marriage was not entered primarily for the purpose of
gaining immigration status.
C.
The standard of review
[14]
The Court has consistently held that a large
degree of deference is owed to the decision-makers of Immigration, Refugee and
Citizenship Canada given the immigration officers’ expertise and experience in
immigration matters. As such, the Decision must be examined under the standard
of reasonableness (Truong v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 422 at para 12; Nguyen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1207 at para 11; Burton
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 345 [Burton] at para
13). More specifically, whether a marriage is genuine or is entered into for
the primary purpose of immigration is a question of mixed facts and law and a
highly factual determination, subject to review on a reasonableness standard (Burton
at para 15; Bercasio v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC
244 at para 17).
III.
Analysis
A.
The Ross Affidavit is not admissible
[15]
I will first deal with the preliminary objection
raised by Mr. Shahzad against the Ross Affidavit filed in support of the
Minister’s response to this application for judicial review.
[16]
In the Ross Affidavit, the Officer first
confirmed that her notes portrayed her assessment of the most significant
factors relating to her Decision. She then provided additional details on some
aspects of her Decision, notably her treatment of the miscarriage, the weight
she attached to it, and the reasons why she concluded as she did on this point.
The Officer also recounted how ten years’ experience as an immigration officer
taught her that there will likely be some sort of outward manifestation of a
relationship beyond what Mr. Shahzad and his spouse alleged, no matter what
part of the world an applicant and his spouse come from, except in cases of
arranged marriages.
[17]
The Minister argues that the Ross Affidavit should
be given its proper weight as it provides context for the Court. The Minister
claims that the Officer is not trying to bolster her written reasons with new
explanations, as each comment in the Ross Affidavit is directly tied to
something written in the reasons. Relying on Leahy v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FCA 227 [Leahy], the Minister submits that it was
legitimate for the Officer to explain in an affidavit why she chooses the word “miscarriage” instead of “pregnancy”.
The Minister also pleads that an immigration officer’s experience is a valid
factor to consider, as it directly shapes the reasonableness of her choices,
and that it is practical for the Court to benefit from the Officer’s
experience.
[18]
I do not agree with the
Minister and find that the Ross Affidavit cannot be
admitted.
[19]
The submission of affidavits
from administrative tribunals in the context of applications for judicial
review has been met with caution by the courts. The
case law has clearly established that a judicial review application strictly
relates to the decision under review and that “the record before the reviewing court must be that which was before
the decision-maker” (Bernard v Canada
(Revenue Agency), 2015 FCA 263 at paras 13-28; Sedighi v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 445 at para 14; Mahouri v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 244 at para 14). The general rule is that a reviewing court should not
receive, from a decision-maker, new evidence going beyond the tribunal record
and the decision itself (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada
v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22 [AUCC]
at para 20; Qin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 147 at
para 18). This rule is based on the principle of
finality of tribunal decisions: a tribunal cannot use judicial review as an
opportunity to “amend, vary,
qualify or supplement” its reasons (Canada
(Attorney General) v Quadrini, 2010 FCA 246 at para 31).
[20]
Exceptions to this general
rule exist, but they are limited. In Connolly v
Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 294 at para 7, the Federal Court of
Appeal, citing the words of Mr. Justice Stratas in AUCC, outlined the
recognized exceptions to this general prohibition. These exceptions “tend to facilitate or advance the role of
the judicial review court without offending the role of the administrative
decision-maker” (AUCC at para 20). They
include: (i) an affidavit providing general background assisting in
understanding the issues relevant to the judicial review; (ii) an affidavit
necessary to bring evidence on procedural defects or a breach of procedural
fairness; and (iii) an affidavit highlighting the complete absence of evidence
before the administrative decision-maker (AUCC at para 20). In order to
be admissible, an affidavit from a decision-maker cannot venture outside these
areas.
[21]
The Minister contends that
the Officer’s affidavit falls within the first “background information” exception. I am not persuaded that this is the case. Under
that exception, an affidavit from a decision-maker can only be accepted when it
provides general background information that may assist the court in
understanding the issues relevant to the judicial review, such as how the task
of assessment was conducted, how a request for information was handled, and how
documents were gathered (Leahy at para 145; Sellathurai
v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2008 FCA 255 [Sellathurai]
at paras 46-47). However, an affidavit from a
decision-maker cannot be used as an after-the-fact means of augmenting or
bootstrapping the reasons of the decision-maker. Affidavit evidence going to the
merits of the matter already decided by the decision-maker should instead be
struck out as they invade the role of the initial decision-maker as fact-finder
and merits-provider (AUCC at para 20). When an affidavit goes beyond this
point of no return, it shall not be considered by the reviewing court.
