SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Donnohue
Grant
Appellant
and
Her
Majesty The Queen
Respondent
‑
and ‑
Director
of Public Prosecutions of Canada, Attorney General of British Columbia,
Canadian
Civil Liberties Association and Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
Interveners
Official English Translation: Reasons of Deschamps J.
Coram: McLachlin
C.J. and Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Joint
Reasons for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 149)
Partially
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 150 to 184)
Partially
Concurring Reasons:
(paras. 185 to 230)
|
McLachlin C.J. and Charron J. (LeBel,
Fish and Abella JJ. concurring)
Binnie J.
Deschamps J.
|
______________________________
R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353
Donnohue Grant Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
and
Director of Public Prosecutions of
Canada,
Attorney
General of British Columbia,
Canadian
Civil Liberties Association and
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Grant
Neutral citation: 2009 SCC 32.
File No.: 31892.
2008: April 24; 2009: July 17.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, LeBel,
Deschamps, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal
for ontario
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Arbitrary
detention — Right to counsel — Encounter between accused and police going from
general neighbourhood policing to situation where police effectively took
control over accused and attempted to elicit incriminating information —
Whether police conduct would cause a reasonable person in accused’s position to
conclude that he or she was not free to go and had to comply with police demand
— Whether accused arbitrarily detained — Whether accused’s right to counsel
infringed — Meaning of “detention” in ss. 9 and 10 of Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms .
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Enforcement
— Exclusion of evidence — Firearm discovered as result of accused’s statements
taken in breach of his right against arbitrary detention and right to counsel —
Firearm admitted into evidence at trial and accused convicted of five firearms
offences — Whether admission of firearm bringing administration of justice into
disrepute — Revised framework for determining whether evidence obtained in
breach of constitutional rights must be excluded — Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, s. 24(2) .
Criminal law — Firearms — Possession of firearm for
purposes of weapons trafficking — Whether simple movement of firearm from one
place to another without changing hands amounts to weapons trafficking —
Meaning of “transfer” of weapon for purposes of ss. 84 , 99 and 100 of
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46 .
Three police officers were on patrol for the purposes of
monitoring an area near schools with a history of student assaults, robberies,
and drug offences. W and F were dressed in plainclothes and driving an
unmarked car. G was in uniform and driving a marked police car. The accused, a
young black man, was walking down a sidewalk when he came to the attention of W
and F. As the two officers drove past, the accused stared at them, while at
the same time fidgeting with his coat and pants in a way that aroused their
suspicions. W and F suggested to G that he have a chat with the approaching
accused to determine if there was any need for concern. G initiated an
exchange with the accused, while standing on the sidewalk directly in his
intended path. He asked him what was going on, and requested his name and
address. At one point, the accused, behaving nervously, adjusted his jacket,
which prompted the officer to ask him to keep his hands in front of him. After
a brief period observing the exchange from their car, W and F approached the
pair on the sidewalk, identified themselves to the accused as police officers
by flashing their badges, and took up positions behind G, obstructing the way
forward. G then asked the accused whether he had anything he should not have,
to which he answered that he had “a small bag of weed” and a firearm. At this
point, the officers arrested and searched the accused, seizing the marijuana
and a loaded revolver. They advised him of his right to counsel and took him
to the police station.
At trial, the accused alleged violations of his rights
under ss. 8 , 9 and 10 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms . The trial judge found no Charter breach and admitted
the firearm. The accused was convicted of five firearms offences. The Court of
Appeal upheld the convictions for different reasons. It concluded that a
detention had crystallized during the conversation with G, before the accused
made his incriminating statements, and that the detention was arbitrary and in
breach of s. 9 of the Charter . However, it held that the gun should
be admitted into evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter . The court
agreed with the trial judge that the accused’s act of moving the gun from one
place to another fell within the definition of “transfer” in the Criminal
Code , and that this justified the conviction for possession of a firearm
for the purposes of weapons trafficking.
Held : The
appeal should be allowed on the trafficking charge and an acquittal entered.
The appeal should be dismissed on all other counts.
Per McLachlin C.J.
and LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.: Existing jurisprudence on the
issues of detention and exclusion of evidence is difficult to apply and may
lead to unsatisfactory results. It is the duty of the Court, without
undermining the principles that animate the jurisprudence to date, to take a
fresh look at the frameworks that have been developed for the resolution of
these two issues. [3]
Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter refers
to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant physical
or psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established either where
the individual has a legal obligation to comply with a restrictive request or
demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state conduct
that he or she had no choice but to comply. In cases where there is no
physical restraint or legal obligation, it may not be clear whether a person
has been detained. To determine whether the reasonable person in the
individual’s circumstances would conclude that he or she had been deprived by
the state of the liberty of choice, the court may consider, inter alia,
the following factors: (a) the circumstances giving rise to the encounter as
they would reasonably be perceived by the individual; (b) the nature of the
police conduct; and (c) the particular characteristics or circumstances of the
individual where relevant. To answer the question whether there is a detention
involves a realistic appraisal of the entire interaction as it developed, not a
minute parsing of words and movements. In those situations where the police
may be uncertain whether their conduct is having a coercive effect on the
individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in unambiguous terms that
he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and is free to go. It is
for the trial judge, applying the proper legal principles to the particular facts
of the case, to determine whether the line has been crossed between police
conduct that respects liberty and the individual’s right to choose, and conduct
that does not. Deference is owed to the trial judge’s findings of fact,
although application of the law to the facts is a question of law. [32] [43‑44]
In this case, the accused was detained within the
meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter before being asked the
questions that led him to disclose his possession of the firearm. The
encounter began with G approaching the accused and making general inquiries.
Such preliminary questioning is a legitimate exercise of police powers. G then
told the accused to keep his hands in front of him. While this act, in
isolation, might be insufficient to indicate detention, consideration of the
entire context of what transpired from that point forward leads to the
conclusion that the accused was detained. Two other officers approached,
flashed their badges and took tactical adversarial positions behind G, who
began to engage in questioning driven by, and indicative of, focussed suspicion
of the accused. The sustained and restrictive tenor of the conduct after the
direction to the accused to keep his hands in front of him reasonably supports
the conclusion that the officers were putting him under their control and
depriving him of his choice as to how to respond. At this point, the accused’s
liberty was clearly constrained and he was in need of the Charter protections
associated with detention. The encounter took on the character of an
interrogation, going from general neighbourhood policing to a situation where
the police had effectively taken control over the accused and were attempting
to elicit incriminating information. Although G’s questioning was respectful,
the encounter was inherently intimidating. The power imbalance was obviously
exacerbated by the accused’s youth and inexperience. Because the test is an
objective one, the fact that the accused did not testify as to his perceptions of
the interaction is not fatal to his argument that there was a detention. The
evidence supports his contention that a reasonable person in his position would
conclude that his or her right to choose how to act had been removed by the
police, given their conduct. [45] [47‑52]
The evidence of the firearm was obtained in a manner
that breached the accused’s rights under ss. 9 and 10 (b) of the Charter .
An unlawful detention is necessarily arbitrary, in violation of s. 9 . The
officers acknowledged at trial that they did not have legal grounds or a
reasonable suspicion to detain the accused prior to his incriminating
statements. Therefore, the detention was arbitrary. The police also failed to
advise the accused of his right to speak to a lawyer before the questioning
that led to the discovery of the firearm. The right to counsel arises
immediately upon detention, whether or not the detention is solely for
investigative purposes. [11] [55] [57‑58]
The criteria relevant to determining when, in “all the
circumstances”, admission of evidence obtained by a Charter breach
“would bring the administration of justice into disrepute” must be clarified.
The purpose of s. 24(2) , as indicated by its wording, is to maintain the
good repute of the administration of justice. Viewed broadly, the term
“administration of justice” embraces maintaining the rule of law and upholding Charter
rights in the justice system as a whole. The phrase “bring the administration
of justice into disrepute” must be understood in the long‑term sense of
maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system.
While exclusion of evidence resulting in an acquittal may provoke immediate
criticism, s. 24(2) does not focus on immediate reaction to the individual
case. Rather, it looks to whether the overall repute of the justice system,
viewed in the long term, will be adversely affected by admission of the
evidence. The inquiry is objective. It asks whether a reasonable person,
informed of all relevant circumstances and the values underlying the Charter ,
would conclude that the admission of the evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. Section 24(2) ’s focus is not
only long‑term, but prospective. The fact of the Charter breach
means damage has already been done to the administration of justice.
Section 24(2) starts from that proposition and seeks to ensure that
evidence obtained through that breach does not do further damage to the repute
of the justice system. Section 24(2) ’s focus is also societal.
Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the police or providing
compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic concerns. [66‑70]
When faced with an application for exclusion under
s. 24(2) , a court must assess and balance the effect of admitting the
evidence on society’s confidence in the justice system having regard to: (1)
the seriousness of the Charter ‑infringing state conduct, (2) the
impact of the breach on the Charter ‑protected interests of the
accused, and (3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its
merits. At the first stage, the court considers the nature of the police
conduct that infringed the Charter and led to the discovery of the
evidence. The more severe or deliberate the state conduct that led to the Charter
violation, the greater the need for the courts to dissociate themselves from
that conduct, by excluding evidence linked to that conduct, in order to
preserve public confidence in and ensure state adherence to the rule of law. The
second stage of the inquiry calls for an evaluation of the extent to which the
breach actually undermined the interests protected by the infringed right. The
more serious the incursion on these interests, the greater the risk that
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. At the third stage, a court asks whether the truth‑seeking
function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of
the evidence or by its exclusion. Factors such as the reliability of the
evidence and its importance to the Crown’s case should be considered at this
stage. The weighing process and the balancing of these concerns is a matter for
the trial judge in each case. Where the trial judge has considered the proper
factors, appellate courts should accord considerable deference to his or her
ultimate determination. [71‑72] [76‑77] [79] [86] [127]
Here, the gun was discovered as a result of the
accused’s statements taken in breach of the Charter . When the three‑stage
inquiry is applied to the facts of this case, a balancing of the factors
favours the admission of the derivative evidence. The Charter ‑infringing
police conduct was neither deliberate nor egregious and there was no suggestion
that the accused was the target of racial profiling or other discriminatory
police practices. The officers went too far in detaining the accused and
asking him questions, but the point at which an encounter becomes a detention
is not always clear and the officers’ mistake in this case was an
understandable one. Although the impact of the Charter breach on the
accused’s protected interests was significant, it was not at the most serious
end of the scale. Finally, the gun was highly reliable evidence and was
essential to a determination on the merits. The balancing mandated by
s. 24(2) is qualitative in nature and therefore not capable of
mathematical precision. However, when all these concerns are weighed, the
courts below did not err in concluding that the admission of the gun into
evidence would not, on balance, bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. The significant impact of the breach on the accused’s Charter ‑protected
rights weighs strongly in favour of excluding the gun, while the public
interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits weighs strongly in
favour of its admission. However, the police officers were operating in
circumstances of considerable legal uncertainty, and this tips the balance in
favour of admission. [132‑133] [139‑140]
The accused’s conviction for possession of a firearm for
the purposes of weapons trafficking under s. 100(1) of the Criminal
Code should be quashed on the ground that he did not “transfer” the firearm
within the meaning of that section. A contextual reading of s. 100 and
the related provisions reveals that Parliament intended to reserve the stiffest
penalties for transfers that amount to weapons trafficking, not for the mere
movement of a firearm from place to place. Since the trial judge did not find
that the accused was in possession of the gun for the purpose of transferring
it to another person, the s. 100(1) conviction cannot stand. [141] [143]
Per Binnie J.: The
majority’s approach to the definition of “detention” in ss. 9 and 10 of
the Charter lays too much emphasis on the claimant’s perception of
psychological pressure, albeit as filtered through the eyes of the hypothetical
reasonable person in the claimant’s situation. The objective facts of such
encounters as well as the perception of the police in initiating the encounter,
and whatever information the police possess at the time or acquire as the
encounter proceeds, all of which may or may not be known to the person stopped,
should be factored into a more comprehensive analysis of when a “detention”
occurs for Charter purposes. [150] [180]
The Court’s embrace of a wholly claimant‑centred
approach may lead to the impression that it is more important to enquire
whether the hypothetical reasonable person “in the individual’s circumstances”
would think himself or herself to be detained than whether he or she is
detained. The perspective of the person stopped is important and it is true
that there can be no detention unless the liberty of the person stopped is (or
is reasonably perceived by that person to be) significantly constrained, but
this does not exhaust the relevant considerations. [151]
It is important to be able to determine at what moment
an interaction between the police and a member of the public is converted into
a detention of that individual, thereby triggering the rights subsidiary to
detention including the right to involve his or her lawyer. Re‑examining
the concept of “psychological detention” with a view to broadening the
perspectives from which the encounter is viewed is one way to ease the “obvious
tension” between the requirement to inform detained persons of their right to
counsel and the proper and effective use of brief investigative
detentions. The police know, but the claimant may not know, the point at
which he or she graduates from being a person of interest to a person around
whom suspicion is starting to focus, and becomes a person whose legal rights
are seriously in issue. [153] [160] [165] [177]
There are a number of problems with the Court’s
continuing endorsement of the Therens approach for the purpose of
determining when a simple interaction crystallizes into a detention. Insistence
that the claimant’s circumstances be viewed from the more detached perspective
of a “reasonable person” in some cases exaggerates the ability of ordinary
people to stand up to police assertion of authority, and may compel the
conclusion that the claimant had the choice to walk away whereas in reality no
such choice existed. On the other hand, if the concept of the reasonable
person is intended to describe average cooperative members of the public, the
Canadian reality is that such people will almost always regard a direction from
a police officer as a demand that must be complied with. Viewed in this way,
police instructions or demands readily constrain a claimant’s choice to leave
and, therefore, even the less intrusive encounters between the police and
citizens ought frequently to be declared detentions under the claimant‑centred
approach adopted by the majority. [166] [170]
A further problem in calibrating the “reasonable person”
is to define exactly what information this fictional person possesses and what
experience he or she brings to the assessment of the encounter. This is of
particular relevance to visible minorities who may, because of their background
and experience, feel especially unable to disregard police directions, and feel
that assertion of their right to walk away will itself be taken as evasive and
subsequently argued by the police to be sufficient grounds of suspicion to
justify a Mann detention. The police perspective on such encounters,
whether or not conveyed to the person stopped, is relevant. In the absence of
explicit criteria various judges will tend to read into the “reasonable person”
their own projections of the moment at which, in their view, the person stopped
ought to be able to call a lawyer. This may encourage a results‑oriented
analysis. [169] [172‑174]
The Therens approach does not take into account
adequately what the police know and when they knew it except insofar as this
information is conveyed to the person stopped, but the police may not consider
it to be in their interest to convey the information. Apparent general
inquiries by the police may be designed, unknown to the person stopped, to
elicit the missing piece by way of self‑incrimination. Possession of such
knowledge may in fact place the police in an adversarial relationship with the
person approached whether that person is aware of the jeopardy or not. It is
the adversarial relationship together with the “stop” that generates the need
for counsel. On the other hand, a more benign police purpose may deprive even
an unambiguous police command of the legal effect of a detention, and thereby
enure to the benefit of the prosecution. [167] [178‑179]
A finding of detention requires a police command or
direction as well as compliance by the person claiming a s. 9 detention in
the reasonable belief that there was no other choice. However, police words
and conduct should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the encounter from
the police perspective, whether disclosed to the person from whom cooperation
was requested or not. Moreover, when considering the perception of the person
stopped, serious weight should be given to the values and experience of the
person actually stopped, including the experience of visible minorities.
[176‑177]
On the facts of this case, the conclusion of the
majority that the accused was arbitrarily detained is agreed with. The purpose
of the police officers was to investigate crime, whether actual or anticipated.
The police had no information whatsoever that the accused may have been
implicated in criminal activity or even whether a crime had been committed. The
police order to the accused to “keep his hands in front of him” crystallized
the detention. However, the finding of a detention is properly the product not
only of the accused’s perception (filtered through the hypothetical reasonable
person) but also of the objective facts of why the encounter was initiated
(crime detection) and the perception of the police, who at the outset lacked
any information on which to base such aggressive tactics. The majority’s
analysis under s. 24(2) and the consequent disposition of the appeal are
also agreed with. [181‑184]
Per Deschamps J.: The
facts of this case, considered as a whole, support the conclusion that the
accused was detained. The detention came to a head when the officers asked him
certain direct questions that, viewed objectively, might have caused a
reasonable person to feel singled out, cornered and, therefore, detained.
Owing to the nature of the questions asked by G, the line between prevention
and suppression was crossed. G asked the accused if he had committed a crime.
Once such a question had been asked of a person who had known he was being
watched from the time he had crossed paths with W and F — who had since arrived
on the scene — the encounter could no longer be described simply as an
interaction between a police officer and a member of the public. The exchange
was no longer an impromptu conversation that the accused would think he could
walk away from as he pleased. [191]
Regarding the factors to consider in deciding whether to
admit or exclude evidence obtained in violation of a Charter right, the
new test proposed by the majority is inconsistent with the purpose of s. 24(2)
of the Charter , which is to maintain public confidence in the
administration of justice. The statement that s. 24(2) has a long‑term
societal purpose is of great significance for the identification of the factors
to considered in the analysis. The proposed test, by focussing the analysis on
the conduct of the police in the first branch and on the interest of the
accused in the second, and by attaching less importance to the seriousness of
the offence in the third, does not give sufficient consideration to the long‑term
societal interest that must guide the judge in reaching a decision. In
determining whether the maintenance of confidence in the administration of
justice would be better served by admitting the evidence or by excluding it,
the judge must instead strike a fair balance between two societal interests:
the public interest in protecting Charter rights and the public interest
in an adjudication on the merits. On the first branch, any facts that help
show the effect of the violation on the protected rights must be considered,
including the state conduct that gave rise to the violation. The impact of a
violation on protected interests will vary with the circumstances, and the
judge must therefore consider all the facts that will enable him or her to
assess the long‑term impact of his or her decision on the repute of the
administration of justice, that is, not on the rights of the accused being
tried, but rather on those of every individual whose rights might be violated
in a similar way. As for the second branch, whether the evidence is reliable
and whether it is essential or peripheral are factors that are crucial to the
maintenance of public confidence, as is the seriousness of the offence. [185]
[195] [198] [202] [223‑226]
In this case, to admit the weapon in evidence would have
a positive effect on the repute of the administration of justice. According to
the trial judge’s findings of fact, the exchange lasted only a few minutes, the
officers were polite to the accused, and they were motivated by a desire to
take a proactive approach in patrolling an area near schools with serious
problems related to youth crime and safety. On the protection of the public,
it should be noted that the charge is firearms‑related, that it would be
impossible to establish guilt without the evidence and that the evidence is
eminently reliable. When balanced against each other, the limited impact of
the violation on the protected interests and the great importance of the
evidence for the purposes of the trial favour admitting the physical evidence.
[228‑229]
There is agreement with the majority on the charge of
possession of a firearm for the purposes of trafficking. [229]
Cases Cited
By McLachlin C.J. and Charron J.
Not followed: R. v.
Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; applied:
R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613; referred to: R. v.
Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Doucet‑Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of
Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3; Blencoe v. British Columbia
(Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307; R. v.
Esposito (1985), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88; Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] 2
S.C.R. 2; Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re),
2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248; R. v. Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151; R.
v. Grafe (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 267; Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350; R. v. Duguay
(1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289; R. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621; R. v.
Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1257; R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2
S.C.R. 460; R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190; R. v. Burlingham,
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 206; R. v. Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3; R.
v. Harrer, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562; R. v. Silveira, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297;
R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
3; R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631; R. v. White,
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 417; R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199; R. v. Wray,
[1971] S.C.R. 272; R. v. Kitaitchik (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 14; R. v.
Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609; R. v. Harper, [1994] 3
S.C.R. 343; R. v. Schedel (2003), 175 C.C.C. (3d) 193; R. v.
Richfield (2003), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 23; R. v. Dolynchuk (2004), 184
C.C.C. (3d) 214; R. v. Banman, 2008 MBCA 103, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 547; R.
v. S.A.B., 2003 SCC 60, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 678; R. v. Shepherd, 2007
SKCA 29, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 113, aff’d 2009 SCC 35, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527; R. v.
Padavattan (2007), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 221; R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 495; R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679; R. v. St.
Lawrence, [1949] O.R. 215; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13; R.
v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223; R. v. Harris, 2007 ONCA 574, 225
C.C.C. (3d) 193; R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980; R. v. Goldhart,
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 463; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494; McDiarmid
Lumber Ltd. v. God’s Lake First Nation, 2006 SCC 58, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 846; R.
v. Davis, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 759.
By Binnie J.
Not followed: R. v.
Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613; referred to: R. v. Golden,
2001 SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Stansbury
v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 59; R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, aff’g 2007
ONCA 60, 85 O.R. (3d) 127; R. v. Moran (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225, leave
to appeal refused, [1988] 1 S.C.R. xi; R. v. Grafe (1987), 36 C.C.C.
(3d) 267; Practice Note (Judges’ Rules), [1964] 1 W.L.R. 152.
By Deschamps J.
Not followed: R. v.
Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; referred to: R. v. Orellana,
[1999] O.J. No. 5746 (QL); R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2
S.C.R. 460; R. v. Kang‑Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456; R.
v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659; R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 297; R. v. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755; R. v. Stillman,
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206; R. v.
Strachan (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 567; Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 1 (2009); R. v. Duguay, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93; Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391; R. v.
Taillefer, 2003 SCC 70, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307; R. v. O’Connor, [1995]
4 S.C.R. 411; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 (c),
13 , 24 .
Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C‑46, ss. 84 “transfer”, 86(2), 99, 100.
Firearms Act, S.C.
1995, c. 39, s. 21 “transfer”.
Model Code of Pre‑Arraignment
Procedure (ALI 1975), s. 110.1(2).
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Shearing, Clifford D., and Philip C. Stenning
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal
(McMurtry C.J.O. and Laskin and Lang JJ.A.) (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 1, 213 O.A.C.
127, 209 C.C.C. (3d) 250, 38 C.R. (6th) 58, 143 C.R.R. (2d) 223, 2006
CarswellOnt 3352, [2006] O.J. No. 2179 (QL), affirming the accused’s
conviction entered by M. H. Harris J., 2004 CarswellOnt 8783. Appeal allowed
in part.
Jonathan Dawe and Frank R.
Addario, for the appellant.
Michal Fairburn and John
Corelli, for the respondent.
James C. Martin
and Paul Adams, for the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions
of Canada.
Michael Brundrett
and Margaret A. Mereigh, for the intervener the Attorney General of
British Columbia.
Don Stuart and
Graeme Norton, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.
Marlys A. Edwardh
and Jessica R. Orkin, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’
Association (Ontario).
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Fish, Abella
and Charron JJ. was delivered by
The Chief Justice and
Charron J. —
I. Overview
[1]
Mr. Grant appeals his convictions on a series of firearms offences,
relating to a gun seized by police during an encounter on a Toronto sidewalk.
The gun was entered as evidence against Mr. Grant and formed the basis of his
convictions. The question on this appeal is whether that evidence was obtained
in breach of Mr. Grant’s Charter rights, and if so, whether the evidence
should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms .
[2]
Resolving these questions requires us to revisit two important and
contentious areas of criminal law Charter jurisprudence. The first is
the definition of “detention” under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter . The
second is the test for exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the Charter
pursuant to s. 24(2) .
[3]
The submissions before us reveal that existing jurisprudence on the
issues of detention and exclusion of evidence is difficult to apply and may
lead to unsatisfactory results. Without undermining the principles that
animate the jurisprudence to date, we find it our duty, given the difficulties
that have been pointed out to us, to take a fresh look at the frameworks that
have been developed for the resolution of these two issues. We will also
consider the subsidiary issue that arises in this case: the meaning of
“transfer” of a weapon for the purposes of ss. 84 , 99 and 100 of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 .
II. Facts
[4]
The encounter at the centre of this appeal occurred at mid-day on
November 17, 2003, in the Greenwood and Danforth area of Toronto. With
four schools in the area and a history of student assaults, robberies, and drug
offences occurring over the lunch hour, the three officers involved in the
encounter were on patrol for the purposes of monitoring the area and
maintaining a safe student environment. Two of the officers, Constables Worrell
and Forde, were dressed in plainclothes and driving an unmarked car. Although
on patrol, their primary task was to visit the various schools to determine if
there were persons on school property who should not have been there — either
non-students or students from another school. The third officer, Constable
Gomes, was in uniform and driving a marked police car. On “directed patrol”,
he had been tasked with maintaining a visible police presence in the area in
order to provide student reassurance and to deter crime during the high school
lunch period.
[5]
Mr. Grant, a young black man, was walking northbound on Greenwood Avenue
when he came to the attention of Constables Worrell and Forde. As the two
officers drove past, Cst. Worrell testified that the appellant “stared” at them
in an unusually intense manner and continued to do so as they proceeded down
the street, while at the same time “fidgeting” with his coat and pants in a way
that aroused their suspicions. Given their purpose for being in the area and
based on what he had just seen, Cst. Worrell decided that “maybe we should have
a chat with this guy and see what’s up with him”. Cst. Worrell wanted to know whether
Mr. Grant was a student at one of the schools they were assigned to monitor,
and, if he was not, whether he was headed to one of the schools anyway.
Noticing Cst. Gomes parked on the street ahead of Mr. Grant, and in light of
his uniformed attire, the two plainclothes officers suggested to Cst. Gomes
that he “have a chat” with the approaching appellant to determine if there was
any need for concern.
[6]
Cst. Gomes then got out of his car and initiated an exchange with Mr.
Grant, while standing on the sidewalk directly in his intended path. The
officer asked the appellant “what was going on”, and requested his name and
address. In response, the appellant provided a provincial health card. At one
point, the appellant, behaving nervously, adjusted his jacket, prompting the
officer to ask him to “keep his hands in front of him”. By this point, the two
other officers had returned and parked on the side of the street.
[7]
Cst. Worrell testified on cross‑examination that he and Cst. Forde
pulled up because he got a funny feeling based on Mr. Grant’s way of looking
over at them, looking around “all over the place”, and adjusting himself. On
direct examination he said that “[h]e still seemed to be, I don’t know, looking
a bit nervous the way he was looking around, looking at us, looking around when
speaking to Officer Gomes. And at this time, I suggested to my partner, you
know, I don’t think it would hurt if we just go up to Officer Gomes and just
stand by, just to make sure everything was okay.” Thus, after a brief period
observing the exchange from their car, the two officers approached the pair on
the sidewalk, identified themselves to the appellant as police officers by
flashing their badges, and took up positions behind Cst. Gomes, obstructing the
way forward. The exchange between Cst. Gomes and Mr. Grant subsequent to the
arrival of the two officers was as follows:
Q. Have you
ever been arrested before?
A. I got
into some trouble about three years ago.
Q. Do you
have anything on you that you shouldn’t?
A. No. Well,
I got a small bag of weed.
Q. Where is
it?
A. It’s in
my pocket.
Q. Is that
it?
A. (Male
puts his head down.) Yeah. Well, no.
Q. Do you
have other drugs on you?
A. No, I
just have the weed, that’s it.
Q. Well,
what is it that you have?
A. I have a firearm.
[8]
At this point, the officers arrested and searched the appellant, seizing
the marijuana and a loaded revolver. They then advised Mr. Grant of his right
to counsel and took him to the police station.
III. Judgments Below
[9]
At trial, Mr. Grant alleged violations of his rights under ss. 8 , 9 and
10 (b) of the Charter . The trial judge held that the officers’
inquiries did not amount to a search within the meaning of s. 8 . He further
concluded that Mr. Grant was not detained prior to his arrest or, if he was
detained, he waived his rights by cooperating with the officers’ requests.
Having found no Charter breach, he had no difficulty admitting the
firearm: 2004 CarswellOnt 8779. Mr. Grant was convicted of five firearms
offences, including possession of a restricted firearm for the purpose of
transferring it without lawful authority (s. 100(1) of the Criminal Code ).
[10] In the
Ontario Court of Appeal, Laskin J.A. held that the trial judge’s conclusion on
the question of detention was undermined by several mischaracterizations as to
what had occurred, thereby entitling the court to revisit the issue. He
concluded that a detention had crystallized during the conversation with Cst.
Gomes, before the appellant made his incriminating statements. Because the
officers had no reasonable grounds to detain the appellant, the detention was
arbitrary and a breach of s. 9 was established. Laskin J.A. did not deal with
s. 10 (b) and found no breach of s. 8 . On the question of exclusion under
s. 24(2) , Laskin J.A. determined that the firearm was “derivative” evidence
emanating from a self-incriminatory statement and would very often be excluded
on that basis alone. However, after a review of recent developments in the s.
24(2) jurisprudence, Laskin J.A. concluded that the admission of the gun would
not unduly undermine trial fairness. He held that the repute of the
administration of justice would be damaged more by the exclusion of the gun
than by its admission. He therefore held that the gun was properly admitted
into evidence. On the firearms issue, Laskin J.A. held that Mr. Grant’s act of
moving the gun from one place to another fell within the definition of
“transfer” in s. 84 of the Code, justifying the conviction under s.
100(1) . He therefore dismissed the appeal: (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 1.
IV. Analysis
A. Breach of the Charter
[11] The
first issue in this case is whether the evidence of the gun was obtained in a
manner that breached Mr. Grant’s rights under the Charter . Mr. Grant
argues that the police breached his Charter rights by arbitrarily
detaining him contrary to s. 9 and by failing to advise him of his right to
speak to a lawyer contrary to s. 10 (b), before the questioning that led
to the discovery of the firearm that is the subject of these charges.
Alternatively, if the Court finds he was not detained, Mr. Grant argues that
the Court of Appeal erred in finding that there was no violation of s. 8 ’s
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
[12] The
threshold question is whether the appellant was detained before he produced the
firearm and was arrested. If he was detained, the detention was arbitrary; all
parties are agreed that the police lacked legal grounds to detain the
appellant. Further, if detained, Mr. Grant was entitled to be advised of the
right to counsel at that point, which would establish breach of s. 10 (b)
of the Charter .
1. The Meaning of “Detention” Under the Charter
(a) The Positions of the Parties
[13] Mr.
Grant argues that he was detained before he made his inculpatory statements and
revealed the gun. He contends that his liberty to choose to remain or leave
was taken away by the conduct of the police officers in blocking his path, and
that this detention was arbitrary because at this point the officers lacked
reasonable grounds to detain him under the standard for investigative detention
elaborated in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59. Because he
was detained, he argues, the police were required to advise him under s. 10 (b)
that he had the right to speak to a lawyer.
[14] The
Crown argues that Mr. Grant was not detained until the police arrested him
after he disclosed his firearm, at which point they advised him of his right to
talk to a lawyer. It says that the officers’ prior conduct was not directed at
curtailing the appellant’s liberty, but rather at protecting their own safety
while asking him some questions. The Crown says that the officers were
engaging in community policing, which involves a dynamic interaction between
the police and the citizens they serve. The Crown contends that preliminary,
non-coercive questioning pursuant to police policy is a legitimate exercise of
investigative police powers, is essential to the effective fulfilment of the
police’s duty to enforce the law, and does not amount to detention triggering
the right to counsel.
(b) Interpretative Principles
[15] As for
any constitutional provision, the starting point must be the language of the
section. Where questions of interpretation arise, a generous, purposive and
contextual approach should be applied.
[16] Constitutional
guarantees such as ss. 9 and 10 should be interpreted in a “generous rather
than . . . legalistic [way], aimed at fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee
and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter ’s
protection” (R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p.
344). Unduly narrow, technical approaches to Charter interpretation
must be avoided, given their potential to “subvert the goal of ensuring that
right holders enjoy the full benefit and protection of the Charter ” (Doucet-Boudreau
v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at
para. 23).
[17] While
the twin principles of purposive and generous interpretation are related and
sometimes conflated, they are not the same. The purpose of a right must always
be the dominant concern in its interpretation; generosity of interpretation is
subordinate to and constrained by that purpose (P. W. Hogg, Constitutional
Law of Canada (5th ed. Supp.), vol. 2, at pp. 36-30 and 36-31). While a
narrow approach risks impoverishing a Charter right, an overly generous
approach risks expanding its protection beyond its intended purposes. In
brief, we must construe the language of ss. 9 and 10 in a generous way that
furthers, without overshooting, its purpose: Big M Drug Mart, at p. 344.
[18]
To interpret “detention” in ss. 9 and 10 generously, yet
purposively, we must consider the context in which it is embedded — in other
words, the role it plays in conjunction with related protections in the Charter .
(c) The Purpose of the Rights Linked to
Detention
[19] Detention
represents a limit on the broad right to liberty enjoyed by everyone in Canada
at common law and by virtue of s. 7 of the Charter , which guarantees
that liberty will only be curtailed in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice. Section 9 of the Charter establishes that
“[e]veryone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned”.
Section 10 accords certain rights to people who are arrested or detained,
including the right to retain and instruct counsel.
[20] The
purpose of s. 9, broadly put, is to protect individual liberty from unjustified
state interference. As recognized by this Court in Blencoe v. British
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307,
“liberty”, for Charter purposes, is not “restricted to mere freedom from
physical restraint”, but encompasses a broader entitlement “to make decisions
of fundamental importance free from state interference” (para. 49). Thus, s. 9
guards not only against unjustified state intrusions upon physical liberty, but
also against incursions on mental liberty by prohibiting the coercive pressures
of detention and imprisonment from being applied to people without adequate
justification. The detainee’s interest in being able to make an informed
choice whether to walk away or speak to the police is unaffected by the manner
in which the detention is brought about.
[21] More
specifically, an individual confronted by state authority ordinarily has the
option to choose simply to walk away: R. v. Esposito (1985), 24 C.C.C.
(3d) 88 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 94; Dedman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2,
at p. 11, citing Martin J.A. in the Ontario Court of Appeal ((1981), 32 O.R.
(2d) 641, at p. 653):
Although a police officer may approach a person on the street and ask him
questions, if the person refuses to answer the police officer must allow him to
proceed on his way, unless . . . [he] arrests him . . . .
See also Application
under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248,
at para. 131. Where this choice has been removed — whether by physical or
psychological compulsion — the individual is detained. Section 9 guarantees
that the state’s ability to interfere with personal autonomy will not be
exercised arbitrarily. Once detained, the individual’s choice whether to speak
to the authorities remains, and is protected by the s. 10 informational
requirements and the s. 7 right to silence.
[22] “Detention”
also identifies the point at which rights subsidiary to detention, such as the
right to counsel, are triggered. These rights are engaged by the vulnerable
position of the person who has been taken into the effective control of the
state authorities. They are principally concerned with addressing the imbalance
of power between the state and the person under its control. More specifically,
they are designed to ensure that the person whose liberty has been curtailed
retains an informed and effective choice whether to speak to state
authorities, consistent with the overarching principle against
self-incrimination. They also ensure that the person who is under the control
of the state be afforded the opportunity to seek legal advice in order to
assist in regaining his or her liberty. As this Court observed in R. v.
Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151:
In a broad sense, the purpose of ss. 7 to 14 is two‑fold
to preserve the rights of the detained individual, and to maintain the repute
and integrity of our system of justice. More particularly, it is to the
control of the superior power of the state vis‑à‑vis the
individual who has been detained by the state, and thus placed in its power,
that s. 7 and the related provisions that follow are primarily directed.
The state has the power to intrude on the individual’s physical freedom by
detaining him or her. The individual cannot walk away. This physical
intrusion on the individual’s mental liberty in turn may enable the state to
infringe the individual’s mental liberty by techniques made possible by its
superior resources and power. [Emphasis added; pp. 179-80.]
[23] By
setting limits on the power of the state and imposing obligations with regard
to the detained person through the concept of detention, the Charter
seeks to effect a balance between the interests of the detained individual and
those of the state. The power of the state to curtail an individual’s liberty
by way of detention cannot be exercised arbitrarily and attracts a reciprocal
obligation to accord the individual legal protection against the state’s
superior power.
(d) Defining Detention
[24] The
word “detention” admits of many meanings. Read narrowly, “detention” can be
seen as indicating situations where the police take explicit control over the
person and command obedience. Read expansively, “detention” can be read as
extending to even a fleeting interference or delay. Neither of these extremes
offers an acceptable definition of “detention” as used in ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter .
[25] The
first extreme was rejected by this Court in R. v. Therens, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 613, which held that detention for Charter purposes occurs when a
state agent, by way of physical or psychological restraint, takes away an
individual’s choice simply to walk away. This encompasses not only explicit
interference with the subject’s liberty by way of physical interference or
express command, but any form of “compulsory restraint”. A person is detained
where he or she “submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and
reasonably believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist” (Therens,
at p. 644). It is clear that a person may reasonably believe he or she has no
choice in circumstances where there has been no formal assertion of police
control. Thus the first interpretation must be rejected. This comports with
the principle that a generous rather than legalistic approach must be applied
to the interpretation of Charter principles and avoids cramping the
purpose of the protections conferred by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter .
[26] The
second interpretation of “detention”, reducing it to any interference, however
slight, must also be rejected. As held in Mann, at para. 19, per
Iacobucci J.:
. . . the police cannot be said to “detain”, within the meaning of ss. 9
and 10 of the Charter , every suspect they stop for purposes of
identification, or even interview. The person who is stopped will in all cases
be “detained” in the sense of “delayed”, or “kept waiting”. But the
constitutional rights recognized by ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter are not
engaged by delays that involve no significant physical or psychological restraint.
It is clear
that, while the forms of interference s. 9 guards against are broadly defined
to include interferences with both physical and mental liberty, not every
trivial or insignificant interference with this liberty attracts Charter
scrutiny. To interpret detention this broadly would trivialize the applicable Charter
rights and overshoot their purpose. Only the individual whose liberty is
meaningfully constrained has genuine need of the additional rights accorded by
the Charter to people in that situation.
[27] Having
rejected the extreme positions advanced, the question is where between them the
line that marks detention under ss. 9 and 10 is to be traced. This is a
question that is not easily answered in the abstract; as in so many areas of
the law, the most useful guidance derives from the decided cases. In what
follows, we set out the general principle of choice that underlies the
determination. We then discuss situations which illustrate where the line
should be drawn.
[28] The
general principle that determines detention for Charter purposes was set
out in Therens: a person is detained where he or she “submits or
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that the
choice to do otherwise does not exist” (per Le Dain J., at p. 644).
This principle is consistent with the notion of choice that underlies our
conception of liberty and, as such, shapes our interpretation of ss. 9 and 10
of the Charter . When detention removes the “choice to do otherwise” but
comply with a police direction, s. 10 (b) serves an indispensable
purpose. It protects, among other interests, the detainee’s ability to choose
whether to cooperate with the investigation by giving a statement. The ambit of
detention for constitutional purposes is informed by the need to safeguard this
choice without impairing effective law enforcement. This explains why the
extremes of formally asserted control on the one hand and a passing encounter
on the other have been rejected; the former restricts detention in a way that
denies the accused rights he or she needs and should have, while the latter
would confer rights where they are neither necessary or appropriate.
