SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Citation: Wakeling v. United States of America, 2014 SCC 72, [2014]
3 S.C.R. 549
|
Date: 20141114
Docket: 35072
|
Between:
Andrew
Gordon Wakeling
Appellant
and
Attorney
General of Canada on behalf of the United States of America and
Attorney
General of British Columbia
Respondents
And Between:
Andrew
Wakeling
Appellant
and
Attorney
General of Canada on behalf of the Minister of Justice
Respondent
- and -
Attorney
General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec, Canadian Civil Liberties
Association, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Information and
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario and Privacy Commissioner of Canada
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 82)
Concurring
Reasons:
(paras. 83 to 101)
Dissenting
Reasons:
(paras. 102 to 151)
|
Moldaver J. (LeBel and Rothstein JJ.
concurring)
McLachlin C.J.
Karakatsanis J. (Abella and Cromwell JJ.
concurring)
|
wakeling v.
united states of america, 2014 SCC
72, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 549
Andrew Gordon Wakeling Appellant
v.
Attorney General of Canada on behalf of
the United States of America and
Attorney General of British
Columbia Respondents
and
Andrew Wakeling Appellant
v.
Attorney General of Canada on
behalf of the Minister of Justice Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec,
Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association,
Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario and
Privacy Commissioner of Canada Interveners
Indexed as: Wakeling v. United States of America
2014 SCC 72
File No.: 35072.
2014: April 22; 2014: November 14.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver and Karakatsanis JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights —
Search and seizure — Fundamental justice — Interception of communications —
Exemption from offence of disclosing intercepted private communication without
consent — Provision of Criminal Code exempting disclosure of lawfully intercepted
private communication to person or authority with responsibility in a foreign
state for investigation or prosecution of offences if disclosure is intended to
be in the interests of the administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere —
Whether provision unjustifiably infringes s. 7 or 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 193(2) (e).
Criminal law —
Interception of communications — Disclosure of information — Exemption from
offence — Whether exemption provision which authorizes sharing of lawfully
obtained wiretap information between Canadian and foreign law enforcement
agencies is constitutional — Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 7 , 8
— Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 193(2) (e).
The
RCMP lawfully intercepted private communications between W and others that
revealed a plot to transport drugs into the United States of America. The
wiretap information was disclosed to U.S. authorities, who used it to seize a
large quantity of ecstasy pills at a border crossing. The U.S. requested W’s
extradition. At the extradition hearing, W submitted that legislation
authorizing the disclosure violates ss. 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms , and the intercepted communications should not be
admitted as evidence. The extradition judge rejected W’s arguments and issued a
committal order. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.
Held
(Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be
dismissed.
Per
LeBel, Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.: The ability to share information between law enforcement agencies
facilitates the effective investigation of domestic and multi-jurisdictional
crime. Part VI of the Criminal Code sets out a comprehensive scheme intended
by Parliament to exclusively govern the interception and use of private
communications for law enforcement purposes. Therefore,
there is no need to consider the
constitutionality of s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act. Section
193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code is the governing provision in this
case. Although not structured as an explicit authorizing provision, it
implicitly authorizes cross-border disclosure of lawfully intercepted wiretap
information. Accordingly, the arguments raised by W properly go to the
constitutionality of s. 193(2) (e).
Section 8 of the Charter is
engaged. Although a disclosure is not a search within the meaning of s. 8 , s. 8
protects wiretap targets at both the interception and disclosure stages under
Part VI of the Criminal Code . Wiretap interceptions are highly invasive and
pose heightened privacy concerns. There is a residual, albeit diminished,
expectation of privacy in wiretap information after it has been lawfully
collected. W’s s. 7 arguments need not be addressed. They are subsumed under the s. 8 analysis.
In order for a search to be
reasonable under s. 8 , it must be authorized by law, the law itself must be reasonable,
and the search must be carried out in a reasonable manner. This same framework
applies, mutatis mutandis, to disclosures made pursuant to s. 193(2) (e).
Applying this framework to the facts at hand, there is no violation of s. 8 . The disclosure in this case was lawfully authorized by s. 193(2) (e),
and the legislation, taken as a whole, is reasonable. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the manner of disclosure was unreasonable.
With respect to the first step of
the s. 8 framework, the disclosure in this case was authorized by law. A
disclosure will be authorized by law where it is carried out in accordance with
the procedural and substantive requirements the law provides. Section 193(2) (e)
requires that the recipient must be a person or authority with responsibility
in a foreign state for the investigation or prosecution of offences, and the
disclosure must be intended to be in the interests of the administration of
justice in Canada or elsewhere. The disclosure in this case was provided to
U.S. law enforcement authorities for the purpose of foiling a cross-border drug
smuggling operation. In making the disclosure, Canadian authorities intended to
advance the administration of justice in Canada and the United States.
Turning to the second step, s.
193(2) (e) is a reasonable law. First, it is not unconstitutionally
overbroad. It limits the type of information that may be disclosed, the purpose for which it may
be disclosed, and the persons to whom it may be disclosed. Second, it is not
unconstitutionally vague. While “the administration of
justice” as used in s. 193(2) (e) is a broad concept, it is not one that
so lacks in precision as to give insufficient guidance for legal debate. In
this context, the phrase “the administration of justice” means that the
disclosure must be for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
Third, s. 193(2)(e) is not
unconstitutional for lack of accountability or transparency mechanisms. Part VI of the Criminal
Code contains numerous privacy safeguards. The judicial authorization relating to the
initial interception requires privacy interests to be balanced with the
interests of law enforcement. The interception of communications is also
subject to notice and reporting requirements. Additionally, accountability has
been built into the disclosure scheme itself. A disclosure that fails to comply
with s. 193(2) (e) can lead to criminal charges against the disclosing
party or result in the exclusion of improperly disclosed evidence at a
subsequent proceeding. This provides a powerful incentive for Canadian
authorities to comply with s. 193(2) (e). Finally, although not
constitutionally mandated in every case, adherence to international protocols
and the use of caveats or information-sharing agreements may be relevant in
determining whether a disclosure was intended to advance the administration of
justice, and therefore was authorized by s. 193(2) (e).
As
regards the third step of the s. 8 framework, the use of protocols, caveats, or
agreements may also be relevant to assessing whether the disclosure was carried
out in a reasonable manner. The
disclosure in this case was carried out in a reasonable manner. Nothing
suggests that the police acted unreasonably. However,
in different factual contexts, there may be significant potential dangers posed
by the disclosure of intercepted communications to foreign authorities. Where a disclosing party knows or should
have known that the information could be used in unfair trials, to facilitate
discrimination or political intimidation, or to commit torture or other human
rights violations, s. 8 requires that the disclosure, if permissible at all, be
carried out in a reasonable manner. In the most serious cases, s. 8 will forbid
disclosure. In other cases, information-sharing protocols or caveats may
sufficiently mitigate the risks.
Per
McLachlin C.J.: The only issue on this appeal is whether the disclosure of the
intercepted communications violated s. 8 of the Charter , and, if so,
whether the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) . It is not
necessary to consider the constitutionality of s. 193(2)(e), s. 193(2)(b)
or the Privacy Act to answer that question. W has not shown an
infringement of his s. 8 rights. The individual whose communications are
lawfully intercepted under a valid and reasonably executed warrant cannot
complain that use of the information for law enforcement breaches his right to
privacy. This principle is not confined to the use of information in Canada.
Sharing the information for purposes of law enforcement does not violate s. 8 . Sections
7 and 8 of the Charter protect against unreasonable uses of lawfully
intercepted information but in this case, where the information was disclosed
to U.S. authorities for law enforcement purposes, these residual concerns about
unreasonable use do not arise. W’s rights were not violated.
Section
193(2)(e) does not change this. It is not an authorizing
provision. It does not confer a power on Canadian authorities to share
information with foreign counterparts. The provision operates by exempting
officers from prosecution where they disclosed intercepted communications under
their common law powers. Section 193(1) of the Criminal Code makes it an
offence to disclose intercepted private communications without consent. Section
193(2)(e) is an exemption from that offence. It preserves the common law
power of law enforcement authorities to share lawfully obtained information for
purposes of law enforcement both domestically and abroad. The exception
prevents law enforcement officers from being convicted for using information
obtained under warrant for purposes of law enforcement. It is therefore
unnecessary to opine on the constitutionality of s. 193(2)(e).
Per
Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. (dissenting): Section 193(2)(e)
violates s. 8 of the Charter in a manner that is not justified under s. 1 .
It permits disclosure of wiretapped information to foreign officials
without safeguards or restrictions on how the information may be used and
without accountability measures for this broad state power. Nothing restrains
foreign law enforcement officials from using this highly personal information
in unfair trials or in ways that violate human rights norms, from publicly
disseminating the information, or from sharing it with other states. The torture of Maher Arar in Syria provides a chilling example of
the dangers of unconditional information sharing. Section 8 requires that when
a law authorizes intrusions on privacy, it must do so in a reasonable manner. A
reasonable law must have adequate safeguards to prevent abuse. It must avoid intruding
farther than necessary. It must strike an appropriate balance between privacy
and other public interests. Section 193(2)(e) falls short on all three
counts. The permitted disclosure to foreign officials without safeguards
renders the Part VI wiretap regime of the Criminal Code unconstitutional.
The appropriate remedy is to strike the words “or to a person or authority with
responsibility in a foreign state” from s. 193(2)(e). It is unnecessary
to consider the constitutionality of s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act
or arguments with respect to s. 7 of the Charter .
Balancing
the state’s interest in a search and the public interest in protecting privacy
involves asking what level of privacy protection we are entitled to expect.
International cooperation and information sharing are essential to law
enforcement. Canadian interests are served by appropriate information sharing
with other jurisdictions. Timely disclosure will often be critical in the
investigation of serious transnational crimes. However, when information is
shared across jurisdictional lines, safeguards that apply in domestic investigations
lose their force. Section 193(2)(e) does nothing to prevent the use of
disclosed information in proceedings which fail to respect due process and
human rights. The requirement of prior judicial authorization does not provide
sufficient protection against inappropriate future use. The failure to require
caveats on the use of disclosed information is unreasonable. Caveats or
standing agreements would not undermine the objectives of the wiretap scheme. They
are commonplace in international law enforcement cooperation and provide some
assurance that disclosed information will only be used in accordance with
respect for due process and human rights.
For
a law to provide reasonable authority for a search or seizure, it must include
some mechanism to permit oversight of state use of the power. Accountability
mechanisms deter and identify inappropriate intrusions on privacy. None of the
safeguards in Part VI apply to disclosure to foreign officials. Improper or
hazardous information sharing is unlikely to come to light without record-keeping,
reporting or notice obligations. It is for Parliament to decide what measures
are most appropriate, but, at a minimum, the disclosing party should be
required to create a written record and to make the sharing known to the target
or to government.
The
infringement of s. 8 of the Charter is not justified under s. 1 . The
objective of international cooperation in law enforcement is pressing and substantial, and disclosure of wiretap information is
rationally connected to that objective. However, s. 193(2)(e) as it is
presently drafted interferes with privacy to a greater extent than necessary. The
inclusion of accountability mechanisms and limits on subsequent use would cure
the constitutional deficiencies without undermining Parliament’s goals.
Cases Cited
By Moldaver J.
Distinguished:
R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R.
