Dockets:
A-478-14
A-313-12
A-479-14
Citation: 2017 FCA 157
CORAM:
|
STRATAS J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
WOODS J.A.
|
BETWEEN:
|
MOHAMED ZEKI MAHJOUB
|
Appellant
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION and THE MINISTER
OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
|
Respondents
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STRATAS J.A.
A.
Introduction
[1]
The Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration signed a security certificate under subsection 77(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 stating that Mr. Mahjoub—a
refugee in Canada—is not admissible in Canada due to security grounds. The
security certificate states:
We hereby certify
that we were of the opinion, based on a Security Intelligence Report received
and considered by us, that Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, a foreign national, is
inadmissible on grounds of security for the reasons described in section 34(1)(b),
34(1)(c), 34(1)(d) and 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.
[2]
In the security certificate,
the grounds for Mr. Mahjoub’s inadmissibility to Canada—in other words, the
portions of section 34 mentioned in the security certificate—are “engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any
government,” “engaging in terrorism,” “being a danger to the security of Canada,” and “being a member of an organization that there are reasonable
grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage” in conduct such
as “an act of subversion against a democratic
government, institution or process as they are understood in Canada,” “the subversion by force of any government,” or “terrorism.”
[3]
Under section 77 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, the Ministers referred the security certificate
to the Federal Court for a determination of its reasonableness.
[4]
Acting under section 78 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Federal Court (per
Blanchard J.) determined that the security certificate was reasonable: 2013 FC
1092. It found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that two
inadmissibility grounds were present: paragraph 34(1)(d) (being a danger
to the security of Canada) and paragraph 34(1)(f) (being a member of an
organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged
or will engage in espionage, subversion by force of a
government or terrorism).
[5]
The Federal Court’s judgment
declaring the security certificate to be reasonable (2013 FC 1092) was the
culmination of several complex, interrelated decisions in this matter: 2012 FC
669, 2013 FC 1094, 2013 FC 1095, 2013 FC 1096, 2013 FC 1097, and an additional
set of confidential reasons (2013 FC 1093) (all per Blanchard J.).
Leading up to these are 53 orders, a number of which are supported by full
reasons for order (most per Blanchard J.).
[6]
When the Federal Court
determined the security certificate to be reasonable, the security certificate
became “conclusive proof” that Mr. Mahjoub is
inadmissible to Canada. It also became “a removal order
that is in force without it being necessary to hold or continue an examination
or admissibility hearing.” See section 80 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act.
[7]
Mr. Mahjoub appeals to this
Court. Specifically, three appeals are before us:
•
File A-478-14, an appeal
from the Federal Court’s judgment upholding the reasonableness of the
certificate (2013 FC 1092).
•
File A-479-14, an appeal
from an order of the Federal Court (2013 FC 1095). In this order, the Federal
Court, among other things, refused to grant Mr. Mahjoub’s request that the
proceedings be stayed on account of abuse of process. The abuse of process was
said to arise from, among other things, alleged Charter breaches, instances of
procedural unfairness, and substantive errors and unfairness in the Ministers’
issuance of the certificate.
•
File A-313-12, an appeal
from an order of the Federal Court (2012 FC 669). In this order, the Federal
Court, among other things, refused to grant Mr. Mahjoub’s request that the
proceedings be stayed on account of abuse of process. The abuse of process was said
to arise from the commingling of the parties’ courtroom materials following a
hearing, resulting in the infringement of legal professional and litigation
privilege.
[8]
For the following reasons, I
would dismiss the appeals. The various grounds asserted by the appellant
against the security certificate are without merit. In particular, there are no
grounds to set aside the Federal Court’s finding that the security certificate
is reasonable. Further, there are no grounds to set aside the Federal Court’s
refusal to stay the proceedings permanently on account of abuse of process.
[9]
The evidentiary record,
largely comprised of open-source, open-court information, demonstrates that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of two terrorist
organizations and that, by maintaining contact in Canada with other terrorists,
he was a danger to the security of Canada: see paragraphs 107-151, below. As
for the Federal Court’s legal rulings on various issues raised by Mr. Mahjoub
and the manner in which the Federal Court applied the law, a summary appears at
paragraphs 76-82, below. An overall conclusion is at paragraphs 353-355, below.
B.
Procedural background
[10]
Only a brief summary of the
proceedings against the appellant is needed; a more comprehensive review of the
facts appears in the seven, highly detailed decisions of the Federal Court in
this matter.
[11]
Mr. Mahjoub is an Egyptian
national. He arrived in Canada on December 31, 1995 and claimed refugee status.
Less than a year later, the Immigration and Refugee Board granted him this status.
[12]
In the meantime, Mr. Mahjoub
came to the attention of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. An
investigation of Mr. Mahjoub started.
[13]
The investigation led to the
issuance of a security certificate against Mr. Mahjoub in June 2000. Soon after,
on the authority of the security certificate, he was arrested and detained.
[14]
As required by law, the security
certificate was automatically referred to the Federal Court for an assessment
of its reasonableness. The Federal Court determined the security certificate to
be reasonable: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mahjoub,
2001 FCT 1095, [2001] 4 F.C.R. 644.
[15]
All of this took place under
the security certificate provisions of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. I-2. In 2001, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001,
c. 27 was enacted in its place. The security certificate provisions in the
former Immigration Act were not substantially changed.
[16]
In 2007, while deportation proceedings
against Mr. Mahjoub were underway, the constitutionality of the security
certificate provisions fell for decision in the Supreme Court of Canada.
[17]
The Supreme Court held that
the provisions violated sections 7, 9 and 10(c) of the Charter: Charkaoui v.
Canada, 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (Charkaoui I). Section 7 was
violated because the person named in the security certificate did not
sufficiently know the case to meet and did not have the means to meet it, given
the secrecy attaching to many aspects of the security certificate procedures.
Sections 9 and 10(c) were violated because the detention provisions included a
lengthy period of time in which subjects were barred from challenging the
lawfulness of their detention. Neither violation was saved by section 1.
[18]
The Supreme Court declared
the unconstitutional provisions to be of no force or effect. But it suspended
its declaration for one year in order to allow Parliament to amend the Act.
[19]
For present purposes, the
practical effect of Charkaoui I was to render invalid the first security
certificate issued in 2000 against Mr. Mahjoub. Having been authorized under
invalid provisions, it too was invalid.
[20]
Before the expiry of the
one-year suspension of the declaration of invalidity, Parliament amended the
invalid security certificate provisions: An Act to amend the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a
consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3. These new
provisions came into force on February 22, 2008.
[21]
On that same day, the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration issued a new security certificate against Mr.
Mahjoub. This is the one the Federal Court has determined to be reasonable.
This is the one now before this Court.
[22]
Shortly after the Ministers
issued the new security certificate against Mr. Mahjoub, the Supreme Court
released a second decision concerning the security certificate proceedings
against Mr. Charkaoui: Charkaoui v. Canada, 2008 SCC 38, [2008] 2 S.C.R.
326 (Charkaoui II). The Supreme Court of Canada found that the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service’s policy of destroying notes from interviews and
intercepts in the course of intelligence gathering breached section 7 of the Charter
because it infringed Mr. Charkaoui’s right to know the case against him.
[23]
Charkaoui II, unlike Charkaoui I, did not
automatically render the new security certificate against Mr. Mahjoub invalid.
But, broadly speaking, Charkaoui II says much about substantive and
procedural fairness obligations in security certificate proceedings. Whether
the proceedings concerning the new security certificate have complied with
these obligations is just one small cluster of trees in the larger forest of
issues the Federal Court had to explore.
[24]
Since 2008 the appellant has
continuously received disclosure materials from the Ministers in purported
compliance with the requirements of Charkaoui II. He has also received a
revised summary of the Security Intelligence Report, which formed the primary
basis for the security certificate.
[25]
In 2009, Mr. Mahjoub was
released from detention on strict conditions. These conditions have been
relaxed over time. There are many decisions concerning this.
[26]
The proceedings in the
Federal Court concerning the new certificate—the one now before this Court—were
most complex and challenging. Due to the manner in which the parties conducted
the proceedings and due to other circumstances, many motions fraught with
difficult issues were brought—many on extremely short notice, many often
overlapping and interrelating with other motions and many requiring prompt determination.
Faced with this chaos, it fell to the Federal Court to bring order. It did so.
The end product is 1,021 pages and 2,160 paragraphs of tightly-written,
crystal-clear reasons.
[27]
Portions of the hearings in
the Federal Court and this Court were closed to the public so that submissions
could be made concerning national security and intelligence evidence. A
provision added by the amendments in 2008, paragraph 83(1)(c) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, allows this.
[28]
In these closed hearings,
the interests of Mr. Mahjoub were represented by two Special Advocates who are
authorized and regulated under sections 85-85.5 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act. They have a security clearance that allows them to
make submissions in the closed hearing about the confidential material. Before
us, I confirm that Mr. Mahjoub’s interests were expertly represented, in
complete fulfilment of the purposes behind the 2008 amendments.
[29]
In some cases, the Court
needs to explain its decision by going into the confidential material and must
issue confidential reasons alongside public, expurgated reasons. However, given
the status and importance of the open court principle— “a
hallmark of a democratic society” (Re Vancouver Sun, 2004 SCC 43,
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para. 23)—to the extent possible, the Court should try
to express all of its reasons for judgment publicly.
[30]
Confidentiality is not required
here. This public document contains all of my reasons for proposing that these
appeals be dismissed.
C.
What appeals are properly before
this Court?
(1)
Introduction
[31]
After the final decision of
the Federal Court, Mr. Mahjoub brought a number of appeals in this Court. Owing
to interlocutory proceedings in this Court and the strict limits on the ability
to appeal to this Court from matters arising under the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act, some complexity has arisen.
[32]
As will be seen, some of the
appeals before this Court are improper and must be dismissed at the outset. Nevertheless,
in the end this does not matter: all of the issues raised in all of the appeals,
whether or not proper, have ended up before us. Some explanation is needed as
to why that is so.
(2)
Procedural history in this
Court
[33]
Mr. Mahjoub presented to
this Court a total of five notices of appeal.
[34]
The Registry accepted the
first notice of appeal for filing (file A-313-12). This concerned the Federal
Court’s decision on the loss of legal professional and litigation privilege
arising from the commingling of documents (2012 FC 669).
[35]
Later, following the Federal
Court’s decisions in 2013 FC 1092, 2013 FC 1095, 2013 FC 1096 and 2013 FC 1097,
Mr. Mahjoub presented four notices of appeal. The Ministers objected to the
filing of the notices of appeal. This Court allowed in part their objection.
[36]
Two of the four were not
permitted to be filed. One concerned 2013 FC 1096 and another concerned 2013 FC
1097. As a result, these two notices of appeal are not before us.
[37]
The remaining two notices of
appeal were permitted to be filed. One concerned the Federal Court’s judgment
upholding the reasonableness of the certificate (2013 FC 1092). This is file
A-478-14. The other concerned the Federal Court’s refusal to grant Mr.
Mahjoub’s request that the proceedings be stayed on account of abuse of
process. This is file A-479-14.
[38]
As a result of the
foregoing—as mentioned at the outset of these reasons—three appeals are before
this Court: files A-478-14, A-479-14 and A-313-12.
(3)
This Court’s jurisdiction to
entertain these appeals
[39]
In this Court, the Ministers
did not object to this Court’s jurisdiction to entertain these three appeals.
However, this Court must always ensure that it has the subject-matter
jurisdiction to determine matters placed before it: Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 300 at para. 16; Canadian National
Railway Company v. BNSF Railway Company, 2016 FCA 284 at paras. 22-23. This
is the case even if the parties do not raise any jurisdictional concerns: Re
McKittrick Properties Ltd., [1926] 4 D.L.R. 44, 59 O.L.R. 199 (C.A.); Manie
v. Ford (Town) (1918), 14 O.W.N. 83 (H.C.), aff’d (1918), 15 O.W.N. 27
(C.A.). If this Court does not have the subject-matter jurisdiction over an
appeal, it cannot determine it.
[40]
Therefore, at the outset,
two of the three notices of appeal—those in files A-479-14 and A-313-12—must be
quashed for want of jurisdiction.
[41]
Under section 79 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, appeals to this Court are strictly limited.
Only when the Federal Court has made a “determination”
concerning the reasonableness of the certificate under section 78 of the Act
can an appeal be brought. Under section 79 an appeal can only be “from the determination” and only if the Federal Court
“certifies that a serious question of general
importance is involved and states the question.” For good measure,
section 79 adds that “no appeal may be made from an
interlocutory decision in the proceeding.”
[42]
In this matter, the Federal
Court certified only one question for this Court’s consideration. Its reasons
on the issue of certification appear at 2014 FC 200. The question it certified
concerned one of the issues bound up in the Federal Court’s judgment that the
certificate was reasonable (2013 FC 1092), a matter now before this Court in
file A-478-14.
[43]
The certified question is as
follows:
Do Part 1,
Division 4, Sections 33 and 34, and Part 1, Division 9 of the IRPA, as well as
sections 4, 6 and 7(3) of An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential
amendment to another Act breach section 7 of the Charter by denying the
named person [here, Mr. Mahjoub] the right to a fair hearing? If so, are the
provisions justified under section 1?
[44]
This is a valid question. Accordingly,
the appeal from the Federal Court’s reasonableness decision (file A-478-14) is
properly before us.
[45]
The notice of appeal in file
A-313-12 was the subject of an earlier ruling in this Court. The Ministers moved
to strike the notice of appeal for want of jurisdiction due to the bar in
section 79 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Mr. Mahjoub
submitted, among other things, that the motion giving rise to the ruling
concerning the loss of privilege arising from the comingling of documents had
nothing to do with the determination of the reasonableness of the certificate.
This Court declined to decide the matter by way of preliminary motion and left
it for this panel to determine: 2012 FCA 218. This notice of appeal can be
considered alongside the one in file A-479-14 as they are similarly situated.
[46]
Both of these notices of
appeal concern, in the words of section 79 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, “interlocutory decision[s] in the
proceeding” arising under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
Section 79 prohibits them from being appealed.
[47]
Therefore, I would dismiss the
appeals in files A-479-14 and A-313-12 for want of jurisdiction.
[48]
In the end, then, only one
appeal properly remains before us: the appeal in file A-478-14 concerning the
Federal Court’s reasonableness decision (2013 FC 1092).
(4)
The issues before this Court
[49]
As mentioned, the appeal in
file A-478-14 arrives in this Court by way of a certified question. But the
issues to be considered on appeal are not limited to those in the certified
question.
[50]
Once an appeal has been
brought to this Court by way of certified question, this Court must deal with
the certified question and all other issues that might affect the validity of the
judgment under appeal: Baker v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 12; Harkat
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 122, [2012] 3 F.C.R. 635
at para. 6. The certification of a
question “is the trigger by which an appeal is
justified” and, once triggered, the appeal concerns “the judgment itself, not merely the certified question”:
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998]
1 S.C.R. 982, 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 25. Simply put, “once a case is to be considered by the Federal Court of
Appeal, that Court is not restricted only to deciding the question certified”;
instead, the Court may “consider all aspects of the
appeal before it”: Ramoutar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration) (1993), 65 F.T.R. 32, [1993] 3 F.C.R. 370 at pp. 379-380.
[51]
The issues in the appeal in
file A-478-14 are defined by the notice of appeal: Pfizer Canada Inc. v.
Teva Canada Limited, 2016 FCA 218, 141 C.P.R. (4th) 165 at para. 22.
Originating documents such as this are to be construed in order to gain “a realistic appreciation” of their “essential character” by “reading
[them] holistically and practically without fastening onto matters of form”:
Canada (National Revenue) v. JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc.,
2013 FCA 250, [2014] 2 F.C.R. 557 at para. 50.
[52]
Mr. Mahjoub’s notice of
appeal clearly places in issue the validity of the Federal Court’s decisions
leading up to the judgment on the reasonableness of the certificate. Mr.
Mahjoub alleges in his notice of appeal that the Federal Court’s judgment on
the reasonableness of the certificate “concerns or is
linked” with the earlier decisions.
[53]
Indeed it is. Just a few
examples will illustrate this. If the Federal Court should have issued a
permanent stay of proceedings in its earlier decisions (2013 FC 1095 and 2012
FC 669) on account of abuse of process or the violation of privilege arising
from the commingling of documents, it could not have gone on to determine
whether the certificate is reasonable. If the Federal Court wrongly decided (in
its confidential reasons in 2013 FC 1093, and also in 2013 FC 1094 and 2013 FC
1096) to rely upon improperly-obtained evidence, for example by way of an
improper warrant or unsourced intelligence, its conclusion that the certificate
was reasonable may be vitiated. Finally, if the Federal Court wrongly dismissed
certain constitutional challenges advanced by Mr. Mahjoub against the security
certificate provisions (2013 FC 1097), the certificate must fall.
[54]
Therefore, all issues raised
by Mr. Mahjoub that potentially affect the Federal Court’s determination that
the certificate was reasonable are before us. In practical terms, this means
that pretty much all of the issues determined in 2010 FC 989, 2012 FC 669, 2013
FC 1092, 2013 FC 1094, 2013 FC 1095, 2013 FC 1096, 2013 FC 1097 and another confidential
matter (2013 FC 1093) are properly before this Court.
[55]
All parties proceeded in this
matter on this basis. Full argument was received on all issues.
D.