[29] The
language of ss. 9 and 10 is consistent with this purpose-based approach to
detention. The pairing of “detained” and “imprisoned” in s. 9 provides textual
guidance for determining where the constitutional line between justifiable and
unjustifiable interference should be drawn. “Imprisonment” connotes total or
near-total loss of liberty. The juxtaposition of “imprisoned” with “detained”
suggests that a “detention” requires significant deprivation of liberty. Similarly,
the words “arrest or detention” in s. 10 suggest that a “detention” exists
when the deprivation of liberty may have legal consequences. This linguistic
context requires exclusion of police stops where the subject’s rights are not
seriously in issue.
[30] Moving
on from the fundamental principle of the right to choose, we find that
psychological constraint amounting to detention has been recognized in two
situations. The first is where the subject is legally required to comply with a
direction or demand, as in the case of a roadside breath sample. The second is
where there is no legal obligation to comply with a restrictive or coercive
demand, but a reasonable person in the subject’s position would feel so
obligated. The rationale for this second form of psychological detention was
explained by Le Dain J. in Therens as follows:
In my opinion, it is not realistic, as a general rule, to regard
compliance with a demand or direction by a police officer as truly voluntary,
in the sense that the citizen feels that he or she has the choice to obey or
not, even where there is in fact a lack of statutory or common law authority
for the demand or direction and therefore an absence of criminal liability for
failure to comply with it. Most citizens are not aware of the precise legal
limits of police authority. Rather than risk the application of physical force
or prosecution for wilful obstruction, the reasonable person is likely to err
on the side of caution, assume lawful authority and comply with the demand. The
element of psychological compulsion, in the form of a reasonable perception of
suspension of freedom of choice, is enough to make the restraint of liberty
involuntary. Detention may be effected without the application or threat of
application of physical restraint if the person concerned submits or
acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably believes that
the choice to do otherwise does not exist. [Emphasis added; p. 644.]
[31] This
second form of psychological detention — where no legal compulsion exists — has
proven difficult to define consistently. The question is whether the police
conduct would cause a reasonable person to conclude that he or she was not free
to go and had to comply with the police direction or demand. As held in Therens,
this must be determined objectively, having regard to all the circumstances of
the particular situation, including the conduct of the police. As discussed in
more detail below and summarized at para. 44, the focus must be on the state
conduct in the context of the surrounding legal and factual situation, and how
that conduct would be perceived by a reasonable person in the situation as it
develops.
[32] The
objective nature of this inquiry recognizes that the police must be able to know
when a detention occurs, in order to allow them to fulfill their attendant
obligations under the Charter and afford the individual its added
protections. However, the subjective intentions of the police are not
determinative. (Questions such as police “good faith” may become relevant when
the test for exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) is applied, in cases where a Charter
breach is found.) While the test is objective, the individual’s particular
circumstances and perceptions at the time may be relevant in assessing the
reasonableness of any perceived power imbalance between the individual and the
police, and thus the reasonableness of any perception that he or she had no
choice but to comply with the police directive. To answer the question whether
there is a detention involves a realistic appraisal of the entire interaction
as it developed, not a minute parsing of words and movements. In those
situations where the police may be uncertain whether their conduct is having a
coercive effect on the individual, it is open to them to inform the subject in
unambiguous terms that he or she is under no obligation to answer questions and
is free to go. It is for the trial judge, applying the proper legal principles
to the particular facts of the case, to determine whether the line has been
crossed between police conduct that respects liberty and the individual’s right
to choose, and conduct that does not.
[33] In
most cases, it will be readily apparent whether or not an encounter between the
police and an individual results in a detention. Making the task easier is the
fact that what would reasonably be understood by all concerned is often
informed by generally understood legal rights and duties, as a few examples
illustrate.
[34] At one
end of the spectrum of possibilities, detention overlaps with arrest or
imprisonment and the Charter will clearly apply. Similarly, a legal
obligation to comply with a police demand or direction, such as a breath sample
demand at the roadside, clearly denotes s. 9 detention. As Le Dain J. observed
in Therens, “[i]t is not realistic to speak of a person who is liable to
arrest and prosecution for refusal to comply with a demand which a peace
officer is empowered by statute to make as being free to refuse to comply” (p.
643).
[35] At the
other end of the spectrum lie encounters between individual and police where it
would be clear to a reasonable person that the individual is not being deprived
of a meaningful choice whether or not to cooperate with a police demand or
directive and hence not detained.
[36] We may
rule out at the outset situations where the police are acting in a
non-adversarial role and assisting members of the public in circumstances
commonly accepted as lacking the essential character of a detention. In many
common situations, reasonable people understand that the police are not
constraining individual choices, but rather helping people or gathering
information. For instance, the reasonable person would understand that a
police officer who attends at a medical emergency on a 911 call is not
detaining the individuals he or she encounters. This is so even if the police,
in taking control of the situation, effectively interfere with an individual’s
freedom of movement. Such deprivations of liberty will not be significant
enough to attract Charter scrutiny because they do not attract legal
consequences for the concerned individuals.
[37] Another
often-discussed situation is when police officers approach bystanders in the
wake of an accident or crime, to determine if they witnessed the event and
obtain information that may assist in their investigation. While many people
may be happy to assist the police, the law is clear that, subject to specific
provisions that may exceptionally govern, the citizen is free to walk away: R.
v. Grafe (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 267 (Ont. C.A.). Given the existence of
such a generally understood right in such circumstances, a reasonable person
would not conclude that his or her right to choose whether to cooperate with
them has been taken away. This conclusion holds true even if the person may
feel compelled to cooperate with the police out of a sense of moral or civic
duty. The Ontario Court of Appeal adverted to this concept in Grafe,
where Krever J.A. wrote, at p. 271:
The law has long recognized that although there is no legal duty there is
a moral or social duty on the part of every citizen to answer questions put to
him or her by the police and, in that way to assist the police: see, for
example, Rice v. Connolly, [1966] 2 All E.R. 649 at p. 652, per Lord
Parker C.J. Implicit in that moral or social duty is the right of a police
officer to ask questions even, in my opinion, when he or she has no belief that
an offence has been committed. To be asked questions, in these circumstances,
cannot be said to be a deprivation of liberty or security.
[38] In the
context of investigating an accident or a crime, the police, unbeknownst to
them at that point in time, may find themselves asking questions of a person
who is implicated in the occurrence and, consequently, is at risk of
self-incrimination. This does not preclude the police from continuing to
question the person in the pursuit of their investigation. Section 9 of the Charter
does not require that police abstain from interacting with members of the
public until they have specific grounds to connect the individual to the
commission of a crime. Nor does s. 10 require that the police advise everyone
at the outset of any encounter that they have no obligation to speak to them
and are entitled to legal counsel.
[39] Effective
law enforcement is highly dependent on the cooperation of members of the
public. The police must be able to act in a manner that fosters this
cooperation, not discourage it. However, police investigative powers are not
without limits. The notion of psychological detention recognizes the reality
that police tactics, even in the absence of exercising actual physical restraint,
may be coercive enough to effectively remove the individual’s choice to walk
away from the police. This creates the risk that the person may reasonably feel
compelled to incriminate himself or herself. Where that is the case, the
police are no longer entitled simply to expect cooperation from an individual.
Unless, as stated earlier, the police inform the person that he or she is under
no obligation to answer questions and is free to go, a detention may well
crystallize and, when it does, the police must provide the subject with his or
her s. 10 (b) rights. That the obligation arises only on detention
represents part of the balance between, on the one hand, the individual rights
protected by ss. 9 and 10 and enjoyed by all members of society, and on the
other, the collective interest of all members of society in the ability of the
police to act on their behalf to investigate and prevent crime.
[40] A more
complex situation may arise in the context of neighbourhood policing where the
police are not responding to any specific occurrence, but where the
non-coercive police role of assisting in meeting needs or maintaining basic
order can subtly merge with the potentially coercive police role of
investigating crime and arresting suspects so that they may be brought to
justice. This is the situation that arises in this case.
[41] As
discussed earlier, general inquiries by a patrolling officer present no threat
to freedom of choice. On the other hand, such inquiries can escalate into
situations where the focus shifts from general community-oriented concern to
suspicion of a particular individual. Focussed suspicion, in and of itself,
does not turn the encounter in a detention. What matters is how the police,
based on that suspicion, interacted with the subject. The language of the Charter
does not confine detention to situations where a person is in potential
jeopardy of arrest. However, this is a factor that may help to determine
whether, in a particular circumstance, a reasonable person would conclude he or
she had no choice but to comply with a police officer’s request. The police
must be mindful that, depending on how they act and what they say, the point
may be reached where a reasonable person, in the position of that individual,
would conclude he or she is not free to choose to walk away or decline to
answer questions.
[42] The
length of the encounter said to give rise to the detention may be a relevant
consideration. Consider the act of a police officer placing his or her hand on
an individual’s arm. If sustained, it might well lead a reasonable person to
conclude that his or her freedom to choose whether to cooperate or not has been
removed. On the other hand, a fleeting touch may not, depending on the
circumstances, give rise to a reasonable conclusion that one’s liberty has been
curtailed. At the same time, it must be remembered that situations can move
quickly, and a single forceful act or word may be enough to cause a reasonable
person to conclude that his or her right to choose how to respond has been
removed.
[43] Whether
the individual has been deprived of the right to choose simply to walk away
will depend, to reiterate, on all the circumstances of the case. It will be
for the trial judge to determine on all the evidence. Deference is owed to the
trial judge’s findings of fact, although application of the law to the facts is
a question of law.
[44] In
summary, we conclude as follows:
1. Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter
refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a
significant physical or psychological restraint. Psychological detention is
established either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with
the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by
reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply.
2. In cases where there is no physical restraint
or legal obligation, it may not be clear whether a person has been detained.
To determine whether the reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances
would conclude that he or she had been deprived by the state of the liberty of
choice, the court may consider, inter alia, the following factors:
(a) The circumstances giving rise to the
encounter as they would reasonably be perceived by the individual: whether the
police were providing general assistance; maintaining general order; making
general inquiries regarding a particular occurrence; or, singling out the
individual for focussed investigation.
(b) The nature of the police conduct,
including the language used; the use of physical contact; the place where the
interaction occurred; the presence of others; and the duration of the
encounter.
(c) The particular characteristics or
circumstances of the individual where relevant, including age; physical
stature; minority status; level of sophistication.
2. Was the Appellant Detained Prior to Incriminating
Himself?
[45] Against
this background, we return to the question at hand: Was Mr. Grant detained
within the meaning of ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter before the questions
that led him to disclose his firearm? The trial judge held that he was not.
An appellate court must approach a trial judge’s decision on this issue with
appropriate deference. However, we agree with Laskin J.A. that the trial
judge’s conclusion on the question of detention is undermined by certain key
findings of fact that cannot reasonably be supported by the evidence. In the
circumstances, it is necessary to revisit the issue.
[46] This
is not a clear case of physical restraint or compulsion by operation of law.
Accordingly, we must consider all relevant circumstances to determine if a
reasonable person in Mr. Grant’s position would have concluded that his or her
right to choose how to interact with the police (i.e. whether to leave or
comply) had been removed.
[47] The
encounter began with Cst. Gomes approaching Mr. Grant (stepping in his path)
and making general inquiries. Such preliminary questioning is a legitimate
exercise of police powers. At this stage, a reasonable person would not have
concluded he or she was being deprived of the right to choose how to act, and
for that reason there was no detention.
[48] Cst.
Gomes then told the appellant to “keep his hands in front of him”. This act,
viewed in isolation, might be insufficient to indicate detention, on the ground
that it was simply a precautionary directive. However, consideration of the
entire context of what transpired from this point forward leads to the
conclusion that Mr. Grant was detained.
[49] Two
other officers approached, flashing their badges and taking tactical
adversarial positions behind Cst. Gomes. The encounter developed into one where
Mr. Grant was singled out as the object of particularized suspicion, as
evidenced by the conduct of the officers. The nature of the questioning changed
from ascertaining the appellant’s identity to determining whether he “had
anything that he should not”. At this point the encounter took on the character
of an interrogation, going from general neighbourhood policing to a situation
where the police had effectively taken control over the appellant and were
attempting to elicit incriminating information.
[50] Although
Cst. Gomes was respectful in his questioning, the encounter was inherently
intimidating. The power imbalance was obviously exacerbated by
Mr. Grant’s youth and inexperience. Mr. Grant did not testify, so we
do not know what his perceptions of the interaction actually were. However,
because the test is an objective one, this is not fatal to his argument that
there was a detention. We agree with Laskin J.A.’s conclusion that
Mr. Grant was detained. In our view, the evidence supports
Mr. Grant’s contention that a reasonable person in his position (18 years
old, alone, faced by three physically larger policemen in adversarial
positions) would conclude that his or her right to choose how to act had been
removed by the police, given their conduct.
[51] The
police conduct that gave rise to an impression of control was not fleeting.
The direction to Mr. Grant to keep his hands in front, in itself inconclusive,
was followed by the appearance of two other officers flashing their badges and
by questioning driven by focussed suspicion of Mr. Grant. The sustained and
restrictive tenor of the conduct after the direction to Mr. Grant to keep his
hands in front of him reasonably supports the conclusion that the officers were
putting him under their control and depriving him of his choice as to how to
respond.
[52] We
conclude that Mr. Grant was detained when Cst. Gomes told him to keep his hands
in front of him, the other two officers moved into position behind Cst. Gomes,
and Cst. Gomes embarked on a pointed line of questioning. At this point,
Mr. Grant’s liberty was clearly constrained and he was in need of the Charter
protections associated with detention.
3. Was the Detention Arbitrary Under Section
9?
[53] We
have determined that the appellant was detained prior to his arrest. The
question at this point is whether the detention was “arbitrary” within the meaning
of s. 9.
[54] The s.
9 guarantee against arbitrary detention is a manifestation of the general
principle, enunciated in s. 7 , that a person’s liberty is not to be curtailed
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. As this Court
has stated: “This guarantee expresses one of the most fundamental norms of the
rule of law. The state may not detain arbitrarily, but only in accordance with
the law” (Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9,
[2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 88). Section 9 serves to protect individual
liberty against unlawful state interference. A lawful detention is not
arbitrary within the meaning of s. 9 (Mann, at para. 20), unless
the law authorizing the detention is itself arbitrary. Conversely, a detention
not authorized by law is arbitrary and violates s. 9.
[55] Earlier
suggestions that an unlawful detention was not necessarily arbitrary (see R.
v. Duguay (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.)) have been overtaken by Mann,
in which this Court confirmed the existence of a common law police power of
investigative detention. The concern in the earlier cases was that an arrest
made on grounds falling just short of the “reasonable and probable grounds”
required for arrest should not automatically be considered arbitrary in the
sense of being baseless or capricious. Mann, in confirming that a brief
investigative detention based on “reasonable suspicion” was lawful, implicitly
held that a detention in the absence of at least reasonable suspicion is
unlawful and therefore arbitrary within s. 9.
[56] This
approach mirrors the framework developed for assessing unreasonable searches
and seizures under s. 8 of the Charter . Under R. v. Collins,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, and subsequent cases dealing with s. 8 , a search must be
authorized by law to be reasonable; the authorizing law must itself be
reasonable; and the search must be carried out in a reasonable manner.
Similarly, it should now be understood that for a detention to be
non-arbitrary, it must be authorized by a law which is itself non-arbitrary.
We add that, as with other rights, the s. 9 prohibition of arbitrary
detention may be limited under s. 1 by such measures “prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”: see R. v.
Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621, and R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 S.C.R.
1257.
[57] Here,
the officers acknowledged at trial that they did not have legal grounds or
reasonable suspicion to detain the accused prior to his incriminating
statements. No issue was taken with this concession on appeal. We therefore
conclude that the detention was arbitrary and in breach of s. 9.
4. Was the Appellant’s Section 10 (b)
Right to Counsel Infringed?
[58] In R.
v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 460, we conclude that the s. 10 (b)
right to counsel arises immediately upon detention, whether or not the
detention is solely for investigative purposes. That being the case, s. 10 (b)
of the Charter required the police to advise Mr. Grant that he had the
right to speak to a lawyer, and to give him a reasonable opportunity to obtain
legal advice if he so chose, before proceeding to elicit incriminating
information from him. Because he now faced significant legal jeopardy and had
passed into the effective control of the police, the appellant was “in
immediate need of legal advice”: R. v. Brydges, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 190, at
p. 206. Because the officers did not believe they had detained the appellant,
they did not comply with their obligations under s. 10 (b). The breach
of s. 10 (b) is established.
B. Exclusion of the Evidence
1. Background
[59] When
must evidence obtained in violation of a person’s Charter rights be
excluded? Section 24(2) of the Charter provides the following answer:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any
rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter , the evidence shall be excluded
if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute.
[60] The
test set out in s. 24(2) — what would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute having regard to all the circumstances — is broad and imprecise. The
question is what considerations enter into making this determination. In Collins
and in R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, this Court endeavoured to
answer this question. The Collins/Stillman framework, as interpreted
and applied in subsequent decisions, has brought a measure of certainty to the
s. 24(2) inquiry. Yet the analytical method it imposes and the results it
sometimes produces have been criticized as inconsistent with the language and
objectives of s. 24(2) . In order to understand these criticisms, it is
necessary to briefly review the holdings in Collins and Stillman.
[61] In
Collins, the Court (per Lamer J., as he then was) proceeded by
grouping the factors to be considered under s. 24(2) into three categories: (1)
whether the evidence will undermine the fairness of the trial by effectively
conscripting the accused against himself or herself; (2) the seriousness of the
Charter breach; and (3) the effect of excluding the evidence on the
long-term repute of the administration of justice. While Lamer J. acknowledged
that these categories were merely a “matter of personal preference” (p. 284),
they quickly became formalized as the governing test for s. 24(2) .
[62] Collins
shed important light on the factors relevant to determining admissibility of Charter -violative
evidence under s. 24(2) . However, the concepts of trial fairness and
conscription under the first branch of Collins introduced new problems
of their own. Moreover, questions arose about what work (if any) remained to
be done under the second and third categories, once conscription leading to
trial unfairness had been found. Finally, issues arose as to how to measure
the seriousness of the breach under the second branch and what weight, if any,
should be put on the seriousness of the offence charged in deciding whether to
admit evidence.
[63] The
admission of physical or “real” evidence obtained from the body of the accused
in breach of his or her Charter rights proved particularly problematic.
Ten years after Collins, the Court revisited this question in Stillman.
The majority held that evidence obtained in breach of the Charter should,
at the outset of the s. 24(2) inquiry, be classified as either “conscriptive”
or “non-conscriptive”. Evidence would be classified as conscriptive where “an
accused, in violation of his Charter rights, is compelled to incriminate
himself at the behest of the state by means of a statement, the use of the body
or the production of bodily samples”: Stillman, at para. 80, per
Cory J. The category of conscriptive evidence was also held to include real
evidence discovered as a result of an unlawfully conscripted statement. This is
known as derivative evidence.
[64] Stillman
held that conscriptive evidence is generally inadmissible — because of its
presumed impact on trial fairness — unless if it would have been independently
discovered. Despite reminders that “all the circumstances” must always be
considered under s. 24(2) (see R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, per
Sopinka J., R. v. Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 3, per LeBel
J.), Stillman has generally been read as creating an all-but-automatic
exclusionary rule for non-discoverable conscriptive evidence, broadening the
category of conscriptive evidence and increasing its importance to the ultimate
decision on admissibility.