531; referred to: British
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473;
R. v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; Imperial Oil v. Jacques, 2014
SCC 66, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 287; R. v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51; R.
v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606; R. v. Samson
(1982), 37 O.R. (2d) 237; R. v. Finlay (1985), 52 O.R. (2d) 632.
By McLachlin C.J.
Referred
to: R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20; R. v. Law, 2002 SCC
10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227; R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34; Imperial
Oil v. Jacques, 2014 SCC 66, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 287.
By Karakatsanis J. (dissenting)
R.
v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30; R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554; R.
v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531; R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC
46, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 390; United States of America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1469; R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292; R. v.
Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281; R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 432; Brown v. The Queen, 2013 FCA 111, 2013 D.T.C. 5094; R. v. Mills,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668; R. v.
McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, [2009]
1 S.C.R. 66; R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20; Lavallee, Rackel
& Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209;
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Thompson,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Schachter v.
Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679; R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96; Corbiere v.
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act to amend the Criminal Code , the Crown Liability and Proceedings
Act and the Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
ss. 1 , 7 , 8 , 24 .
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , Part
VI, ss. 183, 184.1, 184.2, 184.4, 185, 186, 193, 195, 196, 487.01(5).
Municipal
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56,
s. 8(1).
Privacy
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, s. 8 .
Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Tse Act, S.C. 2013, c. 8 .
Authors Cited
Austin,
Lisa M. “Information Sharing and the ‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of Section 8 of
the Charter ” (2007), 57 U.T.L.J. 499.
Canada. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar. Report of the Events Relating to Maher
Arar: Analysis and Recommendations. Ottawa: Public Works and Government
Services, 2006.
Franklin, Ben A. “Wiretaps reveal Dr. King feared rebuff on nonviolence”,
The New York Times, September 15, 1985.
Roach, Kent. “Overseeing Information Sharing”, in Hans Born and
Aidan Wills, eds., Overseeing Intelligence Services: A Toolkit. Geneva:
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2012, 129.
Sanchez, Julian. “Wiretapping’s true danger”, Los Angeles Times,
March 16, 2008.
United Kingdom. Intelligence and Security Committee. Rendition.
London: The Committee, 2007.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal (Low, Groberman and
MacKenzie JJ.A.), 2012 BCCA 397, 328 B.C.A.C. 174, 558 W.A.C. 174, 293 C.C.C.
(3d) 196, 267 C.R.R. (2d) 279, [2012] B.C.J. No. 2057 (QL), 2012 CarswellBC
3067, affirming a decision of Ross J., 2011 BCSC 165, 268 C.C.C. (3d) 295, 228
C.R.R. (2d) 239, [2011] B.C.J. No. 212 (QL), 2011 CarswellBC 1468. Appeal dismissed,
Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting.
Gregory P. Delbigio,
Q.C., for the appellant.
W. Paul Riley and Jeffrey
G. Johnston, for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada on behalf of
the United States of America and on behalf of the Minister of Justice.
M. Joyce DeWitt-Van Oosten, Q.C., for the respondent the Attorney General of British
Columbia.
Joan Barrett, for
the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.
Jean-Vincent Lacroix,
Dominique A. Jobin and Émilie-Annick Landry-Therriault, for the
intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Peter M. Rogers,
Q.C., and Jane O’Neill, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association.
Michael A. Feder and
Emily MacKinnon, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association.
David Goodis and Stephen
McCammon, for the intervener the Information and Privacy Commissioner of
Ontario.
Mahmud Jamal, Patricia
Kosseim and Jennifer Seligy, for the intervener the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada.
The judgment of LeBel,
Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. was delivered by
Moldaver J. —
I.
Introduction
[1]
The ability to share information between law
enforcement agencies, including lawfully intercepted wiretap information,
facilitates the effective investigation of both domestic and
multi-jurisdictional crime. But the effective investigation of crime must
proceed in accordance with the rights guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms . The main issue in this appeal is whether federal
legislation which authorizes the sharing of lawfully obtained wiretap
information between Canadian and foreign law enforcement agencies is
constitutional — specifically, whether the legislation falls short of the
constitutional standards mandated by the Charter .
II.
Background
[2]
Andrew Gordon Wakeling was the subject of a
Canadian drug investigation. Over the course of the investigation, the RCMP
lawfully monitored and recorded communications between Mr. Wakeling and others.
These communications revealed a plot to transport drugs across the Canada-U.S.
border. Canadian authorities provided this information to U.S. authorities (the
“Impugned Disclosure”), who used it to intercept and seize 46,000 ecstasy pills
at the International Falls, Minnesota border crossing on April 5, 2006.
[3]
The U.S. sought Mr. Wakeling’s extradition from
Canada for his involvement in the ecstasy shipment. At the extradition hearing,
Mr. Wakeling submitted that the legislation authorizing the Impugned Disclosure
was unconstitutional. Specifically, he argued that the provisions breach ss. 7
and 8 of the Charter , and that the wiretap information provided to U.S.
law enforcement authorities should therefore not be admitted as evidence
against him.
[4]
The extradition judge, Ross J., rejected Mr.
Wakeling’s arguments and issued a committal order. That order was upheld by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal. Before this Court, Mr. Wakeling requests that
the committal order be quashed and that a new extradition hearing be held.
[5]
For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss Mr.
Wakeling’s appeal.
III.
Statutory Provisions
[6]
Section 193 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46 , states:
193.
(1) Where a private communication has been intercepted
by means of an electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical or other device without
the consent, express or implied, of the originator thereof or of the person
intended by the originator thereof to receive it, every one who, without the
express consent of the originator thereof or of the person intended by the
originator thereof to receive it, wilfully
(a)
uses or discloses the private communication or any part thereof or the
substance, meaning or purport thereof or of any part thereof, or
(b)
discloses the existence thereof,
is guilty of an indictable
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
(2)
Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who discloses a private communication
or any part thereof or the substance, meaning or purport thereof or of any part
thereof or who discloses the existence of a private communication
. . .
(b)
in the course of or for the purpose of any criminal investigation if the
private communication was lawfully intercepted;
. . .
(e) where disclosure is
made to a peace officer or prosecutor in Canada or to a person or authority
with responsibility in a foreign state for the investigation or prosecution of
offences and is intended to be in the interests of the administration of
justice in Canada or elsewhere; or
. . .
[7]
Section 8 of the Privacy Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. P-21 , states:
8. (1) Personal information under the control of a government
institution shall not, without the consent of the individual to whom it
relates, be disclosed by the institution except in accordance with this
section.
(2)
Subject to any other Act of Parliament, personal information under the control
of a government institution may be disclosed
. . .
(b) for any
purpose in accordance with any Act of Parliament or any regulation made
thereunder that authorizes its disclosure;
. . .
(f)
under an agreement or arrangement between the Government of Canada or an
institution thereof and the government of a province, the council of the
Westbank First Nation, the council of a participating First Nation — as defined
in subsection 2(1) of the First Nations Jurisdiction over Education in
British Columbia Act — , the government of a foreign state, an
international organization of states or an international organization
established by the governments of states, or any institution of any such
government or organization, for the purpose of administering or enforcing any
law or carrying out a lawful investigation;
. . .
[8]
Finally, ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter
state:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or
seizure.
IV.
Judicial History
A.
Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2011 BCSC
165, 268 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ross J.)
[9]
At his extradition hearing, Mr. Wakeling
restricted his constitutional challenge to s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal
Code and s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act . He made a variety
of broad and sweeping submissions in support of his contention that the
impugned provisions do not pass constitutional muster.
[10]
Mr. Wakeling submitted that transparency,
accountability and the rule of law are principles of fundamental justice under
s. 7 of the Charter and that the provisions in question are
unconstitutional because the disclosure they authorize does not comply with
these principles (trial judgment, at para. 42). He also argued that both
provisions breach s. 7 of the Charter because they are vague and overbroad.
With respect to s. 193(2) (e), he submitted that it “provides virtually
unlimited discretion to law enforcement” to disclose wiretap communications and
he criticized the subjective nature of the test it employs (ibid., at
para. 99). He further submitted that the phrase “the interests of the
administration of justice . . . elsewhere” is “incapable of framing
legal debate within Canada” and that it does not have a “constant and settled
meaning” (ibid.). In his view, the effect of these uncertainties is that
decision-makers are given “unrestricted latitude . . . to disclose
intercepted private communications or the substance of the communications, and
to be exempt from the application of the offence provisions of Part VI” (ibid.).
[11]
With respect to s. 8 of the Charter , Mr.
Wakeling submitted that the Impugned Disclosure re-engaged s. 8 such that a second
judicial authorization was needed before the disclosure could occur. In this
regard, he submitted that his privacy interests at the disclosure stage were
the same as those he enjoyed at the interception stage and deserved the same
protection (trial judgment, at para. 68). Hence, he argued that a second
judicial authorization should be required prior to disclosure, and that the
provisions in question are unreasonable because they do not provide for this.
He also submitted that the provisions are unreasonable because they do not
contain sufficient accountability mechanisms such as a police record-keeping
requirement, a requirement to report to Parliament about the disclosures, or an
obligation to provide notice of the disclosure to the person whose
communications were intercepted. Finally, he took issue with the fact that
Canadian authorities have little control over the subsequent use of the
disclosed information (para. 116).
[12]
The extradition judge considered and rejected
all of Mr. Wakeling’s arguments. In her view, the constitutionality of s. 8(2) (f)
of the Privacy Act did not need to be considered because s. 193(2) (e)
of the Criminal Code “expressly governs disclosure of private
communications intercepted under Part VI of the Criminal Code to foreign
law enforcement authorities” and “[t]he more general information sharing rules
in the Privacy Act are subject to the specific provisions of [the Criminal
Code ]” (para. 21).
[13]
Turning to Mr. Wakeling’s constitutional
arguments, the extradition judge concluded that the Impugned Disclosure did not
re-engage s. 8 of the Charter , as the Impugned Disclosure was “not
conduct that interferes with a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
circumstances” (para. 75). Thus, the disclosure did not amount to “a search or
seizure that engages s. 8 of the Charter ” (ibid.). In the
alternative, she reasoned that if the Impugned Disclosure engaged s. 8,
s. 193(2)(e) is a reasonable law.
[14]
The extradition judge also rejected Mr.
Wakeling’s submission that transparency and accountability are principles of
fundamental justice that apply to s. 193(2) (e). In her view, “[e]ven if
these concepts could be characterized as principles of fundamental justice in
some contexts, they could not realistically be applied to the manner in which
police investigate criminal activity” (para. 48).
[15]
The extradition judge similarly rejected Mr.
Wakeling’s submission that s. 193(2) (e) is vague and overbroad, noting
that
in making
the arguments on vagueness and overbreadth that he does, the applicant demands
a level of drafting precision from Parliament that is neither constitutionally
mandated, nor realistic. By necessity, the wording of s. 193(2) (e) had to be
kept fairly broad to capture the myriad of ways in which a need to disclose “in
the interests of the administration of justice” might arise. The law must
retain flexibility since laws must of necessity govern a variety of different circumstances
and situations. [para. 108]
[16]
Lastly, the extradition judge rejected Mr.
Wakeling’s rule of law argument. Relying on this Court’s decision in British
Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, she found Mr. Wakeling’s submissions to be “circular,
since the measures are themselves embodied in the law” (para. 53).