Analysis
(1)
The standard of review
[56]
The Supreme Court has confirmed
that the standards of review set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC
33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 apply when this Court reviews the Federal Court’s
finding that a security certificate is reasonable: Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Harkat, 2014 SCC 37, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 33 at paras. 107-109.
[57]
Therefore, for questions of
law, questions of legal principle and questions of mixed fact and law where
there are extricable questions of law or legal principle, the Federal Court shall
be reviewed for correctness. On all other questions, particularly questions of
fact, the Federal Court shall be reviewed for palpable and overriding error.
[58]
Everyone knows what
correctness review is: if there is error, this Court can substitute its opinion
for that of the Federal Court. But not everyone knows what palpable and
overriding error is.
[59]
On occasion during argument,
it became apparent that Mr. Mahjoub’s view of what constitutes palpable and
overriding error diverges from our own. As well, as will be seen, the high
threshold for finding palpable and overriding error plays a significant role in
this matter. Thus, at the outset of my analysis, I wish to say a few words
about palpable and overriding error.
[60]
In this case, many of Mr.
Mahjoub’s submissions focus on the Federal Court’s fact-finding and its
factually suffused application of legal standards to the facts, particularly on
the issue of the reasonableness of the security certificate. These matters can
only be reviewed for palpable and overriding error.
[61]
Palpable and overriding
error is a highly deferential standard of review: Benhaim v. St. Germain,
2016 SCC 48, [2016] 2 S.C.R. 352 at para. 38; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401. When arguing palpable and
overriding error, it is not enough to pull at leaves and branches and leave the
tree standing. The entire tree must fall. See Canada v. South Yukon Forest
Corporation, 2012 FCA 165, 431 N.R. 286 at para. 46, cited with approval by
the Supreme Court in St. Germain, above.
[62]
“Palpable” means an error that is obvious. Many things can
qualify as “palpable.” Examples include obvious
illogic in the reasons (such as factual findings that cannot sit together),
findings made without any admissible evidence or evidence received in
accordance with the doctrine of judicial notice, findings based on improper
inferences or logical error, and the failure to make findings due to a complete
or near-complete disregard of evidence.
[63]
But even if an error is
palpable, the judgment below does not necessarily fall. The error must also be
overriding.
[64]
“Overriding” means an error that affects the outcome of the
case. It may be that a particular fact should not have been found because there
is no evidence to support it. If this palpably wrong fact is excluded but the
outcome stands without it, the error is not “overriding.”
The judgment of the first-instance court remains in place.
[65]
There may also be situations
where a palpable error by itself is not overriding but when seen together with
other palpable errors, the outcome of the case can no longer be left to stand.
So to speak, the tree is felled not by one decisive chop but by several telling
ones.
[66]
Often those alleging
palpable and overriding error submit that a first-instance court forgot,
ignored, misconceived or gave insufficient weight to evidence because it did
not mention the evidence in its reasons. Before us, Mr. Mahjoub frequently
makes that submission. But a non-mention in reasons does not necessarily lead
to a finding of palpable and overriding error.
[67]
For one thing, first-instance
courts benefit from a rebuttable presumption that they considered and assessed
all of the material placed before them: Housen at para. 46.
[68]
Further, when an appellate
court considers a submission of palpable and overriding error, often it focuses
on the reasons of the first-instance court. But its reasons are to be viewed in
context and construed in light of both the evidentiary record before it and the
submissions made to it: R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3 at
paras. 35 and 55. Although the reasons may not mention a particular matter or a
particular body of evidence, the evidentiary record and the context may shed
light on why the first-instance court did what it did. They may also confirm
that although a matter is not mentioned in the reasons, it was nevertheless
within the court’s contemplation and considered by it.
[69]
Sometimes counsel submit
that gaps in the reasons of the first-instance court show palpable and
overriding error. In considering this sort of submission, appellate courts must
remember certain realities about the craft of writing reasons. It is an
imprecise art suffused by difficult judgment calls that cannot be easily
second-guessed. This Court has described the task of a first-instance court
drafting reasons in the following way:
Immersed from day-to-day and week-to-week in a long and
complex trial such as this, trial judges occupy a privileged and unique
position. Armed with the tools of logic and reason, they study and observe all
of the witnesses and the exhibits. Over time, factual assessments develop,
evolve, and ultimately solidify into a factual narrative, full of complex
interconnections, nuances and flavour.
When it comes time to draft reasons in a complex case,
trial judges are not trying to draft an encyclopedia memorializing every last
morsel of factual minutiae, nor can they. They distill and synthesize masses of
information, separating the wheat from the chaff and, in the end, expressing
only the most important factual findings and justifications for them.
Sometimes appellants attack as palpable and overriding
error the non-mention or scanty mention of matters they consider to be
important. In assessing this, care must be taken to distinguish true palpable
and overriding error on the one hand, from the legitimate by-product of
distillation and synthesis or innocent inadequacies of expression on the other.
(South Yukon,
above at paras. 49-51.) These observations are particularly true in a case like
this with a voluminous, complex and sprawling record scattered among numerous motions
and proceedings.
[70]
Palpable and overriding
error is often best defined by describing what it is not. If an appellate court
had a free hand, it might weigh the evidence differently and come to a
different result. It might be inclined to draw different inferences or see
different factual implications from the evidence. But these things, without
more, do not rise to the level of palpable and overriding error.
[71]
Another point of confusion
among counsel in this area is the standard of review for exercises of
discretion by the first-instance court.
[72]
An exercise of discretion
involves applying legal standards to the facts as found. For the purposes of
the Housen framework that governs the appellate standards of review,
exercises of discretion are questions of mixed fact and law: Hospira
Healthcare Corporation v. Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology, 2016 FCA 215,
402 D.L.R. (4th) 497 at paras. 28 and 71-72; Imperial Manufacturing Group
Inc. v. Decor Grates Incorporated, 2015 FCA 100, [2016] 1 F.C.R. 246 at
para. 18.
[73]
Sometimes people are
confused because not all questions of mixed fact and law are alike. Some
questions of mixed fact and law are binary in nature. For example, the question
whether on the facts a professional has fallen below the legal standard of care
is a question of mixed fact and law that admits of only a yes or no answer.
Other questions of mixed fact and law allow for a whole range of possible answers.
For example, consider the question of remedy for an abuse of process, a
question very much before us. Governed by the legal standards set out in the
case law, a court has a range of remedial options available to it. In cases
where questions of mixed fact and law give rise to that range, we tend to speak
of the court as having discretion. But it is still a question of mixed fact and
law for the purposes of the Housen framework that governs the appellate
standards of review.
[74]
Under the Housen
framework, questions of mixed fact and law, including exercises of discretion,
can be set aside only on the basis of palpable and overriding error—the high
standard described above—unless an error on an extricable question of law or
legal principle is present. So, for example, if an appellate court can discern
some error in law or principle underlying the first-instance court’s exercise
of discretion, it can reverse the exercise of discretion on account of that
error. Another way of putting this is whether the discretion was “infected or tainted” by some misunderstanding of the
law or legal principle: Housen at para. 35.
[75]
Having canvassed these basic
principles of appellate review and viewing this matter—as this Court must—through
the prism of the standards of review, I turn now to a general description of
the nature of the submissions made to in this Court. I also offer an overall
assessment of the Federal Court’s decisions in this matter.
(2)
Applying the standard of review: a summary
conclusion
[76]
In the Federal Court, Mr.
Mahjoub advanced dozens of legal issues, large and small. Except on one
occasion, the Federal Court did not err in law or in legal principle. On that one
occasion, the Federal Court did err—but, as we shall see, it erred in Mr.
Mahjoub’s favour.
[77]
Further, the Federal Court
did not commit palpable and overriding error.
[78]
Thus, there are no grounds
for this Court to interfere with the Federal Court’s decision. As a matter of
law, its decision must stand.
[79]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub frequently
invites this Court to reassess and reweigh the evidence before the Federal
Court and to substitute its fact-finding and exercises of discretion for that
of the Federal Court: see, e.g., paras. 12-15, 15.2-15.3, 50-53 and 67
of Mr. Mahjoub’s memorandum of fact and law. Sometimes he asks this Court to
draw factual inferences the Federal Court declined to draw (see e.g., ibid.
at para. 19), to find more prejudice on the facts than the Federal Court was
willing to find (see, e.g., ibid. at para. 20), to assume the
Federal Court disregarded evidence that it did not mention (see, e.g., ibid.
at paras. 45 and 69), to allege the Federal Court misconceived evidence in
order to encourage this Court to substitute its own factual finding for that of
the Federal Court (see, e.g., ibid. at paras. 48, 55, 64-65 and
69), and to challenge credibility findings (see, e.g., ibid. at
para. 87).
[80]
The invitations must be
declined. They tempt us to travel down a road the law forbids to us. Unless we see
legal error, the only road we can travel is one in the direction of palpable
and overriding error.
[81]
For the benefit of others
who one day may have to decide a case as complex this and who seek guidance,
the Federal Court’s seven sets of reasons—1,021 pages and 2,160 paragraphs of
tightly-written, crystal-clear reasons—are a model worthy of study and
emulation, an example of the execution of the judicial craft at its finest. Repeatedly
and without unnecessary duplication, the Federal Court set out its methodology
for fact-finding on each particular issue before it, the admissibility of
evidence relevant to each issue, and its assessments of credibility and weight.
Its factual conclusions, clearly and firmly expressed, relate directly to the
legal tests supplied by the governing law. Even-handedness, neutrality, logic and
clinical analysis were on display throughout. See, for example, the searching examination,
lucid discussion, and fair rejection of a number of the allegations and
evidence offered by the Ministers: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 218-228, 230-231,
248-252, 254-259, 262, 268-269, 292, 294-295, 447, 450, 452-454, 456-457, 501-503,
528, 574-583, 595-596, 599, 600, 609, 614 and 615.
[82]
To be sure though, in no way
does this play into this Court’s task in these appeals. When an appellant
persuades this Court that a judgment must be quashed on account of legal error
or palpable and overriding error, magnificently crafted reasons and otherwise-stellar
judicial method count for naught: the responsibility of this Court is to quash
the judgment. But here, as I have said, there is no legal error, other than the
one instance that favoured Mr. Mahjoub, and there is no palpable and overriding
error.
(3)
The reasonableness of the
security certificate
[83]
In considering the
reasonableness of the security certificate, the Federal Court had much evidence
before it, both from open proceedings and closed proceedings. However, it was
of the view that its ruling on the reasonableness of the certificate could be
based largely on testimony received in open court and from other open, available
sources—not evidence whose admissibility was subject to legal challenge. As can
be seen from the following summary of facts and the citations supporting them, this
is very much the case.
[84]
The overall task of the
Federal Court was to determine “whether the certificate
is reasonable” and to “quash the certificate if
[the Court] determines that it is not”: Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, section 78.
[85]
As mentioned at the outset
of these reasons, several section 34 grounds for inadmissibility were set out
in the security certificate. The grounds are read disjunctively; if any one
ground is established, the certificate is reasonable: Almrei (Re), 2009
FC 1263, [2011] F.C.R. 163 at para. 59. Under section 33 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, the facts that constitute inadmissibility
include “facts arising from omissions and … include
facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have
occurred, are occurring or may occur.” In this case, the Federal Court
found that two grounds for inadmissibility were established.
[86]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub
submits that the security certificate was not reasonable. He submits that the
Federal Court erred in identifying the legal standard for reasonableness. He
also submits that the certificate is unreasonable on the evidence.
(a)
The legal standard for
reasonableness
[87]
Mr. Mahjoub submits that
each fact alleged by the Ministers in the security certificate must be proven
on the balance of probabilities and then holistically assessed as to whether the
facts so proven constitute reasonable grounds to believe.
[88]
The Federal Court did not
accept this submission (2013 FC 1092 at paras. 41-44) and neither do I. Each
fact alleged that establishes inadmissibility need only be proven on a standard
of “reasonable grounds to believe.” This follows
from Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 2005
SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 at paragraphs 114-116 and Charkaoui I, above
at paragraph 39.
[89]
The reasonable grounds to
believe standard “requires the judge to consider
whether ‘there is an objective basis [for the belief],…which is based on
compelling and credible information’”: Charkaoui I at para. 39,
citing Mugesera, above at para. 114. This is “something
more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil
matters of proof on the balance of probabilities”: Mugesera at
para. 114. If the “preponderance of the evidence”
is contrary to the version of the facts alleged by the Minister, the security
certificate cannot be upheld as reasonable: Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 79,
[2011] 2 F.C.R. 145 at para. 45; Almrei (Re), above. The Federal Court
followed this jurisprudence and applied the substantive standards prescribed by
it.
[90]
I also agree with the
reasons of the Federal Court on the meaning of the grounds of inadmissibility
set out in paragraphs 34(1)(d) and 34(1)(f) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, the two grounds on which the Federal Court found
the certificate to be reasonable: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 50-66 and 673. These
two grounds are danger to the security of Canada and membership in
organizations that engaged in subversion by force and terrorism. However, some
specific submissions Mr. Mahjoub makes concerning these two grounds should be
examined more closely.
[91]
Mr. Mahjoub submits that the
Federal Court applied too broad a definition of “membership”
for the purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act. I reject this.
[92]
Terrorist organizations do
not issue membership cards or keep membership lists. Thus, as the Federal Court
found (2013 FC 1092 at para. 63), formal membership, in the sense understood
for lawful organizations, is not required. Rather, certain activities that
materially support a terrorist group’s objectives, such as providing funds, providing
false documents, recruiting or sheltering persons, can be evidence of
membership in a terrorist organization even though the activities do not
directly link to terrorist violence.
[93]
Mr. Mahjoub also submits
that there must be some evidence of an “intention to
participate or contribute” to an organization. I reject this.
[94]
Paragraph 34(1)(f) of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act does not specify a mental
element that must be satisfied for membership; on its face it merely sets out
the status of membership, nothing more.
[95]
In any event, the Federal
Court found that Mr. Mahjoub had a mental element of membership: he had “an institutional link with Al Jihad and knowingly
participated in that organization” and there were reasonable grounds to
believe “he knew about [the terrorist] training”
at a Sudanese farm where he worked and was “complicit”
in it. See 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 483, 504, 628-632.
[96]
The appellant also submits
that under paragraph 34(1)(f) the person named in a security certificate
must have been involved in the terrorist activity of the organization before
the person can be found to be a member. I also reject this.
[97]
Involvement in acts of
terrorism is a ground set out in paragraph 34(1)(c), a ground that, in
the end, the Federal Court did not rely upon in this case. To require acts of
terrorism before membership can be found in paragraph 34(1)(f) would
make this paragraph and others in subsection 34(1) redundant: Kanagendren v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 86, [2016] 1
F.C.R. 428 at paras. 20-26.
[98]
Thus, overall, the Federal
Court properly identified the standard to be applied in determining the
reasonableness of the certificate and properly understood the grounds for
inadmissibility under section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act. There are no grounds to interfere on these bases.
(b)
The facts found by the
Federal Court relating to the reasonableness of the security certificate
[99]
As mentioned above, the
Federal Court found that there were reasonable grounds to believe that two
inadmissibility grounds were present: paragraph 34(1)(d) (danger to the
security of Canada) and paragraph 34(1)(f) (membership in two
organizations that engaged in subversion by force and terrorism).
[100]
The Federal Court found that
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub was a danger to the
security of Canada within the meaning of paragraph 34(1)(d) by virtue of
his continuing contact with terrorists: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 673. It also found
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of
Al Jihad and the Vanguards of Conquest, two organizations that engaged in subversion
by force and terrorism within the meaning of paragraph 34(1)(f): ibid.
[101]
The facts as found by the
Federal Court amply demonstrate the reasonableness of the security certificate
on these grounds.
[102]
Most of the facts found by
the Federal Court are based on testimony received in open court and from other
open, available sources—news articles, periodicals, books, encyclopaedias,
online database entries, publications of non-governmental organizations, think
tank publications, and both foreign and Canadian government publications. These
materials are of the sort often used in immigration proceedings. The Federal
Court specifically held these materials to be reliable in this case, in part
based on the expert testimony before it. The Federal Court was sensitive also to
the weight that should be accorded to the materials and examined them on an
individual basis. See generally, 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 94-106. Expert testimony,
used to some extent in the Court’s analysis, and other testimony, used less,
was carefully assessed for credibility: see, e.g., 2013 FC 1092 at
paras. 124-135 and 139-171.
[103]
Other evidence relied upon
in support of many of the facts included documentary evidence and physical
evidence found in the possession of Mr. Mahjoub when he was arrested.
[104]
To the Federal Court, this
was “the most reliable evidence adduced by the
Ministers”: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 93. It was significant too—it formed
the basis of several findings that linked Mr. Mahjoub to known terrorists and
established his membership in terrorist groups: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 271,
274, 308 and 668-669.
[105]
The Federal Court also
relied upon secret or closed evidence, primarily documents known as Bibliographic
Reference System (BRS) and other intelligence reports but only after a careful
assessment of their weight: see, e.g., 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 107-122.
However, in the end result it found very little of this evidence necessary.
[106]
The Federal Court was also
extremely solicitous about the use of much of the closed evidence. In
accordance with the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, it excluded
closed evidence for which there are reasonable grounds to believe the evidence
was obtained from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment: Orders dated June 9, 2010 and August 31, 2010 in file DES-7-08.
Similarly, in another Order dated June 19, 2012 in file DES-7-08, the Federal
Court excluded BRS reports concerning conversations to which Mr. Mahjoub was
not privy, in accordance with this Court’s decision in Harkat, above. It
also refused to rely on information tendered in private from human sources in
support of the Ministers’ claims.
