Date: 20131025

 

Docket: DES-7-08

 

Citation: 2013 FC 1092

Ottawa, Ontario, October 25, 2013

PRESENT:  The Honourable Mr. Justice Blanchard

 

BETWEEN:

IN THE MATTER OF A CERTIFICATE SIGNED PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 77(1) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT (IRPA);

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE REFERRAL OF A CERTIFICATE TO THE FEDERAL COURT PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION 77(1) OF THE IRPA;

AND IN THE MATTER OF  MOHAMED ZEKI MAHJOUB

 

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT

 

  I.  Introduction

 

• [1] Mr. Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub, an Egyptian national, is the subject ofa security certificate signed pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [IRPA] on February 22, 2008 by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. The security certificate states:

We hereby certify that we were of the opinion, based on a Security Intelligence Report received and considered by us, that Mohamed

Zeki Mahjoub, a foreign national, is inadmissible on grounds of security for the reasons described in sections 34(1)(b), 34 (1)(c), 34(1)(d) and 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

 

The basis of the certificate is that Mr. Mahjoub poses a threat to national security.  The Ministers believe that Mr. Mahjoub has engaged in terrorism and subversion, that he is a high-ranking member of organizations that have engaged in terrorism and subversion, namely Al Jihad (AJ) and the closely related Vanguards of Conquest (VOC), and that he is a danger to the security of Canada because he has and will continue, while in Canada, his involvement in terrorist activities.

 

• [2] Pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the IRPA, the Ministers shall sign and refer the security certificates to the Federal Court so that a designated judge of that Court may determine whether the certificate is reasonable. That decision is this Court’s ultimate task in these proceedings.

 

• [3] In essence, the Court is to decide whether the named person, Mr. Mahjoub, a Convention refugee, is entitled to remain in Canada. Unlike in a criminal proceeding, the named person is not charged with a crime, and the Court is not to determine the named person’s guilt or innocence. As such, the only remedy available to the Ministers, if successful in these proceedings, is the removal of Mr. Mahjoub from Canada on the grounds that he is a threat to national security, subject to deportation proceedings.

 

• [4] After taking into consideration all of the evidence and the actions of the Ministers throughout these proceedings and leading to these proceedings, I find the security certificate signed pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the IRPA to be reasonable. While the Ministers have failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub is or was directly engaged in terrorism or subversion, they have established reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of a group that engaged in terrorism and subversion, namely Al Jihad (also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and its splinter or sub-group, the Vanguards of Conquest (also known as Tala al-Fath). I am satisfied that these groups targeted Canada and Canadians with their terrorist activities, and consequently as a member of this group, Mr. Mahjoub was a danger to the security of Canada. It was therefore reasonable for the Ministers to certify that Mr. Mahjoub was inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraphs 34(1)(f) and 34(1)(d) of the IRPA.

 

  II.  Background

 

• [5] To provide context, I shall provide a brief summary of the events leading up to these proceedings and the procedural history of the proceedings. A lexicon of acronyms is appended to these Reasons for ease of reference.

 

 

 

• [6] Mr. Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub is an Egyptian national born in Al-Sharkiya, Egypt, at the beginning of April 1960. Mr. Mahjoub arrived in Canada via Toronto Pearson International Airport during the night of December 30 and 31, 1995. He was traveling on a false Saudi Arabian passport. At the airport, Mr. Mahjoub claimed refugee status in Canada, which the Immigration and Refugee Board granted on October 24, 1996.

• [7] Mr. Mahjoub came to the attention of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS or the Service) in |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 1996 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. The Service conducted an investigation into Mr. Mahjoub’s past and present activities and associations pursuant to section 12 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-23 (CSIS Act). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| the Service sought a warrant at the Federal Court of Canada (as it then was) to collect further information on Mr. Mahjoub pursuant to section 21 of the CSIS Act. The Service obtained this warrant and subsequent warrants expanding its warrant powers. The warrants were in force from |||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [8] As a result of the information collected during its investigation, the Service prepared a Security Intelligence Report (SIR) recommending that the Solicitor General of Canada and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration sign a security certificate pursuant to section 40.1(1) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2.The Solicitor General of Canada, the Honourable Lawrence MacAulay, and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Honourable Elinor Caplan, signed the first security certificate naming Mr. Mahjoub on May 17 and June 12, 2000 respectively.

 

• [9] Mr. Mahjoub was arrested on June 26, 2000. The first security certificate was referred to the Federal Court of Canada in DES-1-00, and Justice Marc Nadon determined the first security certificate to be reasonable in a decision released on October 5, 2001 (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mahjoub, 2001 FCT 1095). Mr. Mahjoub remained in detention pending his deportation. On July 30, 2003 and November 25, 2005, Justice Eleanor Dawson dismissed Mr. Mahjoub’s applications pursuant to subsection 84(2) of the IRPA to be released from detention. In the meantime, Mr. Adil Charkaoui, another named person subject to a security certificate, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the constitutionality of the security certificate regime.