[17]
Having rejected Mr. Wakeling’s legal arguments,
the extradition judge considered the evidence and found that it was sufficient
to warrant his committal.
B.
British Columbia Court of Appeal, 2012 BCCA 397,
328 B.C.A.C. 174 (Low, Groberman and MacKenzie JJ.A.)
[18]
On appeal, Mr. Wakeling reiterated his challenge
to the constitutionality of s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code and
s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act . The B.C. Court of Appeal, per
Low J.A., agreed with the extradition judge that s. 193(2) (e) was the
governing provision for the specific disclosure at issue. Hence, the court
found it unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of s. 8(2) (f) of
the Privacy Act .
[19]
In addressing Mr. Wakeling’s s. 8 claim, Low
J.A. concluded that the state conduct did not interfere with any reasonable
privacy expectation to which Mr. Wakeling could lay claim. The court thus
rejected Mr. Wakeling’s s. 8 argument. As the Impugned Disclosure did not
re-engage s. 8 of the Charter , no second judicial authorization was
needed.
[20]
Low J.A. similarly concluded that Mr. Wakeling’s
fundamental justice submissions pertaining to transparency and accountability
were without merit:
The impugned provision does not have to
be transparent by requiring prior notice and there is no need for a reporting
requirement of some sort after the fact. The information gathered by lawful
electronic interception becomes law enforcement intelligence. In my opinion,
it is no different than information obtained from a police informer or
information contained in documents that lawfully come into the hands of the
police. If disclosure is in the interests of the administration of justice,
there is no need for prior judicial approval or for notice or for reporting. Such
requirements would formalize and hamper the inter-jurisdictional investigation
of crime and sometimes the prevention of crime. Control of the use of
lawfully-gathered police intelligence by foreign authorities is not practical
and would be presumptuous. What is practical and necessary for both crime
detection and crime prevention is the ability of police officers to lawfully
inform their counterparts in other jurisdictions about impending criminal
activity, as occurred in the present case, or past criminal activity. [para.
43]
[21]
Finally, the court rejected Mr. Wakeling’s
vagueness and overbreadth arguments, noting that “[t]he administration of
justice is a concept that is well understood and needs no clarification or
narrowing” (para. 44). In the result, the court dismissed the appeal.
C.
Issues
[22]
On appeal to this Court, Mr. Wakeling renews his
constitutional attack on s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code and s.
8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act , relying on the same arguments he made
below. He also raises for the first time, with leave of the Court, the
constitutionality of s. 193(2)(b) of the Code. He maintains that
all of these provisions infringe his rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter ,
and that the infringements are not justified under s. 1 .
V.
Analysis
[23]
I propose initially to explain why this appeal
turns on the constitutionality of s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code
and not s. 193(2)(b) of the Code or s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy
Act . I will then address Mr. Wakeling’s Charter arguments as they
relate to s. 193(2) (e).
A.
The Privacy Act Does Not Apply
[24]
The Privacy Commissioner of Canada, an
intervener, submits that contrary to the lower court decisions, the RCMP must
comply with both the Criminal Code and the Privacy Act
when disclosing intercepted private communications to a foreign state, as
“[n]othing in the Criminal Code relieves the RCMP from their duty to
comply with the Privacy Act ” (factum, at para. 13). According to the
Privacy Commissioner, s. 193(2)(e) of the Criminal Code “limits
the breadth of the criminal prohibition” set out in s. 193 , “[b]ut this
exemption neither authorizes a disclosure under the Privacy Act nor is
itself a source of police power” (para. 14).
[25]
With respect, I do not agree. The federal Privacy
Act is a statute of general application. Section 8(2) of the Act sets
out the circumstances in which personal information under the control of a
government institution may be disclosed. That section explicitly states that it
is “[s]ubject to any other Act of Parliament”. Therefore, prior to considering
the disclosure contemplated by s. 8(2) , it must first be determined whether
another Act of Parliament addresses the particular disclosure in issue. In this
case, the Impugned Disclosure (involving lawfully intercepted private
communications) is specifically addressed by another Act of Parliament —
the Criminal Code .
[26]
Part VI of the Criminal Code represents a
comprehensive scheme dealing with the interception of private communications.
The individual right to privacy stands in tension with our collective need for
effective law enforcement, and the safeguards layered into the wiretap
provisions show Parliament’s efforts to “reconcile these competing interests” (R.
v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at p. 45). As noted by the extradition
judge,
Part VI . . . creates a
specific regime for the protection of privacy interests in relation to
intercepted communications by creating specific offences, setting out
procedures for authorized interception of private communications in the
investigation of specific crimes, and delineating the circumstances under which
intercepted communications may be disclosed. [para. 22]
This level of detail and
specificity in Part VI indicates that Parliament intended this framework to be
the exclusive regime governing the interception and use of private
communications for law enforcement purposes.
[27]
Section 193(2)(e) deals directly with the
issue at hand — namely, the cross-border disclosure of wiretap information.
Admittedly, s. 193(2) is not structured as an explicit authorizing provision.
Rather, it takes the form of a series of exemptions to the criminal offence
identified in s. 193(1) . Nonetheless, I am satisfied that it represents
Parliament’s attempt to regulate the disclosure of intercepted communications
and specify the circumstances in which such disclosures may lawfully be made.
Succinctly put, s. 193(2)(e) implicitly authorizes the disclosure of
wiretap information in accordance with the conditions prescribed therein.
[28]
For these reasons, s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal
Code , and not s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act , is the
governing provision in this case. Accordingly, I need not consider the
constitutionality of s. 8(2) (f).
[29]
In concluding that s. 193(2) (e) is an
authorizing provision, I do not quarrel with the Chief Justice that, in
general, the police may look to the common law for authority to use the fruits
of a lawful search for legitimate law enforcement purposes, including
disclosures to foreign law enforcement agencies. However, adopting this
analysis in the wiretap context poses a problem. Finding that s. 193(2) (e)
is not an authorizing provision, but merely an exception to a criminal
offence, implies that none of the subparts of s. 193(2) are authorizing
provisions, and that authorization for all of the listed disclosures must come
from some other source. This, however, does not accord with the Court’s recent
decision in Imperial Oil v. Jacques, 2014 SCC 66, [2014] 3 S.C.R.
287, in which the majority held that the exemptions in s. 193(2) “give a person the right to disclose recordings that otherwise could
not be disclosed” (para. 43). Therefore, in my view, s. 193(2) (e)
is properly read as an authorizing provision.
B.
Section 193(2) (b) Need Not Be Considered
[30]
As noted, Mr. Wakeling was granted leave to
challenge the constitutionality of s. 193(2) (b) of the Criminal Code
before this Court. In contrast to s. 193(2) (e), which addresses the cross-border
disclosure of wiretap communications, s. 193(2) (b) authorizes the
disclosure of wiretap communications “in the course of or for the purpose of
any criminal investigation”.
[31]
Mr. Wakeling made only cursory mention of s.
193(2) (b) in argument. As his complaint is specific to the issue of
international, cross-border sharing of wiretap information for criminal law
purposes, it is properly considered under s. 193(2) (e). For that reason
— and the fact that Mr. Wakeling did not press s. 193(2) (b) in written
or oral argument — I see no need to address its constitutionality.
C.
Does the Impugned Disclosure Violate Section 8
of the Charter ?
(1)
Is Section 8 Engaged?
[32]
Section 8 is typically invoked where police
perform a search or seizure and thereby infringe upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. It is quite evident that the interception of
wiretap communications constitutes a search. However, the disclosure of
previously intercepted communications — which is what s. 193(2) (e)
implicitly authorizes — is not, in my view, a “search” within the meaning of s.
8. Therefore, as a preliminary matter, it is important to clarify precisely how
s. 8 is engaged in the present case. I now turn to that issue.
[33]
Mr. Wakeling submits that s. 8 is engaged
because the disclosure of his intercepted communications pursuant to s. 193(2) (e)
amounted to a second search, such that a second judicial authorization was
necessary prior to the Impugned Disclosure. Absent such authorization, he
argues that the police violated his s. 8 rights.
[34]
With respect, I disagree. As the intervener the
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (“BCCLA”) observes, the plain
meaning of “search” does not include the disclosure of information by the
state. A disclosure is simply the communication to a third party of previously
acquired information.
[35]
In sum, there was only one search that engaged
s. 8 of the Charter on the facts of this case — the original lawful
interception of Mr. Wakeling’s private communications. For this reason, to
invoke s. 8 , the appellant must rely on some other analytical approach.
[36]
The BCCLA frames the s. 8 analysis in a
different way. It submits that to the extent s. 193(2) (e) permits
disclosure of the fruits of a search, it forms “part of the context in which
courts must assess the reasonableness of the law authorizing the search”
(factum, at para. 3).
[37]
This submission warrants brief elaboration.
According to the BCCLA, s. 193(2)(e) is an integral part of a search
regime for wiretap interceptions set out in Part VI of the Criminal Code .
Like all laws authorizing searches, that regime — including any integral part
of that regime — must be reasonable in order to comply with s. 8 of the Charter .
Therefore, if s. 193(2) (e) is held to be unreasonable, this would taint
the overall regime for s. 8 purposes and render it unconstitutional.
[38]
While I see some merit in the analytical
approach proposed by the BCCLA, my conclusion that s. 8 protects targets at
both the interception and disclosure stages under Part VI is more a
function of the special dangers associated with wiretaps. Parliament has
recognized that wiretaps pose heightened privacy concerns beyond those inherent
in other searches and seizures. Justice Karakatsanis describes (at para. 116)
the serious privacy implications of electronic surveillance, citing this
Court’s caution that “one can scarcely imagine a state activity more dangerous
to individual privacy” (Duarte, at p. 43). Given these implications, the
protections that Parliament has seen fit to fold into the wiretap regime
include s. 193 which provides that, other than for one of the delineated
purposes, the disclosure of wiretap information is not only unauthorized, it is
criminal.
[39]
The highly intrusive nature of electronic
surveillance and the statutory limits on the disclosure of its fruits suggest a
heightened reasonable expectation of privacy in the wiretap context. Once a
lawful interception has taken place and the intercepted communications are in
the possession of law enforcement, that expectation is diminished but not extinguished.
This heightened and continuing expectation of privacy in the wiretap context is
further indication that s. 8 ought to apply to disclosures under Part VI.
[40]
In sum, while I acknowledge the Chief Justice’s
concern that s. 193(2)(e) does not engage s. 8 simply by virtue of its
integral place in the search regime of Part VI, that is not the sole
reason — or indeed the main one — why I conclude that s. 8 is engaged in this
context. As I have emphasized, Parliament has recognized that wiretap
interceptions are an exceptional and invasive form of search, and it is
therefore perfectly appropriate, in my view, that s. 8 protections should
extend to wiretap disclosures by law enforcement. Furthermore, there is a
residual and continuing expectation of privacy in wiretap information that
persists even after it has been lawfully collected. Indeed, the Chief
Justice agrees that “residual privacy interests” remain at the time of
disclosure and that s. 8 protects against unreasonable uses of the information
by law enforcement (para. 95). I am therefore satisfied that s. 8 is properly
engaged.
(2)
The Analytical Framework Under Section 8 of the Charter
[41]
In order for a search to be reasonable under s.