[107]
The following is a summary
of the evidence the Federal Court relied upon to support the reasonableness of
the security certificate.
[108]
Two terrorist organizations
play a central role in this factual summary: Al Jihad and the Vanguards of
Conquest. A third—Al Qaeda—lurks amongst them.
[109]
First, Al Jihad. Overall,
the Federal Court found that the evidence of Al Jihad’s involvement in the
subversion by force of the government of Egypt and terrorism, “including acts of terrorism resulting in the deaths of
civilians,” was “overwhelming [and] compelling”:
2013 FC 1092 at paras. 178-182; testimony of professors and open source
evidence.
[110]
Al Jihad is “a militant Egyptian Sunni Islamist organization with a blind
cell structure and a strict policy of secrecy” that is involved in
terrorism: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 178; testimony of Professor F. Gerges. In
1998, it became part of the “World Islamic Front for
the Destruction of Jews and Crusaders”: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 180;
testimony of Professor Wark; publication called Al-Quds al’-Arabi. Al Jihad
was in part responsible for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
in October 1981 and was fully responsible for terrorism against other public
officials, including car bombings, attacks on embassies, and so on: 2013 FC
1092 at para. 179; testimony of Professor Byman; testimony of M. Guay; Al-Hayah
newspaper, August 9, 1998.
[111]
Al Jihad also existed “as an independent entity or closely associated with Al
Qaeda” or, put another way, they were “overlapping
organizations” that “engaged in terrorism and
subversion related activities”: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 180, 182, 464,
593 and 622. In the view of some, it was a “carbon
copy” of Al Qaeda and adopted Al Qaeda’s structure: 2013 FC 1092 at
para. 180; testimony of Professor Gerges. Al Qaeda is culpable for the 1998
U.S. Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in
Yemen, the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the 2002 Bali
bombings, and other acts of terror.
[112]
One of the contributions of
Al Jihad to the terrorist repertoire—later adopted by Al Qaeda—was the idea of
having two explosions, the first a small one that would kill few but draw
uninjured, curious people to their windows to see what happened, the second, a
bigger one designed to kill or maim them. See 2013 FC 1092 at para. 180;
testimony of Professor Gerges; Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda
and the Road to 9/11 (Vintage: New York, 2006).
[113]
Al Jihad “trained in a cell structure in the late 1980s and early
1990s” and “conducted violent attacks on
Egyptian officials and embassies” under the leadership and “dictatorial rule” of Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri: 2013 FC
1092 at paras. 178 and 188; testimony of Professor Gerges. Dr. Al Zawahiri is a
member or senior official of radical Islamist organizations which have
orchestrated and carried out terrorist attacks around the world, one of the
founders of Al Qaeda, and the current leader of Al Qaeda: 2013 FC 1092 at para.
464. Dr. Al Zawahiri has also warned of 9/11-style attacks against Canadians, whom
he regards as “second-rate Crusaders”: 2013 FC
1092 at para. 667: National Post, 28 October 2006.
[114]
The second relevant
terrorist group is the Vanguards of Conquest. It “overlapped
significantly in terms of personnel and leadership with Al Jihad” and
formed a “combined front” with others. It “shares the same terrorist goals adopted by the [Al Jihad]
which involve the violent subversion of the government of Egypt and terrorism.” At
“a minimum, [it is] a name used in the media for a
sub-group of [Al Jihad] or an organization used by Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri as a
front for the [Al Jihad]”; it emerged before 1993: see 2013 FC 1092 at
paras. 177, 189-208, based on the testimony of Professors Gerges and Byman, the
expert report of Professor Wark, and open source evidence, including the books,
The Road to Al-Qaeda and The Spectrum of Islamist Movements. The Vanguards
of Conquest claimed responsibility for the assassination attempts on the
Egyptian Interior Minister in 1993 and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in
1995: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 199 and 204, citing Professors Gerges and Byman.
[115]
On the basis of the
admissible evidence before it, the Federal Court found Mr. Mahjoub to be a
member of these two terrorist organizations, Al Jihad and the Vanguards of
Conquest.
[116]
The Federal Court based this
on, among other things, Mr. Mahjoub’s communications, his associations with
certain known terrorists and their organizations, his travels, and some false
explanations he gave when questioned.
[117]
As far as Mr. Mahjoub and
this case are concerned, the story begins in 1991.
[118]
In that year, Mr. Mahjoub
moved to Sudan according to the personal information form he filled out upon
arriving in Canada in 1995: Mr. Mahjoub’s personal information form (Exhibit
A2, Tab 3); 2013 FC 1092 at para. 460.
[119]
Mr. Mahjoub’s move to Sudan
was “an unusual choice if your motive was economic”:
testimony of Professor Byman, October 28, 2010 (Appeal Book, Doc. 506.2, p.
139); 2013 FC 1092 at para. 460. As Mr. Mahjoub himself stated, “it was very difficult to obtain a job in Sudan, even for
Sudanese”: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 460: Mr. Mahjoub’s personal information
form. By 1992, Mr. Mahjoub was “without status as an
illegal migrant in a difficult job market” in Sudan: 2013 FC 1092 at
para. 621. But despite that status, he remained in Sudan: Mr. Mahjoub’s
personal information form.
[120]
Also in 1991—the same year
that Mr. Mahjoub moved to Sudan—Al Qaeda and Al Jihad moved from Afghanistan, “where the jihad was winding down” to Sudan “whose National Islamic Front-backed regime harboured them”:
2013 FC 1092 at paras. 458 and 597; testimony of Mr. Al Fadl from the trial in United
States v. Bin Laden, decision reported at 146 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (Exhibit A12); testimony of Professors Byman, Gerges and Wark. Around
this time, Mr. Bin Laden and other “[Al Jihad] and
Al Qaeda elements” also moved to Sudan: Expert Report of Professor Wark,
Exhibit R24, at p.14; 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 458-459 and 623. “Direct and indirect terrorist contacts of Mr. Mahjoub”
also moved to Sudan at this time: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 459.
[121]
Despite the economic
situation in Sudan, the difficulty of anyone getting a job in Sudan and Mr.
Mahjoub’s status as an illegal immigrant in Sudan, Mr. Mahjoub nevertheless was
able to find a job. In his personal information form supporting his claim for refugee
status upon arrival in Canada some years later, Mr. Mahjoub said he was an
agricultural engineer on the Al-Damazin farm while in Sudan: 2013 FC 1092 at paras.
462-463.
[122]
In fact, Mr. Mahjoub was
much more than an ordinary agricultural engineer.
[123]
Although Mr. Mahjoub had
just arrived in Sudan as an illegal migrant and although he had “no prior experience in managing an enterprise,” suddenly
he was given a “top executive position” as the Deputy Director-General or “second-in-command” of an entire company, the Althemar
Almubarakah Agriculture Company, and manager of the Damazin Project for Pluvial
Agriculture on the Al-Damazin farm: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 75, 462-463, 477, 481,
490 and 621; October 17, 1993 reference letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub
providing details of his employment for Althemar (Exhibit A2, Tab 10). Mr.
Mahjoub omitted this information in his personal information form when claiming
refugee status in Canada.
[124]
While the wages for the
average Sudanese employee were less than $50 U.S. monthly, Mr. Mahjoub was
earning “in the range of $600.00 U.S. monthly excluding
any…top-up”: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 484-486; testimony of Mr. Al Fadl in
United States v. Bin Laden, above. This was a “conservative
estimate” and in fact his salary could have been double that: 2013 FC
1092 at para. 485; testimony of Mr. Al Fadl in United States v. Bin Laden;
The Looming Tower, above.
[125]
The company and the farm
were far from ordinary.
[126]
Both were owned by the then-leader
of Al Qaeda, Mr. Osama Bin Laden: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 75 and 464; testimony
of Professor Wark, confirmed by the testimony of Mr. Al Fadl. No one disputes this
fact: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 464. Al Qaeda maintained contact with the farm by
radio: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 478; testimony of Mr. Al Fadl.
[127]
Mr. Mahjoub’s immediate
supervisor was Mr. Al Duri, a member of Al Jihad: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 75,
402, 464. Mr. Mahjoub would have “worked closely”
with him: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 75, 86, 380, 401-402, 483, 613 and 621;
October 17, 1993 reference letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub; testimony of
Professors Wark and Byman.
[128]
Mr. Mahjoub’s rank and
responsibility in the company were similar to that of Mr. Salim, one of Mr. Bin
Laden’s most trusted associates, a founding member of Al Qaeda and a member of
Al Jihad: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 390 and 483; New York Times article,
December 3, 2008; Mr. Al Fadl transcript.
[129]
When it came to hiring
employees—particularly senior officers like Mr. Mahjoub—Mr. Bin Laden “had a preoccupation with the ideological purity of his
associates,” “took great care in screening”
them and “adopted significant security measures”
in doing so: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 478; testimony of Professor Byman;
transcript of the evidence of Mr. Al Fadl from United States v. Bin Laden,
above. Thus, in part using intelligence information from Sudanese authorities,
employees were vetted for trustworthiness, a component of which was commitment
to Mr. Bin Laden’s views and ideology and a known history within the extremist
movement: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 478 and 480; Mr. Al Fadl transcript; testimony
of Professor Byman.
[130]
Mr. Bin Laden was especially
wary of Egyptian nationals like Mr. Mahjoub: many were employed by the Egyptian
security or intelligence services and could be infiltrators: 2013 FC 1092 at
para. 479; testimony of Mr. Al Fadl and Mr. Al Ridi in United States v. Bin
Laden, above.
[131]
In these circumstances, Mr.
Mahjoub, an Egyptian national, must have been “thoroughly
vetted to establish” his “identity and orientation,”
to prove he was “trustworthy” and to confirm he
was committed “to [Bin Laden’s] views and ideology”:
2013 FC 1092 at para. 480; testimony of Professor Byman. And given his “top executive position,” Mr. Mahjoub must have passed
with flying colours: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 480-481. He was “known and trusted by Mr. Bin Laden.” This trust could
have only been gained if Mr. Mahjoub demonstrated “an
ideological commitment to jihad” and “a known
participation within the Islamic extremist community”: 2013 FC 1092 at
paras. 598 and 621.
[132]
Mr. Mahjoub must have been
committed to the cause. He accepted his top position in Mr. Bin Laden’s company
despite some personal risk. If the authorities of his country of nationality,
Egypt, had become aware of his association with Mr. Bin Laden, he would have been
in danger: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 482; testimony of E. Al Ridi in United
States v. Bin Laden, above. Further, he only associated with Egyptians on
the farm, not elsewhere in Sudan: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 482. To the Federal
Court this meant that Mr. Mahjoub “trusted the other
Egyptians working for Mr. Bin Laden because he knew about Mr. Bin Laden’s
vetting process” and that it “would prevent foreign government
infiltration”: ibid.
[133]
Was the farm on which Mr.
Mahjoub was working just a farm? At one level, some might see it as a peaceful,
bucolic place: it grew sesame, peanuts and white corn: transcript of Mr. Al
Fadl in United States v. Bin Laden, above; 2013 FC 1092 at para. 384. But
peaceful and bucolic it was not. The farm grew another type of crop: trained
terrorists.
[134]
On “the
back one-third” of the farm, “general weapons
and…explosives” training and refresher training took place, supervised
by Al Qaeda members. One such member was Al Qaeda explosives expert Salem el-Masry.
See transcript of Mr. Al Fadl in United States v. Bin Laden, above; 2013
FC 1092 at paras. 384, 464, 474 and 482.
[135]
The Federal Court found that
this took place in part while Mr. Mahjoub was in his top executive position at
the farm: testimony of Professor Wark; testimony of Mr. Al Fadl in United
States v. Bin Laden; 2013 FC 1092 at para. 476. And “in his position of authority over the company and the farm,”
Mr. Mahjoub was “aware of these [explosives and weapons
training] activities,” was “complicit in these
activities” and “knew of the ongoing weapons
training” on the farm: testimony of Mr. Al Fadl in United States v.
Bin Laden, above; testimony of Professor Byman; 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 466,
474, 476, 482-483 and 621.
[136]
In reaching its conclusion
about Mr. Mahjoub’s knowledge, the Federal Court carefully considered the
credibility of the testimony of Mr. Al Fadl. While noting that he had a
tendency to exaggerate, the Federal Court found that on this aspect of his
testimony Mr. Al Fadl guarded against exaggeration: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 388.
It found his testimony on this to be credible.
[137]
Despite Mr. Mahjoub’s high
position in the company and the farm and despite a fairly high salary for an
illegal migrant in Sudan, Mr. Mahjoub left the company and the farm in May 1993:
Mr. Mahjoub’s personal information form; 2013 FC 1092 at para. 484. Soon
afterward, in December 1995, he came to Canada and claimed refugee status.
[138]
Exactly why Mr. Mahjoub left
is unclear. But the evidence suggests some reasons. The Federal Court found
some corroboration for the Ministers’ allegation that Mr. Mahjoub left
Sudan due to increased cooperation between the Egyptian and Sudanese
governments, the fact that Egyptian nationals were becoming increasingly
unwelcome in Sudan in late 1995, and Sudan’s shift in policy towards harbouring
terrorists: Mr. Mahjoub’s personal information form; 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 494
and 601. Also due to high profile Al Jihad and Vanguards of Conquest attacks
occurring at this time—in particular the attempted assassination of President
Mubarak and the deaths of several young Egyptians executed by Al Jihad as
spies—many Egyptians left or were expelled from Sudan: 2013 FC 1092 at para.
495.
[139]
As well, “other individuals in Sudan associated with terrorism, some
with direct or indirect connections to Mr. Mahjoub, traveled or moved abroad
around this time” to “[find] a base abroad”:
2013 FC 1092 at paras. 499 and 623, relying upon the Security Intelligence
Report offered in support of the security certificate. These included “prominent members” of Al Jihad and Al Qaeda: 2013 FC
1092 at paras. 499 and 504; Expert Report of Professor Byman; affidavit of J.
Dratel (Exhibit R39, at para. 27). Mr. Mahjoub’s departure from Sudan “coincided with the departure of these terrorist groups and
many of their leading members,” lending “support
to the Ministers’ allegations of Mr. Mahjoub’s association with these groups”:
2013 FC 1092 at paras. 500 and 601; classified evidence in support.
[140]
Mr. Mahjoub entered Canada
on a false Saudi Arabian passport and claimed refugee status: 2013 FC 1092 at
para. 506. This, along with Mr.
Mahjoub's timing in entering and leaving Sudan, was behaviour coinciding with or
paralleling that of other individuals the Federal Court found to be terrorists,
including some contacts of Mr. Mahjoub: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 507 and 601-602.
[141]
Upon arrival in Canada, Mr.
Mahjoub filled out a personal information form in support of his claim to
refugee status. In it, Mr. Mahjoub stated that he left the company and the
Al-Damazin farm to buy and sell goods in a market in Sudan. The Federal Court
found this explanation not to be credible given the salary Mr. Mahjoub was
making at the farm and given the concern he expressed elsewhere in his personal
information form about “severe surveillance by the Egyptian
people, especially when [he] was in the market”: 2013 FC 1092 at paras.
485-490.
[142]
The evidence of Mr.
Mahjoub’s activities and contacts in Canada from the time of his arrival until
his arrest in 2000 under the first certificate is very detailed. The Federal
Court summarized this evidence as follows:
Most of the
inculpatory evidence that the Ministers have adduced in relation to Mr.
Mahjoub's residence in Canada is evidence of his ongoing associations with
established or suspected members of the [Al Jihad], [Vanguards of Conquest], Al Qaeda, and [a
related terrorist group]. This
evidence is compelling, and it establishes that Mr. Mahjoub maintained contact
with Al Qaeda terrorist Mr. [Ahmed] Khadr, a friendship with established Al
Qaeda terrorist Mr. Al Duri [text omitted] [*], and a close and active
association with established Al Qaeda/[Al Jihad]
terrorist Mr. Marzouk, and contact with a telephone number linked to the [Vanguards of Conquest] in Kuwait [*]. A number of these contacts were still
active in the terrorist milieu, particularly Mr. [Ahmed] Khadr and Mr. Marzouk.
These contacts were routinely concealed by the use of aliases. Mr. Mahjoub also
concealed these contacts from the Service in one or more interviews [text
omitted]. Mr. Mahjoub’s fear of the Egyptian authorities and belief that the
Service was conspiring with them does not explain his dishonesty. Mr. Mahjoub’s
denials are insufficient to rebut the Ministers’ evidence of his terrorist
contacts. I conclude that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr.
Mahjoub’s contact, given the individuals' backgrounds and Mr. Mahjoub’s
unwillingness to be candid about his contact with them, related to the
terrorist network to which these individuals were associated.
(2013 FC 1092 at para.
568.)
[143]
Only two sentences in this
passage are supported by classified evidence and they are marked with a “[*]”. The remainder is drawn from the testimony of Ms. El Fouli in the first security proceedings,
the reference letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub, an address book found in
Mr. Mahjoub’s possession when he was arrested, telephone toll records obtained
from telephone companies via a subpoena from the Department of Justice, and open
source and expert testimony, much of which is summarized at 2013 FC 1092 at paragraphs 286, 297-298, 329, 340, 342-343, 345, 359, 365, 370, 373-374,
543 and 544.