 

• [10] On February 23, 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada released Charkaoui v. Canada, 2007 SCC 9 [Charkaoui I], its first decision on the constitutionality of the regime. The Supreme Court’s ruling declared the security certificate regime under what was then section 77(1) of IRPA to be unconstitutional for two reasons: the named person did not sufficiently know the case to meet or have the means to meet it as required by section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sch. B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c. 11 [Charter], and the regime made a discriminatory distinction between foreign nationals and permanent residents in its detention provisions, violating section 15 of the Charter. The Supreme Court suspended its declaration of invalidity of the security certificate scheme for one year to enable Parliament to bring the scheme into line with the constitution.

 

• [11] Mr. Mahjoub was first released from detention on stringent conditions on June 14, 2007 by Order of Justice Mosley which followed his Reasons for Order on February 15, 2007 (2007 FC 171). The conditions required the supervision and monitoring of all of Mr. Mahjoub’s activities.

• [12] Prior to the expiry of the year-long suspension of invalidity for the security certificate regime, Parliament passed Bill C-3, which came into force February 22, 2008, the last day of the old legislation’s validity. Bill C-3 made the following changes to the security certificate regime:

1. A new disclosure process;

2. A new process for closed hearings and classified information;

3. A provision for the appointment of Special Advocates to represent the named person’s interests in closed hearings, and

4. Elimination of the distinction between permanent residents and foreign nationals for the purposes of detention review.

 

• [13] In the weeks leading up to the coming into force of Bill C-3, the Service prepared an updated SIR, concluding that Mr. Mahjoub was inadmissible to Canada. The Service submitted the SIR to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the Honourable Stockwell Day, and the Minister of Citizenship of Immigration, the Honourable Diane Finley. The Ministers signed the new security certificate, the subject of this proceeding, on February 22, 2008.

 

• [14] On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada released Charkaoui v. Canada, 2008 SCC 38, its second decision relating to the security certificate regime, also known as Charkaoui II. The Supreme Court declared the Service’s policy of destroying its operational notes to be a serious breach of the Service’s duty to retain and disclose information. The decision outlined the Service’s disclosure obligations in a security certificate proceeding, adapting the principles in R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 to the distinguishable security certificate context, while confirming that the named person’s right to disclosure is not absolute and is subject to national security privilege (Charkaoui II at paragraphs 48-63).

 

 

 

• [15] The following is a summary of the procedural history of this case from its beginnings in spring 2008.

 

• [16] The first schedule for the proceedings was set at the end of April 2008. Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson was appointed the designated judge for Mr. Mahjoub’s file, DES-7-08. Mr. Mahjoub retained Ms. Marlys Edwardh and Ms. Barbara Jackman, the same counsel as another person subject to a security certificate, Mr. Mahmoud Jaballah. The Special Advocates, Mr. Anil Kapoor and Mr. Gordon Cameron, were appointed in July 2008. In the late summer and fall of 2008, the Ministers and several of the named persons and special advocates litigated a motion to implement the Supreme Court’s Charkaoui II decision.

 

• [17] The Ministers’ case opened on September 29, 2008 with in camera evidence in support of the reasonableness of the security certificate and the threat that the Ministers alleged in support of maintaining Mr. Mahjoub’s conditions of release. On October 3, 2008, the Court issued a disclosure order implementing the Charkaoui II decision. The Ministers’ evidence continued until October 20, 2008, when the proceeding was suspended. The Special Advocates elected not to continue their cross-examination, reserving it until they had access to the Charkaoui II disclosure. The Ministers delivered two phases of classified Charkaoui II disclosure to the Special Advocates, the first on December 15, 2008 and the second on January 15, 2009.

 

• [18] Justice Layden-Stevenson was elevated to the Federal Court of Appeal on December 12, 2008. She subsequently ordered that issues of “variation of conditions of release” and reasonableness of the certificate be bifurcated to avoid undue complication and delay. The learned judge went on to complete the outstanding detention reviews and issued her reasons therein on December 18, 2008, and then again on March 9, 2009. By Communication dated December 19, 2008, Justice Layden-Stevenson also noted the unanimous agreement of all counsel that evidence adduced on the detention review relating to Mr. Mahjoub’s threat assessment can be read into the record of this proceeding.

 

• [19] In early 2009, by agreement, a number of issues, including constitutional issues, were litigated before Justice Dawson with the view of having her determinations apply to the outstanding certificate proceedings, including Mr. Mahjoub’s proceedings. Justice Dawson issued her decisions on these matters in March 2009, January 2010 and February 2010 (Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 240; Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 79 and Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 224; the latter two decisions were adopted in this proceeding by orders dated March 11, 2010 and March 15, 2010).

 

• [20] On March 17, 2009, Mr. Mahjoub’s supervising sureties, his wife and stepson, withdrew their consent to act as sureties for Mr. Mahjoub. The Court convened on an urgent basis, and Mr. Mahjoub consented to return to detention, which he did on April 30, 2009.

 

• [21] Throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 2009, the Court dealt with a number of contentious issues. These issues related to the lack of compatibility between the electronic formatting of the Charkaoui II disclosure and the systems used by the Special Advocates to review this disclosure, litigation over national security privilege and disclosure of Charkaoui II materials to Mr. Mahjoub (including a late change of position by the Ministers over the content of their own proposed summaries), Mr. Mahjoub’s constitutional challenge to the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, and Mr. Mahjoub’s detention review.