[65] This
general rule of inadmissibility of all non-discoverable conscriptive evidence,
whether intended by Stillman or not, seems to go against the requirement
of s. 24(2) that the court determining admissibility must consider “all the
circumstances”. The underlying assumption that the use of conscriptive
evidence always, or almost always, renders the trial unfair is also open to
challenge. In other contexts, this Court has recognized that a fair trial “is
one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while
preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused”: R. v. Harrer,
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 562, at para. 45. It is difficult to reconcile trial fairness
as a multifaceted and contextual concept with a near-automatic presumption that
admission of a broad class of evidence will render a trial unfair, regardless
of the circumstances in which it was obtained. In our view, trial fairness is
better conceived as an overarching systemic goal than as a distinct stage of
the s. 24(2) analysis.
[66] This
brief review of the impact of Collins and Stillman brings
us to the heart of our inquiry on this appeal: clarification of the criteria
relevant to determining when, in “all the circumstances”, admission of evidence
obtained by a Charter breach “would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute”.
2. Overview of a Revised Approach to Section 24(2)
[67] The
words of s. 24(2) capture its purpose: to maintain the good repute of the
administration of justice. The term “administration of justice” is often used
to indicate the processes by which those who break the law are investigated,
charged and tried. More broadly, however, the term embraces maintaining the
rule of law and upholding Charter rights in the justice system as a
whole.
[68] The
phrase “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” must be understood
in the long‑term sense of maintaining the integrity of, and public
confidence in, the justice system. Exclusion of evidence resulting in an
acquittal may provoke immediate criticism. But s. 24(2) does not focus on
immediate reaction to the individual case. Rather, it looks to whether the
overall repute of the justice system, viewed in the long term, will be
adversely affected by admission of the evidence. The inquiry is objective. It
asks whether a reasonable person, informed of all relevant circumstances and
the values underlying the Charter , would conclude that the admission of
the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
[69] Section
24(2)’s focus is not only long-term, but prospective. The fact of the Charter
breach means damage has already been done to the administration of
justice. Section 24(2) starts from that proposition and seeks to ensure that
evidence obtained through that breach does not do further damage to the repute
of the justice system.
[70] Finally,
s. 24(2)’s focus is societal. Section 24(2) is not aimed at punishing the
police or providing compensation to the accused, but rather at systemic
concerns. The s. 24(2) focus is on the broad impact of admission of the
evidence on the long-term repute of the justice system.
[71] A
review of the authorities suggests that whether the admission of evidence
obtained in breach of the Charter would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute engages three avenues of inquiry, each rooted in the
public interests engaged by s. 24(2) , viewed in a long-term, forward-looking
and societal perspective. When faced with an application for exclusion under
s. 24(2) , a court must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence
on society’s confidence in the justice system having regard to: (1) the
seriousness of the Charter -infringing state conduct (admission may send
the message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) the
impact of the breach on the Charter -protected interests of the accused
(admission may send the message that individual rights count for little), and
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. The
court’s role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments under each
of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering all the
circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. These concerns, while not precisely tracking the
categories of considerations set out in Collins, capture the factors
relevant to the s. 24(2) determination as enunciated in Collins and
subsequent jurisprudence.
(a) Seriousness of the Charter -Infringing State
Conduct
[72] The
first line of inquiry relevant to the s. 24(2) analysis requires a court to
assess whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute by sending a message to the public that the courts, as
institutions responsible for the administration of justice, effectively condone
state deviation from the rule of law by failing to dissociate themselves from
the fruits of that unlawful conduct. The more severe or deliberate the state
conduct that led to the Charter violation, the greater the need for the
courts to dissociate themselves from that conduct, by excluding evidence linked
to that conduct, in order to preserve public confidence in and ensure state
adherence to the rule of law.
[73] This
inquiry therefore necessitates an evaluation of the seriousness of the state
conduct that led to the breach. The concern of this inquiry is not to punish
the police or to deter Charter breaches, although deterrence of Charter
breaches may be a happy consequence. The main concern is to preserve public
confidence in the rule of law and its processes. In order to determine the
effect of admission of the evidence on public confidence in the justice system,
the court on a s. 24(2) application must consider the seriousness of the
violation, viewed in terms of the gravity of the offending conduct by state
authorities whom the rule of law requires to uphold the rights guaranteed by
the Charter .
[74] State
conduct resulting in Charter violations varies in seriousness. At one
end of the spectrum, admission of evidence obtained through inadvertent or
minor violations of the Charter may minimally undermine public
confidence in the rule of law. At the other end of the spectrum, admitting
evidence obtained through a wilful or reckless disregard of Charter
rights will inevitably have a negative effect on the public confidence in the
rule of law, and risk bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.
[75] Extenuating
circumstances, such as the need to prevent the disappearance of evidence, may
attenuate the seriousness of police conduct that results in a Charter
breach: R. v. Silveira, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, per Cory J. “Good
faith” on the part of the police will also reduce the need for the court to
disassociate itself from the police conduct. However, ignorance of Charter
standards must not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or wilful blindness
cannot be equated with good faith: R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59, at
p. 87, per Dickson C.J.; R. v. Kokesch, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3, at
pp. 32‑33, per Sopinka J.; R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 631, at para. 59. Wilful or flagrant disregard of the Charter
by those very persons who are charged with upholding the right in question may
require that the court dissociate itself from such conduct. It follows that deliberate
police conduct in violation of established Charter standards tends to
support exclusion of the evidence. It should also be kept in mind that for
every Charter breach that comes before the courts, many others may go
unidentified and unredressed because they did not turn up relevant evidence
leading to a criminal charge. In recognition of the need for courts to
distance themselves from this behaviour, therefore, evidence that the Charter -infringing
conduct was part of a pattern of abuse tends to support exclusion.
(b) Impact on the Charter -Protected Interests
of the Accused
[76] This
inquiry focusses on the seriousness of the impact of the Charter breach
on the Charter -protected interests of the accused. It calls for an
evaluation of the extent to which the breach actually undermined the interests
protected by the right infringed. The impact of a Charter breach may
range from fleeting and technical to profoundly intrusive. The more serious the
impact on the accused’s protected interests, the greater the risk that
admission of the evidence may signal to the public that Charter rights,
however high-sounding, are of little actual avail to the citizen, breeding
public cynicism and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.
[77] To determine
the seriousness of the infringement from this perspective, we look to the
interests engaged by the infringed right and examine the degree to which the
violation impacted on those interests. For example, the interests engaged in
the case of a statement to the authorities obtained in breach of the Charter
include the s. 7 right to silence, or to choose whether or not to speak to
authorities (Hebert) — all stemming from the principle against
self-incrimination: R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 417, at para. 44.
The more serious the incursion on these interests, the greater the risk that
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.
[78] Similarly,
an unreasonable search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter may impact on the
protected interests of privacy, and more broadly, human dignity. An
unreasonable search that intrudes on an area in which the individual reasonably
enjoys a high expectation of privacy, or that demeans his or her dignity, is
more serious than one that does not.
(c) Society’s Interest in an Adjudication on
the Merits
[79] Society
generally expects that a criminal allegation will be adjudicated on its merits.
Accordingly, the third line of inquiry relevant to the s. 24(2) analysis asks
whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be
better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion. This inquiry
reflects society’s “collective interest in ensuring that those who transgress
the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law”: R. v.
Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, at pp. 1219-20. Thus the Court suggested in Collins
that a judge on a s. 24(2) application should consider not only the
negative impact of admission of the evidence on the repute of the
administration of justice, but the impact of failing to admit the
evidence.
[80] The
concern for truth-seeking is only one of the considerations under a
s. 24(2) application. The view that reliable evidence is admissible
regardless of how it was obtained (see R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272) is
inconsistent with the Charter ’s affirmation of rights. More
specifically, it is inconsistent with the wording of s. 24(2) , which mandates a
broad inquiry into all the circumstances, not just the reliability of the
evidence.
[81] This
said, public interest in truth-finding remains a relevant consideration under
the s. 24(2) analysis. The reliability of the evidence is an important factor
in this line of inquiry. If a breach (such as one that effectively compels the
suspect to talk) undermines the reliability of the evidence, this points in the
direction of exclusion of the evidence. The admission of unreliable evidence
serves neither the accused’s interest in a fair trial nor the public interest
in uncovering the truth. Conversely, exclusion of relevant and reliable
evidence may undermine the truth-seeking function of the justice system and
render the trial unfair from the public perspective, thus bringing the
administration of justice into disrepute.
[82] The
fact that the evidence obtained in breach of the Charter may facilitate
the discovery of the truth and the adjudication of a case on its merits must
therefore be weighed against factors pointing to exclusion, in order to
“balance the interests of truth with the integrity of the justice system”: Mann,
at para. 57, per Iacobucci J. The court must ask “whether the
vindication of the specific Charter violation through the exclusion of
evidence exacts too great a toll on the truth-seeking goal of the criminal
trial”: R. v. Kitaitchik (2002), 166 C.C.C. (3d) 14 (Ont. C.A.), at
para. 47, per Doherty J.A.
[83] The
importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case is another factor that may
be considered in this line of inquiry. Like Deschamps J., we view this factor
as corollary to the inquiry into reliability, in the following limited sense.
The admission of evidence of questionable reliability is more likely to bring
the administration of justice into disrepute where it forms the entirety of the
case against the accused. Conversely, the exclusion of highly reliable evidence
may impact more negatively on the repute of the administration of justice where
the remedy effectively guts the prosecution.
[84] It has
been suggested that the judge should also, under this line of inquiry, consider
the seriousness of the offence at issue. Indeed, Deschamps J. views this
factor as very important, arguing that the more serious the offence, the
greater society’s interest in its prosecution (para. 226). In our view, while
the seriousness of the alleged offence may be a valid consideration, it has the
potential to cut both ways. Failure to effectively prosecute a serious charge
due to excluded evidence may have an immediate impact on how people view the
justice system. Yet, as discussed, it is the long-term repute of the justice
system that is s. 24(2)’s focus. As pointed out in Burlingham, the goals
furthered by s. 24(2) “operate independently of the type of crime for which the
individual stands accused” (para. 51). And as Lamer J. observed in Collins,
“[t]he Charter is designed to protect the accused from the majority, so
the enforcement of the Charter must not be left to that majority” (p.
282). The short-term public clamour for a conviction in a particular case must
not deafen the s. 24(2) judge to the longer-term repute of the administration
of justice. Moreover, while the public has a heightened interest in seeing a
determination on the merits where the offence charged is serious, it also has a
vital interest in having a justice system that is above reproach, particularly
where the penal stakes for the accused are high.
[85] To
review, the three lines of inquiry identified above — the seriousness of the Charter -infringing
state conduct, the impact of the breach on the Charter -protected
interests of the accused, and the societal interest in an adjudication on the
merits — reflect what the s. 24(2) judge must consider in assessing the effect
of admission of the evidence on the repute of the administration of justice.
Having made these inquiries, which encapsulate consideration of “all the circumstances”
of the case, the judge must then determine whether, on balance, the admission
of the evidence obtained by Charter breach would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
[86] In all
cases, it is the task of the trial judge to weigh the various indications. No
overarching rule governs how the balance is to be struck. Mathematical
precision is obviously not possible. However, the preceding analysis creates a
decision tree, albeit more flexible than the Stillman self-incrimination
test. We believe this to be required by the words of s. 24(2). We also take
comfort in the fact that patterns emerge with respect to particular types of
evidence. These patterns serve as guides to judges faced with s. 24(2)
applications in future cases. In this way, a measure of certainty is achieved.
Where the trial judge has considered the proper factors, appellate courts
should accord considerable deference to his or her ultimate determination.
3. Application to Different Kinds of Evidence
[87] We
have seen that a trial judge on a s. 24(2) application for exclusion of
evidence obtained in breach of the Charter must consider whether
admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, having
regard to the results of the three lines of inquiry identified above.
[88] We now
turn to some of the types of evidence the cases have considered.
(a) Statements by the Accused
[89] Statements
by the accused engage the principle against self-incrimination, “one of the
cornerstones of our criminal law”: R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3
S.C.R. 609, at para. 2. This Court in White, at para. 44, per Iacobucci
J., described the principle against self-incrimination as “an overarching
principle within our criminal justice system, from which a number of specific
common law and Charter rules emanate, such as the confessions rule, and
the right to silence”. The principle also informs “more specific procedural
protections such as, for example, the right to counsel in s. 10 (b), the
right to non‑compellability in s. 11 (c), and the right to use
immunity set out in s. 13 ”. Residual protection for the principle against
self-incrimination is derived from s. 7 .
[90] This
case concerns s. 24(2). However, it is important to note at the outset that
the common law confessions rule, quite apart from s. 24(2), provides a
significant safeguard against the improper use of a statement against its
maker. Where a statement is made to a recognized person in authority,
regardless of whether its maker is detained at the time, it is inadmissible
unless the Crown can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that it was made
voluntarily. Only if such a statement survives scrutiny under the confessions
rule and is found to be voluntary, does the s. 24(2) remedy of exclusion arise.
Most commonly, this will occur because of added protections under s. 10 (b)
of the Charter .
[91] There
is no absolute rule of exclusion of Charter -infringing statements under
s. 24(2) , as there is for involuntary confessions at common law. However, as a
matter of practice, courts have tended to exclude statements obtained in breach
of the Charter , on the ground that admission on balance would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.
[92] The
three lines of inquiry described above support the presumptive general,
although not automatic, exclusion of statements obtained in breach of the Charter .
[93] The
first inquiry focusses on whether admission of the evidence would harm the
repute of justice by associating the courts with illegal police conduct.
Police conduct in obtaining statements has long been strongly constrained. The
preservation of public confidence in the justice system requires that the
police adhere to the Charter in obtaining statements from a detained
accused.
[94] The
negative impact on the justice system of admitting evidence obtained through
police misconduct varies with the seriousness of the violation. The impression
that courts condone serious police misconduct is more harmful to the repute of
the justice system than the acceptance of minor or inadvertent slips.
[95] The
second inquiry considers the extent to which the breach actually undermined the
interests protected by the right infringed. Again, the potential to harm the
repute of the justice system varies with the seriousness of the impingement on
the individual’s protected interests. As noted, the right violated by
unlawfully obtained statements is often the right to counsel under s. 10 (b).
The failure to advise of the right to counsel undermines the detainee’s right
to make a meaningful and informed choice whether to speak, the related right to
silence, and, most fundamentally, the protection against testimonial
self-incrimination. These rights protect the individual’s interest in liberty
and autonomy. Violation of these fundamental rights tends to militate in favour
of excluding the statement.
[96] This
said, particular circumstances may attenuate the impact of a Charter
breach on the protected interests of the accused from whom a statement is obtained
in breach of the Charter . For instance, if an individual is clearly
informed of his or her choice to speak to the police, but compliance with s.
10 (b) was technically defective at either the informational or
implementational stage, the impact on the liberty and autonomy interests of the
accused in making an informed choice may be reduced. Likewise, when a
statement is made spontaneously following a Charter breach, or in the
exceptional circumstances where it can confidently be said that the statement
in question would have been made notwithstanding the Charter breach (see
R. v. Harper, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 343), the impact of the breach on the
accused’s protected interest in informed choice may be less. Absent such
circumstances, the analysis under this line of inquiry supports the general
exclusion of statements taken in breach of the Charter .
[97] The
third inquiry focusses on the public interest in having the case tried fairly
on its merits. This may lead to consideration of the reliability of the evidence.
Just as involuntary confessions are suspect on grounds of reliability, so may,
on occasion, be statements taken in contravention of the Charter .
Detained by the police and without a lawyer, a suspect may make statements that
are based more on a misconceived idea of how to get out of his or her
predicament than on the truth. This danger, where present, undercuts the
argument that the illegally obtained statement is necessary for a trial of the
merits.
[98] In
summary, the heightened concern with proper police conduct in obtaining
statements from suspects and the centrality of the protected interests affected
will in most cases favour exclusion of statements taken in breach of the Charter ,
while the third factor, obtaining a decision on the merits, may be attenuated
by lack of reliability. This, together with the common law’s historic tendency
to treat statements of the accused differently from other evidence, explains
why such statements tend to be excluded under s. 24(2) .
(b) Bodily Evidence
[99] Bodily
evidence is evidence taken from the body of the accused, such as DNA evidence
and breath samples. Section 8 of the Charter protects against
unreasonable search and seizure, and hence precludes the state from obtaining
such evidence in a manner that is unreasonable.
[100]
The majority in Stillman, applying a capacious definition of
conscription, held that bodily evidence is “conscriptive” and that its
admission would affect trial fairness. This resulted in a near-automatic
exclusionary rule for bodily evidence obtained contrary to the Charter .
[101]
Stillman has been criticized for casting the flexible in “all the
circumstances” test prescribed by s. 24(2) into a straitjacket that determines
admissibility solely on the basis of the evidence’s conscriptive character
rather than all the circumstances; for inappropriately erasing distinctions
between testimonial and real evidence; and for producing anomalous results in
some situations: see, e.g., Burlingham, per L’Heureux‑Dubé
J.; R. v. Schedel (2003), 175 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (B.C.C.A.), at paras. 67‑72,
per Esson J.A.; D. M. Paciocco, “Stillman, Disproportion and the
Fair Trial Dichotomy under Section 24(2)” (1997), 2 Can. Crim. L.R. 163;
R. Mahoney, “Problems with the Current Approach to s. 24(2) of the Charter : An
Inevitable Discovery” (1999), 42 Crim. L.Q. 443; S. Penney, “Taking
Deterrence Seriously: Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence Under
Section 24(2) of the Charter ” (2004), 49 McGill L.J. 105; D.
Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (4th ed. 2005), at p.
581. We will briefly review each of these criticisms.
[102]
The first criticism is that the Stillman approach transforms the
flexible “all the circumstances” test mandated by s. 24(2) into a categorical
conscriptive evidence test. Section 24(2) mandates a broad contextual approach
rather than an automatic exclusionary rule: D. M. Paciocco, “The Judicial
Repeal of s. 24(2) and the Development of the Canadian Exclusionary Rule”
(1989-90), 32 Crim. L.Q. 326; A. A. McLellan and B. P. Elman, “The
Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms : An Analysis of
Section 24 ” (1983), 21 Alta. L. Rev. 205, at pp. 205‑8; Orbanski,
at para. 93. As stated in Orbanski, per LeBel J., the inquiry
under s. 24(2) “amounts to finding a proper balance between competing interests
and values at stake in the criminal trial, between the search for truth and the
integrity of the trial . . . . All the Collins factors remain relevant
throughout this delicate and nuanced inquiry” (para. 94).
[103]
A flexible, multi-factored approach to the admissibility of the evidence
is required, not only by the wording of s. 24(2) but by the wide variation
between different kinds of bodily evidence. The seriousness of the police
conduct and the impact on the accused’s rights of taking the bodily evidence,
may vary greatly. Plucking a hair from the suspect’s head may not be
intrusive, and the accused’s privacy interest in the evidence may be relatively
slight. On the other hand, a body cavity or strip search may be intrusive,
demeaning and objectionable. A one-size-fits-all conscription test is
incapable of dealing with such differences in a way that addresses the point of
the s. 24(2) inquiry — to determine if the admission of the evidence will bring
the administration of justice into disrepute.
[104]
Recent decisions suggest a growing consensus that the admissibility of
bodily samples should not depend solely on whether the evidence is conscriptive:
R. v. Richfield (2003), 178 C.C.C. (3d) 23 (Ont. C.A.), per Weiler
J.A.; R. v. Dolynchuk (2004), 184 C.C.C. (3d) 214 (Man. C.A.), per
Steel J.A.; R. v. Banman, 2008 MBCA 103, 236 C.C.C. (3d) 547, per
MacInnes J.A. This Court in R. v. S.A.B., 2003 SCC 60, [2003] 2 S.C.R.