[144]
In Canada, Mr. Mahjoub
associated or had contact with a number of persons who are or were (at least at
the time) “important players in the terrorist milieu,”
such as Mr. Al Duri, Mr. Ahmed Khadr, who was “a
senior…Osama Bin Laden network aide and fundraiser” and Mr. Marzouk:
2013 FC 1092 at paras. 270-311, 314-428 and 624. In the case of Mr. Al Duri,
the Al Qaeda member who was Mr. Mahjoub’s immediate supervisor on the farm in
Sudan used for terrorists’ weapons training, the Federal Court concluded from
materials found on Mr. Mahjoub’s person at the time of arrest that they had “a close association or friendship”: 2013 FC 1092 at
para. 612.
[145]
Much of the evidence
underlying the Federal Court’s findings in the preceding paragraph was closed
evidence. If this paragraph is deleted and if those portions of the paragraph
preceding that one that refer to closed evidence are deleted, one can see that there
is still a mountain of open source and open court evidence supporting the
reasonableness of the security certificate.
[146]
In finding the above facts,
the Federal Court relied in part on the testimony given by Mr. Al Fadl in United
States v. Bin Laden, above. The Federal Court was extremely cautious concerning
this evidence and assessed it most carefully: see, e.g., 2013 FC 1092 at paras.
152-156 and 465-474. It found that this evidence met the “reliable and appropriate” standard for admissibility
under paragraph 83(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act. In particular, the Federal Court considered Mr. Al Fadl’s evidence concerning
the “farm” to be “compelling
and credible”: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 474.
[147]
The Federal Court confirmed
that there was no believable exculpatory evidence, even in the top secret
evidence disclosed to the Special Advocates and considered in the closed
hearing: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 162. In its view, no believable evidence existed
in Mr. Mahjoub’s direct evidence: 2013
FC 1092 at paras. 586-589. Having examined the evidentiary record, both open
and closed, on this I agree with the Federal Court.
[148]
Much of the Federal Court’s
fact-finding is supported by its assessments of Mr. Mahjoub’s credibility,
assessments that withstand scrutiny under the palpable and overriding error
standard.
[149]
Although Mr. Mahjoub did not
testify, several of his prior statements were properly before the Federal
Court. At various times, the Federal Court found instances where Mr. Mahjoub’s statements
were simply “not credible” or “deceptive” or Mr. Mahjoub was being “evasive,” “likely
untruthful,” “untruthful,” deliberately “imprecise,” “motivated to
conceal” or concealing, and lacked “credibility
and candour”: see, e.g., 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 263, 266, 284,
309-311, 444-445, 486-487, 490-491, 514-515, 529, 532-533, 550-551, 566, 568,
588, 599, 603-605, 607-608, 614, 617-620, 624-625 and 645. For example, in the
face of all of the evidence about the farm, above, Mr. Mahjoub wrote in his
personal information form given to the authorities in support of his refugee
claim when he arrived in Canada that he was just a fellow in Sudan who was on a
farm and left that job to “buy and sell goods in the
market.” He said he especially feared the market, as he felt he was
under “severe surveillance by the Egyptian people”
there: Mr. Mahjoub’s personal information form; 2013 FC 1092 at para. 484-487
and 490.
[150]
In the view of the Federal
Court, a number of “lies and omissions” on the
part of Mr. Mahjoub were “crafted and designed to
consistently conceal any facts that could connect Mr. Mahjoub to known terrorists,
terrorist activities or known terrorist-related enterprises such as Althemar”:
2013 FC 1092 at para. 619. Further, the Federal Court observed that the fact
that Mr. Mahjoub “would lie about the use of aliases
[was] of particular concern” given the frequent use of aliases “in the terrorist milieu” and the fact that the “use of aliases…serves to conceal the true identity of
individuals involved”: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 619. In part, the lies and
omissions by Mr. Mahjoub led the Federal Court to conclude that his innocent
account of events and his activities in Sudan and in Canada “is not credible”: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 619-620.
[151]
The Federal Court did not
uphold the reasonableness of the security certificate merely because Mr.
Mahjoub’s statements were not credible. Rather, his lack of credibility was
just one of many, many elements underscoring the reasonableness of the
certificate.
[152]
Before leaving the issue of
the reasonableness of the certificate, certain submissions made by the Special
Advocates should be addressed.
[153]
First, on the issue whether
one of Mr. Mahjoub’s contacts was Mr. Marzouk, the Special Advocates suggest
that the Federal Court ignored key evidence from intelligence reports. But, as
explained above, the non-mention of evidence in reasons alone does not mean
that there is palpable and overriding error. This is especially so in a case as
large and sprawling as this. Palpable and overriding error is a high standard
of review that is difficult to meet. Given the detailed and comprehensive
manner in which the Federal Court dealt with this issue, I am not persuaded
that the Federal Court committed palpable and overriding error in this respect.
It had much other evidence before it supporting Mr. Mahjoub’s contact with Mr.
Marzouk: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 306-311, 529-531, 566 and 568. And there was
plenty of evidence supporting Mr. Marzouk’s involvement in terrorism: paras.
339-340. Even if there was an error here, I consider it neither “palpable” in the sense of obvious, or “overriding,” in the sense that it will affect the
outcome of the appeal—here the overall finding that the security certificate is
reasonable.
[154]
In discussing the evidence
supporting Mr. Mahjoub’s connection with Mr. Marzouk, the Special Advocates
expressed concern that such a finding, made with inadequate evidence in
support, could taint Mr. Mahjoub with “guilt by
association.” In the abstract, I agree that not much, if anything, can
be proven by the fact that person A has dealings with person B who happens to
be a terrorist. But here, as explained at paragraphs 107-151 above, there was
much, much more that proves that the security certificate is reasonable.
[155]
The Special Advocates also
challenged one intercepted conversation that the Federal Court used to link Mr.
Mahjoub to the Vanguards of Conquest: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 585; summary of
intercept (Exhibit A8, Tab 6). They submit that the Federal Court
misinterpreted it as an admission by Mr. Mahjoub that he was a member of the
Vanguards of Conquest.
[156]
Here we are dealing with a
factually suffused question of mixed fact and law. I am not persuaded that the
high threshold for palpable and overriding error was met. It was open to the
Federal Court to find that the intercepted conversation contained an admission
of membership. The fact that another court might have ruled differently or
might have attached less significance to a piece of evidence does not establish
palpable and overriding error. Finally, even if the finding of Mr. Mahjoub’s
membership in the Vanguards of Conquest falls, he was still found to be a
member of the terrorist organization, Al Jihad. Membership in one terrorist
organization is enough for the Federal Court to uphold the reasonableness of
the security certificate.
[157]
To summarize, the standard
for assessing the security certificate is “reasonable
grounds to believe” that the security grounds for inadmissibility under
section 34 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act are present. The
Federal Court found reasonable grounds. Far from there being palpable and
overriding error on this point, the Federal Court’s conclusions are impeccably
sourced and well-supported by admissible evidence—often considerable evidence.
(c)
Implications for the legal
issues that follow
[158]
On appeal, Mr. Mahjoub
raised a number of issues concerning the admissibility of evidence. I need not
consider these. Even if the evidence that Mr. Mahjoub challenged were excluded,
the remaining admissible evidence supporting the reasonableness of the security
certificate would remain in place. The security certificate would remain reasonable.
[159]
Given this, I see only two
ways in which Mr. Mahjoub can still prevail in this appeal.
[160]
The first way is if he
establishes a legal objection that strikes at the heart of the issuance of the
security certificate. Here, Mr. Mahjoub raises two such legal objections: the
legislative scheme for security certificates is constitutionally invalid; and
the issuance of the security certificate is invalid because necessary legal
prerequisites were not fulfilled in this case. If either of these submissions
is accepted, then the security certificate must be quashed.
[161]
The second way is if the
Federal Court committed reversible error in deciding not to stay the
proceedings permanently on account of an abuse of process. Mr. Mahjoub also makes
this submission. He submits that given various instances of misconduct, errors
and incidents, including instances of wrongful acquisition and wrongful use of
evidence, violations of solicitor-client privilege and violations of Charter
rights, the Federal Court committed reversible error in not staying the
proceedings permanently. Put another way, no matter how reasonable the security
certificate may be, the assault on the reputation and integrity of the
administration of justice in this case is so great that these proceedings
should have been stayed permanently.
[162]
Accordingly, I shall examine
each alleged error and incident raised by Mr. Mahjoub and assess the issue of whether
a stay was justified for any of those errors and incidents. And then I shall
consider whether, taken together, these errors and incidents warranted a permanent
stay of the proceedings for abuse of process.
[163]
Of course, these matters must
be considered within the rubric of Housen appellate review—correctness
for errors of law and legal principle and palpable and overriding error for all
other matters.
(4)
Legal objections that potentially
strike at the heart of the issuance of the security certificate in this case
(a)
The constitutionality of the
legislative regime for security certificates
[164]
Mr. Mahjoub challenges the
constitutionality of sections 2, 12, 17 and 21 to 24 of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 and Division 9 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act which largely concerns the
security certificate regime followed in this case. If Mr. Mahjoub were to
succeed in these constitutional arguments, the security certificate must fall,
just as the first security certificate fell after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Charkaoui I, above.
[165]
In the Federal Court, some
of the bases for Mr. Mahjoub’s constitutional challenge were of no merit
whatsoever. They had been previously decided by Charkaoui I and their
reassertion before the Federal Court could have been seen as an abuse of
process. Nevertheless, the Federal Court considered Mr. Mahjoub’s
constitutional challenge in its entirety.
[166]
In detailed reasons, the
Federal Court dismissed Mr. Mahjoub’s constitutional challenge: 2013 FC 1097. I
see no basis for intervening with its decision on this issue.
[167]
The Federal Court found that
the impugned provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
did not violate Charter rights and so there was no need to consider the issue
of justification under section 1 of the Charter. I agree.
[168]
Key parts of the Federal
Court’s findings are as follows. The provision in the 2008 amendments for
Special Advocates was constitutional and did not impair Mr. Mahjoub’s right to
choose his counsel. Closed proceedings in circumstances such as these are constitutional.
Judges presiding over security certificate proceedings are independent and
impartial. The standard of “reliable and appropriate”
for the admissibility of evidence under paragraph 83(1)(h) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act was capable of definition and was not arbitrary.
The legislative regime required the named person to be informed of the case to
meet and, thus, was constitutionally adequate in that regard. Further, the
named person, here Mr. Mahjoub, had enough information under this legislative
regime to know whether or not to testify. The standard of “reasonable grounds to believe” for assessing the
reasonableness of the security certificate was constitutional. And the
legislative scheme did not authorize arbitrary detention. See generally 2013 FC
1097 at paras. 15, 24, 47, 57-61, 87, 95, 122, 128, 144, 152, 156-162, 164 and
171-174. These findings were informed by a careful and correct reading of the
applicable jurisprudence, including Charkaoui I, Charkaoui II,
this Court’s decision in Harkat, above, Almrei (Re), above, and Jaballah
(Re), above.
[169]
Indeed, in Harkat,
decided after the Federal Court’s decision, the Supreme Court rejected a similarly
broad constitutional challenge against the security certificate provisions in
issue in this case.
[170]
In Harkat, the
Supreme Court held that the security certificate regime in the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act was constitutional (at para. 4):
I
conclude that…the [Immigration and Refugee Protection Act] scheme
[concerning security certificates] is constitutional. Crafting a regime that
achieves a fundamentally fair process while protecting confidential national
security information is a difficult task. The scheme must apply to a broad range
of cases, implicating a variety of national security concerns. Parliament’s
response to this challenge has been to confer on judges the discretion and
flexibility to fashion a fair process, in the particular case before them. If
this is impossible, judges must not hesitate to find a breach of the right to a
fair process and to grant whatever remedies are appropriate, including a stay
of proceedings.
In my view, these words apply
equally to Mr. Mahjoub’s sweeping attack against the constitutionality of the
security certificate regime.
[171]
Before us, Mr. Mahjoub makes
arguments that differ in some respects from those raised before the Supreme
Court in Harkat. For this reason, I considered the constitutional
question certified by the Federal Court to be proper and not foreclosed by Harkat.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Harkat still governs.
Harkat means that Mr. Mahjoub’s constitutional arguments must fail.
[172]
On the issue of the constitutionality
of ex parte or closed proceedings in portions of security certificate
proceedings, the Supreme Court has confirmed in Harkat that closed
proceedings are constitutional as long as the named person is given sufficient
disclosure to know and meet the case. This is a case-specific inquiry. See Harkat,
above at paras. 4, 51-60 and 77.
[173]
Without the benefit of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harkat before it, the Federal Court carried
out this case-specific inquiry. As a result of that inquiry, it found that “upon consideration of all of the evidence, including
summaries, available to Mr. Mahjoub, I find that Mr. Mahjoub was reasonably
informed as to the case to meet and was able to meet that case”: 2013 FC
1092 at para. 173. Throughout the proceedings, Mr. Mahjoub could make informed
choices about how to meet that case: 2013 FC 1097 at para. 152. The Federal
Court found that from time to time there were gaps in the disclosure—e.g.,
the failure to give Mr. Mahjoub summaries of certain foreign agency reports—but
also found that those gaps did not violate his right to know the case to meet,
in part because of the existence of other evidence, often open-source evidence,
that gave the same information: see, e.g., 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 213-217.
[174]
I note that to the extent
that Mr. Mahjoub or his counsel were not personally aware of all the details of
the classified information, the Special Advocates were aware. I confirm that
they made use of it in a way that maximized Mr. Mahjoub’s chances of success in
challenging the reasonableness of the security certificate.
[175]
I wish now to deal with
specific submissions made by Mr. Mahjoub concerning the constitutionality of some
of the specific sections of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.
[176]
I agree with the reasons of
the Federal Court concerning the constitutionality of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act: 2013 FC 1096. Section 12 of that Act empowers
the collection of information and intelligence on activities that may on
reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of
Canada. Contrary to Mr. Mahjoub’s submission, that power is not untrammelled:
investigations may be undertaken only if there are “reasonable
grounds to suspect” that activities constitute “threats
to the security of Canada” and then only “to the
extent that is strictly necessary.” I agree with the Federal Court that
section 12 is neither vague nor overbroad. Section 12 is limited by section 2,
which defines in detail what constitutes a “threat to
the security of Canada” in a manner that conforms to the standards set by
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society,
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, 93 D.L.R. (4th) 36 (vagueness) and Canada (Attorney
General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101 (overbreadth).
[177]
Similarly, I am not
convinced that the Federal Court erred in assessing the constitutionality of
section 12 and related warrant provisions (e.g., section 21) on the
basis of Mr. Mahjoub’s Charter right under section 8 to not be subject to
unreasonable search and seizure. The Federal Court considered and applied the
principles in the Supreme Court of Canada’s relevant search and seizure
jurisprudence and correctly concluded that the lower “reasonable
grounds to suspect” standard for investigations complied with section 8 given
the “minimally intrusive” nature of the searches
and the fact that any investigative warrants under section 21 must be based on
the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard:
2013 FC 1096 at paras. 35-36. All of this is consistent with this Court’s
decision in Atwal v. Canada, [1988] 1 F.C. 107, 79 N.R. 91.
[178]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub
submits that sections 21-24 of the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act violate section 8 of the
Charter to the extent that they allow the systematic interception of and
listening to solicitor-client communications. I disagree. On their face, the
sections are broad warrant-authorizing provisions, just like any other search
warrant provisions. To the extent the sections are used improperly, for
instance to authorize the interception of solicitor-client communications, that
is a question concerning the validity of the warrant issued under these
provisions or the manner in which an interception is carried out. The
provisions themselves are not invalid.
[179]
Section 17 allows for
intelligence sharing. Mr. Mahjoub submits that this section also violates his
right against unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the Charter.
On this, again I agree with the conclusion of the Federal Court: 2013 FC 1096
at para. 65. The intelligence-sharing scheme under the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service Act is subject to various safeguards and oversight and
does not in principle or on the facts of this case result in unreasonable
searches in violation of the Charter, in accordance with the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Wakeling v. United States of America, 2014 SCC 72,
[2014] 3 S.C.R. 549.
[180]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub
advances an additional cluster of Charter arguments against the security
certificate legislative regime without any relevant cases directly on point. These
arguments are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s general blessing of the
security certificate review regime in paragraph 4 of its decision in Harkat,
above. Nevertheless, I will focus on a couple of them.
[181]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub challenges
the legislative regime and its provision for Special Advocates on the basis of
the right to counsel in section 10 of the Charter. I see no violation. The
Supreme Court has upheld the separate roles of counsel for the named person and
the Special Advocates and I also agree with the Federal Court’s rejection of
this argument for the reasons it gave: 2013 FC 1097 at paras. 116-122; Harkat,
above at paras. 67-73.
[182]
On the Charter right to be
free from arbitrary detention, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the
impugned provisions in principle do not violate section 9 of the Charter. This
scheme has standards that, in the words of Charkaoui I, “are rationally related to the purpose of the power of
detention” (at paras. 89 and 93). As the Federal Court noted (at paras.
171-173 of 2013 FC 1097), under section 81 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act the Ministers must have reasonable grounds to believe that
the named person poses a threat to national security or to the safety of any
person, or is unlikely to appear for removal proceedings. Under section 82 of
the Act, when reviewing the named person’s detention or conditions of release,
the Federal Court must carefully examine the individual’s circumstances and
assess the appropriateness of the detention. This is a proportionate response
and an appropriate safeguard that ensures non-arbitrary detention and, thus, it
is constitutional.