 

• [22] Mr. Mahjoub went on a hunger strike in July 2009 to protest the conditions of his detention. In September 2009, the Court was informed that his medical condition was deteriorating, requiring the Court to urgently reschedule a detention review hearing approximately one month earlier. By the end of September, Mr. Mahjoub had ended his hunger strike. On November 30, 2009, the Court released Mr. Mahjoub on strict conditions that nevertheless permitted him to live without supervising sureties. The passage of time and Mr. Mahjoub’s essential compliance with his conditions of release resulted in the relaxation of these conditions in subsequent detention reviews.

 

• [23] Ongoing litigation concerning disclosure required the reasonableness hearings, originally scheduled for February 2010, to be adjourned to March 2010. In the first few months of 2010, Mr. Mahjoub received summaries of most of the Charkaoui II disclosure and a revised public summary of the SIR. The reasonableness hearings were adjourned again because the Special Advocates’ expert, Dr. Omar Ashour, failed to disclose his conflict of interest when approached in January 2010 by the Ministers to be retained as their expert. By reason of this unexpected delay and with the consent of the parties, the Court heard the Special Advocates’ motion to exclude evidence for which there are reasonable grounds to believe it was obtained from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment pursuant to subsection 83(1.1) of the IRPA. The Court released its Reasons for Order on June 9, 2010 (2010 FC 737) and its Order implementing the Reasons on August 31, 2010, excluding some of the Ministers’ evidence.

 

• [24] On June 1, 2010, counsel for Mr. Mahjoub brought a motion to be removed as Mr. Mahjoub’s solicitors of record on the grounds of an irrevocable breakdown in the solicitor‑client relationship. The Court granted the motion on June 14, 2010. In late June, the Court had a three-way case management conference call with Mr. Mahjoub’s prospective counsel, including some individuals who would later become Mr. Mahjoub’s retained counsel, informing them that the reasonableness hearing would resume by October 12, 2010, which it did. The Ministers closed their public case on November 2, 2010.

 

• [25] In July 2010, the Court also clarified that preliminary matters and motions were complete. Nevertheless, during September and October 2010, Mr. Mahjoub brought motions for further disclosure and informally advised of his intention to bring a motion challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained by warrants and a motion for a permanent stay of proceedings on the grounds of abuse of process. The Court granted a two-week adjournment and decided by Order dated November 3, 2010 to avoid the repetition of evidence and to mitigate the delay by hearing all of the evidence for the two motions and reasonableness prior to deciding the motions.

 

• [26] After issuing additional subpoenas and making additional motions for disclosure, Mr. Mahjoub opened his case in late November 2010. The evidence continued until January 2011, and disclosure to Mr. Mahjoub, particularly in relation to the motions that he had brought in fall 2010, was ongoing. Mr. Mahjoub continued to make broad disclosure requests in support of his motions into April 2011. He also requested additional subpoenas to issue. The Ministers challenged the issuance of some of these subpoenas.This required litigation and as a result, no hearings relating to reasonableness were held from the end of January until June 2011. The hearing resumed in early June, 2011 until July 14, 2011.

 

• [27] On September 8, 2011, the Court received notification from Mr. Mahjoub’s counsel that the Ministers had seized Mr. Mahjoub’s materials from a court breakout room beginning on July 15, 2011 and commingled those documents with the Ministers’ documents. Mr. Mahjoub subsequently brought a motion for a permanent stay of proceedings and a motion for adjournment of the reasonableness proceedings. The Court adjourned the reasonableness proceedings and determined that the commingled documents needed to be separated before Mr. Mahjoub’s motion could be dealt with. Prothonotary Aalto was designated to oversee the separation process and report to the Court at the conclusion of the process. Subsequently, the Court declined to grant a permanent stay of proceedings for the Ministers’ negligent commingling of the documents, but instead removed eleven members of the Ministers’ litigation team from the case to remedy the abuse of process.

 

• [28] In the meantime, significant ongoing disclosure, including tranches of Charkaoui II disclosure, was released to Mr. Mahjoub. The most critical disclosure was the release to Mr. Mahjoub in October 2011 of a number of allegations that were contained in the foreign agency information. The Service had received permission to disclose these allegations in response to the requests that it had sent to the foreign agencies in late 2010. Mr. Mahjoub also received responses to the Ministers’ national security privilege objections made during several Service witnesses’ testimony.

 

• [29] In addition, Mr. Mahjoub had been gathering additional evidence to support his case as of March 2011 and throughout 2011. On the request of Mr. Mahjoub once the commingling issue was decided, the Court agreed to adjourn the reasonableness proceeding until July 2012. Mr. Mahjoub’s request to adjourn until October 2012 was refused on the basis that there had been significant previous rescheduling of the proceeding, and given the increased number of witnesses since July 2011, it was important to move the proceeding forward. Witness testimony resumed on July 6, 2012.

 

• [30] On June 19, 2012, the Court ruled on the Special Advocates’ motion to exclude evidence pursuant to the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Harkat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2012 FCA 122 [Harkat]. Evidence consisting of the Service’s summaries of conversations to which Mr. Mahjoub was not privy was excluded.