678, dealing with the constitutionality of DNA warrant provisions in the Criminal
Code , acknowledged that the Charter concerns raised by the gathering
of non‑testimonial evidence are better addressed by reference to the
interests of privacy, bodily integrity and human dignity, than by a blanket
rule that by analogy to compelled statements, such evidence is always
inadmissible. See also: L. Stuesser, “R. v. S.A.B.: Putting
‘Self-Incrimination’ in Context” (2004), 42 Alta. L. Rev. 543.
[105]
The second and related objection to a simple conscription test for the
admissibility of bodily evidence under s. 24(2) is that it wrongly equates
bodily evidence with statements taken from the accused. In most situations,
statements and bodily samples raise very different considerations from the
point of view of the administration of justice. Equating them under the
umbrella of conscription risks erasing relevant distinctions and compromising
the ultimate analysis of systemic disrepute. As Professor Paciocco has
observed, “in equating intimate bodily substances with testimony we are not so
much reacting to the compelled participation of the accused as we are to the
violation of the privacy and dignity of the person that obtaining such evidence
involves” (“Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy
under Section 24(2)”, at p. 170). Nor does the taking of a bodily sample
trench on the accused’s autonomy in the same way as may the unlawful taking of
a statement. The pre-trial right to silence under s. 7 , the right against
testimonial self-incrimination in s. 11 (c), and the right against
subsequent use of self-incriminating evidence in s. 13 have informed the
treatment of statements under s. 24(2). These concepts do not apply coherently
to bodily samples, which are not communicative in nature, weakening self‑incrimination
as the sole criterion for determining their admissibility.
[106]
A third criticism of the conscription test for admissibility of bodily
evidence under s. 24(2) is that from a practical perspective, the conscriptive
test has sometimes produced anomalous results, leading to exclusion of evidence
that should, in principle and policy, be admitted: see Dolynchuk; R.
v. Shepherd, 2007 SKCA 29, 218 C.C.C. (3d) 113 (per Smith J.A.
dissenting), aff’d 2009 SCC 35, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 527 (released concurrently);
and R. v. Padavattan (2007), 223 C.C.C. (3d) 221 (Ont. S.C.J.), per
Ducharme J. Notably, breath sample evidence tendered on impaired driving
charges has often suffered the fate of automatic exclusion even where the
breach in question was minor and would not realistically bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. More serious breaches in other kinds
of cases — for instance, those involving seizures of illegal drugs in breach of
s. 8 — have resulted in admission on the grounds that the evidence in question
was non-conscriptive. This apparent incongruity has justifiably raised concern.
[107]
We conclude that the approach to admissibility of bodily evidence under
s. 24(2) that asks simply whether the evidence was conscripted should be
replaced by a flexible test based on all the circumstances, as the wording of
s. 24(2) requires. As for other types of evidence, admissibility should be
determined by inquiring into the effect admission may have on the repute of the
justice system, having regard to the seriousness of the police conduct, the
impact of the Charter breach on the protected interests of the accused,
and the value of a trial on the merits.
[108]
The first inquiry informing the s. 24(2) analysis — the seriousness of
the Charter -infringing conduct — is fact-specific. Admission of
evidence obtained by deliberate and egregious police conduct that disregards
the rights of the accused may lead the public to conclude that the court
implicitly condones such conduct, undermining respect for the administration of
justice. On the other hand, where the breach was committed in good faith,
admission of the evidence may have little adverse effect on the repute of the court
process.
[109]
The second inquiry assesses the danger that admitting the evidence may
suggest that Charter rights do not count, thereby negatively impacting
on the repute of the system of justice. This requires the judge to look at the
seriousness of the breach on the accused’s protected interests. In the context
of bodily evidence obtained in violation of s. 8 , this inquiry requires the
court to examine the degree to which the search and seizure intruded upon the
privacy, bodily integrity and human dignity of the accused. The seriousness of
the intrusion on the accused may vary greatly. At one end of the spectrum, one
finds the forcible taking of blood samples or dental impressions (as in Stillman).
At the other end of the spectrum lie relatively innocuous procedures such as
fingerprinting or iris-recognition technology. The greater the intrusion on
these interests, the more important it is that a court exclude the evidence in
order to substantiate the Charter rights of the accused.
[110]
The third line of inquiry — the effect of admitting the evidence on the
public interest in having a case adjudicated on its merits — will usually
favour admission in cases involving bodily samples. Unlike compelled
statements, evidence obtained from the accused’s body is generally reliable,
and the risk of error inherent in depriving the trier of fact of the evidence
may well tip the balance in favour of admission.
[111]
While each case must be considered on its own facts, it may be ventured
in general that where an intrusion on bodily integrity is deliberately
inflicted and the impact on the accused’s privacy, bodily integrity and dignity
is high, bodily evidence will be excluded, notwithstanding its relevance and
reliability. On the other hand, where the violation is less egregious and the
intrusion is less severe in terms of privacy, bodily integrity and dignity,
reliable evidence obtained from the accused’s body may be admitted. For
example, this will often be the case with breath sample evidence, whose method
of collection is relatively non-intrusive.
(c) Non-Bodily Physical Evidence
[112]
The three inquiries under s. 24(2) will proceed largely as explained
above. Again, under the first inquiry, the seriousness of the Charter -infringing
conduct will be a fact-specific determination. The degree to which this
inquiry militates in favour of excluding the bodily evidence will depend on the
extent to which the conduct can be characterized as deliberate or egregious.
[113]
With respect to the second inquiry, the Charter breach most often
associated with non-bodily physical evidence is the s. 8 protection against
unreasonable search and seizure: see, e.g., Buhay. Privacy is the
principal interest involved in such cases. The jurisprudence offers guidance in
evaluating the extent to which the accused’s reasonable expectation of privacy
was infringed. For example, a dwelling house attracts a higher expectation of
privacy than a place of business or an automobile. An illegal search of a house
will therefore be seen as more serious at this stage of the analysis.
[114]
Other interests, such as human dignity, may also be affected by search
and seizure of such evidence. The question is how seriously the Charter
breach impacted on these interests. For instance, an unjustified strip search
or body cavity search is demeaning to the suspect’s human dignity and will be
viewed as extremely serious on that account: R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 495, at pp. 516-17, per Dickson C.J.; R. v. Golden, 2001
SCC 83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679. The fact that the evidence thereby obtained is not
itself a bodily sample cannot be seen to diminish the seriousness of the
intrusion.
[115]
The third inquiry, whether the admission of the evidence would serve
society’s interest in having a case adjudicated on its merits, like the others,
engages the facts of the particular case. Reliability issues with physical
evidence will not generally be related to the Charter breach.
Therefore, this consideration tends to weigh in favour of admission.
(d) Derivative Evidence
[116]
The class of evidence that presents the greatest difficulty is evidence
that combines aspects of both statements and physical evidence — physical
evidence discovered as a result of an unlawfully obtained statement. The cases
refer to this evidence as derivative evidence. This is the type of evidence at
issue in this case.
[117]
We earlier saw that at common law, involuntary confessions are inadmissible.
The common law’s automatic exclusion of involuntary statements is based on a
sense that it is unfair to conscript a person against himself or herself and,
most importantly, on a concern about the unreliability of compelled statements.
However, the common law drew the line of automatic inadmissibility at the
statements themselves and not the physical or “real” evidence found as a
result of information garnered from such statements. Because reliability was
traditionally the dominant focus of the confessions rule, the public interest
in getting at the truth through reliable evidence was seen to outweigh concerns
related to self-incrimination: Wray and R. v. St. Lawrence,
[1949] O.R. 215 (H.C.J.).
[118]
Section 24(2) of the Charter implicitly overruled the common law
practice of always admitting reliable derivative evidence. Instead, the judge
is required to consider whether admission of derivative evidence obtained
through a Charter breach would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.
[119]
The s. 24(2) jurisprudence on derivative physical evidence has thus far
been dominated by two related concepts — conscription and discoverability.
Physical evidence that would not have been discovered but for an inadmissible
statement has been considered conscriptive and hence is inadmissible: R. v.
Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, and Burlingham. The doctrine of
“discoverability” has been developed in order to distinguish those cases in
which the accused’s conscription was necessary to the collection of the
evidence, from those cases where the evidence would have been obtained in any
event. In the former cases, exclusion was the rule, while in the latter,
admission was more likely.
[120]
The conscription-discoverability doctrine has been justifiably
criticized as overly speculative and capable of producing anomalous results: D.
Stuart, “Questioning the Discoverability Doctrine in Section 24(2) Rulings”
(1996), 48 C.R. (4th) 351; Hogg, at section 41.8(d). In practice, it has proved
difficult to apply because of its hypothetical nature and because of the
fine-grained distinctions between the tests for determining whether evidence is
“derivative” and whether it is “discoverable”: see Feeney, at
paras. 69-71.
[121]
The existing rules on derivative evidence and discoverability were
developed under the Collins trial fairness rationale. They gave effect
to the insight that if evidence would have been discovered in any event, the
accused’s conscription did not truly cause the evidence to become available.
The discoverability doctrine acquired even greater importance under Stillman
where the category of conscriptive evidence was considerably enlarged. Since
we have concluded that this underlying rationale should no longer hold and that
“trial fairness” in the Collins/Stillman sense is no longer a
determinative criterion for the s. 24(2) inquiry, discoverability should
likewise not be determinative of admissibility.
[122]
Discoverability retains a useful role, however, in assessing the actual
impact of the breach on the protected interests of the accused. It allows the
court to assess the strength of the causal connection between the Charter -infringing
self-incrimination and the resultant evidence. The more likely it is that the
evidence would have been obtained even without the statement, the lesser the
impact of the breach on the accused’s underlying interest against
self-incrimination. The converse, of course, is also true. On the other hand,
in cases where it cannot be determined with any confidence whether evidence
would have been discovered in absence of the statement, discoverability will
have no impact on the s. 24(2) inquiry.
[123]
To determine whether the admission of derivative evidence would bring
the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) , courts must pursue
the usual three lines of inquiry outlined in these reasons, taking into
account the self-incriminatory origin of the evidence in an improperly obtained
statement as well as its status as real evidence.
[124]
The first inquiry concerns the police conduct in obtaining the statement
that led to the real evidence. Once again, the extent to which this inquiry
favours exclusion will depend on the factual circumstances of the breach: the
more serious the state conduct, the more the admission of the evidence derived
from it tends to undermine public confidence in the rule of law. Were the
police deliberately and systematically flouting the accused’s Charter rights?
Or were the officers acting in good faith, pursuant to what they thought were
legitimate policing policies?
[125]
The second inquiry focusses on the impact of the breach on the Charter -protected
interests of the accused. Where a statement is unconstitutionally obtained, in
many cases the Charter right breached is the s. 10 (b) right to
counsel, which protects the accused’s interest in making an informed choice
whether or not to speak to authorities. The relevant consideration at this
stage will be the extent to which the Charter breach impinged upon that
interest in a free and informed choice. Where that interest was significantly
compromised by the breach, this factor will strongly favour exclusion. In
determining the impact of the breach, the discoverability of the derivative
evidence may also be important as a factor strengthening or attenuating the
self-incriminatory character of the evidence. If the derivative evidence was
independently discoverable, the impact of the breach on the accused is lessened
and admission is more likely.
[126]
The third inquiry in determining whether admission of the derivative
evidence would bring the administration into disrepute relates to society’s
interest in having the case adjudicated on its merits. Since evidence in this
category is real or physical, there is usually less concern as to the
reliability of the evidence. Thus, the public interest in having a trial
adjudicated on its merits will usually favour admission of the derivative
evidence.
[127]
The weighing process and balancing of these concerns is one for the
trial judge in each case. Provided the judge has considered the correct
factors, considerable deference should be accorded to his or her decision. As
a general rule, however, it can be ventured that where reliable evidence is
discovered as a result of a good faith infringement that did not greatly
undermine the accused’s protected interests, the trial judge may conclude that
it should be admitted under s. 24(2) . On the other hand, deliberate and
egregious police conduct that severely impacted the accused’s protected
interests may result in exclusion, notwithstanding that the evidence may be
reliable.
[128]
The s. 24(2) judge must remain sensitive to the concern that a more
flexible rule may encourage police to improperly obtain statements that they
know will be inadmissible, in order to find derivative evidence which they
believe may be admissible. The judge should refuse to admit evidence where
there is reason to believe the police deliberately abused their power to obtain
a statement which might lead them to such evidence. Where derivative evidence
is obtained by way of a deliberate or flagrant Charter breach, its
admission would bring the administration of justice into further disrepute and
the evidence should be excluded.
4. Application to This Case
[129]
The issue is whether the gun produced by Mr. Grant after Toronto police
stopped and questioned him should be excluded from the evidence at his trial.
The trial judge held that had a Charter breach been established, he
would not have excluded the evidence. While the trial judge’s s. 24(2)
conclusion may not command deference where an appellate court reaches a
different conclusion on the breach itself (see R. v. Grant, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 223, at pp. 256-57, per Sopinka J.; R. v. Harris, 2007
ONCA 574, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at p. 212), the trial judge’s underlying factual
findings must be respected, absent palpable and overriding error.
[130]
Here, the admissibility of Mr. Grant’s incriminatory statements is not
in issue, the statements having no independent evidentiary value. The only
issue is the admission or exclusion of the gun. This falls to be determined in
accordance with the inquiries described earlier.
[131]
At the outset, it is necessary to consider whether the gun was “obtained
in a manner” that violated Mr. Grant’s Charter rights: see R. v.
Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980, and R. v. Goldhart, [1996] 2 S.C.R.
463. As explained above, we have concluded that Mr. Grant’s rights under ss. 9
and 10 (b) of the Charter were breached. The discovery of the gun
was both temporally and causally connected to these infringements. It follows
that the gun was obtained as a result of a Charter breach.
[132]
Because the gun was discovered as a result of statements taken in breach
of the Charter , it is derivative evidence. The question, as always, is
whether its admission would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute. To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the concerns
that underlie the s. 24(2) analysis, as discussed above, in “all the
circumstances” of the case, including the arbitrary detention and the breach of
the right to counsel.
[133]
We consider first the seriousness of the improper police conduct that
led to the discovery of the gun. The police conduct here, while not in
conformity with the Charter , was not abusive. There was no
suggestion that Mr. Grant was the target of racial profiling or other
discriminatory police practices. The officers went too far in detaining the
accused and asking him questions. However, the point at which an encounter
becomes a detention is not always clear, and is something with which courts
have struggled. Though we have concluded that the police were in error in
detaining the appellant when they did, the mistake is an understandable one.
Having been under a mistaken view that they had not detained the appellant, the
officers’ failure to advise him of his right to counsel was similarly erroneous
but understandable. It therefore cannot be characterized as having been in bad faith.
Given that the police conduct in committing the Charter breach was
neither deliberate nor egregious, we conclude that the effect of admitting the
evidence would not greatly undermine public confidence in the rule of law. We
add that the Court’s decision in this case will be to render similar conduct
less justifiable going forward. While police are not expected to engage in
judicial reflection on conflicting precedents, they are rightly expected to
know what the law is.
[134]
The second inquiry under the s. 24(2) analysis focusses on whether the
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute from the perspective of society’s interest in respect for Charter
rights. This inquiry focusses on the impact of the breach on the accused’s
protected interests. Because the two infringed Charter rights protect
different interests, it is necessary to consider them separately at this stage.
[135]
The initial Charter violation was arbitrary detention under s. 9
of the Charter , curtailing Mr. Grant’s liberty interest. This
interaction, beginning as a casual conversation, quickly developed into a
subtly coercive situation that deprived Mr. Grant of his freedom to make an
informed choice as to how to respond. This is so, notwithstanding the fact
that the detention did not involve any physical coercion and was not carried
out in an abusive manner. We therefore conclude that the impact of this breach,
while not severe, was more than minimal.
[136]
The second Charter violation was breach of Mr. Grant’s s. 10 (b)
right to counsel. Cst. Gomes, by his own admission, was probing for answers
that would give him grounds for search or arrest. Far from being spontaneous
utterances, the appellant’s incriminating statements were prompted directly by
Cst. Gomes’ pointed questioning. The appellant, in need of legal advice, was
not told he could consult counsel.
[137]
As discussed, discoverability remains a factor in assessing the impact
of Charter breaches on Charter rights. The investigating
officers testified that they would not have searched or arrested Mr. Grant but
for his self-incriminatory statements. Nor would they have had any legal
grounds to do so. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence was non-discoverable
aggravates the impact of the breach on Mr. Grant’s interest in being able to
make an informed choice to talk to the police. He was in “immediate need of
legal advice” (Brydges, at p. 206) and had no opportunity to seek it.
[138]
Considering all these matters, we conclude that the impact of the
infringement of Mr. Grant’s rights under ss. 9 and 10 (b) of the Charter
was significant.
[139]
The third and final concern is the effect of admitting the gun on the
public interest in having a case adjudicated on its merits. The gun is highly
reliable evidence. It is essential to a determination on the merits. The Crown
also argues that the seriousness of the offence weighs in favour of admitting
the evidence of the gun, so that the matter may be decided on its merits,
asserting that gun crime is a societal scourge, that offences of this nature
raise major public safety concerns and that the gun is the main evidence in the
case. On the other hand, Mr. Grant argues that the seriousness of the offence
makes it all the more important that his rights be respected. In the result,
we do not find this factor to be of much assistance.
[140]
To sum up, the police conduct was not egregious. The impact of the Charter
breach on the accused’s protected interests was significant, although not at
the most serious end of the scale. Finally, the value of the evidence is
considerable. These effects must be balanced in determining whether admitting
the gun would put the administration of justice into disrepute. We agree with
Laskin J.A. that this is a close case. The balancing mandated by s. 24(2) is
qualitative in nature and therefore not capable of mathematical precision.
However, weighing all these concerns, in our opinion the courts below did not
err in concluding that the admission of the gun into evidence would not, on
balance, bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The significant
impact of the breach on Mr. Grant’s Charter -protected rights weighs
strongly in favour of excluding the gun, while the public interest in the
adjudication of the case on its merits weighs strongly in favour of its
admission. Unlike the situation in R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009]
2 S.C.R. 494, the police officers here were operating in circumstances of
considerable legal uncertainty. In our view, this tips the balance in favour of
admission, suggesting that the repute of the justice system would not suffer
from allowing the gun to be admitted in evidence against the appellant.
C. The Meaning of “Transfer” in Sections 84 ,
99 and 100 of the Criminal Code
[141]
Mr. Grant argues that his conviction of possession of a firearm for the
purposes of weapons trafficking under s. 100(1) of the Criminal Code
should be quashed on the grounds that he did not “transfer” the firearm within
the meaning of that section. Section 100(1) states:
100. (1) Every person commits an offence who possesses a
firearm, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, any
ammunition or any prohibited ammunition for the purpose of
(a) transferring
it, whether or not for consideration, or
(b) offering
to transfer it,
knowing that
the person is not authorized to transfer it under the Firearms Act or
any other Act of Parliament or any regulations made under any Act of
Parliament.
[142]
In the Court of Appeal, Laskin J.A. noted that “[t]he word ‘transfer’
is defined in s. 84 to mean ‘sell, provide, barter, give, lend, rent, send, transport,
ship, distribute or deliver’” (para. 72 (italics in original, underlining
added)). He observed that the dictionary definition of “transport” is to
“carry, convey or remove from one place or person to another” (para. 72
(emphasis in original)). He also noted that ss. 84 and 100 of the Code
were enacted with reference to the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39 , and
he considered this wider context. Laskin J.A. was not persuaded that there was
any reason to depart from the plain meaning of the word. On this definition,
Mr. Grant’s admission that he was “dropping off” the gun somewhere “up the
road” entailed moving the gun from one place to another and was therefore
sufficient to establish all elements of the offence defined by s. 100(1) .