[183]
In summary, I reject the constitutional
submissions advanced by Mr. Mahjoub, substantially for the reasons given by the
Federal Court. Given that the Federal Court correctly found that none of the
impugned provisions infringed Mr. Mahjoub’s Charter rights, there was no need
for it to consider section 1 of the Charter. The legislative regime at issue in
this case is constitutional.
(b)
Legal prerequisites for the
issuance of security certificates
[184]
Mr. Mahjoub submits that the
Ministers failed to exercise their powers properly in issuing the security
certificate in this case.
[185]
The Federal Court carefully
examined this allegation and rejected it. It found that the Ministers conducted
their own reviews of the Security Intelligence Report, appropriately relied on
the advice and recommendations of their officials, and personally considered
and signed the security certificate: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 114 and 119. They
were given briefings and were given all of the supporting documents: 2013 FC
1095 at paras. 109 and 114-115. The Federal Court reached these conclusions
relying in part upon the personal testimony of one of the Ministers and the
testimony of several officials. There is no basis to reject these findings.
[186]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub
seems to suggest that before signing the security certificate the Ministers had
to read and consider every last bit of evidence. I reject this.
[187]
Section 77 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act states that the Ministers “shall sign” a security certificate stating the person
named in the certificate is inadmissible. This is a broad potential power
seemingly unqualified by statutory wording. But the section does not give the
Ministers an untrammelled discretion.
[188]
The potential power to do
something is one thing; the discretion to exercise it is another: Entreprises
Sibeca Inc. v. Frelighsburg (Municipality), 2004 SCC 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
304 at para. 21. In other words,
…there
is no such thing as absolute and untrammelled “discretion”, that is that action
can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind
of the administrator; no legislative Act can, without express language, be
taken to contemplate an unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose,
however capricious or irrelevant, regardless of the nature or purpose of the
statute….[T]here is always a perspective within which a statute is intended to
operate; and any clear departure from its lines or objects is…objectionable….
(Roncarelli v.
Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, 16 D.L.R. (2d)
689 at p. 140 S.C.R.; see also Padfield v.
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] UKHL 1, [1968] A.C. 997 (H.L.).)
[189]
To discern the “perspective within which a statute is intended to operate,”
we must consider the text, context and purpose of the security certificate
provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: Re Rizzo
& Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193 and Bell
ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559.
Having done so, I conclude it is not necessary for the Ministers to have
reviewed every last bit of information and to satisfy themselves that a
certificate is reasonable before signing it. If that were the standard, the
later assessment by the Federal Court of the reasonableness of the security
certificate would be somewhat redundant. In no way does the Act require a
double assessment of reasonableness of the security certificate.
[190]
In this regard, I also agree
with the Federal Court’s observation that “the
executive could not function if Ministers were required to personally conduct
an investigation into every decision or even to read every facting document
relevant to the decision, particularly if, as here, the case involves a large
volume of material”: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 109.
[191]
This being said, the
issuance of a security certificate against a named person is no small thing. It
has drastic consequences. As Mr. Mahjoub points out to us, and as happened
here, it can result in the arrest and detention of the named person, to say
nothing of the protracted nature of the proceedings that follow and the
ultimate consequence of inadmissibility. The Ministers cannot just autograph
the certificate blithely; far from it. And, in the case of the Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, the Minister must personally sign the certificate:
subsection 6(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[192]
I note subsection 77(2) of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Under this section, “the Minister,” in this case the Minister of Public
Safety, shall file with the Court the information and other evidence that is
relevant to the ground of inadmissibility stated in the certificate and on
which the certificate is based, as well as a summary of information and other
evidence that enables the person named in the certificate to be reasonably
informed of the case made. This is not necessarily the Minister in her personal
capacity. Typically, this is done by the Minister’s officials, acting under the
principle in Carltona Ltd v. Commissioners of Works, [1943] 2 All E.R.
560 (C.A.). There is no necessary relationship between the information
disclosed under subsection 77(2) and the information that the Ministers must
have before them when considering whether to sign a security certificate under
subsection 77(1) of the Act.
[193]
In light of the foregoing, I
conclude that the Ministers do not need to review all of the information to be
disclosed under subsection 77(2) to the named person before signing a security
certificate. Instead, they need to review enough material in order to be
satisfied that they can express an opinion in the security certificate that the
named person is inadmissible under one of the grounds in subsection 34(1) of
the Act and that the opinion is sufficiently well-founded as to justify the
consequences set in motion by the issuance of the certificate. This requires
supporting evidence that is cogent and credible.
[194]
In this case, that threshold
was easily met. The Ministers were given the Security Intelligence Report, in
this case a very detailed document. That document gave the Ministers enough
information to sign the security certificate. For good measure, aside from the
Security Intelligence Report, the Ministers had access to the advice and
recommendations of their officials, briefings, and all the supporting
documents.
[195]
The security certificate the
Ministers signed itself qualifies as a “certificate”
within the meaning of subsection 77(1) of the Act. It states that the Ministers
have “an opinion…based on a Security Intelligence
Report received and considered by [them]” that Mr. Mahjoub is
inadmissible. They are warranting that they received and considered the
Security Intelligence Report, nothing more, and that they have formed “an opinion,” nothing more. From there, the
reasonableness of the security certificate can be tested by referring it to the
Federal Court and, as is well known, all evidence bearing upon the reasonableness
of the security certificate may be admitted in support of it.
[196]
Mr. Mahjoub also submits
that he should have been entitled to bring a judicial review against the
issuance of the certificate right after it was issued. I reject this. Under
this legislative regime, judicial review of the issuance of a security
certificate is ousted. In its place is an automatic referral of the certificate
to the Federal Court for an assessment of its reasonableness. In these
circumstances, it is open to Parliament to oust judicial review by enacting
another form of meaningful review by a court; in no sense is immunization of
executive action from review taking place: J.P. Morgan, above; Tsleil-Waututh Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 128 at paras. 51 and 77-78. For
example, as J.P. Morgan shows, while tax assessments issued by the
Minister of National Revenue are decisions of the Minister, Parliament has
ousted judicial review. It has provided an alternate form of meaningful review
of the Minister’s decision through administrative review and, ultimately, an
appeal to the Tax Court of Canada and beyond.
[197]
Finally, the Special
Advocates submit that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service owes a duty of
candour—a duty to make full, fair and frank disclosure—to the Ministers so that
they can properly assess whether to sign the security certificate.
[198]
The Federal Court rejected
this submission. It found that there was no legal basis for the Court reaching
behind the Ministers and enforcing a duty owed to them by their subordinate
agencies and officials: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 142. The role of the subordinate
agencies and officials was to provide their expert recommendation to the
Ministers: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 160. The implication of such a duty was
unnecessary. If the Ministers relied on misleading or incomplete information
when they signed the security certificate, the Federal Court could find the
certificate unreasonable: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 140.
[199]
The legal validity of this
finding need not be determined. The Federal Court found that to the extent
there was a duty of candour, it was met. It found no misleading information or
omissions in the Security Intelligence Report that formed the basis of the
certificates: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 160-161. As well, it found that the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service did take into account exculpatory
information when preparing the Security Intelligence Report: 2013 FC 1095 at
paras. 160-161. And having reviewed the facting documents behind the Security
Intelligence Report, the Federal Court was well-positioned to assess this: 2013
FC 1095 at para. 155. There is no palpable and overriding error in these
findings.
[200]
The Special Advocates submit
that there was undisclosed information withheld from the Ministers that is
confidential in nature. In the closed hearing it made submissions on this. The
Federal Court was aware of this undisclosed information but still made the
findings it did. However, this undisclosed information could not have plausibly
affected the issuance of the certificate. As well, its non-disclosure is not of
such significance that the values that underlie our system of justice are
offended in a manner that might attract the remedy of a permanent stay.
(5)
Should the security
certificate proceedings have been stayed permanently on account of an abuse of
process?
[201]
Mr. Mahjoub submits that
various instances of misconduct, violations of legal rights and Charter
breaches took place and that, individually and collectively, these should have
resulted in a permanent stay of the security certificate proceedings.
[202]
Often the Federal Court
found no misconduct, no violations of legal rights or no infringements of the Charter.
Sometimes it found misconduct, violations of legal rights and Charter breaches
but held that none of them by themselves warranted a permanent stay of the
security certificate proceedings. And it also found that collectively any misconduct,
violations of legal rights and Charter breaches did not warrant a permanent stay
of the security certificate proceedings.
[203]
These points are developed below.
Overall, on almost all of these points, I agree with the results reached by the
Federal Court substantially for the reasons it gave.
[204]
At the outset, I wish to
examine the legal principles governing abuses of process and the remedies
available for them, particularly the remedy of a permanent stay.
[205]
On this, I see no error in law
or in legal principle on the part of the Federal Court.
[206]
The remedy of a permanent stay
for abuse of process exists in the Federal Court system by virtue of its
statute, its plenary powers and, where Charter rights have been infringed, the
remedial provisions of the Charter: Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
F-7, section 50; Philipos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 79 at
para. 23; Mazhero v. Fox, 2014 FCA 219 at para. 4; Canada (National
Revenue) v. RBC Life Insurance Company, 2013 FCA 50, [2013] 3 C.T.C. 126;
subsection 24(1) of the Charter (“just and appropriate
remedy”).
[207]
As the Federal Court noted,
abuses of process are often said to arise in two situations. Some abuses center
on the effect of a proceeding on the person to whom it is directed and concern
the fairness of the proceeding to that person. Others “[contravene]
fundamental notions of justice” and “thus
[undermine] the integrity of the judicial process”: 2012 FC 669 at para.
68, citing R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, 130 D.L.R. (4th) 235 at
para. 73; see also R. v. Nixon, 2011 SCC 34, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 566 at
para. 36. The roots of these two categories are to be found in the classic
statement in R. v. Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128, 20 D.L.R. (4th) 651 at
pp. 136-137 S.C.R. concerning when an abuse of process will be found: “where compelling an accused to stand trial would violate
those fundamental principles of justice which underlie the community’s sense of
fair play and decency and to prevent the abuse of a court’s process through
oppressive or vexatious proceedings.”
[208]
Also, as the Federal Court
noted, there is no single remedy for abuse of process. In fact, there are many
possible remedies available to redress instances of misconduct, violations of
legal rights and Charter breaches. In O’Connor, above at paragraph 69,
the Supreme Court spoke of a range of tools existing under the Charter and the
common law ranging from a scalpel to an axe that could be used to “fashion, more carefully than ever, solutions taking into
account the sometimes complementary and sometimes opposing concerns of fairness
to the individual, societal interests, and the integrity of the judicial
system.”
[209]
The most drastic remedy—perhaps
the sledgehammer in the judicial workshop—is the permanent stay of proceedings.
It is warranted only in the “clearest of cases”:
O’Connor at para. 68; Jewitt at p. 137; Nixon at para. 37;
R. v. Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, 89 C.C.C. (3d) 1 at p. 616
S.C.R.
[210] The most recent word of the Supreme Court on the
“clearest of cases” threshold is in R. v.
Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at para. 32. There, the Supreme
Court laid out the three-part test for a stay, citing R. v. Regan, 2002
SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297:
The test used to determine whether a stay of proceedings is
warranted is the same for both [situations] and consists of three requirements:
(1) There must be prejudice to the accused’s right to a
fair trial or the integrity of the justice system that “will be manifested,
perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome”
(Regan, at para. 54);
(2) There must be no alternative remedy capable of
redressing the prejudice; and
(3) Where there is still uncertainty over whether a stay is
warranted after steps (1) and (2), the court is required to balance the
interests in favour of granting a stay, such as denouncing misconduct and
preserving the integrity of the justice system, against “the interest that
society has in having a final decision on the merits” (ibid., at para.
57).
[211]
This is consistent with the
passage from Nixon at paragraph 42 adopted by the Federal Court at
paragraph 42 of 2013 FC 1095:
The test for
granting a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, regardless of whether the
abuse causes prejudice to the accused’s fair trial interests or to the
integrity of the justice system, is that set out in Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, and R. v.
Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297. A stay of proceedings will only be
appropriate when: “(1) the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be
manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by
its outcome; and (2) no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that
prejudice” (Regan, at para. 54, citing O’Connor, at para. 75).
[212]
In some of its decisions,
the Supreme Court has not only explained that there is a high threshold (“clearest of cases”) but also has required that there
be a balancing of the need for the remedy against the societal interests of the
proceeding continuing, as captured in the third step of the test outlined in Babos,
above. Under this balancing, a stay is warranted only where the former is
disproportional to the latter.
[213]
For example, in Nixon
at paragraph 38, the Supreme Court suggested that “[a]chieving
the appropriate balance between societal and individual concerns defines the
essential character of abuse of process.”
[214]
The Supreme Court in R.
v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, 49 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at p. 1667 S.C.R. (quoted
by the Federal Court at paragraph 36 of 2013 FC 1095) explained it this way:
Under the
doctrine of abuse of process [in the criminal context], the unfair or
oppressive treatment of an appellant disentitles the Crown to carry on with the
prosecution of the charge. The prosecution is set aside, not on the merits (see
Jewitt, supra, at p. 148), but because it is tainted to such a
degree that to allow it to proceed would tarnish the integrity of the court. The
doctrine is one of the safeguards designed to ensure “that the repression of
crime through the conviction of the guilty is done in a way which reflects our
fundamental values as a society” (Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R.
640, at p. 689, per Lamer J.) It acknowledges that courts must have the
respect and support of the community in order that the administration of
criminal justice may properly fulfil its function. Consequently, where the
affront to fair play and decency is disproportionate to the societal interest
in the effective prosecution of criminal cases, then the administration of
justice is best served by staying the proceedings. [emphasis added]
[215]
And in Blencoe v. British
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307
(quoted by the Federal Court at 2013 FC 1095 at paragraph 37), the Supreme
Court suggested the following (at para. 120):
In order to find
an abuse of process [in the administrative context], the court must be
satisfied that, “the damage to the public interest in the fairness of the
administrative process should the proceeding go ahead would exceed the harm to
the public interest in the enforcement of the legislation if there proceedings
were halted” (Brown and Evans, [Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
Canada (Toronto: Canvasback, 1998) (loose-leaf)] at p. 9-68).
[216]
As the Federal Court noted
(2013 FC 1095 at para. 38), the Supreme Court has spoken of this balancing in
other cases too: see, e.g., R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, 71
C.C.C. (3d) 1 at pp. 811-812 S.C.R.; Regan, above, at para. 57; R. v.
Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 at para. 200.
[217]
Before the Federal Court and
before us, Mr. Mahjoub submitted that this balancing should be done in only
close cases. I agree with the Federal Court when it held (2013 FC 1095 at para.
38) that where it is certain that the “clearest of
cases” threshold for a permanent stay is met—for example where the
conduct is particularly egregious—a balancing is not required. I also agree
with the Federal Court (2013 FC 1095 at para. 38) that short of that, balancing
“the interests in maintaining the integrity of the
judicial system and individual rights on the one hand and the public interest
in proceeding with the case on the other” is a “useful
tool in the exercise of…discretion.” I also agree with the Federal
Court’s earlier use of this same balancing tool in Re Harkat, 2010 FC
1243, 380 F.T.R. 255 at paragraph 56.
[218]
The Federal Court was
appropriately alive to the possibility that there can be conduct that is “so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in the
light of it will be offensive” and so the party moving for a stay “need not prove that prejudice to either the administration
of justice or the [moving party] will be perpetuated or aggravated”: 2013
FC 1095 at paras. 43 and 492.
[219] Having canvassed these considerations, the
Federal Court concluded that the decision whether or not to grant a stay was a discretionary
one guided by the above factors. The Federal Court formulated the following test
and applied it in this case (at para. 44):
(a) Did
the Ministers, their departments, the [Canadian Security Intelligence] Service
or the [Canada Border Services Agency] engage in conduct that violated Mr.
Mahjoub’s right to a fair trial or undermined society’s expectations of
fairness in the administration of justice?
(b) Will
the prejudice to Mr. Mahjoub or to the administration of justice caused by the
violation or abuse in question be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through
the conduct of the trial or by its outcome? Or is this an exceptional case
where the past conduct is so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in
the light of it will be offensive?
(c) Is
this the clearest of cases in which no other remedy is reasonably capable of
removing that prejudice? In other words, if it is not obvious that this is the
clearest of cases, is the public and individual interest in a permanent stay of
proceedings greater than the public interest in a decision on the merits?
[220]
I agree with this test with
one small qualification. Under branch (c), passages from cases like Conway,
quoted above and Babos, above at paragraph 44 suggest that for a stay to
be granted the outcome of the balancing must show that the public and
individual interest in a permanent stay of proceedings is disproportionately
greater than the public interest in a decision on the merits. The concept of
disproportionality reflects the classic, oft-stated threshold that a permanent
stay of proceedings is available only in the “clearest
of cases.”
[221]
As it turns out, then, under
branch (c) of its test, the Federal Court applied a test that was more
favourable to Mr. Mahjoub than was perhaps warranted in law. And in applying that
more favourable test, the Federal Court still found that the security
certificate proceedings should not be stayed permanently.
[222]
Thus, with the small
exception in Mr. Mahjoub’s favour mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the
Federal Court’s analysis of the law is accurate.
[223]
It follows, then, that in
order to succeed in the area of abuse of process, Mr. Mahjoub must undercut the
Federal Court’s finding that a stay of proceeding is not warranted. And that
can be done only by demonstrating palpable and overriding error.