 

• [31] By consent of the Ministers, much of Mr. Mahjoub’s remaining evidence was adduced by affidavit, and Mr. Mahjoub closed his case on September 13, 2012. On that day, Mr. Mahjoub sought to obtain final decisions in his late filed motion relating to abuse of process and his constitutional and warrant challenges, which would effectively postpone his decision whether or not to testify. These issues have been explained at length in my reasons deciding the Abuse of Process Decision at paragraphs 340-346. The Court ordered Mr. Mahjoub to file a motion justifying why the schedule should be changed at this late stage. On September 19, 2012, Mr. Mahjoub decided not to testify. On October 2, 2012 the Court dismissed Mr. Mahjoub’s motion to change the schedule on the basis that the process to be followed in the proceeding had been decided much earlier in the proceeding (the November 3, 2010 Order, re-confirmed in the June 28, 2012 Order) and that it was not appropriate or efficient to modify the process at that late stage.

 

• [32] In addition, the Special Advocates brought a motion to exclude “unsourced intelligence” from the Ministers’ evidence in the proceedings on September 28, 2012. The Ministers adduced evidence on this motion on October 24, 2012.

 

• [33] The Ministers brought the remainder of their in camera evidence from October 9 to 12, 2012 and then closed their in camera case. The Court dismissed the Special Advocates’ objection that the Ministers were splitting their case in bringing this evidence. The Ministers and Special Advocates agreed that no public litigation was required as a result of the in camera evidence.

 

• [34] The Ministers continued to make required Charkaoui II disclosure, and Mr. Mahjoub continued to attempt to adduce new evidence until the eve of final submissions, which took place from November 26, 2012 to January 22, 2013.

 

• [35] The Court reserved on all five outstanding matters: the motion to exclude evidence obtained by the CSIS Act section 21 warrants (Warrants Decision), the constitutional challenge to the CSIS Act and Division 9 of the IRPA (Constitutional Decision) the motion for a permanent stay of proceedings due to abuse of process (Abuse of Process Decision), the motion to exclude “unsourced intelligence” (Foreign Agency Evidence Decision), and the reasonableness of the security certificate (Reasonableness Decision).

 

 

  III.  Legal Framework

 

• [36] The certificate signed pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the IRPA naming Mr. Mahjoub states that he is inadmissible on grounds of security. Pursuant to section 78 of the IRPA, on referral of the certificate, the designated judge shall determine whether it is reasonable and shall quash the certificate if he or she determines that it is not.

 

• [37] As Justice Dawson has explained in one of her decisions in the common issues proceedings (Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 79), the referral of a certificate may be characterized as follows:

 

[19]  The Act requires the Ministers to refer security certificates to the Court. When a certificate is referred, the Ministers are required to file with the Court the information and evidence upon which the certificate is based, and a summary of such information and evidence that enables the person named in the certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Ministers. There is no requirement for leave to proceed before the Court and the Ministers bear the onus of establishing that the certificate is reasonable. [Emphasis added]

 

• [38] To determine whether the certificate is reasonable, the judge must be satisfied that the Ministers have established that, with respect to the person named in the security certificate, he or she meets the criteria set out in subsection 34(1) of the IRPA, which provides as follows:

 

• [39] As Justice Mosley comments in Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 at paragraph 59: “[w]here a security certificate asserts inadmissibility on more than one ground, each ground must be read disjunctively. If any one ground is established, the certificate is to be determined to be reasonable…”

 

• [40] The standard of proof for the facts constituting inadmissibility is set out in section 33 of the IRPA:

 

• [41] The wording of section 33 does not support Mr. Mahjoub’s and the Special Advocates’ submission that each fact alleged by the Ministers must be proven on a balance of probabilities and then holistically assessed as to whether the facts so proven constitute reasonable grounds to believe. Each fact alleged that constitutes inadmissibility need only be proven on a reasonable grounds to believe standard.

 

• [42] The Supreme court of Canada makes this clear in Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 [Mugesera] at paragraph 116 in which the Court states that because the reasonable grounds to believe standard applies to questions of fact, “[t]his means that in this appeal the standard applies to whether Mr. Mugasera gave the speech, to the message it conveyed in a factual sense and to the context in which it was delivered.” These are the type of facts constituting inadmissibility. While the Supreme Court was dealing with a slightly different inadmissibility provision in the former Immigration and Refugee Act, in my view it also finds application to sections 33 and 34 of the current IRPA.

 

 

 

• [43] Charkaoui I provides the definition of the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard as it applies in security certificate referrals as well as reviews of the named person’s detention. The standard “requires the judge to consider whether ‘there is an objective basis [for the belief] … which is based on compelling and credible information’: Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC 40, at para. 114.” The Supreme Court in Mugasera further explains at paragraph 114 that the standard is “something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on the balance of probabilities.”

 

• [44] The named person may present a contrary version of the facts alleged by the Ministers, requiring the designated judge to examine which version is more probable. As established in the subsequent security certificate jurisprudence, in particular Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 at paragraph 101 and Harkat (Re), 2010 FC 1241 at paragraph 64, if the “preponderance of the evidence” is contrary to the version of the facts alleged by the Ministers, the certificate cannot be upheld as reasonable. As Justice Dawson further explains in Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 79:

[43]  The requirement that the belief be objectively grounded on compelling and credible evidence is an important protection. The standard connotes a degree of probability found on credible evidence, although the required degree of probability is less than a balance of probabilities. See: Thanaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2006] 1 F.C.R. 474 (C.A.) at paragraph 22.