[143]
Mr. Grant submits that a contextual reading of s. 100 and the related
provisions reveals that Parliament intended to reserve the stiffest penalties
for transfers that amount to weapons trafficking, not the mere movement of a
firearm from place to place. Since the trial judge did not find that he was in
possession of the gun for the purpose of transferring it to another person, Mr.
Grant argues that the s. 100(1) conviction cannot stand.
[144]
We agree with Mr. Grant that Parliament did not intend s. 100(1) to
address the simple movement of a firearm from one place to another. First,
according to the “associated meaning” principle of statutory interpretation,
“when two or more words linked by ‘and’ or ‘or’ serve an analogous grammatical
and logical function within a provision, they should be interpreted with a view
to their common features”: McDiarmid Lumber Ltd. v. God’s Lake First Nation,
2006 SCC 58, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 846, at para. 30, per McLachlin C.J. See
also R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th ed.
2008), at pp. 227-31. Once again, the definition of “transfer” is given in
s. 84 as “sell, provide, barter, give, lend, rent, send, transport, ship,
distribute or deliver”. Of these words, only “transport” can plausibly be said
to include moving a thing from place to place without the thing actually
changing hands. The common element is the notion of a transaction. This
suggests a more restrictive meaning than indicated by the dictionary definition
of “transport”.
[145]
It should also be noted that s. 100(1) (a) applies to the transfer
of a firearm, “whether or not for consideration”. Even if “transfer” is
equated with “transport”, the underlined words suggest that the import of the
provision is to criminalize the transfer of firearms for purposes that
implicate others. In other words, the inclusion of the phrase “whether or not
for consideration” in s. 100(1) (a) suggests that Parliament did not
intend to criminalize simple movement of firearms by this provision, but rather
transport for purposes that implicate another person. Further, the
criminalization of an “offer” to transfer a firearm under s. 100(1) (b)
suggests that a “transfer” is transactional in nature.
[146]
We do not accept, as did Laskin J.A., the proposition that the more
restrictive reading of s. 100(1) would “destroy the cohesion between the Criminal
Code provisions on firearms and the Firearms Act ” (para. 77). While
it is undoubtedly true that Parliament intended to place tight restrictions on
the movement of firearms, there are other provisions in both regimes that deal
specifically with “transfers” that fall short of trafficking. Moving a firearm
in an unauthorized manner could result in prosecution under s. 86(2) of the Criminal
Code , which penalizes the transportation of a firearm in contravention of
the regulations made pursuant to the Firearms Act . Moreover, the Firearms
Act defines “transfer” differently from the Criminal Code , so their
cohesion should not be overstated: see s. 21 of the Act.
[147]
Finally, s. 100(1) appears in the Code under the heading
“Trafficking Offences”. As the Court held in R. v. Davis, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 759, at para. 53, per Lamer C.J., headings “should be considered
part of the legislation and should be read and relied on like any other
contextual feature” (quoting R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of
Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 269). Firearms trafficking offences are
extremely serious, carrying substantial penalties. Indeed, since amendments to
the Code in 2008, a conviction under s. 100(1) now carries a mandatory
minimum penitentiary sentence of three years for a first-time offender, up from
one year when Mr. Grant was convicted. It should not be lightly assumed that
Parliament intended to deem anyone moving a firearm from place to place without
authorization to be a weapons trafficker, liable to at least three years’
imprisonment on a first offence. In our view, a contextual reading of the
applicable provisions suggests the contrary. Mr. Grant’s offence was serious
and potentially extremely dangerous, but on the evidence he did not commit the
crime of trafficking.
[148]
We would therefore allow the appeal on Count 4.
V. Conclusion
[149]
We would allow the appeal on Count 4 (the trafficking charge) and enter
an acquittal. On all other counts, we would dismiss the appeal.
The following are the reasons delivered by
[150]
Binnie J. — I concur with
the disposition of the appeal proposed by my colleagues the Chief Justice and
Charron J. and with their modified framework for determinations under s. 24(2)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding the admission
or rejection of evidence obtained in a manner that violates the Charter .
I differ, with respect, on their approach to the definition of “detention” in
ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter . In particular, I believe their approach
lays too much emphasis on the claimant’s perception of psychological
pressure, albeit as filtered through the eyes of the hypothetical reasonable
person in the claimant’s situation. My colleagues summarize their position on
this point as follows:
1. Detention under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter
refers to a suspension of the individual’s liberty interest by a significant
physical or psychological restraint. Psychological detention is established
either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with the
restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by
reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply.
[Emphasis added; para. 44.]
My colleagues
then set out a number of factors to help “determine whether the reasonable
person in the individual’s circumstances would conclude that he or she had been
deprived by the state of the liberty of choice” (ibid.).
[151]
The Court’s continued embrace of a wholly claimant-centred approach may
lead to the impression that it is more important to enquire whether the
hypothetical reasonable person “in the individual’s circumstances” would think
himself or herself to be detained than whether he or she is detained.
The perspective of the person stopped (or a “reasonable person” caught in that
particular situation) is important because it is that person’s liberty
that is at issue, but, in my view, the claimant’s perspective does not exhaust
the relevant considerations. I agree there can be no detention unless the
liberty of the person stopped is (or is reasonably perceived by that person to
be) significantly constrained, but there may be much happening of which the
person stopped is unaware, and this other context ought potentially to affect
the legal characterization of the encounter. I agree with Professor Stuart
when he writes that
the focus
should not be exclusively on the state of mind of the accused. As Courts
of Appeal have persuasively suggested, detention should also take into account
the perceptions of the police. . . . [Otherwise] [t]hose perhaps most in need
of Charter protection against coercive police practices will have none. On the
other hand, it would be unfortunate if preliminary police questioning of any
suspect would have to be peppered with Charter warnings.
(D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (4th ed.
2005), at p. 327)
My colleagues do
take into account some police-related factors (e.g., whether the individual is
singled out for “focussed investigation” (para. 44(2)(a)) but, as will be seen,
they do so only to the extent this information is made evident to the person
stopped.
[152]
Also important, in my view, is an objective assessment of the
facts of the encounter divorced from the perception of both parties, neither of
whom may have a very clear idea of what is going on in the rush of events.
A. When Does a “Stop” Become a Detention?
[153]
While the uniformed police embody society’s collective desire for public
order and livable and safe communities, they also present a serious and
continuing risk to the individual’s right to be left alone by the state in the
absence of objective justification for the state’s intervention. Interactions
between the police and members of the public are not only rich in diversity but
exceedingly common. Quite apart from police assistance offered to the general
public, a traditional part of the daily routine of the “cop on the beat” is to
check out “suspicious persons”. Clear guidance on the rules governing such
encounters is, or ought to be, an important part of police
training: C. D. Shearing and P. C. Stenning, Police
Training in Ontario: An Evaluation of Recruit and Supervisory Courses (1980),
at p. 41. This case is about a pedestrian. No one doubts the importance of
being able to determine at what moment an interaction between the police
and a pedestrian is converted into a detention of that individual,
thereby triggering the rights subsidiary to detention, including the right to
involve his or her lawyer who can generally be expected to advise his or her
client not to say anything further. In the first instance it is the police who
must decide if a detention exists because they are the people who administer
the caution and inform the person detained about the right to counsel. Their
intentions and perceptions will inevitably be factored into their
determinations whether disclosed to the claimant or not, and should be taken
into account in the legal test for detention when the matter eventually comes
before a judge.
[154]
A growing body of evidence and opinion suggests that visible minorities
and marginalized individuals are at particular risk from unjustified “low
visibility” police interventions in their lives: R. v. Golden, 2001 SCC
83, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 83. See also A. Young, “All Along the
Watchtower: Arbitrary Detention and the Police Function” (1991), 29 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 329, at p. 390; D. M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to Stop Racial
Profiling: The Development of an Equality-Based Conception of Arbitrary
Detention” (2002), 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145; Ontario Human Rights
Commission, Inquiry Report. Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial
Profiling (2003); Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System (1995), at p. 337. The appellant, Mr.
Grant, is black. Courts cannot presume to be colour-blind in these situations.
[155]
At the same time, members of visible minorities may, as much as anyone
else, be approached and asked questions by police. While, even more so than
others, they may feel unable to choose to walk away, the perspective of the
police and the information (if any) the police possess when they initiate an
encounter would help assess whether the liberty interest of the person stopped
is truly at issue, even if the police perspective on the encounter is not made
known by words or conduct to the person stopped.
B. A Brief History of the “Reasonable
Perception” Test
[156]
Our approach to detention, as with so much of this area of the law,
draws heavily on the U.S. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Both societies,
Canada and the United States, place a high value on the right of citizens to go
about their business without being arbitrarily stopped by the police and told
to give an account of activities that they consider to be none of the police’s
affair. We therefore want a definition of detention that protects our
liberty. Accordingly, in R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, Le Dain J.
held, and subsequent cases have agreed, that a person is detained where he or
she “submits or acquiesces in the deprivation of liberty and reasonably
believes that the choice to do otherwise does not exist” (p. 644). This approach
corresponded to earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court establishing that
“a person has been ‘seized’ [i.e. detained] within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”: United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), at p. 554, endorsed in Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), and subsequent cases.
[157]
Stewart J. in Mendenhall stated quite categorically that the
“subjective intention” of the state authority (a drugs enforcement officer) “to
detain the respondent, had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant except
insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent” (p. 554, fn. 6
(emphasis added)). The approach of excluding from consideration information
not reasonably evident to the person stopped is endorsed by my colleagues at
numerous points in their judgment, for example:
The question
is whether the police conduct would cause a reasonable person to conclude that
he or she was not free to go and had to comply with the police direction or
demand. [para. 31]
.
. .
Accordingly,
we must consider all relevant circumstances to determine if a reasonable person
in Mr. Grant’s position would have concluded that his or her right to choose
how to interact with the police (i.e. whether to leave or comply) had been
removed. [para. 46]
.
. .
In our view, the evidence supports Mr. Grant’s contention that a
reasonable person in his position (18 years old, alone, faced by three
physically larger policemen in adversarial positions) would conclude that his
or her right to choose how to act had been removed by the police, given their
conduct. [para. 50]
[158]
The Mendenhall approach to detention adopted in Therens
and affirmed in this case by my colleagues has different consequences in the
U.S. than it does here. In relation to the right to counsel, for example,
that right does not arise in the U.S. “without delay” upon a psychological
detention (“or seizure”), but only where there is “a ‘formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal
arrest”: California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), at p. 1125; Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), at p. 495. See also Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), at pp. 490-91; Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), at p. 444; Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995),
at p. 112. Whether such a situation of formal restraint exists under U.S. law
“depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the
person being questioned”: Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994),
at p. 323 (emphasis added). In other words, in the U.S. psychological
detention does not, without more, invoke entitlement to the assistance of
counsel. The U.S. courts take a generous view of when “psychological
detention” occurs because it triggers scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment of
police conduct that would otherwise lie outside judicial oversight under their
Constitution. In practical terms, the U.S. can live with such a broad
claimant-centred definition because it does not have the effect of bringing in
the lawyers at an early stage in encounters between the police and the
citizen. The significant effect of a finding of detention in the U.S., as
under our decision in R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59, is to
require the police to meet the standard of reasonable suspicion. Thus, the Mendenhall
doctrine of psychological detention, when imported into Canada, raises a
complication under s. 10 (b) not present in the United States.
C. Recognizing an “Obvious Tension”
[159]
In this case, Laskin J.A., speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal,
recognized that:
The definition of “psychological detention” reflects a judicial
balance between competing values. On the one hand, the police have the duty
and the authority to investigate and prevent crime in order to keep our
community safe. In carrying out their duty, they must interact daily with
ordinary citizens. Not every such encounter between the police and a citizen
amounts to a constitutional “detention”. This court and other courts have
recognized that police must be able to speak to a citizen without triggering
that citizen’s Charter rights.
.
. .
On the other hand, ordinary citizens must have the right to move
freely about their community.
((2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 1, at paras. 10 and 12)
[160]
In the companion case of R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2
S.C.R. 460, where the police intercepted an individual as he tried to leave an
Ontario liquor store where a fraud had just been committed, Doherty J.A., also
speaking for the Ontario Court of Appeal, recognized the “obvious tension
between the requirement to inform detained persons of their right to counsel
and the proper and effective use of brief investigative detentions” (2007 ONCA
60, 85 O.R. (3d) 127, at para. 41).
[161]
Having found a breach of s. 9 , Laskin J.A. did not go on in this case to
deal with the s. 10 (b) right to counsel. However, as my colleagues
treat Suberu in this Court as a more or less straightforward application
of their analysis of detention in Grant, I propose to deal with both ss.
9 and 10 (b) here.
[162]
The Crown’s argument is that by introducing a right to legal counsel
(and “to be informed of that right”) prematurely into commonplace interactions
between police and members of the public, the Court would hamstring essential
police services and unduly tilt the constitutional balance against the public
interest in effective law enforcement. For the police, in Professor Uviller’s
mellifluous phrase, “[t]he confession is the ‘queen of the evidentiary
chessboard’” (quoted in Young, at pp. 365-66). When lawyers are on the scene,
the potential for obtaining confessions tends to dry up.
[163]
The defence, on the other hand, supports a broad definition of detention
and quick access to legal advice because under a less generous Charter
approach a member of the public risks serious prejudice to his or her defence
before the lawyer can get involved, since few members of the public are clear
about their Charter rights. The solution to this dilemma offered by the
Ontario Court of Appeal in Suberu was to read down s. 10 (b) so
that the concept of “without delay” is stretched more readily to accommodate
the reasonable needs of law enforcement (which in practice might well result in
a situation similar to that prevailing in the U.S.). The problem with the
Ontario court’s solution, as my colleagues note, is that the interpretation
does not sit easily with what those words mean, whether interpreted
purposefully, textually or contextually with the Charter .
[164]
The appellant, supported by the Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, suggests that the “obvious
tension” could be eased by declaring inadmissible any incriminating statements
made by an accused between the moment the detention crystallized and the
subsequent notification to the accused of the right to retain and instruct
counsel. However, this presupposes that the s. 9 detention has indeed
crystallized, which is the point in issue.
[165]
Another way to ease the “obvious tension” (other than resort to s. 1 )
would be for the courts to re-examine the concept of “psychological detention”
with a view to broadening the perspectives from which the encounter is viewed.
This would help obviate some of the problems with a purely claimant-centred
approach, in my opinion.
D. Problems With the Claimant-Centred Approach
[166]
I believe there are a number of problems with the Court’s continuing
endorsement of the Therens/Mendenhall approach to determine when
a simple interaction crystallizes into a detention. Insistence that the
claimant’s circumstances be viewed from the more detached perspective of a
“reasonable person” provides in some cases a welcome corrective, but in other
cases, by exaggerating the ability of ordinary people to stand up to police
assertion of authority, that approach may compel the conclusion that the claimant
had the choice to walk away whereas in reality no such choice existed.
1. The Perception of the Police May Be of
Significance
[167]
My colleagues refer to the “complex situation”, for example,
where the non-coercive police role of assisting in meeting needs or
maintaining basic order can subtly merge with the potentially coercive police
role of investigating crime and arresting suspects so that they may be brought
to justice. [para. 40]
I agree that
this “subtle” change of police perspective is relevant to the analysis but it
will not always be made apparent to a person who is unambiguously stopped but
remains unsure whether the encounter is benign or perilous. Police investigators
assemble a mosaic of facts. Apparent “general inquiries” may be designed,
unknown to the person stopped, to elicit the missing piece of
self-incrimination. The success of the police investigation may indeed depend
on the police skill in masking their information and intentions from the
person stopped.
[168]
Of relevance in this respect is the judgment of Martin J.A. in R. v.
Moran (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. xi, setting out some of the considerations he thought relevant
to finding a detention, including
the stage of the investigation, that is, whether the questioning was part
of the general investigation of a crime or possible crime or whether the police
had already decided that a crime had been committed and that the accused was
the perpetrator or involved in its commission and the questioning was conducted
for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from the accused; [p.
259]
These are
matters that would certainly be known to the police but not necessarily
communicated to the person stopped. Perhaps, as mentioned, the stage of the
investigation will be intentionally concealed with a view to a more productive
interrogation. Other Moran considerations would be apparent to the
person stopped, for example,
the nature of the questions: whether they were questions of a general
nature designed to obtain information or whether the accused was confronted
with evidence pointing to his or her guilt; [p. 259]
If, for example,
the police arrive at a street disturbance and it is not clear to them whether
the occurrence is a crime or an accident, and they tell everyone to stay put
until the situation is clarified, such a “stay put” direction should carry a
different legal consequence than if used at what is clearly a crime scene to
hold an individual they believe is a likely suspect. In the former case, the
situation may be explicable by reference to police responsibilities for public
safety and order. In the latter case, the police are attempting to gather
evidence about (and from) a particular individual in relation to a particular
crime. The reality is that in both cases, to borrow Laskin J.A.’s
formulation in the court below, “any reasonable person hearing these words from
a uniformed officer three feet away would treat them not as a request that
might be ignored, but as a command that must be obeyed” (para. 24). Although
in both cases the police command to “stay put” will likely constrain
psychologically the individuals subject to the police direction from walking
away, only in the latter instance ought the Charter right to be
triggered because it is only in that instance that “a person may reasonably
require the assistance of counsel” (Therens, at pp. 641-42).
2. The Uncertain Characteristics of the
“Reasonable Person”
[169]
In a useful commentary on the U.S. Mendenhall test, Professor
Butterfoss writes:
Application of
the test has created a broad “nonseizure” category of police-citizen encounters
that permits officers substantial leeway in approaching and questioning
citizens without being required to show objective justification for such
conduct. This has been accomplished both by constructing a highly artificial
“reasonable person,” who is much more assertive in encounters with police
officers than is the average citizen, and by ignoring the subjective intentions
of the officer. The result is that fourth amendment rights of citizens are
determined through a legal fiction. [Emphasis added.]
(E. J. Butterfoss, “Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in
Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins” (1988-1989), 79 J. Crim.
L. & Criminology 437, at p. 439)
In other words,
encounters with police that average citizens would consider left them with no
choice but to comply are denied the status of “detentions” through the device
of putting in their place an artificially robust and assertive “reasonable
person”. Self-incriminatory conduct may also be rationalized in the state’s
favour by the attributed sense of “moral or social duty on the part of every
citizen to answer questions put to him or her by the police” (see R. v.
Grafe (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 267 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 271). This gap between
the reality on the street and the court constructed “reasonable person” is of
particular relevance to visible minorities who may, because of their background
and experience, feel especially unable to disregard police directions, and feel
that assertion of their right to walk away will itself be taken as evasive and
later be argued by the police to constitute sufficient grounds of suspicion to
justify a Mann detention.
[170]
Leaving aside the issue of visible minorities, is the concept of the
reasonable person intended to describe average cooperative members of the
public? If so, the Canadian reality is that such people will almost always
regard a direction from a police officer as a demand that must be complied
with. This was recognized in Therens (and adopted in this case by my
colleagues) when Le Dain J. acknowledged that “[m]ost citizens are not aware of
the precise legal limits of police authority” and “the reasonable person is
[therefore] likely to err on the side of caution, assume lawful authority and
comply with the demand” (p. 644). Viewed in this way, police instructions or
demands readily constrain a claimant’s choice to leave and, therefore, on that
interpretation, even the less intrusive encounters between the police and
citizens ought frequently to be declared detentions despite the fact that at
that stage such people do not reasonably require the assistance of counsel.