[224]
This, Mr. Mahjoub has not
done. In many of the matters he identifies, he has not established in law
instances of misconduct, violations of legal rights or Charter breaches. And in
others, while there was misconduct, violations of legal rights or Charter
breaches, Mr. Mahjoub has not established that the Federal Court committed
palpable and overriding error in refusing to stay the security certificate
proceedings.
[225]
Mr. Mahjoub raises a panoply
of issues, many that inter-relate and tend to overlap, sometimes substantially,
sometimes resurfacing with slight variation. In such circumstances, it is folly
to try to deal with them by replicating how counsel presented them. Instead,
the focus can only be on the essence and the substance of the arguments
advanced, overlooking their particular form. To do otherwise is to immerse this
Court in “tens of closely related, confusingly stated,
overlapping questions” running the risk of “miss[ing] one” but only in “a purely technical sense”: Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2017 FCA 144 at para. 17. Thus, I took the panoply of issues presented and
translated them into a manageable set of topics.
[226]
When the substance and
essence of this matter is considered in light of all of the written and oral
submissions made, the following topics have been raised by Mr. Mahjoub and, in
some instances, the Special Advocates:
(a)
Violation of the right to
know the case to meet: late disclosure, inability to decide whether to testify;
the destruction of original evidence by the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service and the admission of summaries thereof;
(b)
Unfair interviews:
violations of the right to silence and right to counsel of choice;
(c)
The challenged warrant under
section 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act;
(d)
The use of hearsay evidence
and unsourced intelligence evidence;
(e)
The use of information
derived from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment;
(f)
Breaches of solicitor-client
privilege and litigation privilege: the commingling of documents;
(g)
Breaches of solicitor-client
privilege: the interception of privileged calls;
(h)
The overall delay;
(i)
The cumulative effect of the
foregoing: whether a stay of proceedings should have been granted.
The analysis of each now
follows.
(a)
Violation of the right to
know the case to meet: late disclosure, inability to decide whether to testify;
the destruction of original evidence by the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service and the admission of summaries thereof
[227]
The Federal Court recognized
that while there is no right to full answer and defence in security certificate
proceedings, there is an analogous right to know the case to meet and the
opportunity to meet it: see 2013 FC 1095 at para. 402; Charkaoui I at
para. 53. This was a correct statement of law.
[228]
The Federal Court considered
the issue of delayed or omitted disclosure and the governing case of Charkaoui
II. In assessing delayed or omitted disclosure, the Court is to focus on
the prejudice caused to the person named in the security certificate: 2013 FC
1095 at paras. 399-400.
[229]
In the Federal Court, Mr.
Mahjoub raised many instances of alleged delay or omitted disclosure. The
Federal Court carefully considered each one and found that adequate remedies
had been granted, including orders for further disclosure, the granting of extensions
of time, and adjournments of the proceedings: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 424, 426,
429 and 438.
[230]
I am not persuaded that the
Federal Court erred in law or in extricable legal principle on any of these issues.
Nor did it commit palpable and overriding error. There was no basis in law or
in fact for the award of a permanent stay of proceedings based on these issues.
[231]
The primary document
acquainting Mr. Mahjoub with the case to meet was the Public Summary of the
Security Intelligence Report, first given to him at the same time the second
security certificate was issued. It was regularly updated. In my view, upon the
disclosure of the updated Supplementary Public Summary of the Security
Intelligence Report on January 22, 2010, the disclosure of the Ministers’ case
was substantially complete and gave him knowledge of the case he had to meet.
There were amendments after that time, but these did not disclose new
allegations against Mr. Mahjoub.
[232]
Paragraph 83(1)(e) of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act requires that the named
person, here Mr. Mahjoub, be provided “throughout the
proceeding…with a summary of information and other evidence” so that he
is “reasonably informed of the case made by the
Minister.” After January 22, 2010, Mr. Mahjoub did receive additional
disclosure, but in my view any information held by the Ministers was at the
level of particulars, not new allegations that affected Mr. Mahjoub’s knowledge
of the case to meet.
[233]
Given these circumstances,
Mr. Mahjoub does not seriously contest in this Court that he did not know the
case to meet: see Mr. Mahjoub’s memorandum of fact and law at paras 72-76.
Instead, he challenges a number of issues relating to procedural fairness that
he argued before the Federal Court.
[234]
Before the Federal Court,
Mr. Mahjoub advanced a long list of issues related to the fairness of the
proceedings. On appeal, Mr. Mahjoub takes issue with the Federal Court’s
handling of these issues. These issues concern the Federal Court’s refusal to
grant certain adjournments, the Federal Court’s ruling that the Ministers, in
complying with an order concerning the presentation of in camera
evidence did not improperly split their case, and the Federal Court’s holding
that Charkaoui II provided a complete remedy for alleged deficiencies in
disclosure in the previous security certificate proceedings: Re Mahjoub,
2010 FC 989; see also 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 258 and 464.
[235]
In these refusals, rulings
and holdings, there are no errors of law or of extricable legal principle. Nor
do I see any palpable and overriding error. Further, there was no basis in law
or in fact for the award of a permanent stay of proceedings based on these
matters.
[236]
Mr. Mahjoub also challenges
the destruction of some original notes taken by the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service. The Federal Court found that this did not warrant a permanent
stay of proceedings: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 75-77 and 84.
[237]
The Service destroyed
original operational materials in accordance with its internal policy, OPS-217.
Under that policy, original materials were to be systematically destroyed after
operatives completed their final reports and summaries. In this case, the
reports and summaries were disclosed to Mr. Mahjoub.
[238]
In both Charkaoui II
at paragraph 38 and Harkat at paragraph 93, the Supreme Court held that
this systematic destruction violated the named person’s section 7 rights.
Importantly, however, in neither case did the Supreme Court find that the
destruction warranted a permanent stay of proceedings.
[239]
In Charkaoui II at paragraph
46, the Supreme Court emphasized that each case must be looked at on its facts
and that the court must consider the prejudicial effect of the destruction on
the named person’s case. With Charkaoui II before it, the Federal Court
did just that.
[240]
In the Supreme Court’s
decision in Harkat, decided after the Federal Court’s decision in this
case, these principles were reaffirmed. The Supreme Court added that summaries
of destroyed materials should only be excluded if their admission “would result in an unfair trial or would otherwise undermine
the integrity of the justice system”: Harkat at para. 95.
[241]
Although the Federal Court
did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harkat, it
carried out its task presciently, in a way that mirrored what the Supreme Court
did. The Federal Court carefully assessed the reliability of the summaries of intelligence
information captured in the BRS reports. It considered these reports to be
reliable: they were authored by Service employees, were subject to verification
by any other personnel who were witnesses to what happened and by supervisors,
and they contained direct information from interviews, physical surveillance
and intercepted communications. See 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 107-122; testimony
of Mr. Guay dated October 15, 2010 (Appeal Book, Doc. 505.2, at pp. 140-142, 192-210).
In the view of the Federal Court, the large number of people involved tended to
ensure quality control: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 81 and 83.
[242]
Mr. Mahjoub also attempts to
undercut the reliability of this material by suggesting that those preparing the
summaries had inadequate translation support. The record shows that those
involved had ample translation support if they needed it; at least two
witnesses testified as to their own extensive knowledge of the Arabic language:
2013 FC 1095 at para. 83, relying upon the testimony of Mr. Guay, dated October
12, 2010 (Appeal Book, Doc. 505, at pp. 122-128) and the testimony of CSIS
Witness #2 and CSIS Witness #2B, dated July 6, 2012 (Appeal Book, Doc. 536, at
p. 9) and August 7, 2012 (Appeal Book, Doc. 540, at pp. 3-4) respectively.
[243]
In the Federal Court and in
this Court, Mr. Mahjoub places great weight on an answer given by a Service
witness on cross-examination. Mr. Mahjoub contends that the witness testified
that it was the Service’s practice to destroy transcripts of intercepted
communications in order to avoid testifying in Court.
[244]
The Federal Court examined
all of the testimony leading up to this answer and construed the witness as
saying that the Service did not want its officials to testify in court about
its work as an agent of the Canada Border Services Agency: 2013 FC 1095 at
para. 82. The Federal Court concluded that “[o]n the
basis of [the witness’] testimony read in its entirety and considered in the
context of the evidence of other witnesses on the subject, I am not persuaded
that the Service deliberately set out to frustrate the judicial process by
destroying the intercepts…”: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 82. The Federal Court
explicitly distinguished the situation before it from that in the Supreme Court
abuse of process case of R. v. Carosella, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 80, 142 D.L.R. (4th) 595. In Carosella,
a sexual assault centre deliberately destroyed evidence to frustrate the
judicial process. That was not the case here.
[245]
All of these findings of the
Federal Court are supported by the law and the evidence before it. They are not
vitiated by any palpable and overriding error. Nor are there grounds in law or
in fact for the award of a permanent stay of proceedings based on these matters.
[246]
Despite its finding that the
summaries and reports had a high degree of reliability, the Federal Court gave
Mr. Mahjoub the benefit of the doubt and thereby minimized any prejudice caused
by gaps in disclosure. It did not rely upon any portions of the summaries and
reports that went to Mr. Mahjoub’s demeanour and subjective behaviour: 2013 FC
1092 at para. 119. This underscores the high degree of solicitude on the part
of the Federal Court for the rights of Mr. Mahjoub, solicitude repeatedly demonstrated
throughout the seven decisions before us.
[247]
The Federal Court gave Mr.
Mahjoub the benefit of the doubt concerning destroyed intercepted
communications in another respect. He excluded all communications to which Mr.
Mahjoub was not privy. In doing so, he was following this Court’s decision in Harkat.
This meant that the only summaries of conversations that were admissible were
those which Mr. Mahjoub could personally address: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 120;
2013 FC 1095 at paras. 84 and 88. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this
Court on that point, in effect finding this too rigid a threshold for the
exclusion of this type of evidence.
[248]
The Federal Court held that
even without any evidence from interceptions of communications, it still would
have found Mr. Mahjoub to be a member of a terrorist organization: 2013 FC 1092
at paras. 570, 585 and 630. Given the summary of facts and the sourcing for
these facts at paragraphs 107-151, above, this is indisputably so.
[249]
Overall, the Federal Court
found that while the destruction of the original interception evidence violated
Mr. Mahjoub’s rights under section 7 of the Charter, the evidence fell well
short of establishing an entitlement to a stay of the proceedings. This
conclusion is amply supported by the facts and the law. There is no error of law
or palpable and overriding error in the Federal Court’s assessment.
[250]
Some other evidence was
destroyed: certain interview notes, a letter in a briefcase and items found on Mr.
Mahjoub when he was arrested. Only photocopies were retained and presented as evidence.
The Federal Court ruled on this evidence early on (October 22, 2010). Mr.
Mahjoub attempted to challenge its admissibility on other grounds and the
Federal Court said he was too late. Nevertheless, the Federal Court considered
the matter anew and rejected the challenge on the basis that minimal prejudice
had been caused; Mr. Mahjoub could still test the authenticity and the content
of the evidence: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 92-93. Again, this ruling is not
vitiated by an error of law or palpable and overriding error, nor are there any
grounds for a permanent stay of proceedings founded upon these matters.
(b)
Unfair interviews:
violations of the right to silence and right to counsel of choice
[251]
The Canadian Security
Intelligence Service conducted interviews of Mr. Mahjoub. Mr. Mahjoub alleges
that the interviews breached his Charter rights and the Service’s own policies.
[252]
Certain facts found by the
Federal Court determine these issues against Mr. Mahjoub. And these factual
findings stand unless set aside by palpable and overriding error. There is
none.
[253]
The Federal Court found that
Mr. Mahjoub had received sufficient notice to meet any requirements of
procedural fairness: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 65-67; Dehghani v. Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, 101 D.L.R. (4th) 654
at p. 1076 S.C.R. This factually-suffused finding of mixed fact and law is
amply demonstrated by the evidence before the Federal Court.
[254]
Before the Federal Court,
Mr. Mahjoub did not lead evidence suggesting that the interviews were
involuntary or that he did not understand the purpose of the interviews.
Indeed, there was much evidence before the Federal Court to the contrary.
[255]
The Federal Court found that
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service notified Mr. Mahjoub of the purpose
and the potential consequences of the interviews, namely security and
counter-terrorism, and advised him that the interviews were voluntary. The
Service told Mr. Mahjoub that it had no power to force him to speak. Given
this, the Federal Court heard the evidence of an officer with the Service who
advised that “had [Mr. Mahjoub] not wanted to answer a
question, he could simply have said I don’t want to answer the question”:
testimony of Mr. Guay, dated October 18, 2010 (Appeal Book, Doc. 505.3 at pp. 65-66).
[256]
The evidence before the
Federal Court shows that the Service was mindful of Mr. Mahjoub’s rights. It is
apparent that Mr. Mahjoub was well aware that the interviews were voluntary and
was aware of his rights. In fact, on one occasion, the Service offered to end
an interview after Mr. Mahjoub asked whether he should obtain counsel. But Mr.
Mahjoub invited the Service to press on with the interview. See 2013 FC 1095 at
paras. 59 and 62-63. As well, Mr. Mahjoub was offered an interpreter but he chose
to use his wife and a friend: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 70.
[257]
In this Court, some of the submissions
of Mr. Mahjoub seem aimed at suggesting that in circumstances such as these,
state authorities cannot speak to Mr. Mahjoub at all. There is no authority
supporting such a proposition in the national security context. Neither is
there one in the criminal context. There, the essence of the right to silence is
the right to choose, with voluntariness at its core: see, e.g., R. v.
Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 27; R. v. Singh,
2007 SCC 48, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 405 at para. 37.
[258]
Overall, the Federal Court
found that Mr. Mahjoub’s rights were fully respected in the interviews and his
participation and statements made during the interviews were voluntary. This
fact-based finding is not vitiated by palpable and overriding error. In fact,
it is fully supported by the evidence. Here, there is no ground for the
issuance of a permanent stay of proceedings.
(c)
The challenged warrant under
section 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
[259]
The Special Advocates submit
that a warrant issued under section 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act should have been struck out because of a failure to make full,
frank disclosure in support of the warrant, in particular the failure to
disclose exculpatory information.
[260]
Had the warrant been struck,
they say that the Federal Court’s finding that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of the
Vanguards of Conquest would fall. The finding that Mr. Marzouk was one of Mr.
Mahjoub’s contacts would also be undermined.
[261]
The short answer to all
these grounds is that even if the Special Advocates are correct and this
evidence is ignored, the reasonableness of the security certificate remains
amply confirmed by the facts set out at paragraphs 107-151 above. Further, even
if it were unreasonable to find that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of the Vanguards
of Conquest, the facts establish that he was a member of Al Jihad. For the
purposes of the reasonableness of the security certificate, membership in only
one terrorist organization is enough.
[262]
Further, in issue here is
the Federal Court’s review of a decision of a designated judge to authorize a
warrant. The standard of review is deferential: see, e.g., R. v.
Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253; R. v. Araujo, 2000 SCC 65,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 992; R. v. Garofoli, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1421, 60 C.C.C.
(3d) 161; R. v. Ward, 2012 ONCA 660, 112 O.R. (3d) 321; R. v. Nero,
2016 ONCA 160, 334 C.C.C. (3d) 148. The overall question is whether there were
grounds upon which the issuing justice “could”
grant the warrant. The reviewing court evaluates this through a “contextual analysis of the record, not a piecemeal
dissection of individual items of evidence shorn of their context in a vain
search for alternate exculpatory inferences”: Nero at para. 68.
[263]
This is far from a rehearing
of the original application to obtain the warrant. The reviewing court is not
entitled to substitute its views or discretion for those of the court that
issued the warrant.
[264]
In confidential reasons
concerning the validity of the warrant, the Federal Court identified and
applied these standards. Citing Garofoli, above at page 1452, the
Federal Court stated that “[i]f, based on the record
which was before the authorizing judge as amplified on the review, the
reviewing judge concludes that the authorizing judge could have granted
the authorization, then he or she should not interfere” [emphasis in
original]: 2013 FC 1096 at para. 129. It concluded that even with problematic
parts removed from the warrant, there still would have been sufficient evidence
to satisfy the designated judge that there were reasonable grounds for the
issuance of the warrant: 2013 FC 1096 at para. 133.
[265]
The Special Advocates urge
that warrants issued under section 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act should be treated differently from criminal law warrants. Section
21 warrants need only relate to a threat to the security of Canada. And they
can only be reviewed when the evidence obtained by the warrant happens to be
needed in a legal proceeding. Accordingly, the Special Advocates say, there is
reason—even more than in the normal criminal search warrant context—for the
Service to make full, frank and fair disclosure to the issuing justice when seeking
these warrants, even disclosure of material that the Service itself may not
accept as accurate or truthful.
[266]
Thus, the Special Advocates
submit that this Court should depart from the usual approach applied to the
review of criminal search warrants. As noted above, under that approach, the
reviewing court asks whether the warrant could have issued notwithstanding the
suppression of exculpatory evidence. At paragraph 65 of their memorandum of
fact and law, they submit that when there has been any failure to disclose
material evidence, “the warrant should not issue or
should be set aside.”
[267]
In my view, the different
nature of section 21 warrants does not justify a different legal standard. The
fact that a section 21 warrant may be hard to challenge in some contexts does
not logically lead to the conclusion that when it is challenged in court for
omissions or inaccuracies — exactly like a criminal law search warrant —it
should be subject to a different legal test. In terms of legal policy, it is
hard to understand why a section 21 warrant that could have issued despite
omissions or inaccuracies should be treated differently from a criminal law
warrant. In fact, given the ever-increasing need to guard against terrorism and
other threats to national security it is difficult to understand why
admissibility standards in the national security context should be more
stringent than those in the criminal law context.