8 of the Charter , “[it] must be authorized by law, the law itself must
be reasonable, and the search must be carried out in a reasonable manner” (R.
v. Caslake, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at para. 10; see also R. v.
Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278). I reiterate that a disclosure is
not, standing alone, a “search” within the meaning of the Charter .
However, for the reasons outlined above, s. 8 is engaged. Therefore, in my
view, the s. 8 framework applies, mutatis mutandis, to disclosures made
by law enforcement pursuant to s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code .
[42]
Following the approach outlined above, I will
address each step of the s. 8 framework independently: (1) whether the Impugned
Disclosure was authorized by law; (2) whether the law authorizing the Impugned
Disclosure is reasonable; and (3) whether the Impugned Disclosure was carried
out in a reasonable manner.
(3)
Was the Impugned Disclosure Authorized by Law?
[43]
For ease of reference, I repeat s. 193(2) (e):
(2)
Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who discloses a private communication
or any part thereof or the substance, meaning or purport thereof or of any part
thereof or who discloses the existence of a private communication
. . .
(e)
where disclosure is made to a peace officer or prosecutor in Canada or to a
person or authority with responsibility in a foreign state for the
investigation or prosecution of offences and is intended to be in the interests
of the administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere . . .
[44]
A disclosure will be authorized by law where it
is “carried out in accordance with the procedural and substantive requirements
the law provides” (Caslake, at para. 12). Section 193(2) (e)
imposes two essential requirements. First, with respect to cross-border
disclosures, the recipient must be “a person or authority with responsibility
in a foreign state for the investigation or prosecution of offences”. Second,
the disclosure must be “intended to be in the interests of the administration
of justice in Canada or elsewhere”.
[45]
Under the second requirement, the relevant
intention is that of the disclosing party. For the disclosure to be authorized
by law, that party must subjectively believe that the disclosure will advance
the interests of the administration of justice in Canada and/or the foreign
state. The belief must be honestly and genuinely held. The credibility of the
disclosing party’s expressed intent can be tested against objective facts.
[46]
The disclosure in this case was authorized by
law. No one contends otherwise. The intercepted communications were provided to
U.S. authorities for the purpose of foiling a cross-border drug smuggling
operation. When Canadian authorities shared information about the operation
with their American counterparts, they intended to advance the administration
of justice in Canada and the United States. The requirements under s. 193(2) (e)
were therefore satisfied.
(4)
Is Section 193(2)(e) a Reasonable Law?
[47]
The parties’ submissions focus on the second
step of the s. 8 framework, that is the reasonableness of s. 193(2)(e).
They argue, and Justice Karakatsanis agrees, that this provision is
constitutionally deficient. I do not share that view. As I will explain, s.
193(2)(e) is a reasonable law.
(a)
Overview of the Parties’ Charter Challenges
[48]
Mr. Wakeling and the BCCLA raise a host of Charter
arguments challenging the constitutionality of s. 193(2) (e). For the
sake of clarity, these arguments can be broken down into three distinct (though
somewhat overlapping) categories: (1) s. 193(2) (e) is unconstitutionally
overbroad; (2) s. 193(2) (e) is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) s. 193(2) (e)
is unconstitutional because it lacks accountability mechanisms. Viewed
individually and collectively, these arguments challenge the reasonableness of
the law authorizing the Impugned Disclosure. As such, they are properly
considered under the second step of the s. 8 framework.
(i)
Overbreadth
[49]
The BCCLA’s main line of attack on s. 193(2)(e)
is that it creates an almost “limitless” scope for disclosure of private
intercepted communications. In failing to place reasonable, or indeed any
limits on disclosure, the provision effectively grants police untrammeled
discretion and is ripe for abuse by both domestic and foreign authorities. This
argument strikes me as very similar to Mr. Wakeling’s submission that s.
193(2)(e) is unconstitutionally overbroad and thus contravenes the
principles of fundamental justice in violation of s. 7 of the Charter . I
am of the view that both of these arguments can be dealt with together under
the reasonableness framework of s. 8 . To put it simply, a law that suffers from
overbreadth will necessarily be unreasonable.
(ii)
Vagueness
[50]
Mr. Wakeling argues that the language of s.
193(2)(e) is so vague as to be unworkable. He makes this argument under
s. 7 of the Charter , asserting that the phrase “in the interests of the
administration of justice” does not have a constant and settled meaning. Like
the argument on overbreadth, I believe that this argument can be disposed of
under s. 8 . A provision that is unconstitutionally vague will necessarily be
unreasonable.
(iii)
Accountability Mechanisms
[51]
Mr. Wakeling and the BCCLA submit that s.
193(2)(e) is unconstitutional since it is devoid of mechanisms to hold
authorities accountable for their disclosures of intercepted communications. In
particular, they are concerned that the provision lacks sufficient safeguards,
including judicial pre-authorization, notice and record-keeping requirements,
Parliamentary reporting, as well as international protocols and caveats
limiting the use of disclosed information.
[52]
Mr. Wakeling’s accountability argument goes
somewhat further than that of the BCCLA. He claims that accountability — and
the related value of transparency — are principles of fundamental justice under
s. 7 . I find it unnecessary to finally decide that issue. The accountability
concerns identified by Mr. Wakeling and the BCCLA are best dealt with under s.
8. As this Court’s decision in R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012]
1 S.C.R. 531, notes, accountability forms part of the reasonableness analysis
under s. 8.
[53]
Having outlined the three categories of
objections to s. 193(2)(e), I will now address each of them in greater
depth.
(b)
Is the Scope of Disclosure Authorized by Section
193(2)(e) Unconstitutionally Overbroad?
[54]
Both Mr. Wakeling and the BCCLA take issue with
the extent of disclosure that s. 193(2)(e) authorizes for substantially
similar reasons. Both submit that s. 193(2)(e) permits “near-limitless
disclosure of private communications intercepted by wiretap” (BCCLA factum, at
para. 3; see also A.F., at paras. 129-30).
[55]
With respect, I believe that Mr. Wakeling and
the BCCLA overstate the nature and extent of the disclosure contemplated by s.
193(2)(e). A law may be broad without suffering from overbreadth. While
the provision authorizes a wide scope of disclosure, it does not permit
“near-limitless” disclosure of lawfully intercepted communications. On the
contrary, it limits the type of information that may be disclosed, the purpose
for which it may be disclosed, and the persons to whom it may be disclosed.
[56]
Second, the BCCLA notes that the provision
allows disclosure where it is intended to be “in the interests of the
administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere” and submits that the
use of the word “or” means that disclosure could be in the sole
interests of the foreign state, and not Canada’s. According to the
BCCLA, “it is never reasonable to disclose an intercepted private communication
to a foreign state when to do so is only in the foreign state’s interests and
not Canada’s” (factum, at para. 33).
[57]
With respect, I reject this line of thinking.
Multi-jurisdictional cooperation between law enforcement authorities furthers
the administration of justice in all of the jurisdictions involved. It
must not be forgotten that Canada is often on the receiving end of
valuable information from foreign law enforcement authorities. The language of
s. 193(2)(e) appropriately captures the reciprocity inherent in this
practice.
[58]
Third, the BCCLA submits that “on its face, s.
193(2)(e) permits disclosure even to support torture, or to prosecute an
offence in a foreign state that violates Canadian constitutional norms or
international law, provided only that someone intends that disclosure to
be in the interests of the administration of justice somewhere” (factum,
at para. 10 (emphasis in original)). It also contends that s. 193(2)(e)
“opens the door to disclosures to foreign states that are motivated by Canadian
authorities’ political, financial, personal, or other interests, as long as the
foreign state’s intention relates to the interests of its
administration of justice” (ibid., at para. 13 (emphasis in original)).
[59]
Once again, I disagree. Under s. 193(2)(e),
it is the disclosing party’s intention that matters. The provision
requires that the disclosing party must subjectively believe that disclosure
will further the interests of justice in Canada and/or the foreign state. The
belief must be an honest one, genuinely held. If the disclosing party’s
subjective belief is challenged, the reviewing judge may look at objective
indicators in deciding whether the disclosing party is to be believed.
Measuring the stated belief against objective facts is an accepted way of
separating beliefs that are honestly and genuinely held from those that are
not.
[60]
A disclosing party who knows little or nothing
about the justice system in the foreign state or who does not know how or for
what purpose the foreign state intends to use the information will have a hard
time satisfying a court that he or she genuinely believed that disclosure would
further the interests of the administration of justice. The same holds true for
a disclosing party who knows or has reason to believe that the information will
be used to commit torture or other human rights violations, or for someone who
has sent the information for personal or partisan reasons. That a disclosing
party may have his or her credibility tested against objective indicators
incentivizes that person to proceed cautiously when disclosing information to a
foreign state. Given these limitations inherent in s. 193(2)(e), I am
not persuaded that the provision grants police a “limitless” power to
disclose.
(c)
Is Section 193(2)(e) Unconstitutionally Vague?
[61]
I will now address Mr. Wakeling’s objection that
s. 193(2)(e) is unconstitutionally vague. He contends that the phrase
“where disclosure . . . is intended to be in the interests of the
administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere” is “unworkable” because “the
decision maker would be required to have a full appreciation and understanding
of the laws of the country which will receive the disclosure” (A.F., at para.
126). He also argues that “the administration of justice” does not have a constant
and settled meaning (para. 129).
[62]
Like the extradition judge and the Court of
Appeal, I would not give effect to these submissions. This Court in R. v.
Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606, stated that “a law
will be found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to
give sufficient guidance for legal debate” (p. 643). Section 193(2)(e)
does not offend in this regard. It sets out who must intend that the
disclosure be in the interests of the administration of justice (the person
disclosing the information) and to whom the information may be disclosed
(to a peace officer or prosecutor in Canada or to a person or authority with
responsibility in a foreign state for the investigation or prosecution of
offences). Moreover, while “the administration of justice” is a broad concept,
it is not one that so lacks in precision as to give insufficient guidance for
legal debate. As Borins Co. Ct. J. in R. v. Samson (1982), 37 O.R. (2d)
237, explained:
. . . “administration of justice”,
with particular reference to the criminal law, is a compendious term that
stands for all the complexes of activity that operate to bring the substantive
law of crime to bear, or to keep it from coming to bear, on persons who are
suspected of having committed crimes. It refers to the rules of law that govern
the detection, investigation, apprehension, interviewing and trial of persons
suspected of crime and those persons whose responsibility it is to work within
these rules. The administration of justice is not confined to the courts; it
encompasses officers of the law and others whose duties are necessary to ensure
that the courts function effectively. The concern of the administration of
justice is the fair, just and impartial upholding of rights, and punishment of
wrongs, according to the rule of law. [pp. 246-47]
In the context of s. 193(2)(e),
the phrase “the administration of justice” means that disclosure must be for a
legitimate law enforcement purpose, such as the prevention of cross-border drug
trafficking. It is not unconstitutionally vague.
(d)
Is Section 193(2)(e) Unconstitutional for Lack
of Accountability Mechanisms?
[63]
Mr. Wakeling and the BCCLA also make a variety
of submissions pertaining to accountability and the related value of transparency.