 

[44]  I therefore disagree with Mr. Jaballah that, for example, it is possible to conclude that it is probable a person is not a member of a terrorist organization and still have a reasonable belief that the person is a member. If the evidence establishes a probability, that is, anything more likely than not, this would preclude reasonable grounds for belief of the contrary.

 

[45]  Further, notwithstanding the interpretive rule contained in section 33 of the Act, where there is conflicting evidence on a point, the Court must resolve such conflict by deciding which version of events is more likely to have occurred. A security certificate cannot be found to be reasonable if the Court is satisfied that the preponderance of credible evidence is contrary to the allegations of the Ministers. [Emphasis added]

 

To be clear, this does not mean that the Ministers must prove that the facts as they allege on a balance of probabilities. The standard of proof is not changed. The guidance provided by Justice Dawson addresses how the Court should resolve circumstances involving conflicting evidence on a point. If the evidence establishes there are reasonable grounds to believe that certain facts occurred, are occurring or may occur, those facts may found the basis for inadmissibility. If however, on any given fact in support of an allegation by the Ministers, the preponderance of evidence is contrary to the Ministers allegation, there can be no reasonable grounds to support the allegation.

 

 

• [45] Justice Dawson in Jaballah (Re) 2010 FC 79 has further explained that because the designated judge is required to conduct “a searching examination of the reasonableness of the certificate on the material placed before” him or her, according to paragraph 38 of Charkaoui I:

[26]  The question the Court is to determine is whether, on all of the information and evidence before it, the certificate is reasonable at that point in time. See: Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263 at paragraph 6. The Court does not inquire as to whether the Ministers' decision was reasonable when made, based upon the evidence and information then before the Ministers.

 

[27]  In light of the onus, the requirement that the Ministers adduce evidence in both open and closed proceedings, the right of the person concerned to cross-examine the Ministers’ witnesses and to adduce evidence, the required searching examination of the evidence led in both the open and closed hearings by the designated judge and the fact the decision is to be made on a contemporaneous (not retrospective) basis, it is not accurate to characterize the proceeding as a judicial review on an expanded evidentiary basis. [Emphasis added]

 

 

• [46] Justice Dawson held that the designated judge is not to consider the reasonableness of the certificate within the framework of a judicial review whereby the judge determines whether it was reasonable for the Ministers to sign the security certificate at the time the certificate was issued. Rather, the certificate is considered on the judge’s de novo review of all of the evidence adduced since the Ministers signed the certificate. I agree with this assessment.

 

• [47] Justice Dawson’s comments do not, however, restrict the temporality of the grounds of inadmissibility found in section 34 of the IRPA. At paragraph 33 of Jaballah (Re), 2010 FC 79, she further explains that the designated judge is to decide if there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the relevant matters alleged in subsection 34(1) of the Act have occurred, are occurring, or may occur” (emphasis added).

 

• [48] The Federal Court of Appeal in Harkat concurs with designated judge Justice Simon Noël’s view of the temporality of paragraph 34(1)(d) of the IRPA:

 

[152] I agree with the [designated] judge’s conclusion on the issue of security under section 34 of the Act. The scope of application of this section is governed by the rules of interpretation found in section 33. Unless otherwise provided, the facts that constitute inadmissibility include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe that they have occurred are occurring or may occur. Section 33 covers past, present and future facts. Therefore, there is no requirement under the combined effect of sections 33 and 34 that the danger to the security of Canada be current in order to be inadmissible on security grounds. [Emphasis added]

 

• [49] With respect to membership pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f), the Federal Court of Appeal does not comment on Mr. Harkat’s argument that “the absence of a temporal nexus between membership and the terrorist nature of the organization leads to an interpretation which offends sections 2 and 7 of the Charter.” Subsequently, the Federal Court has interpreted paragraph 34(1)(f) to require a temporal nexus between membership and the reasonable grounds to believe that the organization engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) (see Justice Leonard Mandamin’s comments in Werfalli v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FC 612 at paragraphs 61-78). This interpretation restricts the provision, for it will not capture individuals who are members of an organization before there were reasonable grounds to believe that the organization will engage in the enumerated acts, avoiding a situation where a member of a lawful group has a “Sword of Damocles suspended indefinitely over his or her head” in case that organization ever engages in acts described in (a), (b) or (c) (Werfalli at paragraph 62). This interpretation is in my view reasonable. If at the time of membership it is established, on reasonable grounds to believe, that the organization is not engaged, has not engaged or will not engage in the enumerated acts, the member will not be captured by the provision.

 

 

 

• [50] The Federal Court of Appeal accepted the Immigration and Refugee Board’s (IRB’s) definition of “subversion” as “accomplishing change by illicit means or for improper purposes related to an organization” (Qu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 399 at paragraph 12). This definition was used by the Federal Court in Suleyman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 780 at paragraph 63 and in subsequent paragraph 34(1)(b) jurisprudence such as Jalloh v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 317 at paragraph 14 in defining the term “subversion by force”.