[268]
The Special Advocates also submit
that paragraph 21(1)(b) of the Act should have been interpreted to require
an evidentiary showing of investigative necessity and there was no
investigative necessity here.
[269]
I reject this. Paragraph
21(1)(b) requires a deponent seeking a warrant to depose that “other investigative procedures have been tried and have
failed” or “that the urgency of the matter is
such that it would be impractical to carry out the investigation using only
other investigative procedures.” But an alternative ground is where,
without a warrant, “it is likely that information of
importance with respect to the threat to security of Canada…would not be
obtained.” This third ground provides an independent basis for obtaining
a warrant and does not require a demonstration of investigative necessity: R.
v. Alizadeh, 2014 ONSC 1624 at paras. 20-29.
[270]
In particular, I agree with
the following passage from Alizadeh (at para. 29):
…Under the third
rubric of s. 21(2)(b) of the [Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act],
there is no need to demonstrate that other investigative procedures have been
tried and exhausted. Rather, taking into account the practical and complex
realities required for CSIS to fulfil its mandate to investigate ongoing and
future national security threats, the likelihood of loss of important
information with respect to these future threats is a distinct, legitimate, and
necessary ground upon which a justice can issue a warrant. There are internal
limitations found in the wording of this provision, namely, that the
information must be “important” and that there must be a “likelihood” that the
information would not otherwise be obtained. These words must be interpreted in
a meaningful way so as to protect the important privacy interests of Canadian
citizens and residents.
[271]
The Federal Court, in rather
conclusory reasons, considered that in any event, investigative necessity was
present. Upon review of both the open record and the closed record, I see no
palpable and overriding error in that finding.
(d)
The use of hearsay evidence
and unsourced intelligence evidence
[272]
Mr. Mahjoub makes many
submissions that, broadly, can be seen as an attack against the alleged unfairness
of paragraph 83(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
This paragraph provides that “the judge may receive
into evidence anything that, in the judge’s opinion, is reliable and
appropriate, even if it is inadmissible in a court of law, and may base a
decision on that evidence.”
[273]
To the extent that these
unfairness arguments go to constitutionality, they do not succeed.
[274]
The Supreme Court in Harkat
has upheld the constitutionality of paragraph 83(1)(h), effectively
vindicating the manner in which the Federal Court proceeded.
[275]
In Harkat, the
Supreme Court considered the use of hearsay in unsourced evidence. It held that
“[w]hile [paragraph] 83(1)(h) of the [Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act] may result in the admission of hearsay evidence
and deny the [S]pecial [A]dvocates the ability to cross-examine sources, it
does not violate s. 7 of the Charter”: Harkat at para. 76. The
Supreme Court rejected the idea that the traditional rules of evidence, such as
hearsay, have “been constitutionalized into unalterable
principles of fundamental justice”: Harkat at para. 76; R. v.
L. (D.O.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419, 85 C.C.C. (3d) 289 at p. 453 S.C.R. per
L’Heureux-Dubé J.
[276]
Instead, according to the
Supreme Court, the constitutionally salient consideration is reliability,
though considerations of appropriateness, including fairness in the
proceedings, must come to bear on admissibility: Harkat at para. 76; R.
v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787 at para. 48. This
includes the discretion to exclude evidence whose probative effect is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect: Harkat at para. 76. Paragraph
83(1)(h) confirms these considerations, providing that the standard for
admissibility is reliability and appropriateness.
[277]
Without the benefit of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harkat, the Federal Court, again quite
presciently, upheld the constitutionality of paragraph 83(1)(h) and made
reliability and appropriateness, in the sense discussed in the Supreme Court’s Harkat
decision, its guiding star in navigating through the evidentiary issues,
including hearsay issues.
[278]
In particular, the Federal
Court held that hearsay evidence could be admitted under the paragraph without
compromising the fairness of the proceedings. In Harkat at paragraphs 75
and 76, the Supreme Court upheld that proposition, noting that the court has a
broad discretion to screen out unreliable evidence after a searching review.
This is exactly how the Federal Court proceeded and frequently it screened out
evidence it considered hazardous to rely upon: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 218-228,
230-231, 248-252, 254-259, 262, 268-269, 292, 294-295, 447, 450, 452-454,
456-457, 501-503, 528, 574-583, 595-596, 599, 600, 609, 614 and 615.
[279]
In assessing evidence using
the reliability and appropriateness standard under paragraph 83(1)(h) of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Federal Court was
appropriately cautious. Although the paragraph allows evidence to be admitted “even if it is inadmissible in a court of law,” the
Federal Court observed that the traditional rules of evidence are not to be
disregarded in their entirety, observing that many of them grew out of a
concern about reliability and fairness. Overall, the Federal Court considered itself
to be bound by standards of reliability and fairness or, broadly put, the guarantee
of trial fairness under the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of
the Charter: 2013 FC 1097 at paras. 131-134. I agree with the Federal Court’s
reasons on this point.
[280]
In the Federal Court and
before us, Mr. Mahjoub attacked the use of “unsourced
evidence” in the case against him. “Unsourced
evidence” is evidence or information obtained from a foreign agency
where the agency’s source for the evidence or information is not provided. Mr.
Mahjoub submits that unsourced evidence should not have been used at all.
[281]
The Federal Court rejected
this argument. I agree with this for the reasons it gave.
[282]
The Federal Court observed
that in the intelligence context, inquiring about the source of information
would be a “fundamental transgression of the
[intelligence-sharing] relationship” and, thus, would place Canada’s
intelligence-sharing relations in jeopardy and would result in danger to
national security: 2013 FC 1094 at paras. 18-19; testimony of Mr. Brooks in the
closed hearing. In its view, unsourced evidence cannot be categorically
inadmissible. However, it does not automatically go into evidence either. It
must be shown to be reliable and appropriate in all the circumstances—in other
words, admissible under the statutory standards of paragraph 83(1)(h).
[283]
Further, under subsection
83(1.1), it cannot be “information that is believed on
reasonable grounds to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture…or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” I deal with this
specific ground in the next section of these reasons.
[284]
In considering unsourced
evidence given by a foreign agency, the Federal Court considered a number of
factors (at 2013 FC 1094 at paras. 21 and 26-27) such as evidence of
methodologies used by the foreign agency and its human rights record, the
nature and duration of the relationship between the foreign agency and the
Service, past experiences of the Service with the foreign agency, the foreign
agency’s international reputation and the credibility of the foreign agency,
including its motivations, inconsistencies or exaggerations. To the Federal
Court, this was not a closed list.
[285]
The Special Advocates
suggest that the test used by the Federal Court for unsourced evidence reads
subsection 83(1.1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act too
narrowly as it fails to adequately guard against evidence tainted by torture or
other unacceptable methods and fails to take into account the reality that many
states do not source their information when sharing. In other words, the
unsourced nature of the evidence makes it impossible for Special Advocates to
challenge it on the basis that it is derived from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, or is otherwise unreliable or inappropriate.
The Special Advocates also raise issues as to whether the test proposed by the
Federal Court, as a practical matter, can be applied meaningfully.
[286]
I do not share the Special Advocates’
concerns. The test respects the principles of what constitutes reliable
evidence set out in the jurisprudence, such as the Supreme Court’s decision in Harkat.
And, as deployed in this case, the approach seems to have worked. In some
instances, the Federal Court gave unsourced evidence no weight, required it to
have “truly independent corroboration,” or
exercised caution: 2013 FC 1092 at paras. 62, 115, 575, 582 and 589.
[287]
In this area, the Federal
Court was assisted by testimony relating to the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service’s approach to foreign agency information, particularly in assessing its
value. Since intelligence sharing relies on the “give
to get” principle, a foreign agency that continually provides inaccurate
or misleading information could endanger its reputation in the intelligence
community and impair its ability to successfully interact with other agencies.
As a result, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has developed a
detailed metric for evaluating the information it receives and it carefully
evaluates the agencies it deals with to ensure they provide sufficiently
reliable information. Accordingly, it is a mistake to assume, as Mr. Mahjoub
seems to assume, that all unsourced evidence is inherently unreliable and should
be excluded.
[288]
The test the Federal Court
has formulated is correct. As well, in the end, the reasonableness of the
security certificate is amply confirmed by evidence other than unsourced
evidence.
[289]
There is no error of law or
palpable and overriding error in the Federal Court’s consideration of the
evidence under paragraph 83(1)(h), including the evidence said to be
hearsay and unsourced. There are no grounds for awarding a permanent stay of
proceedings.
(e)
The use of information
derived from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
[290]
It will be recalled that “information that is believed on reasonable grounds to have
been obtained as a result of the use of torture…or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment” is inadmissible: subsection 83(1.1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act.
[291]
In a motion in 2010, the
Federal Court excluded some evidence relied upon by the Ministers in the
Security Intelligence Report because there were reasonable grounds to believe
it had a plausible connection to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment: 2010 FC 787. The Federal Court was persuaded that “significant information” had been gathered “by methods that [did] not include the use of torture or
[cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment]”: 2010 FC 787 at
paras. 116-17, 160-168, 207 and 229.
[292]
In a general abuse of
process motion, Mr. Mahjoub raised this issue again. The Federal Court found
that its earlier order had remedied any violation of Mr. Mahjoub’s section 7
rights and so no further remedy was warranted to protect trial fairness or to
vindicate the interests of justice: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 120-132. The Federal
Court found that the Service intended to exclude information obtained by
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. At no time was
it acting in ignorance of Charter standards or in wilful and flagrant disregard
of the Charter.
[293]
Mr. Mahjoub submits that in
rejecting its arguments in the abuse of process motion, the Federal Court
ignored relevant criteria. I am not persuaded that this is so. The Federal
Court cited all relevant authority and applied it faithfully to the evidence
before it. There is no error in law, nor any palpable and overriding error.
[294]
In assessing this issue, the
Federal Court employed a two-step approach for assessing the admissibility of
evidence under subsection 83(1.1). It drew this approach substantially from the
House of Lords decision in A. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, 2005 UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 and the Supreme Court’s
analysis in R. v. S.(R.J.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 451, 121 D.L.R. (4th) 589 at
pages 565-566 S.C.R. First, the named person or, more typically, Special
Advocates acting on the named person’s behalf, must demonstrate a “plausible connection” between the use of torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the information to be
used against him or her. This preliminary burden can be met: there is plenty of
information available to the public regarding the human rights practices of
different regimes around the world. As a result, the House of Lords called this
a “low bar”: A. and Others at para. 116. Once
this low standard is met, the onus shifts to the Ministers to adduce evidence
that will satisfy the court on the issue of admissibility.
[295]
The Court of Appeal for
Ontario has approved and adopted the Federal Court’s two-step approach in France
v. Diab, 2014 ONCA 374, 120 O.R. (3d) 174 at paragraphs 261-264, and so do I.
[296]
The Special Advocates argue
that for the information to be admissible under subsection 83(1.1), the
Ministers should be required to prove a negative, namely that the “information could not have come from” torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, even in the absence of any
evidence that the information was derived from torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
[297]
This is inconsistent with
the wording of paragraph 83(1)(h) and subsection 83(1.1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act. The framework under those provisions is “admissibility absent reasonable grounds,” not “inadmissibility unless torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment
has been negatived.” In
particular, paragraph 83(1)(h) states a presumptive rule that
information that is reliable and appropriate is admissible. And subsection
83(1.1) specifically refers to paragraph 83(1)(h) and excepts
information from it where it is “believed on reasonable
grounds to have been obtained as a result of the use of torture…or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
[298]
Therefore, the approach
applied by the Federal Court in this matter is consistent with both other
national security jurisprudence and the text of the operative provisions
themselves. There is no basis upon which this Court should intervene.
(f)
Breaches of solicitor-client
privilege and litigation privilege: the commingling of documents
[299]
A full summary of the facts
relevant to this issue can be found in the Federal Court’s decision at 2012 FC
669.
[300]
In July 2011, the Federal
Court’s hearing into the reasonableness of the certificate was adjourned for
the summer. Assistants from the Department of Justice attended at the Federal
Court in Toronto to retrieve the Ministers’ documents from the courtroom and
from a breakout room. The plan was to collect the material, return to the
offices of the Department of Justice and organize the materials.
[301]
Inadvertently, the
assistants also collected materials stored in Mr. Mahjoub’s breakout room. Both
parties’ materials were placed, commingled, in an unoccupied office at the
Department of Justice. The assistants began to sort the documents. Upon
suspecting that some of the materials did not belong to the Ministers, they
ceased their sorting. Inadvertently, the Ministers’ materials had been
commingled with Mr. Mahjoub’s materials.
[302]
Mr. Mahjoub feared that some
of his materials—confidential and subject to litigation privilege and solicitor
and client privilege—had been acquired by the Ministers and had been reviewed.
He brought a motion for an immediate stay of the proceedings.
[303]
Before ruling on Mr.
Mahjoub’s motion for a stay, the Federal Court established a process for
separating the commingled documents. A Prothonotary presided over the
separation process and prepared a report on the results.
[304]
Taking into account all that
had transpired and the Prothonotary’s report, the Federal Court dismissed the
motion for a permanent stay. It termed the Ministers’ conduct in taking Mr.
Mahjoub’s documents as “unintentional and negligent”:
2012 FC 669 at para. 149. It held that the Ministers had adduced enough
evidence showing that Mr. Mahjoub’s materials were not reviewed by anyone on
the Minister’s team: 2012 FC 669 at paras. 122-133. Overall, it held that Mr.
Mahjoub was not actually prejudiced. In its view, the actual fairness of the
proceedings had not been affected.
[305]
However, the Federal Court
found that the seizure itself was a violation of Mr. Mahjoub’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure: 2012 FC 669 at paras. 157-158. It also found
that the appearance of the fairness of the proceedings had suffered. As a
result, he found that there was an abuse of process under the so-called
residual category—an abuse that does not threaten trial fairness but risks
undermining the integrity of the judicial process and the administration of
justice.
[306]
However, the Federal Court
considered that the most extreme remedy of staying the proceedings was not
warranted on the facts. In its words, this was not the “clearest
of cases that would warrant a permanent stay of proceedings”: 2012 FC
669 at para. 145. In doing so, it applied a correct understanding of the law to
the facts before it.
[307]
Applying the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court concerning permanent stays of proceedings, the Federal
Court conducted a balancing exercise, weighing the interests that would be
served in granting a stay of proceedings against society’s interest in having a
final decision on the merits: 2012 FC 669 at para. 146. In doing so, it
examined the particulars of the case and the nature of the proceedings, Mr.
Mahjoub’s circumstances, the seriousness of the Ministers’ conduct and its
impact on the integrity of the administration of justice, and society’s
interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. The Federal Court
concluded (at para. 147) that the “affront to fair play
and decency caused by the Ministers’ taking and co-mingling of Mr. Mahjoub’s
privileged documents is not disproportionate to the societal interest of having
the underlying proceeding continue and be ultimately decided on the merits.”
[308]
The Federal Court was
mindful of the fact that lesser remedies for misconduct are available to
address the appearance of injury to the administration of justice. So here it
ordered a lesser but still significant remedy. Its aim—appropriate given the
law on point—was “to ensure that the Ministers’ conduct
does not undermine society’s expectation in the administration of justice”
and “to ensure that any affront to the appearance of
fairness will not be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct
of the proceedings or by their outcome”: 2012 FC 669 at para. 145.
[309]
To this end, it stated that “[i]n order to dispel any lingering perception that counsel
for the Ministers may have reviewed privileged materials belonging to Mr.
Mahjoub and to ensure that public confidence in the system of justice is
maintained,” it would order that relevant members of the Ministers’
litigation team be removed from the file, be barred from working on the
proceedings or having any further access to any of the materials or information
related to the file, and be prohibited from discussing the file with anyone:
2012 FC 669 at paras. 136, 143-144, 148 and 155; 2013 FC 1095 at para. 26. In
fashioning this remedy, it was mindful of the law concerning the removal of
solicitors discussed by the Supreme Court in Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray
Demolition Corp., 2006 SCC 36, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 189 and applied the factors
discussed in that case.
[310]
Here again, the Federal
Court applied correct legal principles to the facts before it. And in making a
large number of factual findings and in applying the law to the facts before
it, the Federal Court did not commit any palpable and overriding error. Here
again, there are no grounds for the granting of a permanent stay of proceedings.
(g)
Breaches of solicitor-client
privilege: the interception of privileged calls
(i)
Interceptions under section
21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act until October 2001
[311]
Certain solicitor-client communications
were intercepted under national security warrants authorized by section 21 of
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. All of the interceptions
of solicitor-client communications took place following Mr. Mahjoub’s arrest:
2013 FC 1095 at paras. 183-184. Mr. Mahjoub submits that the interception of
the solicitor-client communications constitutes an abuse of process warranting
a stay of the security certificate proceedings.
[312]
Here, it must be kept front
of mind that the central issue before this Court is the reasonableness of the
security certificate. The interceptions did not lead to evidence that was used
to support the reasonableness of the security certificate. The Ministers did
not attempt to use any of the communications as evidence. None of the
communications forms part of the information, above, that supports the
reasonableness of the certificate. Thus, the interceptions have nothing to do
directly with the certificate proceedings before us.
[313]
The only issue is whether
the interception of solicitor-client communications was so abhorrent to our
system of justice that the security certificate proceedings should be stayed.