[171]
On the other hand, perhaps the “reasonable person” is to be invested
with a higher level of legal sophistication, leading to a more robust attitude
towards the police. My colleagues refer to the reasonable person’s assessment
being informed by “generally understood legal rights and duties” (para. 33; see
also para. 37). This more erudite version of the “reasonable person” might
know that apart from some statutory exceptions, he or she ordinarily has the
right to walk away from the encounter regardless of what the police officer
says, unless and until the police possess reasonable grounds to suspect
involvement in a criminal offence and therefore grounds for a Mann-type
investigative detention. If the test envisages the perception of this more
knowledgeable type of “reasonable person”, then anything short of an
investigative detention as described in Mann would fail to constrain
freedom of choice, and whatever is said in those critical early moments of an
encounter will be presumed to be “voluntary” and based on consent.
[172]
A further problem with the “reasonable person” device is to define
exactly what information this fictional person possesses. While “the factors”
identified by my colleagues include “whether the police were providing general
assistance; maintaining general order; making general inquiries regarding a
particular occurrence; or, singling out the individual for focussed
investigation” (para. 44(2)(a)), it is not suggested that the “reasonable
person” is a mind-reader. On their view, this information can only affect the
“reasonable person” assessment to the extent it is made manifest to the
claimant, whose perception would otherwise remain oblivious and unaffected.
[173]
Yet, another difficulty with calibrating the “reasonable person”
approach is that it is not at all clear what experience this hypothetical
individual brings to the assessment of the encounter and what criteria this
individual applies in deciding whether or not the person stopped is free to
choose to break off the encounter. There is a difference between the listing
of a broad range of factors to be considered by a court and identifying their
relative weight and importance.
[174]
In the absence of explicit criteria, various judges will tend to read
into the “reasonable person” their own projections of the moment at which, in their
view, the person stopped ought to be able to call a lawyer. This
creates the risk of a very results-oriented analysis. Perceptions will vary
depending on the personality of the judge seized with the case. My colleagues
emphasize at different places the need for deference to the assessment of the
trial judges (e.g., para. 43) which may further complicate the task of
developing a consistent approach. In other words, continued reliance on the
“reasonable person” whose attributed experience and choice of criteria are
unspecified except for a presumed commitment to “reasonableness” helps to mask
rather than clarify the actual criteria being applied by the Court.
E. Broader Approach
[175]
As a majority of the Court is satisfied with the Therens/Mendenhall
claimant-centred approach, I will not belabour the existence of alternatives.
However, I believe more attention should be paid to the objective facts
of the encounter between a police officer and members of the public, whether or
not such facts are made apparent to the person stopped.
[176]
There is, of course, an important continuing role for psychological
detention as perceived by the person stopped, but in that respect serious
weight should be given to the values and experience of the person actually
stopped, including the experience of visible minorities, and less emphasis on
the hypothetical opinion of the “reasonable person” insofar as the latter is
presumed to be able to handle such stressful encounters without sensing “significant
. . . psychological restraint” (Mann, at para. 19). As mentioned, Mr.
Grant is black. In determining whether he (or a reasonable person in his
position) would feel free to choose to walk away from three policemen, contrary
to their wishes in the circumstances here, his ethnicity raises a significant
issue. As the above-mentioned studies show, trial judges differ in the weight
they are willing to accord to ethnicity in such “low visibility” encounters,
despite the over-representation of Aboriginals and other visible minorities in
encounters with police patrols. That is why, from my point of view, the police
perspective and the information (if any) the police possessed when they
initiated the encounter is important to shed light on whether or not the
liberty interest of the person stopped was truly compromised.
[177]
I agree with my colleagues that a claim of psychological detention must
meet the three-fold test of (i) a police command or direction (ii) compliance
by the person now claiming a s. 9 detention and (iii) grounds for a reasonable
belief that there was no choice but to comply. However, in my view, police
words and conduct should be interpreted in light of the purpose of the
encounter from the police perspective — whether disclosed to the person from
whom cooperation is requested or not. The U.S. Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure (ALI 1975), § 110.1(2), for instance, includes
special provisions for questioning suspects as opposed to seeking cooperation
from citizens and requires warnings to suspects that no legal obligation exists
to respond to questioning. See also the English Judges’ Rules, Rules I
and II (Practice Note (Judges’ Rules), [1964] 1 W.L.R. 152 (C.C.A.), at
p. 153). The police know, but the claimant does not know, the point at which a
person of interest begins to emerge as a suspect and ceases to be, as my
colleagues put it, a person whose “rights are not seriously in issue” (para.
29).
[178]
A central problem with the Therens/Mendenhall claimant-centred
approach, as I see it, is that it does not take adequately into account what
the police know and when they knew it except insofar as this information is
conveyed to the person stopped, but which the police may not consider to be in
their interest to convey. Police may know (as in Suberu) if a crime has
allegedly been committed and whether they are making the approach to an
individual with a view to obtaining general information or, on the other hand,
corralling a suspect and collecting admissible evidence to bring him or her to
justice. Possession of such knowledge may in fact place the police in an
adversarial relationship to the person approached whether that person is aware of
the jeopardy or not. It is the adversarial relationship together with the
“stop” that generates the need for counsel. At that point, the power imbalance
is significant. The unsuspecting suspect may fatally compromise his or her
position simply through ignorance of his or her rights and the fact the police
have now adopted an adversarial position. At that point, as
Le Dain J. put it in Therens, “a person may reasonably require
the assistance of counsel” (pp. 641-42), but may not have any idea of the perilous
turn of events.
[179]
On the other hand, a more benign police purpose may deprive even an
unambiguous police command of the legal effect of a detention, and thereby
enure to the benefit of the Crown. Had Constable Roughley in the Suberu
case, for example, come rushing up to Mr. Suberu in the parking lot of the
liquor store saying “Wait a minute. I need to talk to you before you go
anywhere” because police had just received information, unknown to Mr. Suberu,
that Mr. Suberu’s van had been wired with an explosive device by a local member
of the Hell’s Angels, the detention analysis ought to be quite different
although the constable’s words and the forcefulness of their expression may be
the same.
[180]
It is not controversial that in the early stages of a criminal
investigation the police must be afforded some flexibility before the lawyers
get involved. The police do have the right to ask questions and they need to
seek the co-operation of members of the public, including those who turn out to
be miscreants. The question is how to accommodate that need within a plausible
framework of s. 9 analysis. In my view, without wishing to prolong this
discussion, a better and broader approach to detention would explicitly take
into account (i) the objective facts of such encounters, whether or not evident
to the person stopped, as well as (ii) the perception of the police in
initiating the encounter, whether or not evident to the person stopped, and
(iii) whatever information the police possess at the time, which may or may not
be known to the person stopped, as well as whatever change in the police
perception occurs as the encounter develops. These matters should all be
factored into a more comprehensive analysis of when a “detention” occurs for Charter
purposes than is provided in the Therens/Mendenhall claimant-centred
approach affirmed today by the Court.
F. Application to the Facts
[181]
In this case, I agree with my colleagues that Mr. Grant was arbitrarily
detained. The safety of school neighbourhoods is of great importance but under
our system of law it cannot be achieved by random detention of pedestrians on
the off-chance that some of them might (or might not) be implicated in criminal
activity.
[182]
The purpose of these police officers, whether or not couched in terms of
community policing, was to investigate crime, whether actual or anticipated.
Constable Worrell testified that when the officers drove past in an unmarked
car, Mr. Grant “stared” at them in an unusually intense manner and continued to
do so as they proceeded down the street. He wore a “big jacket” and was
“fidgeting” with his coat and pants. Staring at an unmarked car and fidgeting
are lawful activities but it was enough to cause three police officers to
converge on Mr. Grant. The police purpose for initiating the encounter is
important, I believe, and Constable Worrell testified:
Q. Well, when you stop these people, I take it, the object of the
exercise in light of what you said about the nature of the area is to find out
if perhaps they might be involved in swarmings or robberies or drugs?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And when you and your partner talked about potentially stopping
Mr. Grant yourselves and what you had in mind was having a chat with him —
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. — to determine whether he might be involved in swarmings or
robberies or drugs, correct?
A. It’s possible he may have been, but we didn’t
know for sure.
The police had
no information whatsoever that Mr. Grant may have been implicated in criminal
activity or even whether a crime had been committed, but Mr. Grant’s further
“fidget” with his jacket convinced Constable Gomes to take charge of the
situation (whether or not Mr. Grant was aware of how his fidgets were being
interpreted by Constable Gomes) and to order Mr. Grant to “keep his hands in
front of him”. That command crystallized the detention.
[183]
However, in my view, the finding of a detention is properly the product
not only of Mr. Grant’s perception (filtered through the hypothetical reasonable
person) but also of the objective facts of why the encounter was initiated
(crime detection) and the other facts surrounding the encounter whether or not
evident to Mr. Grant, e.g., the agreement among the three officers (unknown to
Mr. Grant) to converge on him and thereafter effectively to form “a small
phalanx blocking the path in which the appellant was walking” (Laskin J.A., at
para. 29). As Mr. Grant did not testify, we do not have any first-hand
evidence of his perception, although his lack of choice must have been
manifest when every time he moved Constable Gomes, who was standing only three
feet away, moved in a corresponding way to maintain the nose-to-nose impasse.
What we do have in considerable detail is the perception of each of the three
police officers. Their forthright account of their own intentions and their
acknowledged lack of any information that any crime was or was about to be
committed, apart from a “hunch”, none of which was conveyed to Mr. Grant, give
rise to the conclusion that Mr. Grant was arbitrarily detained.
[184]
I therefore concur in the conclusion of the Chief Justice and Charron J.
that Mr. Grant was detained. I also agree with their analysis under s. 24(2)
and the consequent disposition of the appeal.
English version of the reasons delivered by
[185]
Deschamps J. — The
difficulty in resolving the problems related to detention and to the exclusion
of evidence in three appeals now before the Court reveals a number of
deficiencies in the applicable rules. These three cases show that it is
sometimes hard to reconcile the protection of constitutional rights with the
public interest in bringing cases to trial. I have read the reasons of
the majority, and I agree with them that the tests for determining whether a
person was actually detained and whether evidence should be excluded need to be
reformulated. With respect, however, I must comment further on the application
of the new rules concerning detention to the facts of this case. As for the factors
to consider in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional rights, I find that the test proposed by the
majority is problematic, and that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the
constitutional provision that applies to such decisions. Although my analysis
differs from the majority’s, I reach the same conclusion as them.
1. Test for Determining
Whether a Person Was Detained
[186]
Where the state interacts with citizens in a criminal law context, be it
in the streets or in a courtroom, the applicable rules must be clear so that
all those involved in the criminal justice system know the scope of their
respective rights and powers. I agree with the majority that the police cannot
do their work effectively without the co‑operation of the public
(para. 39). The applicable rules must therefore take into account the
fact that the police need to act so as to foster public co‑operation, not
to discourage it.
[187]
In the instant case, the trial judge stressed the fact that the police
officers, who were patrolling an area around four schools where numerous
disturbances had been reported, had conducted themselves politely and seemed to
have been conscientious in doing their work. On whether the law prohibits or
should prohibit this type of police action, the trial judge quoted with
approval the following comment by one of his colleagues:
We do not
expect the police to sit in their station houses waiting for those who commit
offences to walk in and confess. We expect them to be out in the community and
when suspicious events occur to make inquiries. The Charter is not a barrier
to those inquiries.
(2004 CarswellOnt 8779, at para. 9, quoting R. v. Orellana, [1999]
O.J. No. 5746 (QL) (Ct. J.))
This approach is
the very one on which the majority of this Court are basing the test adopted
today to guide the public, law enforcement agencies and judges in determining
at what point a person is “detained” in the legal sense of this term.
[188]
In the companion case of R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, [2009] 2
S.C.R. 460, the majority of the Court acknowledge that police officers may
interact with the public and that not every contact between a police officer
and a member of the public constitutes detention. There is a clear distinction
between the nature of the police action in the case at bar and that of the
action in Suberu. Suberu concerns a targeted action by officers
who had received specific information. In the case at bar, the action was one
of prevention, and the officers’ approach was necessarily different. It will
be helpful to consider the trial judge’s findings of fact.
[189]
Constables Worrell and Forde were on patrol, in plainclothes in an
unmarked car, in an area where four high schools are located. The area was
experiencing problems related to intimidation, robberies and drug offences
involving students. The two officers had been ordered to maintain a presence
there for purposes of prevention. They drove past an individual,
Mr. Grant, and noted that he was staring at them. After they had passed
him, Constable Worrell turned around and saw that he was still watching
them and that he was fidgeting with his clothes at his waist and pulling on his
pants with his right hand. At this point, the officers felt that it would be
appropriate to speak with him. As they continued along their way, they saw
another officer, Constable Gomes, who was on patrol in a marked cruiser. They
suggested that he go speak with Mr. Grant, which he did. While speaking
with Constable Gomes, Mr. Grant behaved nervously and touched his clothes
at his waist, which prompted Constable Gomes to ask him to keep his hands in
front of him. At first, constables Worrell and Forde stayed apart from
Mr. Grant and Constable Gomes, but on seeing that Mr. Grant still
appeared nervous and continued to look at them, they decided to move closer to
make sure everything was all right. They identified themselves, showing their
badges, and then stood behind Constable Gomes. I will not repeat the exchange
that took place between Constable Gomes and Mr. Grant. The relevant
passages are reproduced in the majority’s reasons. All I need say here is that
Mr. Grant made an incriminating statement.
[190]
In analysing all these facts, the trial judge found that Mr. Grant
had not been detained. The following is his own lengthy summary of his reasons
for so finding:
(1) The
Location being the sidewalk of a main street in the City of Toronto in full
view of the public.
(2) The
means by which the police spoke to the accused; i.e., on the street, and the
accused not being required to stay or get into any vehicle or any closed type
of situation.
(3) The
time of day. It was broad daylight. It was approximately 12:30 p.m., the
usual noon hour for students.
(4) There
was no physical force. There was no pat down search and there was no grabbing
where someone, especially the accused, in any situation might feel intimidated.
(5) There
was no actual search or physical search, of course. There were just some
questions put.
(6) There
was an absence of reasonable and probable grounds to conduct an arrest and
there was no reason to take physical control of the accused until, of course,
the marijuana and firearm surfaced.
(7) What
would Police Constable Gomes have done if the accused, for example, left the
scene? He may have followed him. He may have asked him further questions.
There again, that is subject to speculation.
(8) The
length of the interaction. It was short. It consisted of minutes. This
was not a one‑half hour or hour interrogation. It wasn’t off the street
or in a police cruiser.
(9) The
response of the other police officers. These officers stood behind Gomes,
but they were not involved in the discussion. They didn’t surround the accused
nor did they detain him. And I may address that issue further in due course.
(10) The
nature of the conversation with Gomes. It was not in aggressive language.
There were no demands or directions. The only request was that he keep
his hands in front of him. There was no demand to enter a cruiser, and nothing
was said that I find would be compelling. There were no threats or
inducements. This officer just asked some general questions and in response to
those questions the accused produced identification as to who he was, where he
lived, and he even gave his phone number.
(11) The
accused could have walked away. He could have walked around the one police
officer or the three police officers and could have kept going. All he had to
do, in my view, is say, “Excuse me.” To suggest for one moment that he
couldn’t or they wouldn’t permit it is speculation. There was no evidence that
the accused felt compelled or had a subjective belief in relation to anything.
The inference is, that the accused decided to cooperate all the way with the
police. The quantity of time spent was referred to.
I conclude
very easily that this was a conversation of an extremely short duration,
lasting no more than several moments, but no more than three or four minutes.
So much so, that I find the ultimate crime, the solving of the crime and the
arrest and search incidental to the arrest took some four minutes more or less.
I also find
that the limited conversation between Police Constable Gomes and the accused
was no more than that, a conversation and an attempt to chit chat or make chit
chat. Here again, I find it was all meant to check on the temperature of the
community.
(2004 CarswellOnt 8779, at para. 9)
[191]
Unlike the trial judge, the Court of Appeal concluded that
Mr. Grant had been detained: (2006), 81 O.R. (3d) 1. I agree with this
conclusion: viewed as a whole, the facts support the conclusion that there was
indeed a detention. However, I wish to point out that the detention came to a
head when the officers asked Mr. Grant certain direct questions that, viewed
objectively, might have caused a reasonable person to feel singled out,
cornered and, therefore, detained. Owing to the nature of the questions asked
by Constable Gomes, the line between prevention and suppression was crossed.
Constable Gomes asked Mr. Grant if he had committed a crime. Once such a question
had been asked of a person who had known he was being watched from the time he
had crossed paths with constables Worrell and Forde — who had since arrived on
the scene — the encounter could no longer be described simply as an interaction
between a police officer and a member of the public. I agree with the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the exchange was no longer an impromptu conversation
that a young man such as Mr. Grant would think he could walk away from as
he pleased.
[192]
In light of the conclusion that Mr. Grant was detained, I must
consider the power of the police to detain a person for investigation purposes
in performing their crime prevention function. Unlike in the context of crime
suppression, police officers who are charged with preventing crime — in
particular, as in the instant case, in an area near schools experiencing
problems related to violence — know that unlawful acts have been or will be
committed, but do not know when, where or by whom a specific crime will be
committed. They must therefore have some leeway to be able to perform this
function adequately.
[193]
Although I cannot conclude that the officers in the case at bar had a
reasonable suspicion that an offence had been committed, I would not want what
is said in this judgment to discourage them from intervening. As can be seen
from the trial judge’s reasons, the officers were calm and polite. Even though
their actions may, viewed objectively, have constituted detention, that was
most likely not intentional. It would therefore be best in future for
police officers to avoid asking incriminating questions of people who are
likely to be viewed as suspects. The direct questions in the instant case can
be compared with the circumspect approach taken by the officers in R. v.
Kang‑Brown, 2008 SCC 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456. If, in the course of
an exchange of words in which officers act circumspectly, the behaviour of the
person they are speaking with changes, the next question is whether the facts are
sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been or
will be committed. If they are sufficient, it will then be open to the
officers to exercise their power of investigative detention.
[194]
In short, I believe it is important to educate the police about how
their conduct affects members of the public. If they do not really intend to
detain a person, they should — by their deeds and their words — let the person
know that he or she is not being singled out.
2. Factors Supporting the Admission or
Exclusion of Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Charter
[195]
The majority propose revising the test developed in R. v.
Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, for admitting or excluding evidence obtained
in violation of a right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms . I agree with them that the test needs to be revised, but in my
view, the formulation they propose is inconsistent with the purpose of
s. 24(2) . I will be proposing a simpler rule that focusses the analysis
on two aspects: the societal interest in protecting constitutional rights and
the societal interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits. On the
basis of these two aspects, it will be possible to consider all the relevant
circumstances in order to determine whether the exclusion or admission of the
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
A) Purpose of
Section 24(2) of the Charter
[196]
The identification of the purpose of s. 24(2) of the Charter
is of prime importance for the determination of the factors to be considered in
applying this provision. According to Professor David M. Paciocco, “[r]ecent
experience in the United States has demonstrated that the vitality of the
exclusionary rule depends entirely on the purposes that are identified for
exclusion. This is because each of the rationales has its own level of
vulnerability and its own sphere of operation” (“The Judicial Repeal of
s. 24(2) and the Development of the Canadian Exclusionary Rule” (1989‑90),
32 Crim. L.Q. 326, at p. 334). However, Professor Kent Roach
cautions that “[i]f none of the approaches is in a preferred position, the
choice of which rationale will prevail in a particular case is likely to be
inconsistent and result‑oriented” (“Constitutionalizing Disrepute:
Exclusion of Evidence after Therens” (1986), 44 U.T. Fac. L. Rev.
209, at p. 228).