 

• [51] Justice Michael Phelan further elaborated on the term in Oremade v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1077. In that case, “by force” was broadly defined to include “coercion or compulsion by violent means, coercion or compulsion by threats to use violent means, and…reasonably perceived potential for use of coercion by violent means” (ibid. at paragraph 27). The learned judge concluded that the provision required that there be intent to “use such means to subvert the particular government” (ibid. at paragraph 24). This intention “is not to be measured solely from the subjective perspective of the applicant” but from an objective perspective of what the reasonable person would assume (ibid. at paragraph 26). Justice Phelan’s definition has been adopted in subsequent jurisprudence (see: Eyakwe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 409; Jahazi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 242).

 

• [52] As a final point, the Federal Court in Alemu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 997 points out that “since [paragraph 34(1)(b)] delineates two possibilities – engaging in subversion by force or instigating subversion by force – some specificity is required” (at paragraph 31). The Court must therefore determine specifically whether the named person engaged in and/or instigated subversion by force of any government.

 

 

 

• [53] The Supreme Court defines “terrorism” in Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1 [Suresh] at paragraph 98, as follows:

In our view, it may safely be concluded, following the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, that “terrorism” in s. 19 of the Act includes any “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. This definition catches the essence of what the world understands by “terrorism”. Particular cases on the fringes of terrorist activity will inevitably provoke disagreement… [Emphasis added]

 

• [54] Justice Mosley incorporates the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 definition of “terrorist activity” into this definition in Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263:

[71]  Any attempt to define “terrorism” in the immigration context must also now take into account the definition of “terrorist activity” found in subsection 83.01(1) of the Criminal Code: Soe v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 671, [2007] F.C.J. No. 913. That definition is in two parts. The first part links the meaning of the term to the commission of certain listed offences enacted by Canada in the course of domestic ratification of international conventions and treaties against terrorism.

 

[72]  The second part of the definition of terrorist activity in the Criminal Code, includes a number of elements which require proof of political, religious or ideological purpose, an intention to intimidate or compel action or inaction on the part of a government, organization or person and harmful consequences such as death, serious property damage or interference with essential services. [Emphasis added]

 

• [55] Subsequent to the reasonableness decision in Almrei (Re), the Supreme Court of Canada has upheld the constitutionality of the definition of terrorism in the Criminal Code in R. v. Khawaja, 2012 SCC 69:

[62]  I return to the central question: is s. 83.18 broader than necessary or does it have a grossly disproportionate impact, considering that the state objective is the prevention and prosecution of terrorism? It is true that s. 83.18 captures a wide range of conduct. However, as we have seen, the scope of that conduct is reduced by the requirement of specific intent and the exclusion of conduct that a reasonable person would not view as capable of materially enhancing the abilities of a terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity. On the other side of the scale lies the objective of preventing the devastating harm that may result from terrorist activity. When the tailored reach of the section is weighed against the objective, it cannot be said that the selected means are broader than necessary or that the impact of the section is disproportionate.

 

[63]  I add this. The breadth of the impugned provisions reflects Parliament’s determination that “there is substantive harm inherent in all aspects of preparation for a terrorist act because of the great harm that flows from the completion of terrorist acts”: R. v. Ahmad (2009), 257 C.C.C. (3d) 199 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 60. In the context of the present analysis, it is appropriate to exhibit due deference to this determination. The criminalization under s. 83.18 of a broad range of interactions that have the potential — and are intended to — materially enhance the abilities of terrorist groups is not grossly disproportionate nor overbroad in relation to the objective of prosecuting and, in particular, of preventing terrorism. [Emphasis added]

 

 

• [56] Similarly, in Harkat, the Federal Court of Appeal upheld Justice Noël’s broad definition of “terrorism” that includes supporting activities, found at paragraphs 77-81 of the trial decision. The Federal Court of Appeal comments:

[149] I see no merit in the appellant’s argument that the judge erred in concluding that the definition of terrorism includes materially supporting terrorist activities such as providing funds, false documents, recruitment and shelter even though such acts are not directly linked to violence. There is abundant jurisprudence supporting the judge’s conclusion: see Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 2 FC 592 (FCA); Ikhlef (Re), 2002 FCT 263, at paragraph 54; Toronto Coalition to Stop the War v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2010 FC 957, at paragraphs 127-130. [Emphasis added]

 

 

• [57] The Supreme Court of Canada also provides a definition of “danger to the security of Canada” pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(d) in Suresh as follows:

[85] … we accept that a fair, large and liberal interpretation in accordance with international norms must be accorded to “danger to the security of Canada” in deportation legislation. We recognize that “danger to the security of Canada” is difficult to define. We also accept that the determination of what constitutes a “danger to the security of Canada” is highly fact-based and political in a general sense. All this suggests a broad and flexible approach to national security and, as discussed above, a deferential standard of judicial review. Provided the Minister is able to show evidence that reasonably supports a finding of danger to the security of Canada, courts should not interfere with the Minister’s decision.

 

…

 

[87] Whatever the historic validity of insisting on direct proof of specific danger to the deporting country, as matters have evolved, we believe courts may now conclude that the support of terrorism abroad raises a possibility of adverse repercussions on Canada’s security: see Rehman, supra, per Lord Slynn of Hadley, at paras. 16-17. International conventions must be interpreted in the light of current conditions. It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in one country did not necessarily implicate other countries. But after the year 2001, that approach is no longer valid.