On this, charging itself correctly on the legal principles relating to a stay
and applying these principles to the facts before it, the Federal Court
declined to grant a stay. There is no reviewable error in this.
[314]
All of the interceptions
were carried out under section 21 of the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act or by way of judicial authorization and were conducted in good
faith.
[315]
At the outset, one must recognize
that it is inevitable that national security warrants authorizing the
interception of communications sent and received using Mr. Mahjoub’s phone will
result in the interception of solicitor-client communications. When a lawyer
phones Mr. Mahjoub and discusses the proceedings, those discussions will
inevitably be intercepted. This sort of “initial
interception,” an inevitable one, is not fodder for an abuse of process
complaint in itself: Atwal, above at paras. 15 and 30. The key is
what happens to those interceptions afterwards.
[316]
In Atwal, this Court
held that solicitor-client communications can be intercepted and reviewed by a
Director or Regional Director General of the Security Service to ascertain
whether the communication relates to a “threat to the
security of Canada.” If not, the communication is destroyed and no
further disclosure is made: Atwal at paras. 15 and 30. This has been
incorporated into a policy that requires an analyst to disengage from the
communication once it is known to be a solicitor-client communication. This policy
then requires the destruction of the communication. Except for a small number
of calls in which Mr. Mahjoub’s wife acted as an agent, this policy was
followed.
[317]
The Federal Court found as a
fact that the Ministers had rebutted all of the presumed prejudice flowing from
the interception of solicitor-client communications, other than minimal
prejudice resulting from the interception of calls involving Mr. Mahjoub’s
family members who, on occasion, were conveying information as agents of his
solicitors. In its view, any prejudice resulting from this was “contained if not neutralized completely” by Mr.
Mahjoub’s hiring of new counsel in 2008, his adoption of a new legal strategy,
and the lack of advantage gained by the Ministers: 2013 FC 1095 at paras.
191-202.
[318]
The Federal Court neither
erred in law nor did it commit palpable and overriding error in reaching these factually
suffused conclusions. I reiterate that there was no evidence before the Federal
Court suggesting that any intercepted information was used, directly or
indirectly.
[319]
Mr. Mahjoub also submits
that the Federal Court erred in applying Atwal, above, to certain
intercepts during the pre-arrest period. But this submission fails because no
solicitor-client communications were intercepted during this period.
(ii)
Interceptions under the
Federal Court release order
[320]
Mr. Mahjoub was detained
after his arrest until June 2007. The Federal Court issued an order that set
out release terms: Order dated April 5, 2011 in file DES-7-08.
[321]
One of these terms allowed
for the interception of Mr. Mahjoub’s telephone communications. Roughly
eighteen months later a clarification was made: Order dated December 19, 2008
in file DES-7-08. Under that clarification, “the
analyst, upon identifying the communication as one between solicitor and
client, shall cease monitoring the communication and shall delete the
interception.”
[322]
Between the date of the
release order and the clarification order, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service believed that it could listen to all calls, including calls containing
solicitor and client communications, to determine whether there was information
that constituted a breach of conditions or a threat. The Federal Court found
that the analysts “honestly believed” that they
could do this. However, in compliance with the policy described above, all
copies of the solicitor-client communications were destroyed as soon as
possible. See 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 204-216.
[323]
While the clarification
order was in place, certain communications containing solicitor-client
discussions were inadvertently forwarded to the Canada Border Services Agency.
But the Federal Court found as a fact that no one listened to the
communications beyond the extent permitted by the clarification order: 2013 FC
1095 at paras. 224-226. As for calls properly forwarded to the Canada Border Services
Agency, the Federal Court found that analysts would listen to calls forwarded
by the Security Service only long enough to establish they were
solicitor-client communications and then would promptly disengage and lock the
communications in a safe.
[324]
As a result of policies in
place, no one other than a few personnel within the Security Service and the
Canada Border Services Agency accessed the communications. The Federal Court
found that the policies contained sufficient safeguards and were followed
throughout. Thus, in the view of the Federal Court, the presumption of
prejudice from the interception of solicitor-client calls was rebutted and
there was no prejudice to Mr. Mahjoub’s fair trial rights: 2013 FC 1095 at
paras. 217-220.
[325]
The Federal Court added that
there was no “specific evidence” that Mr.
Mahjoub had discussed any solicitor-client information with his counsel or
counsel’s staff in the period between the release order and the clarification
order: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 208. Had the Federal Court so found, its analysis
concerning the adherence to policies by the Security Service and the Canada
Border Services Agency would have sufficed to eliminate any prejudice.
[326]
Overall, given these facts, the
Federal Court did not find that this was the “clearest
of cases” warranting a stay.
[327]
On all these matters, the
Federal Court did not commit palpable and overriding error or an error in law
or of extricable principle.
(iii)
The allegation of bias
against the Federal Court arising from the breach of solicitor-client privilege
[328]
In the Federal Court, Mr.
Mahjoub submitted that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s breach of
solicitor-client privilege acting under warrants issued by the Federal Court
called into question the appearance of impartiality of the Court. The Court was
said to have been tainted as a result of its “failure
to adequately protect potential privileged solicitor client communications in
the authorized interception by failing to apply proper safeguards required by
law” which “breached the impartiality or
appearance of impartiality and created the impression of the court giving the
other side an advantage in hearing strategy and information”: Mr.
Mahjoub’s memorandum of fact and law at para. 60. Further, the impression was
created that “if [the Canadian Security Intelligence Service] continued its proceedings, it was for reasons derived
from the solicitor client interceptions that the court knew was happening,
which was a further disadvantage”: ibid.
[329]
The Federal Court rejected
this submission: 2013 FC 1092 at para. 481.
[330]
There is no reviewable error
here. The standard is the assessment of the informed, reasonable person viewing
the matter realistically and practically: Committee for Justice and Liberty
et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 68 D.L.R. (3d)
716. Against that standard, the mere fact that a court has issued a warrant to
allow security agencies or law enforcement to do certain things does not implicate
that court in the conduct of persons acting under that warrant and, thus,
render it biased and disqualified from proceeding further.
[331]
This point is so devoid of
merit that the words of this Court in Es-Sayyid v. Canada (Minister of
Public Security and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FCA 59, [2013] 4 F.C.R. 3
at paragraph 50 need to be repeated:
…[T]he Supreme Court has said that alleging bias is “a serious step
that should not be undertaken lightly”: [R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 193]. Given the harm caused to the administration of
justice when unsubstantiated allegations are made, and given the serious
shortcomings of the opinion tendered in this case, we cannot help but express
our deep disappointment.
(h)
The overall delay
[332]
In the Federal Court, Mr.
Mahjoub submitted that delays in the security certificate proceedings violated
his rights under sections 7 and 11(b) of the Charter and the obligation
of the Court to proceed informally and expeditiously under paragraph 83(1)(a)
of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.
[333]
The Federal Court considered
this issue in great depth. It considered the leading jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court on delay, including Morin, above, R. v. Godin, 2009
SCC 26, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 3 and Blencoe, above. It correctly identified
and applied the principles in these cases. Its decision is also supported by
other cases to similar effect. The Federal Court did not err in law or in
extricable legal principle.
[334]
In applying the law to the
evidence before it, the Federal Court did not commit palpable and overriding
error. It examined the period from the signing of the second security
certificate in February 2008 and the end of the reasonableness hearing in
January 2013. On the evidence, it found four periods of delay attributable to
the Ministers. The Federal Court found that any prejudice attributable to the
Ministers was largely mitigated during the course of the proceedings. For
example, the release of critical new disclosure coincided with the adjournment
when Mr. Mahjoub changed counsel.
[335]
In this Court, Mr. Mahjoub
submits that “all the delays in this case were created
or caused by the Ministers’ failure to meet their duty to disclose under
section 7 of the Charter”: Mr. Mahjoub’s memorandum of fact and law at
para. 72. This bald statement ignores the evidence in the case, painstakingly
reviewed and enumerated by the Federal Court in its 186 paragraph decision on
this point, to say nothing of the fact that it ignores the standard of palpable
and overriding error.
[336]
Mr. Mahjoub also submits
that in assessing delay, the Federal Court should have taken into account the Ministers’
decision to proceed from 2000-2007 under the first certificate under an
unconstitutional scheme and the inadequate disclosure during that time.
[337]
The Federal Court rejected
this argument on the basis that Mr. Mahjoub did not identify any specific
delays that could have affected the proceedings: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 258. There
is no palpable and overriding error in this finding. This being said, it is
worth observing that much of the activity under the first certificate inured to
the benefit of the proceedings under the second certificate and likely reduced
the time necessary for the issuance and assessment of the second certificate.
[338]
Overall, the Federal Court’s
rejection of Mr. Mahjoub’s allegations of unreasonable delay is based on a
correct understanding of law. The Federal Court did not commit palpable and
overriding error in applying the law to these facts.
[339]
In support of the Federal
Court’s finding that there are no legitimate grounds for complaint, much more
can be said. This was an exceptionally large and very challenging matter, rare
if not unique in Canadian legal history: the nature and volume of disclosure, the
word-by-word level of care needed to manage it because of the need to protect
national security while ensuring fairness to Mr. Mahjoub, the disruption caused
by the replacement of counsel on both sides, the deluge of issues, arguments
and evidence that rained down upon the Federal Court, the frequent relitigation
of issues or litigation of issues again but in modified form, the tens of
thousands of pages of legal submissions and evidence—sometimes difficult and
mind-numbing in their detail—and the constantly evolving law in this new,
relatively underdeveloped area. Looming throughout was the spectre of chaos and
error. This, the Federal Court, to its credit, avoided. In the end, the Federal
Court issued 53 orders, many supported by full reasons for order—to say nothing
of the seven complex and intricate reasons for judgment under direct review
here. All this supports the Federal Court’s finding that there was no
unreasonable delay.
(i)
The cumulative effect of the
foregoing: whether a permanent stay of proceedings should have been granted
[340]
Before the Federal Court,
Mr. Mahjoub sought a stay of the security certificate proceedings against him
based on the violations of his rights as outlined above and the overall alleged
abuse of process. He submits that the Federal Court misdirected itself on the
availability of a stay. Further, on these facts, the Federal Court should have
stayed the security certificate proceedings.
[341]
At the outset, Mr. Mahjoub
submits that the Federal Court never considered whether an abuse of process should
be granted because of the cumulative effect of instances of misconduct, errors
and other incidents, including instances of wrongful acquisition and wrongful
use of evidence, violations of solicitor-client privilege and violations of
Charter rights: see Mr. Mahjoub’s memorandum of fact and law at para. 26. The
Federal Court is said to have “ignored”
cumulative effects.
[342]
This submission is flatly
wrong, so wrong it should never have been advanced. The Federal Court discusses
this at paragraphs 494 and 506 to 510 of 2013 FC 1095. At paragraph 494 of 2013
FC 1095, the Federal Court referred to the “cumulative Charter rights violations and abuse of process.” The heading just before paragraph 496 of 2013
FC 1095 is: “Are the remedies
that have been afforded on an ongoing basis sufficient to address the
cumulative prejudice?” The
heading just before paragraph 506 of 2013 FC 1095 is: “Taking
into account all of the Charter violations and abuses holistically and
cumulatively, is this the clearest of cases in which no other remedy is
reasonably capable of removing that prejudice?” As well, the conclusion
in paragraph 510 of 2013 FC 1095 specifically speaks of the “cumulative effect[s].”
[343]
The Federal Court properly
instructed itself on the general principles governing the granting of a
permanent stay for an abuse of process: see the analysis at paras. 204-222,
above; see 2012 FC 669 at paras. 67-68, 76-79, 138-41 and 144 and 2013 FC 1095
at paras. 38-44 and 477-478.
[344]
Mr. Mahjoub submits that the
Federal Court improperly required the presence of mala fides before
granting a permanent stay. He points to 2013 FC 1095 at paragraphs 479 and 486.
I disagree. At paragraph 493, the Federal Court was discussing cases where mala
fides was present but it was not suggesting that mala fides is a
necessary precondition for a permanent stay. And at paragraph 500, the Federal
Court observed that there was no evidence that the interception of
solicitor-client communications was “committed in bad
faith, negligently or with intent to secure litigation advantage,” but
in no way was the Federal Court suggesting that mala fides is a
necessary precondition for a stay. As was mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
the Federal Court directed itself correctly on the law.
[345]
The Federal Court found that
the cumulative Charter rights violations and abuse of process it had identified
earlier in its reasons did not approach the level of severity found in the “very rare” cases—cases of egregious and intentional misconduct—mentioned
in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, 151 D.L.R. (4th)
119: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 492-494. Thus, this was “not one of those rare cases described in the jurisprudence
that calls for an immediate and permanent stay of proceedings without further
consideration”: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 43,
492 and 494.
[346]
The Federal Court then considered the cumulative
prejudice to the fairness of the proceedings. It found that this was not
significant because the remedies it had awarded or other circumstances had
alleviated or mitigated any prejudice: 2013 FC 1095 at paras. 496-505.
[347]
There was only one small exception to this, a
period of a few months’ delay that would have affected Mr. Mahjoub’s liberty
interest as a person in detention or subject to stringent conditions of
release: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 505. Given the “complex
case which required consideration of many novel issues,” the complexity
added by the involvement of “public and closed evidence
and proceedings,” a “multitude of counsel”,
“exhaustive constitutional and procedural challenges,”
“ongoing disclosure obligations,” and “periodic detention reviews,” the overall prejudice
must be seen as “relatively minor”: 2013 FC 1095
at paras. 506.
[348]
Although the overall
prejudice was “relatively
minor,” the Federal Court decided
to weigh the public interest in a decision on the merits against the public
interest in granting a stay: 2013 FC 1095 at para. 507.
[349]
In conducting this weighing,
the Federal Court (at paragraph 508 of 2013 FC 1095) cited this Court’s
observations in Al Yamani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCA 482, 314 N.R. 347 at paragraphs 38-39:
…Terrorist
organizations by their nature are unpredictable…an allegation that someone is a
former member of a terrorist organization therefore is a very serious one.
Therefore, the gravity of the allegations argues in favour of continuing the
proceedings.
…I acknowledge that some of the issues raised by the
appellant could, in some circumstances, support an abuse of process argument.
However, in the context of proceedings concerning an allegation there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant is or was a member of an
organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe is or was engaged in
terrorism, there is a compelling societal interest in obtaining a decision on
the merits.
[350]
Then the Federal Court
turned to the case before it (2013 FC 1095 at paras. 509-510):
The gravity of
the allegations against Mr. Mahjoub, that he was a leading member of terrorist
organizations and a danger to the security of Canada, weighs in favour of a
determination of the reasonableness of the security certificate on the merits
of the case. On the other hand, the above-discussed Charter violations and
abuses of the Court’s process by the Ministers have resulted in potential
unfairness to Mr. Mahjoub.
Balancing these two factors, I conclude that the importance
of the adjudication on the merits of these grave allegations that impact on the
security of all Canadian outweighs the procedural injustices to Mr. Mahjoub and
their cumulative effect caused by the Ministers. This is far from the clearest
of cases where justice demands a stay.
[351]
For these reasons, applying
the correct law to the facts before it, the Federal Court exercised its
discretion against staying the security certificate proceedings permanently.
[352] On all of this, Mr. Mahjoub has failed to demonstrate
any error of law or any palpable and overriding error. Far from it: on this
factual record, I would have made the same decision the Federal Court did. Indeed,
given the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning when a permanent stay of
proceedings should be granted, it does not seem to be available at all on this
evidentiary record.
E.
Conclusion
[353] The legislative regime concerning security certificates,
including the procedures for assessing the reasonableness of a security
certificate, is constitutional. It manifests a commitment to fundamental
fairness—a commitment worthy of a free and democratic society—to the person
named in the certificate, here, Mr. Mahjoub. Viewed alongside other fairness
features, such as state-funded counsel for Mr. Mahjoub throughout, these particular
security certificate proceedings can only be seen as fundamentally fair in
their execution. True, occasionally mistakes and faults happened and often
remedies were needed to redress them. But individually or collectively, there
is no factual and legal basis upon which the Federal Court could have
permanently stayed these proceedings. They properly ran their course to a final
decision on the merits.
[354] In its final decision on the merits (2013 FC 1092), the Federal
Court found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub is
inadmissible to Canada on two grounds: by being a danger to the security of
Canada (paragraph 34(1)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act) and by being a member of an organization that there are reasonable
grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in
espionage, subversion by force of a government or terrorism (paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act). In finding this, the Federal Court committed no
reviewable error.
[355]
As a result, under section
80 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the security
certificate continues to be “conclusive proof”
that Mr. Mahjoub is inadmissible to Canada and, in the words of section 80,
continues to be “a removal order that is in force
without it being necessary to hold or continue an examination or admissibility
hearing.”
F.
Disposition
[356]
For the foregoing reasons, I
would dismiss the appeals. In file A-478-14, I would answer the question the Federal
Court certified for this Court’s consideration as follows:
Question: Do Part
1, Division 4, Sections 33 and 34, and Part 1, Division 9 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, as well as sections 4, 6 and 7(3) of An Act to amend
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special advocate)
and to make a consequential amendment to another Act breach section 7 of
the Charter by denying the named person [here, Mr. Mahjoub] the right to a fair
hearing? If so, are the provisions justified under section 1?
Answer: Section 7 of the Charter is not
infringed. It is not necessary to answer the question regarding section 1 of
the Charter.
“David Stratas”
“I agree
Richard Boivin J.A.”
“I agree
Judith Woods J.A.”