They take issue with the fact that s. 193(2)(e) contains no
record-keeping requirement, nor any requirement that would “attempt to
constrain the foreign state’s use and dissemination of the communications”
(BCCLA factum, at para. 2). The essence of these arguments is that s. 193(2)(e)
inadequately protects the privacy interests at stake and that, absent
procedural requirements such as notice to the target of the disclosure,
protocols or international agreements, police record keeping, and Parliamentary
reporting, s. 193(2)(e) is unconstitutional.
[64]
In making these arguments, Mr. Wakeling and the
BCCLA rely on Tse, where the constitutionality of s. 184.4 of the Criminal
Code was in issue. That provision permitted peace officers to intercept
certain private communications without judicial authorization if an officer
believed, on reasonable grounds, that the interception was immediately
necessary to prevent an unlawful act that would cause serious harm. In striking
it down, this Court held that “s. 184.4 falls down on the matter of
accountability because the legislative scheme does not provide any mechanism
to permit oversight of the police use of this power” (para. 11 (emphasis
added)).
[65]
In my opinion, Tse is distinguishable
from the present case. First, the statutory scheme at issue in Tse
contained no accountability measures. As I will explain, that is not the
case with s. 193(2)(e).
[66]
Second, the impugned provision in Tse
involved warrantless searches and seizures. Accountability measures,
including after-the-fact notice and reporting requirements, are of particular
importance in that context. The emergency wiretap provision, by its very
nature, allows the police to conduct a warrantless search in exigent
circumstances. No balancing of interests before a judge occurs. In contrast,
Mr. Wakeling’s private communications were intercepted pursuant to a judicial
authorization. Issuing the authorization required the judge to balance Mr.
Wakeling’s privacy interests with the interests of law enforcement. A variety
of procedural safeguards were adhered to. Unlike an emergency wiretap
situation, Mr. Wakeling’s privacy interests were afforded significant
protection at the interception stage.
[67]
Section 193(2)(e) must be considered in
context. In my view, it is inappropriate “to seize upon individual sections of
[the wiretap scheme] and to see if those sections, viewed in isolation,
contravene the provisions of the Charter ” (R. v. Finlay (1985),
52 O.R. (2d) 632 (C.A.), at p. 653). Rather, the proper approach is to consider
the “provisions and the safeguards contained therein in their entirety” (ibid.).
Section 193(2) (e) is part of a unique statutory scheme that contains
numerous privacy safeguards, including notice and reporting requirements.
Pursuant to s. 196(1) of the Criminal Code , an individual who has been
wiretapped must be provided with written notification within three months of
the time the authorization was given or renewed, subject to judicially
authorized extensions. These extensions may be authorized, for instance, where
providing notice to the suspect would derail an ongoing police investigation.
[68]
While Parliament could perhaps, as a matter of
policy, require a second notice relating specifically to a s. 193(2)(e)
disclosure, there are inherent difficulties with such a requirement. In order
to decide whether to apply for an extension of time in providing notice of
disclosure, Canadian authorities would have to keep abreast of all foreign
investigations involving the disclosed information. Without such knowledge, it
would be impossible for them to know whether providing notice of the disclosure
to the suspect would derail or otherwise compromise a foreign investigation.
[69]
To require Canadian authorities to stay on top
of all foreign investigations that involve the disclosed information is surely
unreasonable. It would be highly burdensome, if not entirely impractical. In my
view, the absence of a requirement to provide a second notice does not render
the wiretap regime unconstitutional.
[70]
As noted, the existing notice requirements
contained in Part VI of the Criminal Code ensure that all individuals
who have been wiretapped are provided with notice of this fact. Once notified,
individuals may wish to know whether their intercepted communications have been
disclosed to a foreign authority. An individual may make a request pursuant to
the applicable access to information statute in an effort to obtain this
information. Justice Karakatsanis correctly notes that such efforts may not
always be successful, depending on the details of the applicable access to
information regime and the individual’s circumstances. I express no view on
whether a guaranteed right of access to this information would be advisable —
only that it is not constitutionally required.
[71]
As for Parliamentary reporting, the Minister of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness must prepare an annual report to
Parliament on the use of electronic surveillance pursuant to s. 195 of the Criminal
Code . Once again, Parliament could require that disclosures made under s.
193(2) (e) be included in an annual report. But that is a policy
decision, and it is important that this Court separate policy matters from
constitutional imperatives — especially in this context where international
relations are involved. As this Court stated in Tse, a reporting
requirement to Parliament is not a constitutional imperative (para. 89).
[72]
Contrary to the submissions of Mr. Wakeling and
the BCCLA, s. 193(2)(e) is not devoid of accountability measures.
Rather, accountability has been built into the scheme for the disclosure of
wiretap communications. Section 193(1) provides a powerful incentive for
Canadian authorities to comply with the dictates of s. 193(2)(e). The
failure to do so can lead to criminal charges against the disclosing party or
result in the exclusion of the improperly disclosed evidence at a subsequent
proceeding in Canada. The possibility of criminal sanction or the loss of
important evidence creates an incentive to maintain records about what
information was disclosed, to whom, and for what purpose. Indeed, according to
the evidence of the Deputy Commissioner of Canada West, Gary David Bass, who
testified with respect to certain RCMP practices and procedures, the RCMP have
a number of internal record-keeping policies that apply to the cross-border
sharing of information.
[73]
While police record keeping is not, in my view,
constitutionally required for disclosures made under s. 193(2)(e), I
should not be taken as discouraging the practice. Likewise, these reasons are
not intended to discourage Parliament from instituting reporting requirements
or establishing international agreements between Canada and foreign states to
address cross-border disclosure of wiretap communications. The record at hand
indicates that many agreements are in place between law enforcement agencies.
The record also shows that information is often disclosed with caveats as to
its subsequent use.
[74]
Although not constitutionally mandated,
adherence to international protocols and the use of caveats or information-sharing
agreements may be highly relevant in determining whether a given disclosure was
authorized by law under s. 193(2)(e). These objective indicators may
assist a court in assessing whether disclosure was genuinely intended to
advance the interests of the administration of justice. Moreover, as I discuss
below in reference to the third step of the s. 8 framework, they will also
impact on whether the manner of disclosure is found to be reasonable.
[75]
In considering the possible accountability and
transparency mechanisms that Parliament could enact, certain realities cannot
be ignored. Even where the information is disclosed to a foreign state with a
legal system much like our own, once the information is in the hands of the
foreign state, its use will, for the most part, be beyond our purview. Such is
a defining feature of state sovereignty. Caveats on disclosure and
information-sharing protocols may be desirable, and they may be relevant to
evaluating whether a disclosure is intended to be in the interest of the
administration of justice (as required at the first step of the s. 8 analysis)
or is carried out reasonably (as required at the third step). However, they are
not constitutionally required in every case, nor would they be a panacea if
they were — certainly not standard-form agreements or caveats accompanying
every disclosure, as Justice Karakatsanis’s proposal would likely generate.
There is always a risk that a foreign law enforcement agency may misuse
the information disclosed to it under s. 193(2)(e). This risk can never
be entirely eliminated, regardless of the nature and extent of the procedural
safeguards in place in Canada, and it must not be allowed to undermine the
vital interests served by the detection and prosecution of multi-jurisdictional
crime. In this regard, I re-emphasize that Canada is frequently on the receiving
end of such disclosures — and Canadians are safer for it.
[76]
I do not gainsay the possibility that a foreign
law enforcement agency could misuse the information provided to it by Canadian
authorities. In such cases, there are certain avenues Canada may pursue where
the subsequent use of information disclosed to a foreign state offends our own
notions of justice. For example, where the disclosed information is being used
to seek the extradition of an individual who faces a realistic prospect of
torture or other human rights violations in a foreign country, Canada can
refuse the extradition request to avoid a manifest violation of the Charter .
Likewise, if the information in question is found to have been unlawfully
obtained, its use in an extradition proceeding — or in any other legal venue —
could be challenged. In other contexts, Canada could exert pressure through
diplomatic channels. There are various ways that Canada pursues its objectives
on the international stage — founded on the principles of comity and state
sovereignty — which may have application in a particular case.
[77]
It bears emphasizing that this Court’s task is
not to determine whether there may be better or additional accountability
measures or stricter language that could be put in place with respect to the
cross-border disclosure of wiretap communications. Any attempt to micromanage
Parliament in this context must be approached with great care. The task at hand
is to determine whether s. 193(2)(e) passes constitutional muster. As
discussed, there are a number of accountability measures contained within Part
VI and within s. 193(2)(e) itself, and the scope of the disclosure
contemplated by s. 193(2)(e) is, in my view, entirely reasonable. For
these reasons, I conclude that the impugned legislation does not fall short of
the constitutional standards mandated by s. 8 of the Charter .
(5)
Was the Impugned Disclosure Carried Out in a
Reasonable Manner?
[78]
Having determined that s. 193(2)(e) is a
reasonable law and that it was complied with in this case, the remaining
inquiry is whether the manner of the Impugned Disclosure was
unreasonable, and therefore violates s. 8 of the Charter . Nothing in the
record suggests that the police acted unreasonably in disclosing Mr. Wakeling’s
intercepted communications to U.S. authorities. Neither the Chief Justice nor
Justice Karakatsanis suggest otherwise. Common sense would suggest that
similarly unremarkable and entirely reasonable instances of law enforcement
cooperation to combat cross-border criminal activity occur on a daily basis
between Canadian and U.S. authorities. Saddling police with the obligation of
imposing boilerplate caveats on even the most routine disclosures poses an
unnecessary burden. It would do little to safeguard the interests protected by
s. 8 while impeding legitimate law enforcement operations.
[79]
Nothing further is needed to dispose of the
instant case. However, in different factual contexts, there may be significant
potential dangers posed by the disclosure of intercepted communications to
foreign authorities. Given these dangers, a broader discussion of the third
step of the s. 8 framework is warranted.
[80]
Where a disclosing party knows or should have
known that the information could be used in unfair trials, to facilitate
discrimination or political intimidation, or to commit torture or other human
rights violations — concerns rightly expressed by Justice Karakatsanis — s. 8
requires that the disclosure, if permissible at all, be carried out in a
reasonable manner. In the most serious examples, where there are no steps that
could be taken to mitigate the danger, s. 8 forbids disclosure entirely. I
should emphasize that this inquiry as to the manner of disclosure is distinct
from whether disclosure would be authorized by law pursuant to s. 193(2)(e)
— although, as a practical matter, the two inquiries may overlap. For example,
where the risks are so great that there is no manner of disclosure that
would be objectively reasonable, a disclosing party would find it difficult to
prove that he or she believed that the disclosure was “in the interests of the
administration of justice” under any plausible meaning of that term.
[81]
In other cases, a disclosure could be reasonably
carried out where the use of information-sharing protocols or the imposition of
caveats would sufficiently mitigate the risks. An example may be useful to
illustrate this point. Suppose that Canadian authorities know or ought to know
that a foreign government, to which they are contemplating a disclosure, may
pass on the information to a third country that could exploit it to harm a
Canadian citizen. In that context, the failure to include a caveat limiting
subsequent use of the disclosed information, even where the disclosing party
intended to further the administration of justice, might render the disclosure
unreasonable under s. 8. In such cases, therefore, the existence of appropriate
safeguards will play a crucial role in determining the constitutionality of a
challenged disclosure. It is by mandating appropriate safeguards on a
case-by-case basis, rather than inflexibly requiring them in all situations,
that a proper balance is struck between protecting against unreasonable
disclosures of private communications and facilitating the effective
investigation of domestic and multi-jurisdictional crime.