 

…

 

[89] …while “danger to the security of Canada” must be given a fair, large and liberal interpretation, it nevertheless demands proof of a potentially serious threat.

[90] If he or she poses a serious threat to the security of Canada, whether direct or indirect, and bearing in mind the fact that the security of one country is often dependent on the security of other nations. The threat must be “serious”, in the sense that it must be grounded on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the threat and harm must be substantial rather than negligible. [Emphasis added]

 

 

• [58] I adopt this definition for the purposes of this referral as Justice Noël did at paragraph 82 of the trial decision in Harkat (Re).

 

• [59] Finally, in the Harkat (Re) trial decision, Justice Noël provides the following guidance relating to the terms “membership” in an “organization”:

[85]  Terrorist organizations do not issue membership cards. It is the belief in a cause and the actions of individuals in relation to that cause with the recognition of leaders that establish informal membership. Therefore, many scenarios can be considered (see Canada (M.C.I.) v. Singh (1998) 151 F.T.R. 101 at para. 52).

 

[86]  It has been the approach of courts to give an unrestricted and broad interpretation to the word “member”, and more so when national security is involved (see Poshteh v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FCA 85, para. 27; Almrei (Re), 2009 FC 1263, para. 64).

 

…

 

[90]  Terrorist organizations are loosely structured and extremely secretive. One part of the organization may not know what the other parts are doing. They have a common objective, and use dangerous means and they target innocent civilians. Their ranks vary in time. They change leadership, members and ways to attack and they adapt to new circumstances. No definition can be exhaustive since these organizations are always fluid. Therefore, the word “organization” calls for a broad reading (see Sittampalam v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FCA 326 at para. 38). [Emphasis added]

 

 

• [60] The Federal Court of Appeal in Harkat upheld Justice Noël’s broad definition of organization. Justice Létourneau comments:

[150]  I see no error in the judge’s conclusion that the term “organization” has to be given a broad interpretation in view of the loose structure and the fluid and extremely secretive nature of criminal or terrorist organizations: see Sittampalam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 326, at paragraphs 38 and 39; Ikhlef (Re), supra, at paragraph 64.

 

• [61] This was also the approach adopted by Justice Mosley in Almrei (Re). The learned judge explains:

[63]  There is no definition of these terms in the statute and the courts have not attempted a precise and exhaustive interpretation of their meaning. As was stated by Justice Rothstein in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 1998 CanLII 8281 (F.C.), (1998), 151 F.T.R. 101 (F.C.T.D.), at paragraph 52:

 

The provisions deal with subversion and terrorism. The context in immigration legislation is public safety and national security, the most serious concerns of government. It is trite to say that terrorist organizations do not issue membership cards. There is no formal test for membership and members are not therefore easily identifiable. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration may, if not detrimental to the national interest, exclude an individual from the operation of subparagraph 19(1)(f)(iii)(B). I think it is obvious that Parliament intended the term "member" to be given an unrestricted and broad interpretation.

 

[64]  The Federal Court of Appeal cited this passage with approval in Poshteh, above, at paragraphs 27 to 29. In Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C. 297, [2000] F.C.J. No. 2043, the Court of Appeal held that being a member means simply “belonging” to an organization. This Court has consistently applied an unrestricted and broad interpretation to the meaning of “member”: Ahani (Re) (1998), 146 F.T.R. 223, [1998] F.C.J. No. 507; Ikhlef (Re), 2002 FCT 263, [2002] F.C.J. No. 352; Harkat (Re), 2005 FC 393, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481. [Emphasis added]

 

• [62] Justice Mosley also conducted a thorough overview of the jurisprudence on membership in Krishnamoorthy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1342 at paragraphs 21‑26. I distill from his analysis that there are a number of factors to be considered when determining membership, namely:

1. Both relatively benign and relatively serious activities done by the named person for an organization (Suresh (Re) (1997), 140 F.T.R. 88 at paragraphs 20-21);

2. The named person’s involvement with the organization, length of time involved, and degree of commitment to the organization and its objectives (Tharmavarathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 985 at paragraph 28), and

3. Whether or not the named person was coerced into joining or prevented from leaving (Kashif Omer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 478 at paragraph 13).

 

• [63] In addition, it is clear from the jurisprudence that “actual or formal membership in an organization is not required” and that “there will always be some factors that support a membership finding, and others that point away from membership” (Farkhondehfall v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 471 at paragraph 30, citing Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 2 F.C. 642 and Poshteh at paragraph 36). In Motehaver v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FC 141 at paragraph 30, the applicant was found inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA although there was only evidence of his distribution of propaganda for a terrorist group and “his attempt to become a member…”

 

• [64] Nevertheless, “there must at least be evidence of an ‘institutional link’ with, or ‘knowing participation’ in, the group’s activities” (Sinnaiah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 1576 at paragraph 6).