[22]
In this case, the Ross
Affidavit crossed the Rubicon and manifestly went farther than simply providing
background and context. In her affidavit, the Officer restated and reviewed the grounds and
reasoning for her conclusions on the miscarriage, and indicated why she
believed some questions remained unanswered. Here, the bulk of the Ross
Affidavit elaborates on the Officer’s reasons for the decision, and offers further
explanations for her own treatment of the miscarriage. In my view, this form of
affidavit is inappropriate and cannot be given any weight by the reviewing
court. Decision-makers are obliged to state and disclose the complete bases for their decision in the decision
itself, at the time of the decision and, as such, they cannot be permitted to
fill in the gaps in the record or supplement the grounds for decision (Stemijon
Investments Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 299 at para 41). On
judicial review, courts can look at the reasons of the decision-maker, and even
at the record itself, in order to determine the reasonableness of a decision.
But enabling decision-makers to bolster their decision or remedying it by
writing better reasons in the form of an affidavit would be like asking the
applicant to “hit a moving target” (Sellathurai at para 47; Sapru v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 35 at para 52; Oliinyk v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 756 at para 18). This cannot be
allowed.
[23]
I accept that a reviewing court can consider
implied reasons to justify the reasonableness of an administrative tribunal’s
decision. In fact, not only does the court have the ability to do that on judicial review, but the court is indeed required, further to Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC
62 [Newfoundland Nurses], to find implied reasons in its assessment of
the reasonableness of a decision. But what is problematic is allowing the administrative
tribunal itself to define what those implied reasons are. A tribunal’s decision
is final and the reasons grounding that decision should speak for themselves, with
the assistance of the record, but without the aid of further explanation by the
tribunal itself. Implied reasons are no longer implied if the decision-maker
needs to set out in an affidavit what these are. By doing this, the decision-maker
is in fact adding to the decision by making explicit what was once implied. It
is not for the decision-maker to say what he or she really meant; this is the
task of the reviewing court.
[24]
For those reasons, I conclude that the Ross Affidavit
is inadmissible and it has therefore not been considered for the purpose of
this judgment.
[25]
I make one other observation. Counsel for the
Minister ably argued that the decision-maker’s expertise is an important
element to be considered by the Court, and that the Ross Affidavit provided
helpful background on the Officer’s particular experience. I agree that an
administrative decision-maker’s expertise and experience are at the very heart of
the standard of reasonableness that I need to apply in this case, and that this
is something a reviewing court should always be mindful of on judicial review.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed that “[t]he
presumption of reasonableness is grounded in the legislature’s choice to give a
specialized tribunal responsibility for administering the statutory provisions,
and the expertise of the tribunal in so doing” (Edmonton (City) v
Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd, 2016 SCC 47 [City of Edmonton]
at para 33). The deferential approach dictated by the standard of
reasonableness thus embodies recognition of the administrative decision-maker’s
particular expertise and experience in dealing with matters within the
boundaries of its functions.
[26]
However, there is no need for an affidavit from
the decision-maker to establish or reassert such expertise or experience. In
the context of judicial reviews, an administrative tribunal’s expertise or
experience are not measured against each individual officer’s own knowledge and
background. True, officers always bring their own experience and expertise in
their respective decision-making, but deference is an acknowledgment of the institutional
expertise and experience held by an administrative tribunal. It would be
strange if the deference to be shown to a decision-maker by a reviewing court were
to fluctuate with the identity and specific level of experience of each
particular officer involved, or with the exposure that an officer may have had
to the particular issue raised before him or her. It is worth citing again the
Supreme Court on this point: “as with judges, expertise
is not a matter of the qualifications and experience of any particular tribunal
member. Rather, expertise is something that inheres in a tribunal itself as an
institution” (City of Edmonton at para 33).
[27]
For that reason, it is unnecessary to have an
affidavit to lay out the experience of a particular decision-maker whose
decision is subject to challenge on judicial review.
B.
The decision is reasonable
[28]
Mr. Shahzad argues that the Decision is unreasonable
because the Officer omitted to consider the totality of the evidence,
improperly assessed the development of the couple’s relationship, and erred by
basing her credibility findings on irrelevant considerations. I do not agree.
[29]
Throughout his submissions, Mr. Shahzad proposes
alternative interpretations of the evidence before the Officer and submits that
his reading of the evidence should have prevailed. The arguments put forward by
Mr. Shahzad simply express his disagreement with the Officer’s assessment of
the evidence and ask the Court to prefer his own assessment and interpretation to
that of the decision-maker. In essence, Mr. Shahzad is inviting the Court to
reweigh the evidence that he has presented before the Officer. However, in
conducting a reasonableness review of factual findings, it is not the role of
the Court to do so or to reassess the relative importance given by the
decision-maker to any relevant factor or piece of evidence (Kanthasamy v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at para 99). It suffices
to conclude that the reasoning process of the Officer is not flawed and is
supported by the evidence. Mr. Shahzad’s explanations were all dealt with and
considered, but they were just not retained by the Officer.