[197]
Collins had the merit of setting out the first test for applying
s. 24(2) . But neither in that case nor in those that followed can the
Court be said to have identified a guiding principle or taken a clear position
ranking the various purposes that are often cited for the provision and can be
drawn — sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly — from the case law. The
failure to do so is surprising, given the importance the Court has attached to
contextual analysis and to the need, in interpreting any provision, to consider
its purpose.
[198]
I accordingly agree with the majority that the purpose of s. 24(2)
of the Charter is found in the words of the provision. Section 24 reads
as follows:
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as
guaranteed by this Charter , have been infringed or denied may apply to a court
of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1),
a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or
denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter , the evidence shall be
excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice
into disrepute.
The purpose of
s. 24(2) is to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice.
[199]
Since this purpose is a general one, it makes it possible to take the
various functions of the criminal justice system into account. This purpose
also makes it possible to identify a common denominator between ss. 24(1)
and (2) . It is clear that one of the purposes of the remedy provided for in
s. 24(1), more specifically a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, is
to maintain the repute of the administration of justice: R. v. Conway,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659, at p. 1667. Although a stay of proceedings can be
granted only in the clearest of cases because it allows the accused to go free,
the comparison with s. 24(2) is not without interest, especially in a case
where the exclusion of evidence would in practice lead to the discharge of the
accused by resulting in his or her acquittal.
[200]
A court that must decide under s. 24(1) whether to order a stay of
proceedings may consider the “balance . . . between the public
interest in having all charges dealt with on their merits [and] the public
interest in having all charges stayed to show the court’s determination to ensure
the continued vigour of checks and balances in the criminal justice system” (R.
v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297, dissent, at para. 231
(emphasis deleted); see also the majority’s reasons, at para. 57). This
balancing exercise is also essential to the analysis required by
s. 24(2). Under s. 24(2), the judge must decide whether the best way
to maintain the repute of the administration of justice would be to admit the
evidence or to exclude it.
[201]
I also agree with the majority’s proposition that the exclusionary rule
has, primarily, a prospective societal role and that the judge’s analysis must
focus on systemic concerns (para. 70). The court cannot consider the case
of the accused person who is on trial without addressing the long‑term
impact of its decision on the administration of justice in general. If, where
the stay of proceedings and the admission or exclusion of evidence are
concerned, the point of convergence between the first and second subsections of
s. 24 is the balancing of two factors, what distinguishes these provisions
is that the purpose of the first is to provide for an individual remedy,
whereas the ultimate purpose of the second lies in the societal interest in
maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. The first is focussed
on the individual, the second on society.
[202]
The statement that s. 24(2) has a long‑term societal purpose
is of great significance for the identification of the factors to considered in
the analysis. In my view, the test proposed by the majority, by focussing the
analysis on the conduct of the police in the first branch and on the interest
of the accused in the second, and by attaching less importance to the
seriousness of the offence in the third, does not give sufficient consideration
to the long‑term societal interest that must guide the judge in reaching
a decision.
B) The Test: Branches and Factors
[203]
Since Collins, the courts have generally applied a test under
which the factors relevant to the analysis to be conducted in applying s. 24(2)
were grouped in three broad branches. This Court has applied this test in many
subsequent decisions, including R. v. Greffe, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 755, at
pp. 783‑84, in which Lamer J. (as he then was) summarized the
test as follows:
The first set of factors are those relevant to the fairness of the
trial. The second set of factors concerns the seriousness of the Charter
violations as defined by the conduct of the law enforcement authorities. The
third set of factors recognizes the possibility that the administration of
justice could be brought into disrepute by excluding the evidence despite the
fact that it was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter .
[204]
First, the courts had to determine the nature of the evidence obtained
in violation of the rights of the accused. Where real evidence was
adduced, admitting it rarely led to a finding that trial fairness had been
impaired. Second, they had to assess the seriousness of the violation in light
of both the interests protected by the infringed right and the state conduct.
Third, the courts considered the consequences of excluding the evidence and
determined, more specifically, whether the evidence was essential, having
regard to the seriousness of the offence (Greffe, per Dickson
C.J., at pp. 762‑63).
[205]
In the case at bar, the majority propose to reformulate the test. The
new version continues to have three branches: a review of the state conduct,
the impact of the violation on the Charter -protected interests and the
public interest in an adjudication on the merits.
[206]
It is appropriate that trial fairness is no longer a cornerstone of the
test. One of the problems with the reliance on trial fairness in the first
branch of the Collins test was that it is a concept with several
possible meanings and can accordingly lead to confusion.
[207]
Trial fairness is sometimes defined narrowly and sometimes more broadly.
Defined narrowly, it concerns solely the reliability of the evidence. More
broadly, trial fairness corresponds to “courtroom fairness” (P. Mirfield,
“The Early Jurisprudence of Judicial Disrepute” (1987‑88), 30 Crim.
L.Q. 434, at pp. 444 and 452). In the latter sense, fairness is
related to the concept of “conscriptive evidence”. Its purpose is to safeguard
certain fundamental rights of the accused at trial, such as the right against
self-incrimination. This interpretation is essentially the same as the
one in R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607. Finally, trial
fairness has been defined very broadly by certain commentators and in certain
judgments (see the dissent in R. v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 206, at
para. 86). According to this approach, any use of evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional rights is — regardless of the quality of the
evidence (reliable, conscriptive, derivative, etc.) — a breach of trial
fairness. It is clear that, although the concept of fairness seems to go hand
in hand with any system of justice worthy of that name, it is not precise
enough to serve as a reliable guide.
[208]
The reformulation of the first of the criteria from Collins so as
to exclude the trial fairness concept and take Charter ‑protected
interests into account in the second branch of the new test is a refinement
that may help judges refer to concrete and objective factors. I am in complete
agreement that the greater the impact of the violation on the Charter ‑protected
interests, the more likely it is that there will be negative consequences for
public confidence in the administration of justice. For example, interference
with bodily integrity and a search of a rented car will not have the same
impact on the confidence an objective person with good knowledge of the
circumstances of the case will have in the administration of justice (Collins,
at p. 282).
[209]
However, I cannot agree with focussing the analysis on the accused, as
the purpose remains at all times to maintain public confidence in the
administration of justice in the long term, and what is important is the public
interest in the protection of constitutional rights. Nor can I accept that one
of the factors — state conduct — formerly taken into account when analysing the
seriousness of a violation is now a separate branch of the test. In pursuing
the purpose of maintaining confidence in the administration of justice, the
courts must dissociate themselves from violations of protected rights,
regardless of whether or not they were intentional. Although state
conduct is of course the source of the violation, it is but one of the factors
to be considered in analysing the impact of the violation on Charter ‑protected
interests.
[210]
I find the majority’s emphasis on state conduct puzzling in view of the
purpose of s. 24(2). Although the majority acknowledge that the purpose
of the s. 24(2) rule is neither to punish the police officers nor to
compensate the accused, the importance they attach to this factor places the judge
on a slippery slope. Since any distinction between the role of the exclusion
of evidence as a way for a court to dissociate itself from a violation and its
role as a deterrent — which has been sharply criticized — will be a fine one, I
wonder what role this factor will actually play. The Court’s attitude in this
respect has already been criticized as being one of “doublespeak”
(D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law (4th ed.
2005), at pp. 543‑44). I fear that the same word will also be used
to refer to the new test. Moreover, by making state conduct a separate branch
of the test, the Court is drawing closer to the rules applied in the United
States, which are based on very different constitutional provisions and a very
different socio‑political context (see the reasons of Esson J.A. in R.
v. Strachan (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 567 (B.C.C.A.)).
[211]
It might have been thought that the courts would over time have
understood that it is unhelpful to begin the constitutional analysis by
considering state conduct. The main problem with the importance attached to
this factor is that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of evidence has never
been proved empirically (S. Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously:
Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence Under Section 24(2) of the Charter ”
(2004), 49 McGill L.J. 105, at p. 114).
[212]
In the United States, many commentators have attempted to demonstrate
that the exclusionary rule is either effective or ineffective as a deterrent,
and the question is still open to debate: L. T. Perrin et al., “If It’s Broken,
Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule — A New and Extensive Empirical
Study of the Exclusionary Rule and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to
Partially Replace the Rule” (1998), 83 Iowa L. Rev. 669; W. R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment (4th ed. 2004), vol. 1, at
pp. 32‑37; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 1 (2009); Law
Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 10, Evidence — The Exclusion of
Illegally Obtained Evidence (1974), at pp. 19‑20. The question
has also been the subject of debate in Canada. According to Paciocco, at
p. 340, s. 24(2) cannot have a deterrent effect, because it does not
establish a clear and predictable rule requiring the exclusion of evidence. To
other commentators, from the perspective of the conduct of state agents,
exclusion is not an effective sanction. The police certainly have an interest
in the conviction of an accused, but that interest is above all one of society
as a whole. Administrative or disciplinary measures may have a greater
deterrent effect on the police (Law Reform Commission, at pp. 20‑22;
R. v. Duguay, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93, at pp. 123‑24, and Burlingham,
at para. 104, per L’Heureux‑Dubé J., dissenting). In my
view, the reservations expressed regarding the effectiveness of the exclusion
of evidence as a deterrent are an invitation to be very prudent as regards the
importance attached to state conduct.
[213]
Furthermore, a parallel can be drawn with the order for a stay of
proceedings for abuse of process, which also has as its purpose the maintenance
of public confidence in the administration of justice. As the Court pointed
out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 391, at para. 91, and in R. v. Taillefer, 2003 SCC 70,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 307, at para. 119, the purpose of such an order is not to
punish state misconduct. In my view, there is no justification for attributing
this role, even indirectly, to s. 24(2). Although I agree that the
exclusion of evidence may have a deterrent effect, I do not think state
conduct should be considered separately in the determination of what must be
done to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. If a
judge must decide whether to admit or exclude evidence, a violation of rights
must already have been proved. It is therefore the impact of that violation
that needs to be examined, not the inherent seriousness of the state conduct.
[214]
In sum, I agree with incorporating into the assessment of the impact of
the violation a broader perspective according to which all Charter -protected
interests are taken into account. However, this new approach should be
focussed not on the accused, but on the public interest in the protection of
constitutional rights. Moreover, even though this approach may permit the
courts to examine state conduct in order to determine its impact on the
protected interests and, if necessary, to dissociate themselves from it, the
purpose being pursued is to maintain public confidence in the administration of
justice. The need for the courts to dissociate themselves from state conduct
is at most one factor to be considered in relation to the overall purpose.
Furthermore, in applying the Collins test, the courts have considered
both state conduct and the seriousness of the infringement of the interests
protected by the violated right in their review of the seriousness of the
violation. In my view, therefore, the proposed change incorporates into the
test a branch that is in itself inconsistent with the purpose of the provision
and that does not make the rule any clearer or easier to apply. I accordingly
find that the objective of the reformulation has not been achieved.
[215]
At the third stage of the Collins analysis, the judge had to
determine the effect that excluding the evidence would have on the repute of
the administration of justice. The third branch of the new test proposed by
the majority requires the judge to assess the “public interest in an
adjudication on the merits”. Although this formulation is clearly broad enough
that it will be possible to consider the factors formerly regarded as important
in the third branch of the Collins test, certain factors are unduly de‑emphasized
or simply disregarded in the new test.
[216]
In this regard, the majority’s position on the seriousness of the
offence being prosecuted is ambiguous. Although the majority describe this
factor as a “valid consideration”, they mention that it “has the potential to
cut both ways”, that is, in favour of either excluding or admitting evidence.
Their justification for this position is that although the public has a
heightened interest in an adjudication on the merits where the crime is a
serious one, it also has a heightened interest in having a justice system that
is above reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for the accused are high
(para. 84). I note that they also consider the heightened interest of the
accused in having a justice system that is above reproach, especially where the
crime with which he or she is charged is a serious one. These comments by the
majority help me put the problem in context, and they suggest that the interest
of the accused is equal to that of society where the charge is serious. In
addition to my doubts about how the seriousness of the offence actually fits
into the majority’s test, I must say that I disagree with the proposition that
in the analysis relating to the maintenance of the repute of the administration
of justice, this factor is neutral.
[217]
First of all, the third branch of the majority’s test requires the judge
to consider the factors that weigh in favour of or against proceeding to
trial. At first glance, it is hard to imagine how the seriousness of the
offence, and even the harshness of the sentence, could weigh against proceeding
to trial. However, it is conceivable that when the factor of the seriousness
of the offence is combined with other circumstances — where, for example, the
evidence is unreliable — the accused might claim to have a greater interest in
not standing trial if he or she could face a harsher sentence owing to the
seriousness of the charge. But this interest is subsumed in the public’s
interest, which is of course opposed to having an accused convicted on the
basis of unreliable evidence. Moreover, a well‑informed person who is
objective and is apprised of all the circumstances would surely be shocked if
unreliable evidence were used in any criminal trial (R. v. O’Connor,
[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411, at para. 62).
[218]
What the majority suggest is in reality that, on the one hand, the
interest of the accused in having the evidence excluded increases with the
seriousness of the offence and the harshness of the potential sentence and, on
the other hand, the societal interest in an adjudication on the merits
increases with the seriousness of the offence. The result is that this factor
is considered to be neutral. But I find it unacceptable to place value in
the benefit derived by the accused from the exclusion of reliable evidence.
The accused has a legitimate interest in having his or her rights protected,
but not in having the evidence truncated to his or her advantage. In other
words, the outcome of the analysis cannot be factored into the analysis
itself. Moreover, the protection of the interests of the accused is considered
in the first and second branches of the test proposed by the majority, not in
the third.
[219]
The analysis to be conducted under s. 24(2) should not be more
likely to result in the exclusion of evidence where the charge is murder than
where it is theft. To the extent that the majority’s approach has the effect
of including, in the third branch of the test, factors related to the
consequences of the charges for the accused, it is inconsistent with the
analysis required at this stage.
[220]
The suggestion that the effect of the factor of the seriousness of the
offence is neutral because of the heightened societal interest in having a
system of justice that is above reproach is also problematic. What might be
criticized is the admission of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional
rights. This implies that the violation is taken into account at this stage of
the analysis. In other words, the violation will have been taken into account
at every stage: at the first, in reviewing the conduct of the police; at the
second, in assessing the impact of the violation on the protected interests;
and lastly, at the third, in considering the interest in maintaining a system
of justice that is above reproach. Furthermore, this approach evokes the broad
concept of trial fairness even though that concept is not formally included in
the test proposed by the majority. Thus, trial fairness would be reintroduced
indirectly, but in a more diffuse sense that is potentially much broader than
the one in which it was used in the approach developed in Collins and Stillman.
[221]
In my view, assessing the seriousness of the offence is as important as
determining whether the evidence is reliable or essential. To disregard
this factor would make as little sense as to disregard the fact that an accused
who is granted a stay of proceedings will not be prosecuted.
[222]
If the role of the courts is to conduct trials to seek the truth about
the commission of crimes, the importance of this role reaches its apogee where
the crime is a particularly serious one. I think it goes without saying that
society has a greater interest in an adjudication on the merits where the crime
is a serious one, such as murder, sexual assault or importing hard drugs, than
where it is less serious, as in the case of shoplifting, possession of cannabis
or assault.
C) Proposed Test
[223]
In short, I agree that the time has come for the Court to revisit the
test for the admission or exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of a Charter
right. I am proposing a simple test that takes into account both the public
interest in protecting Charter rights and the public interest in an
adjudication on the merits. I agree with the majority that the judge’s
approach should be to foster the maintenance of public confidence in the
administration of justice in the long term, but I would add that it is by
striking a fair balance between these two societal interests that this result
will be attained. These are the only two aspects that a judge should consider
in determining whether the maintenance of confidence in the administration of
justice would be better served by admitting the evidence or by excluding it.
[224]
On the branch related to the protection of constitutional rights, I
would suggest that any facts that help show the effect of the violation on the
protected rights be considered. In this respect, the state conduct that gave
rise to the violation is obviously a relevant factor. However, the purpose of
the judge’s review is not to punish the police officers or to compensate the
accused for the violation. Rather, it is to assess the impact of that conduct
on the protected interests with a view to ultimately balancing the societal
interest in the protection of constitutional rights against the role of the
judicial system as the institution responsible for holding trials. There may
be cases in which conduct is so serious that the courts feel a need to
dissociate themselves from it and, in the end, to attach paramount importance to
it in their analysis. In the test I am proposing, however, state conduct is
but one of the factors to be considered in assessing the impact of the
violation on the protected rights.
[225]
The impact of a violation on protected interests will vary with the circumstances,
and it would be impossible here to list all the circumstances that might be
relevant. Suffice it to mention the place of the search, the nature of the
evidence, the nature of the violated right, the urgency of the situation for
the police officers, the availability of other less intrusive investigation
methods, the officers’ knowledge of the applicable law, their training, and the
clarity of the law. In short, the judge must take into account all the facts
that may be used to assess the long‑term impact of his or her decision on
the repute of the administration of justice, that is, not on the rights of the
accused being tried, but rather on those of every individual whose rights might
be violated in a similar way.
[226]
As for the branch related to the public interest in an adjudication on
the merits, I would suggest taking the reliability of the evidence into
account. In my view, this consideration is crucial to the maintenance of
public confidence. On the one hand, unreliable evidence will invariably
undermine public confidence in the courts’ ability to determine whether accused
persons are guilty or innocent. On the other hand, a decision to exclude
reliable evidence without good reason is also likely to be seen as an
abdication by the court of its institutional role. As a corollary, whether the
evidence in issue is essential or peripheral is highly significant. Similarly,
the importance of the factor of the seriousness of the offence must be
recognized, given society’s strong interest in being protected from the
commission of serious crimes. I have already explained why I feel this factor
cannot reasonably be excluded without causing the test itself to bring the
administration of justice into disrepute. This is why I would make it an
important factor in the analysis.
[227]
The question the judge must answer is whether the repute of the
administration of justice would be better protected by admitting the evidence
or by excluding it. In some cases, the impact on constitutional rights will be
the determining factor because, owing to certain circumstances of the
violation, the long‑term effect of admitting the evidence would be to
bring the administration of justice into disrepute. But the converse is also
true. Thus, there will be other cases in which it is the public interest in an
adjudication on the merits that should prevail: see, for example, the companion
case of R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494. Absent an
error in principle, the decision is a matter for the trier of fact.
3. Application of the
Principles to the Facts of the Case
[228]
On whether admitting the weapon in evidence would have a positive effect
on the repute of the administration of justice, I agree with the majority’s
conclusion. I refer to the following findings of fact made by the trial
judge: the exchange lasted only a few minutes, the officers were polite to
Mr. Grant, and they were motivated by a desire to take a proactive
approach in patrolling an area near schools with serious problems related to
youth crime and safety. On the protection of the public, it should be noted
that the charge here is firearms‑related, that it would be impossible to
establish guilt without the evidence and that the evidence is eminently
reliable.
[229]
When balanced against each other, the limited impact of the violation on
the protected interests and the great importance of the evidence for the
purposes of the trial favour admitting the physical evidence. Furthermore, on
the charge of possession of a firearm for the purposes of trafficking, I am in
complete agreement with the majority.
[230]
For these reasons, I reach the same conclusion as the majority.
Appeal allowed in part.
Solicitors for the appellant: Sack Goldblatt Mitchell,
Toronto.
Solicitor for the respondent: Attorney General of Ontario,
Toronto.
Solicitor for the intervener the Director of Public Prosecutions of
Canada: Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Halifax.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of British
Columbia: Attorney General of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association: Queen’s University, Kingston.
Solicitors for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association
(Ontario): Marilys Edwardh Barristers Professional Corporation, Toronto.