VI.
Conclusion
[82]
Inter-agency cooperation is critical to the
prevention, detection, and punishment of cross-border crime. Recognizing this,
Parliament has authorized the cross-border sharing of wiretap communications
under s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code . The disclosure in this
case was lawfully authorized by that provision, and the legislation, taken as a
whole, does not violate s. 8 of the Charter . Furthermore, there is no
evidence that the manner of disclosure was unreasonable. Accordingly, I would
dismiss the appeal.
The following are
the reasons delivered by
[83]
The Chief
Justice — I have read the reasons of my colleagues Moldaver J. and
Karakatsanis J., who come to different conclusions about the constitutionality
of s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , and
the measures that should be in place to govern sharing information obtained
under warrant with law enforcement agencies in other countries.
[84]
I approach the matter differently. In my view,
the question on this appeal is whether Mr. Wakeling’s rights under s. 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated. The constitutionality of s.
193(2) (e) becomes an issue only if Mr. Wakeling can show that s. 193(2) (e)
infringed his s. 8 rights. In my view, he has not shown this. Accordingly, I
would dismiss the appeal.
I.
Background
[85]
Moldaver J. has set out the facts and judicial
history of the case. Briefly put, Mr. Wakeling was the subject of a Canadian
drug investigation. In the course of the investigation, the RCMP obtained a
warrant to monitor communications between Mr. Wakeling and others. The
communications revealed a plot to transport drugs across the Canada-U.S. border.
The RCMP shared information obtained from the communications with U.S.
authorities, who used it to intercept and seize 46,000 ecstasy pills at the
International Falls, Minnesota border crossing.
[86]
The U.S. sought Mr. Wakeling’s extradition from
Canada to face charges arising from the seizure of the ecstasy pills. At the
hearing, Mr. Wakeling argued that the RCMP’s disclosure of the information
obtained from the intercepted communications violated his rights under s. 8 of
the Charter and that the evidence should not be admitted against him.
[87]
The extradition judge held that there was no
violation of Mr. Wakeling’s s. 8 rights, admitted the evidence, and issued a
committal order for extradition. The British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed
Mr. Wakeling’s appeal.
II.
The Issue
[88]
The main — and in my view the only — issue on
this appeal is whether the RCMP’s disclosure of the intercepted communications
to U.S. authorities violated Mr. Wakeling’s s. 8 rights and, if so, whether the
evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter .
[89]
In my view, it is not necessary to consider the
constitutionality of s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code to answer
that question. I agree with my colleagues that it is unnecessary to consider
the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21 , or s. 193(2) (b) of the Criminal
Code .
III.
Analysis
[90]
Section 8 of the Charter protects
individuals against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
Everyone has the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
[91]
Section 8 protects the individual’s privacy
interest against unreasonable state intrusion. Here, Mr. Wakeling has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his communications with others. In order
to obtain private information by intercepting communications, the state must
obtain a judicial warrant, which requires the state to demonstrate that there
are reasonable grounds to believe the interception will show evidence of a
crime. (Circumstances where the state can intercept without a warrant
are not relevant here, e.g., s. 184.4 of the Criminal Code .) Where such
grounds exist, the individual’s privacy interest in the intercepted
communication gives way to the state’s interest in law enforcement.
[92]
The warrant allows the police to obtain the
information and to use it for purposes of law enforcement. The individual
whose communications are lawfully intercepted under a valid warrant cannot
complain that this unreasonably breaches his privacy. To put it
metaphorically, a valid warrant sanitizes the state intrusion on privacy, as
long as the execution of the warrant is reasonable and the information is used
for purposes of law enforcement.
[93]
It has never been suggested that this principle
is confined to the use of information in Canada. The reality is that crime
does not stop at national borders, and police routinely share information that
they have lawfully obtained under warrant with their counterparts in other
countries. Provided information is shared for purposes of law enforcement, the
individual cannot complain that the sharing violates his s. 8 right to privacy.
[94]
This Court has found that s. 8 is violated in
cases where the information was seized in a context outside law
enforcement and then passed along for the purpose of law enforcement: R. v.
Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20; R. v. Law, 2002 SCC 10, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 227; and R. v. Cole, 2012 SCC 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34. In those
cases, the “sanitizing” effect of the warrant (or similar authorization
process) was absent; the individual’s privacy interest had not been balanced
against the state’s interest in law enforcement through judicial
pre-authorization. Where, as here, that process has taken place, disclosure
for law enforcement purposes does not violate s. 8 .
[95]
Once information is obtained under warrant, s. 8
protects against unreasonable uses of that information. For example,
information obtained under warrant cannot be used for rendition to a foreign
country (the Maher Arar case discussed by Karakatsanis J.) or public
titillation. Section 7 of the Charter may also be engaged where
disclosure gives rise to a concern that the recipient country will use the
information to kill, torture or mistreat the target. These concerns do not
arise on the facts of this case. Where these residual privacy interests are infringed,
remedies may include prosecution of the disclosing officer under s. 193(1) of
the Criminal Code and remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter .
[96]
It follows that sharing information obtained
under warrant for law enforcement purposes with foreign law officers does not
violate s. 8 , absent the residual concerns just discussed. Here, the
information was disclosed to the U.S. authorities for law enforcement purposes,
and none of the residual concerns arise. It follows that Mr. Wakeling’s rights
were not violated, and his appeal must fail.
[97]
The question is whether s. 193(2) (e) of
the Criminal Code changes this. I do not think it does. As I
state in Imperial Oil v. Jacques, 2014 SCC 66, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 287, at
para. 89, I am of the view that s. 193(2) is not an authorizing provision.
Section 193(2) (e) does not confer a power on Canadian authorities to
share information obtained under warrant with foreign counterparts. Rather, it
operates by exempting officers from prosecution where they disclose intercepted
private communications under their common law powers. Section 193(1) , the
offence provision, is intended to guard against the disclosure of intercepted
private communications by making it an offence to do so without the consent of
the individual concerned. Section 193(2) then lists a number of exemptions
from what otherwise would be an offence by virtue of s. 193(1) . The exception
in s. 193(2) (e) demonstrates that the common law power to use
information obtained under warrant for law enforcement purposes is one of the
categories of disclosure protected from liability as an offence under s.
193(1) . I agree with my colleague Moldaver J. when he says that “the
administration of justice” in s. 193(2) (e) refers only to use for
legitimate law enforcement purposes. The provision therefore preserves the
common law power of law enforcement authorities to share lawfully obtained
information for purposes of law enforcement both domestically and abroad. In a
nutshell, the exception prevents law enforcement officers from being convicted
for doing their job — using information obtained under warrant for purposes of
law enforcement.
[98]
It is therefore unnecessary to opine on the
constitutionality of s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code . To do so
invites speculation, as the eloquent reasons of my colleagues demonstrate: one
says the current legislative scheme provision is unconstitutional, the other
says it is eminently reasonable. We should not send Parliament back to the
legislative drawing board on the basis of hypothetical speculation, where it is
not established that the law infringes anyone’s s. 8 rights.
[99]
For the same reasons, I find it unnecessary to
consider the constitutionality of the Privacy Act . Assuming without
deciding that the Privacy Act applies, it permits the disclosure of
personal information for the purposes of law enforcement. It is specifically
permitted under s. 8(2) (f)
and more generally as a use consistent with the purpose for which the
information was obtained under s. 8(2) (a). As discussed, this
alone does not violate ss. 7 or 8 .
[100]
Much is made of the need — or the absence of
need — for measures to address the risk that information shared with law
enforcement agencies in other countries will be abused. Mr. Wakeling and
supporting interveners argue that the exclusion in s. 193(2) (e) from the
offence for improper disclosure is too broad to provide adequate protection.
The Crown and supporting Attorneys General, on the other hand, emphasize the
risks associated with bureaucratic restrictions on the international sharing of
information and argue that it would be unrealistic and unworkable in today’s
interconnected world. These are difficult questions more redolent of policy
than of law. Parliament has considered them and answered with the offence
provisions and exemptions of s. 193 . In the absence of a demonstrated breach
of s. 8 rights flowing from those provisions, Parliament’s choice must be
allowed to stand, in my respectful opinion.
IV.
Conclusion
[101]
I would dismiss the appeal and confirm the order
for committal of Mr. Wakeling.
The reasons of Abella,
Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. were delivered by
[102]
Karakatsanis J. (dissenting) — Does the legislation permitting Canadian law
enforcement agencies to disclose wiretapped information to foreign law
enforcement officials violate s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms ? I conclude that it does.
[103]
When police intercept an individual’s private communications without
consent, the information they obtain is of an extremely private and personal
nature. Officers must obtain prior judicial authorization before conducting
these intrusive searches, except in exigent circumstances: Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 184.2 , 185 , 186 and 487.01(5) ; R.
v. Duarte, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30. Once the
information is obtained, there are strict limits on how officers can use the
information and to which Canadian officials it may be disclosed.
[104]
By contrast, s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal Code permits
Canadian law enforcement officers to disclose wiretapped information to foreign
law enforcement officials without any restrictions on how the information may
be used and without any measures to permit oversight of when and how this broad
state power is used. Nothing in the provision restrains recipients from using
the information outside Canada in unfair trials or in ways that violate human
rights norms. Similarly, recipient officials are not prevented from publicly
disseminating the information or sharing it with officials in other states,
many of which do not share our legal and democratic values. The torture of
Maher Arar in Syria provides a particularly chilling example of the dangers of
unconditional information sharing.
[105]
I would hold that the wiretap scheme set out in Part VI of the Criminal
Code violates the Charter “right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure” because s. 193(2) (e) permits the sharing of
intercepted information with foreign officials without meaningful safeguards.
To render the scheme constitutional, Parliament must require the disclosing
party to impose conditions on how foreign officials can use the information
they receive, and must implement accountability measures to deter inappropriate
disclosure and permit oversight.
I.
The Legislation
[106]
Part VI of the Criminal Code is the
legislative scheme that governs wiretap interceptions and the use of
intercepted information. In recognition of the profound invasion of privacy
associated with the interception of private communications, Part VI imposes
strict preconditions on such interceptions. With narrow exceptions for exigent
circumstances (ss. 184.1 and 184.4 ), law enforcement officers may generally
only use wiretaps in the course of investigating enumerated crimes (s. 183 ),
must obtain prior judicial authorization (ss. 184(2) (b) and 184.2 ), and
must comply with notice and reporting requirements (ss. 195 and 196 ). A number
of the safeguards contained in Part VI have been added to ensure the
constitutionality of this wiretapping regime: An Act to amend the Criminal
Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the Radiocommunication Act,
S.C. 1993, c. 40; Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v.
Tse Act, S.C. 2013, c. 8 .
[107]
While the basic scheme of Part VI has been found
to strike the balance between privacy and law enforcement interests required
under s. 8 of the Charter (Duarte, at p. 45), this is the first
time that this Court has considered the effect of the disclosure provisions on
its constitutionality. Section 193 of the Criminal Code makes it an
indictable offence to disclose intercepted information without consent, except
where the disclosure falls into a permitted category such as disclosure for the
purpose of a criminal investigation. Since 1988, the Criminal Code has
permitted disclosure
(e) where disclosure is made to a peace officer or
prosecutor in Canada or to a person or authority with responsibility in a
foreign state for the investigation or prosecution of offences and is intended to
be in the interests of the administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere . . .
(Criminal Code, s. 193(2) (e))
II.
Section 8 of the Charter
[108]
Section 8 of the Charter protects against “unreasonable search or
seizure”. A search or seizure is reasonable “if it is authorized by law, if
the law itself is reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried
out is reasonable” (R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278). In
this case, the interception of the appellant’s communications was a search
authorized by law. A warrant was obtained authorizing the wiretap. The
communications were shared with U.S. police pursuant to s. 193(2) (e)
without any conditions or written record.
[109]
I agree with my colleague Moldaver J. that we need not consider the
constitutionality of s. 8(2) (f) of the Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. P-21 . For the reasons set out by my colleague, I also find it unnecessary
to address the arguments with respect to s. 7 of the Charter . The issue
in this case is whether the foreign disclosure contemplated by s. 193(2) (e)
of the Criminal Code is reasonable. In particular, does s. 193(2) (e)
render the wiretap scheme set out in Part VI unreasonable by permitting
essentially unrestricted and unsupervised disclosure of the fruits of wiretap
interceptions to foreign law enforcement officials?
[110]
Whether a law provides reasonable authority for a search is a contextual
inquiry: R. v. Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554, at para. 26.
The question here is whether the wiretap provisions “strik[e] an appropriate
balance” between the state’s interest in the search and the public interest in
protecting privacy: R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531, at
para. 10.
[111]
The assessment of this balance must be connected to the underlying
purposes of s. 8 itself. Just as the expectation of privacy analysis asks what
we, as a society, should be able to expect will be kept private (R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46, [2014]
2 S.C.R. 390, at para. 44), the assessment of whether a law provides reasonable
authority for a search involves asking what level of privacy protection we are
entitled to expect, given the state’s objective in seeking the information.
[112]
In order to determine whether s. 193(2)(e) of Part VI of the Criminal
Code permits an “unreasonable search or seizure”, it is first necessary to
consider the interests that the disclosure regime was meant to serve and its
impact on the privacy rights of affected persons. With those interests in
mind, I will then turn to the particular aspects of s. 193(2) (e) that,
in my view, render Part VI unconstitutional.
III.
The Interests at Stake
[113]
There is no question that international cooperation and
information sharing are essential to law enforcement: United States of
America v. Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469; R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292. Crime does not stop at
state borders, nor should efforts to combat it. Just as electronic
surveillance “plays an indispensable role in the detection of sophisticated
criminal enterprises” (Duarte, at p. 44), international dissemination of
the fruits of that surveillance is increasingly important for law enforcement.
[114]
When Canadian officials share information with
foreign officials, the foreign state is not the only beneficiary; the
importance of comity cannot be ignored. Canadian interests are served when our
law enforcement agencies build appropriate information-sharing relationships
with law enforcement officials in other jurisdictions, and the disclosure of
wiretapped information in individual cases contributes to these relationships.
Further, timely disclosure will often be critical in the investigation of
serious transnational crimes such as drug smuggling, human trafficking and
terrorism. Often, the circumstances will require immediate police action to
protect public safety and prevent crimes. This case is one such example.
[115]
The state’s interest in law enforcement and comity must
be balanced against the significant privacy and other interests engaged by
disclosure. Wiretap interceptions gather private information that is likely
“to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the
individual” (R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281, at p. 293; and R. v.
Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 25). This can include
information about an individual’s political and religious affiliations,
personal finances, intimate relationships, family problems, physical and mental
health, substance use, and encounters with police.
[116]
This Court recognized the invasiveness of wiretapping in Duarte,
where La Forest J. stated that “one can scarcely imagine a state activity more
dangerous to individual privacy than electronic surveillance” (p. 43). He
warned that
[i]f the state may arbitrarily record
and transmit our private communications, it is no longer possible to strike an
appropriate balance between the right of the individual to be left alone and
the right of the state to intrude on privacy in the furtherance of its goals,
notably the need to investigate and combat crime. [p. 44]
[117]
Law enforcement officers in Canada are therefore subject to strict
limits on the use of wiretapped information. Section 193 of the Criminal
Code makes it an indictable offence to disclose intercepted information,
subject to limited exceptions such as giving evidence in civil or criminal
proceedings (s. 193(2) (a)) or disclosing information for the purpose of
a criminal investigation (s. 193(2) (b)). By contrast, courts have held
that information obtained by the state in other kinds of searches and seizures
may be shared with regulatory agencies for purposes outside of criminal
investigations and existing proceedings (see, for example, Brown v. The
Queen, 2013 FCA 111, 2013 D.T.C. 5094).
[118]
When information is shared across jurisdictional lines, the safeguards
that apply in domestic investigations lose their force. This can create
serious risks to individual privacy, liberty and security of the person
interests. As Commissioner O’Connor observed, when information is shared with
foreign authorities, “respect for human rights cannot always be taken for
granted”: Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in
Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events
Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006) (“O’Connor Report”), at p. 321.
[119]
Wiretap information that is shared with foreign
officials may ultimately be used in unfair trials or to prosecute offences that
are not crimes in Canada. Information obtained from wiretaps can lead to
discrimination on the basis of political or religious affiliation. In the
wrong hands, wiretap information may even be used to intimidate or smear
political figures and members of civil society: see, e.g., B. A. Franklin,
“Wiretaps reveal Dr. King feared rebuff on nonviolence”, The New York Times,
September 15, 1985; J. Sanchez, “Wiretapping’s true danger”, Los
Angeles Times, March 16, 2008. Further, s. 193(2)(e)
permits the disclosure to foreign officials of both intercepted personal
information that may be completely unrelated to the criminal investigation or
to its target and information resulting from wiretaps that are later found to
be unlawful.
[120]
Professor Kent Roach writes that the expansion in international
information sharing since 2001 has exacerbated a number of problems:
. . . law enforcement
agencies are now more likely to undertake enforcement actions based on shared
information that is unreliable, and there is now a greater risk that
information shared by intelligence services will be disclosed in subsequent
legal proceedings. Individuals are also at greater risk of having their
rights, especially their right to privacy, infringed. Individuals will rarely
have the opportunity to challenge the accuracy of shared information because
they will often be unaware that information about them has been shared and will
not have access to the shared information.
(K.
Roach, “Overseeing Information Sharing”, in H. Born and A. Wills, eds., Overseeing
Intelligence Services: A Toolkit (2012), 129, at p. 131)
[121]
The respondent the Attorney General of Canada submits
that the expectation of privacy in communications is diminished after they have
been lawfully intercepted. Indeed, people should expect that police will
“share lawfully gathered information with other law enforcement officials,
provided the use is consistent with the purposes for which it was gathered” (Quesnelle,
at para. 39).
[122]
However, that does not mean that there is no
privacy interest in wiretap information; to the contrary, people have the right
to expect that such information will only be disclosed appropriately.
In a well-known passage in R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, McLachlin and
Iacobucci JJ. stated:
Privacy is not an all or nothing right. It does not
follow from the fact that the Crown has possession of the records that any reasonable
expectation of privacy disappears. Privacy interests in modern society include
the reasonable expectation that private information will remain confidential to
the persons to whom and restricted to the purposes for which it was divulged.
[para. 108]
[123]
This Court, per Charron J., also confirmed in R. v. McNeil,
2009 SCC 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, that “any number of persons and entities may
have a residual privacy interest in material gathered in the course of a
criminal investigation” (at para. 19; see also paras. 12 and 39). The
“protective mantle of s. 8 ” shields information seized by the state “so long as
the seizure continues” (R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1
S.C.R. 20, at p. 63).
[124]
Nor is the privacy interest in wiretap information reduced simply
because a subject of a wiretap might anticipate that law enforcement agencies
may share it pursuant to s. 193 of the Criminal Code . A focus on
subjective expectations, which Professor L. M. Austin has described as the
“what did you expect” approach to privacy, would protect “an interest in being
unfairly surprised by state intrusions”, but would fail to guard against
“expected, though nonetheless problematic, invasions of privacy”
(“Information Sharing and the ‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of Section 8 of the
Charter ” (2007), 57 U.T.L.J. 499, at p. 507 (emphasis added)). As this
Court held in Tessling, a diminished subjective expectation of privacy
does not necessarily result in reduced constitutional protections: the
“[e]xpectation of privacy is a normative rather than a descriptive standard”
(para. 42).
[125]
In light of the intrusive nature of wiretapping, the
highly personal nature of the information in question, and the very real risks
that may be created by disclosure to foreign officials, it is clear that a
substantial privacy interest remains in wiretapped information. This restricts
how the information may be divulged and used.
IV.
Challenges to Section 193(2)(e)
[126]
The appellant and interveners challenge a number of aspects of s. 193(2)(e),
including the breadth, alleged vagueness and subjective nature of the test for
disclosure. They also point to a number of deficiencies: of a warrant
requirement for the disclosure; of restrictions on how information may be used
once it is shared; and of accountability mechanisms such as record-keeping and
notice or reporting requirements. I agree with my colleague Justice Moldaver’s
rejection of many of these challenges. However, in my view, the last two
objections ― concerning the lack of restrictions on disclosed information
and the absence of any accountability measures ― each identify serious
constitutional problems. For the reasons set out below, I conclude that to the
extent s. 193(2)(e) permits disclosure of wiretap
information to foreign authorities without restrictions on recipients’ use and
without accountability measures, it is unreasonable and
contrary to s. 8 of the Charter .
A.
Limits on Use of Disclosed Information
[127]
The first failure is that s. 193(2)(e) does not impose any limits
on how the shared information will be used or further disclosed. It simply
permits disclosure of wiretapped information as long as the disclosure “is
intended to be in the interests of the administration of justice in Canada or
elsewhere”. In my view, it is not an answer to say that because police
officers can only share information that they genuinely believe would further
the interests of the administration of justice, in the context of law
enforcement, it is unlikely that s. 193(2)(e) would result in sharing
with foreign states that engage in torture or other human rights violations.
While Canadian law enforcement officials are constrained in their use of
wiretapped information by the Charter and s. 193 of the Criminal Code ,
these restrictions do not apply to foreign officials.
[128]
Of course, many foreign jurisdictions impose some form of legal
oversight on the use of wiretapped information or criminal intelligence
generally. But s. 193(2)(e) itself does nothing to prevent those who
receive the information from using it in proceedings which fail to respect due
process and human rights, which may involve unjustified detention or torture,
or in which the accused has no access to counsel. Even if the direct
recipients of the information respect human and fair trial rights, s. 193(2)(e)
does not stop them from disclosing the information to others who do not. As my
colleague LeBel J. has observed, “[i]f the process is
irretrievably flawed, no amount of trust in the future good behaviour and
restraint of prosecutors and police will save it”: Lavallee, Rackel &
Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3
S.C.R. 209, at para. 69 (dissenting in part).
[129]
One need only look to the case of Maher Arar to understand what is at
stake. Although in that case the information provided was not obtained by way
of wiretap, Commissioner O’Connor found that “[t]he fact that [the RCMP] did
not attach written caveats to the information about Mr. Arar provided to
American agencies increased the risk that those agencies would use the
information for purposes unacceptable to the RCMP, such as removing him to
Syria” (O’Connor Report, at p. 23). Although
disclosure by the state that compromises an individual’s life, liberty or
security of the person interests may well give rise to a remedy under s. 7 of
the Charter , s. 8 must be construed to prevent unreasonable intrusions
on privacy and their potential consequences before they occur: Hunter v.
Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 160.
[130]
The failure to require any caveats on the use of disclosed information
is, in my view, unreasonable. To the extent that s. 193(2)(e) permits
law enforcement officers to intercept private communications and then share the
results with foreign officials without any restrictions on what they may do
with them, Part VI does not achieve the balancing of interests required to
satisfy the demands of s. 8 of the Charter .
[131]
Further, the requirement of prior judicial
authorization for the wiretap itself does not provide sufficient protection
against inappropriate future disclosure of the information. Authorizations to
intercept communications are granted with respect to specified times, places
and persons in the context of Canadian laws and protections. At the time an
authorization is granted, the judge generally does not weigh the targeted
individual’s privacy interests (let alone those of third parties whose
communications are also intercepted) against a future hypothetical state
interest in disclosing the information to foreign law enforcement officials.
Restrictions on the use of disclosed material would provide some protection of
individuals’ privacy and security interests.
[132]
Imposing restrictions on foreign use of Canadian wiretap information
would not undermine the objectives of the wiretap scheme. Caveats on
information sharing are commonplace in international law enforcement and
intelligence cooperation: O’Connor Report, at p. 150;
U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee, Rendition (2007), at p. 53.
Indeed, according to the affidavit of RCMP Deputy Commissioner of Canada West,
Gary David Bass, such caveats are “normally” attached to wiretap disclosures as
a matter of course. Further, the need for written caveats
need not hinder timely information sharing. For example, police forces could
have standing agreements with certain foreign forces with whom they regularly
cooperate, or they could complete a standardized form each time information is
shared.
[133]
I do not propose any particular form for such
caveats or agreements. The key is that a wiretap scheme which authorizes deep
intrusions on privacy with potentially life-changing consequences cannot permit
the unconditional disclosure of information to foreign authorities. Written
caveats must provide some assurance to our law enforcement agencies that
disclosed information will only be used to advance legitimate law enforcement
objectives, in accordance with respect for due process and human rights, and
will not be shared further except as agreed to by the disclosing party.
[134]
My colleague Justice Moldaver suggests that where a particular
disclosure is challenged (as here, in an extradition proceeding), the existence
of caveats or protocols may be relevant to determining the disclosing officer’s
subjective intent ― whether the disclosing officer intended that the
disclosure be “in the interests of the administration of justice in Canada or
elsewhere”. Thus, he says, caveats and protocols may be relevant to whether
the disclosure was authorized by s. 193(2)(e) or whether the disclosure
is carried out in a reasonable manner. This, of course, rests upon the
uncertain assumption that an individual would have knowledge of the disclosure
and the opportunity to challenge it in a Canadian proceeding. Further, such an
approach leaves the assessment and balancing of interests in the hands of the
disclosing officer. Given the significant risks involved in the international
dissemination of such information, and the limited ability of an individual whose
rights have been violated to seek redress, such an approach does not provide
sufficient protections for the important privacy interests engaged. As noted
above, for s. 193(2)(e) to be reasonable, the law itself must strike the
appropriate balance of interests.
B.
Oversight and Accountability
[135]
In addition, for a law to provide reasonable authority for a search or
seizure, it must include some mechanism to permit oversight of state use of the
power: see Tse, at paras. 11 and 82. In my view, this need for accountability
applies not only to the search itself but also to the subsequent use of the
resulting information. Written caveats alone generally do not provide
sufficient protection. Without some accountability mechanism, no information
is available on what is being shared, with whom, for what purpose and what
subsequent use is made of the information. The need for such accountability is
made even greater where information is being shared across borders, putting it
beyond the reach of Canadian legal protections.
[136]
The purpose of accountability mechanisms is to deter and identify
inappropriate intrusions on privacy. None of the safeguards included in the
broader Part VI wiretap regime, such as judicial pre-authorization,
after-the-fact notification, record-keeping or reporting requirements, apply to
the disclosure of wiretap information to foreign officials. Ensuring that the
wiretapping itself is appropriate does not guarantee that subsequent
disclosures will be.
[137]
Justice Moldaver finds that because s. 193(2)(e) is an exemption
to the criminal offence set out at s. 193(1) , law enforcement officers will
have ample incentive to comply with the terms of the exemption in order to
avoid criminal liability. With respect, I am not convinced that the presence
of the criminal offence is ― on its own ― an adequate
accountability mechanism. My chief concern is not that Canadian officers will
intentionally disclose the information for purposes unrelated to “the interests
of the administration of justice in Canada or elsewhere”. Rather, it is the
potential use by foreign officials ― who do not face the risk of
prosecution under s. 193(1) ― that raises concerns about Charter
interests.
[138]
Canadian law enforcement officers may subjectively intend to serve
justice by sharing information. However, improper or hazardous sharing is
unlikely to come to light without record-keeping, reporting or notice
obligations. Moreover, accountability is not only about fostering compliance
with the letter of the law; it is about giving oversight bodies, legislators
and the public the information that they need to ensure that statutory powers
are necessary and are used appropriately.
[139]
Justice Moldaver’s suggestion that individuals subject to disclosure of
wiretapped information might find out through an access to information request
is far from adequate in achieving accountability, particularly since the
various privacy laws governing law enforcement across Canada generally include
an exception for records relating to law enforcement matters: see, for
example, Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56, s. 8(1). Without any requirement that law enforcement
agencies maintain records, even a successful applicant may find there is little
or no record to obtain.
[140]
The case before us was likely an appropriate sharing of information. It
related to drug crimes that spanned the Canada-United States border, was shared
with U.S. law enforcement, and was used to stop such a crime and to apprehend
the offender. However, given the breadth of s. 193(2)(e) and of the
personal information that may be contained in a wiretap, it is not difficult to
imagine situations where disclosure would be inappropriate, even if it was
subjectively “intended to be in the interests of the administration of
justice”, as required by s. 193(2)(e). Accountability mechanisms are
required to safeguard against disclosure in such cases.
[141]
Just as the reasonableness of a search power depends on context (Rodgers),
the exact accountability mechanism that will be required varies with the
circumstances. In general, serious intrusions on a reasonable expectation of
privacy ― such as a search of a dwelling or interception of private
communications ― require prior judicial authorization: R. v. Thompson,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111. In emergencies, after-the-fact notice can serve as a
substitute: Tse. Some kinds of searches, like searches incident to
arrest, may be immediately apparent to their targets, such that no formal
notice mechanism is required.
[142]
Notice of cross-border disclosure would permit individuals ― or
the executive branch of government ― to know which countries have
information and perhaps how it may be used. After-the-fact reporting to the
legislature would create transparency, telling Canadians how often information
is disclosed to identified foreign law enforcement officials and for what
purposes. I recognize that these choices involve practical and policy
considerations. It is for Parliament to decide what measures are most
appropriate and how they should be implemented. The Charter does not
mandate a specific protocol; it requires only that the legislation authorizing
a search be reasonable. Reasonableness, in this case, demands accountability
mechanisms that ensure an appropriate balance between privacy and the state
interest in the search. At a minimum, the disclosing party should be required
to create a written record of what information is shared with whom, with some
obligation to make the sharing ultimately known to the target or to government.
[143]
To conclude, while the sharing of wiretapped information is an important
tool for law enforcement agencies, it must nonetheless be balanced against
adequate protections for the privacy interests at stake in order to pass Charter
muster. This balance requires that the disclosing party obtain assurances
that information will not be improperly used by foreign officials. It also
requires the implementation of accountability measures to facilitate oversight
and to deter inappropriate disclosures. Absent such protections, I find that
s. 193(2) (e) is contrary to s. 8 of the Charter .
V.
Section 1
[144]
In my view, s. 193(2)(e) infringes s. 8 of the Charter in
a manner that is not justified under s. 1 .
[145]
To be upheld under s. 1 , legislation that limits a Charter right
must meet the criteria set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 103. First, the legislation must serve a pressing and
substantial objective. Second, the means chosen must be proportionate: there
must be a rational connection between the legislation and the objective, the
legislation must limit the right as little as possible, and there must be
proportionality between the effects of the Charter limitation and its
objectives.
[146]
In this case, the objective of international cooperation in law
enforcement is pressing and substantial, and disclosure of wiretap information
is rationally connected to that objective. However, s. 193(2)(e) as it
is presently drafted interferes with privacy to a greater extent than
necessary. The inclusion of accountability mechanisms and limits on subsequent
use would cure the constitutional deficiencies without undermining Parliament’s
goals. Accordingly, I conclude that the disclosure to foreign officials
permitted without safeguards under s. 193(2)(e) renders the Part VI
regime unconstitutional.
VI.
Conclusion
[147]
Section 8 requires that when a law authorizes intrusions on privacy, it
must do so in a manner that is reasonable. A reasonable law must have adequate
safeguards to prevent abuse. It must avoid intruding farther than necessary.
It must strike an appropriate balance between privacy and other public
interests. I conclude that s. 193(2)(e) falls short on all three
counts.
[148]
In my view, the appropriate remedy in this case
is to strike the words “or to a person or authority
with responsibility in a foreign state” from s. 193(2) (e) of the Criminal
Code . Such a remedy respects Parliament’s intention to allow law
enforcement officials to collaborate within Canada, while invalidating those
aspects of the legislation that are inconsistent with the Charter .
Severing the unconstitutional elements of this provision is also consistent
with this Court’s view that “when only a part of a statute or provision
violates the Constitution, it is common sense that only the offending portion
should be declared to be of no force or effect, and the rest should be spared”:
Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at p. 696. I would suspend
the effect of this order for 12 months to allow Parliament to amend Part VI to
comply with the Charter .
[149]
The Crown submitted that if this Court were to
suspend a declaration of invalidity, a new hearing should be ordered at which
the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter can be
addressed. This Court has recognized that, where a suspended declaration of
invalidity is ordered, a constitutional exemption may be awarded “to relieve
the claimant of the continued burden of the unconstitutional law during the
period that the striking out remedy is suspended”: R. v. Ferguson, 2008
SCC 6, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 96, at para. 46; see also Corbiere v. Canada
(Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, at para.
22. I would accordingly exempt the appellant from the suspension of the
declaration of invalidity.
[150]
I would answer the relevant constitutional
questions as follows:
Does s. 193(2)(e) of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , infringe s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms ?
Answer: Yes.
If so, is the infringement a reasonable
limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ?
Answer: No.
[151]
Thus, in the circumstances of this case, I would allow
the appeal and order a new hearing.
Appeal
dismissed, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors
for the appellant: Thorsteinssons, Vancouver.
Solicitor
for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada on behalf of the United
States of America and on behalf of the Minister of Justice: Attorney General
of Canada, Vancouver.
Solicitor
for the respondent the Attorney General of British Columbia: Attorney General
of British Columbia, Victoria.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario: Attorney General of
Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Attorney General of Quebec,
Québec.
Solicitors
for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association: McInnes Cooper,
Halifax.
Solicitors
for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: McCarthy
Tétrault, Vancouver.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario: Information
and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors for the
intervener the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt,
Toronto.