[30]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of
reasonableness, the analysis is concerned “with the
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process”, and the Officer’s findings should not be
disturbed as long as the decision “falls within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47). Under
a reasonableness standard, as long as the process and the outcome fit
comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and
intelligibility, and the decision is supported by acceptable evidence that can
be justified in fact and in law, a reviewing court should not substitute its
own view of a preferable outcome (Newfoundland Nurses, at para 17).
[31]
This standard requires deference to the
decision-maker as it “fosters access to justice [by
providing] parties with a speedier and less expensive form of decision making”,
and as the reasonableness standard is “grounded in the
legislature’s choice to give a specialized tribunal responsibility for
administering the statutory provisions, and the expertise of the tribunal in so
doing” (City of Edmonton at paras 22 and 33). The question is not
whether another outcome or interpretation might have been possible. The
question is whether the conclusion reached by the Officer falls within the
range of acceptable, possible outcomes. A decision is not unreasonable because
the evidence could have supported another conclusion. The fact that there could
be other plausible options, and that one of them could support the genuineness
of Mr. Shahzad’s marriage, does not imply that the interpretation retained by
the Officer was unreasonable.
[32]
Under the reasonableness standard, deference to
the decision-maker is a legal obligation for the reviewing court.
Reasonableness dictates that the reviewing court must start from the decision
and the recognition that the administrative decision-maker has the primary
responsibility to make the determination. The Court shall look at the reasons
and the outcome and, if there is a justifiable explanation for the outcome
reached, it shall refrain from intervening. In this case, I do not find that
evidence was ignored by the Officer. The evidence was instead properly reviewed
and analyzed by the Officer on every issue raised by Mr. Shahzad.
[33]
Mr. Shahzad first claims that the Officer failed
to properly take into account the miscarriage of his spouse and to determine
whether it weighed favourably in the assessment of the relationship, thus
ignoring the case law stating that significant weight must be given to the
birth of a child after a marriage in evaluating a bona fide relationship
(Chen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 61 at para 23).
[34]
I am not persuaded that the Officer ignored the
issue of the miscarriage in her Decision. On the contrary, she dealt with it
through the vague and inconsistent recollection that Mr. Shahzad had of it. I
observe that Mr. Shahzad did not really insist on this issue of miscarriage and
only brought it up in response to questions from the Officer on the reasons why
his wife had left her employment. In other words, the miscarriage was not
invoked by Mr. Shahzad as a primary ground to support the genuineness of his
marriage. Furthermore, a child, or a miscarriage, is a significant marker of a bona
fide relationship only if it is accompanied by a paternity test or follows
a suitable period of cohabitation. In this case, there was no evidence proving
paternity, and the evidence of cohabitation was non-credible. In addition, the
mere existence of a child does not, in and of itself, establish the genuineness
of a relationship (Singh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 565 at para 12).
[35]
Relying on Iqbal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2006 FC 1219 at para 8 and Kalsi v Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 407 at paras 9-12, Mr.
Shahzad submits that the Officer had a duty to assess the corroborative
documentary evidence of Mr. Shahzad’s cohabitation with his spouse before
making a conclusion on credibility based on the testimony given at the
interview. He contends that credible and relevant evidence concerning their
common address since 2014 was erroneously dismissed by the Officer.
[36]
Again, Mr. Shahzad is asserting that the
corroborating addresses should have outweighed his non-credible evidence, and
is asking the Court to reweigh the evidence. The Officer simply found that the
evidence submitted by Mr. Shahzad did not rise above the many negative
credibility findings she had noted. Mr. Shahzad indeed fails to point to any
occurrences where the Officer overlooked or ignored key corroborating facts.
The Officer referred to the fact that Mr. Shahzad and his spouse had submitted
documents showing mail going to the same address, as well as the addition of
Mr. Shahzad to the housing contract. The fact that the Officer did not
explicitly refer to bank statements or letters from the stepchildren’s school
is not, in and of itself, unreasonable. The Officer did not have to list every
piece of evidence in her Decision. A “decision-maker is
not required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however
subordinate, leading to its final conclusion” (Newfoundland Nurses at
para 16).
[37]
Mr. Shahzad also pleads that the Officer failed
to consider the totality of the evidence before her, and ignored some of the
explanations given by Mr. Shahzad and his wife. However, in each case, the
Officer took note of the explanations as to why Mr. Shahzad might have
contradicted his spouse. The fact that the Officer did not reproduce in her
reasons every word of Mr. Shahzad’s explanations does not diminish her
Decision’s transparency and logical justification.
[38]
It is trite law that a reviewing court owes
particular deference to the Officer on credibility, which is central to the
analysis of the genuineness of the relationship (Keo v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2011 FC 1456 at para 24). It is also
well-recognized that an officer is presumed to have weighed and considered all
the evidence unless the contrary is shown (Sing v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 125 at para 90; Florea v Canada
(Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 598 (FCA) (QL) at para 1). It
is only when a tribunal is silent on evidence clearly pointing to an opposite
conclusion that the Court may intervene (Ozdemir v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2001 FCA 331 at paras 9-10; Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL) at para
16). Mr. Shahzad has not identified any such evidence.
[39]
Mr. Shahzad also relies on Sandhu v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1061 [Sandhu] to state
that the Officer erred by not giving due consideration to the couple’s cultural
context when assessing the merits of the couple’s bona fide
relationship.
[40]
I do not agree. Culture is beside the point. The
Officer simply found the evidence provided insufficient to support the
existence of a genuine marriage. The onus is on the applicant to put his “best case forward”, and Mr. Shahzad had the burden to
present an application that is not only “complete”,
but also relevant, convincing and unambiguous (Obeta v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration) 2012 FC 1542 at para 25; Oladipo v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration) 2008 FC 366 at para 24). The Officer’s findings on the
absence of a bona fide relationship were anchored on numerous factors
and grounded in the evidence on the record.
[41]
The situation of Mr. Shahzad is materially
different from the Sandhu precedent where the officer disregarded an
overwhelming amount of evidence indicating that the marriage was genuine such
as scores of telephone calls, letters and postcards between the couple (Sandhu
at para 31). In Mr. Shahzad’s case, there is not much the Officer could
speculate on regarding the romantic, or even conjugal, foundation of the
relationship. Evidence of genuine conjugality was lacking as there was
virtually no evidence of cohabitation. The burden laid on Mr. Shahzad to
provide the Officer with sufficient evidence of conjugality, but he failed to
do so (Kaur v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 417 at para
17; Sharma v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1131 at para
16). In light of the evidence, it was open to the Officer to conclude that the
development of Mr. Shahzad’s relationship with his spouse did not reflect the
existence of a genuine marriage.
[42]
Mr. Shahzad finally argues that the Officer
failed in basing her credibility findings on the fact that Mr. Shahzad did not
correctly remember the dates of his wife’s miscarriage and end of employment,
and the medical reasons for the latter. He argues that refugee claims should
not be determined on the basis of a memory test.
[43]
Again, I do not share Mr. Shahzad’s views. I
accept the principle that an officer should not turn its review into a memory
test (Shabab v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 872 at para
39; Sheikh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000]
FCJ No 568 (QL) at para 28). However, singling out contradictions regarding
everyday matters such as the living arrangements in the home Mr. Shahzad shares
with his spouse and her three children, or what activities he and his spouse
were up to the day before the interview, as well as more important topics such
as whether his wife had a miscarriage in 2016 or two years before, or when she
had to stop working because of illness, do not amount to a simple memory test.
Rather, they point to major inconsistencies in Mr. Shahzad’s story that support
the negative credibility inferences drawn by the Officer regarding the
genuineness of the marriage.
[44]
The Officer’s concerns about Mr. Shahzad’s lack
of knowledge about the miscarriage and his spouse’s employment were far from
being an improper memory test. I underline that Mr. Shahzad’s recollection of
these important dates did not miss the mark by a small margin. Far from being
minor, the discrepancies were of serious magnitude, expressed in terms of
months and years instead of weeks or days. Mr. Shahzad was off by two years
on the date of his wife’s miscarriage! Not only were these discrepancies significant
in terms of dates but they did not relate to peripheral or minor issues; they instead
went to fundamental events at the very heart of the bona fide
relationship Mr. Shahzad claimed to have with his spouse.
[45]
In sum, the Decision of the Officer is justifiable,
transparent and intelligible, it allows the reviewing court to understand how
the Officer came to her conclusions, and the outcome is consistent with the
evidence before her. Reasons are to be read as a whole,
in conjunction with the record (Agraira v Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2013 SCC 36 at para 53; Construction Labour Relations v Driver Iron Inc,
2012 SCC 65 at para 3). When read as a whole,
the Officer’s Decision is reasonable and does not fall outside the realm of possible,
acceptable outcomes. The Officer properly assessed all the necessary factors
and provided an analysis of the evidence presented. The intervention of this
Court is not warranted.
IV.
Conclusion
[46]
The Officer’s dismissal of Mr. Shahzad’s
application on the ground that his marriage is not genuine and that the couple
has entered into their relationship primarily for the purpose of obtaining
immigration status represents a reasonable outcome based on the law and the evidence
before the Officer. On a standard of reasonableness, it suffices if the
decision subject to judicial review falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. This
is the case here. Therefore, I must dismiss Mr. Shahzad’s application for
judicial review.
[47]
Neither party has proposed a question of general
importance for me to certify. I agree there is none.
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