 

• [65] In sum, in considering whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that a named person in a certificate is a member of an organization engaged in acts described in paragraphs 34(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the IRPA, the designated judge is to consider evidence of an “institutional link” with or “knowing participation” in the organization’s activities and need not determine that the individual was a formal or actual member. This evidence includes the involvement of the named person, including all of the connections that the named person is alleged by the Ministers to have with the organization(s) at issue, including the length of time and degree of commitment, as well as any activities done for the organization(s) and whether or not the person was coerced into joining or prevented from leaving.

 

• [66] The designated judge must also be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the organization(s) exist as alleged by the Ministers, however amorphous, and whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the said organization(s) is engaged, has engaged or will engage in the enumerated acts.

 

• [67] With this legal framework in mind, I now turn to the specific allegations against Mr. Mahjoub.

 

 

  IV.  Allegations

 

• [68] The Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub, as a foreign national, is inadmissible to Canada on security grounds, pursuant to section 34 of the IRPA for:

• Engaging in or instigating the subversion by force of any government, specifically the government of Egypt (paragraph 34(1)(a));

• Engaging in the subversion by force of the government of Egypt (paragraph 34(1)(b));

• Engaging in terrorism (paragraph 34(1)(c));

• Being a danger to the security of Canada (paragraph 34(1)(d)), and

• Being a member of organizations, namely Al Jihad and the Vanguards of Conquest, that there are reasonable grounds to believe engage and have engaged in the subversion by force of the government of Egypt and terrorism (paragraph 34(1)(f)).

 

• [69] More specifically, in their written submissions, the Ministers allege, on the basis of the June 28, 2012 Public Summary of the SIR, that:

1. Mr. Mahjoub was a prominent member of Al Jihad;

2. Mr. Mahjoub was a high-ranking member of the VOC and its ruling Shura Council;

3. Mr. Mahjoub had contacts with extremists in Egypt and was trying to induce them to travel abroad;

4. Mr. Mahjoub actively recruited new VOC members after the Afghan-Soviet War, recruiting both Afghan and Egyptian individuals to enter Egypt and to form cells to assassinate some Egyptian officials;

5. Mr. Mahjoub was the head of the VOC’s military wing in the early 1990s during which he recruited a number of Egyptians to train in camps in southern Lebanon controlled by both Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps;

6. Mr. Mahjoub was responsible for the VOC’s terrorist operations;

7. Mr. Mahjoub is wanted by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in terrorist acts and was accused of the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad and has been charged in numerous cases;

8. Mr. Mahjoub was in contact with Mubarak Al Duri, Mahmoud Jaballah, Ahmed Said Khadr, Essam Marzouk, Ahmed Agiza and Ahmed Badiya, and these individuals are terrorists and Al Jihad, Vanguards of Conquest or Al Qaeda members.

 

• [70] The Ministers’ specific allegations in the June 28, 2012 classified SIR are as follows:

1. Mr. Mahjoub was a high ranking member of the VOC;

2. Mr. Mahjoub occupied a position of relative seniority with the Arab Mujahideen fighting against the Soviet forces in the 1980s and that during the Afghan-Soviet War, he was responsible for arranging the travel of AJ Mujahideen to Pakistan via Saudi Arabia;

3. Since the end of the Afghan-Soviet War, Mr. Mahjoub operated from Pakistan/Afghanistan for his recruitment operations;

4. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [Mr. Mahjoub continued to be a leader of the VOC while in Canada] and

5. Mr. Mahjoub is also known as Mahmoud Shaker.

 

 

• [71] As I understand the parties’ positions, the following facts are uncontested. Mr. Mahjoub was born April 3, 1960 in Al-Sharkiya, Egypt. He attended Al Azhar University in Cairo from 1979 to 1985, when he graduated with a B.Sc. in agriculture. Shortly after his graduation, Mr. Mahjoub entered compulsory service with the Egyptian military, training in weapons and receiving a posting monitoring aircraft movement. Mr. Mahjoub completed his military service with good conduct in December 1986.

 

• [72] Mr. Mahjoub travelled to Saudi Arabia in June 1991. In or around September 1991, Mr. Mahjoub travelled to Sudan as a visitor. He became an illegal immigrant to Sudan when he lost his passport in February 1992. Also in February 1992, he began working on Al-Damazin, or Damazine Farm, a farm in the southern part of Sudan owned by one of Osama Bin Laden’s companies. In May 1993, Mr. Mahjoub left his position on Damazine Farm.

 

• [73] On December 30, 1995, Mr. Mahjoub made his way to Canada and arrived at Toronto Pearson International Airport. Once in Canada, he had contact with the Elsamnah family, the in‑laws of Mr. Ahmed Khadr, and he shared an apartment with Mr. Sayed Fathi Mohammed El Jamal. He also sometimes went by the name “Abu Ibrahim.” On September 26, 1996, Mr. Mahjoub married Ms. Mona El Fouli, who had been previously married and had a child from the first marriage, Mr. Hani El Fouli. In subsequent years, Mr. Mahjoub had sons Ibrahim and Yusuf by Ms. El Fouli. Mr. Mahjoub worked part-time teaching the Koran from January to March 1997, and then he obtained jobs moving furniture from July 1997 to September 1998, which he continued part-time while taking full-time English as a Second Language (ESL) classes between May 1999 and January 2000. He then began a job at a grocery store. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) arrested Mr. Mahjoub on June 26, 2000.

 

 

• [74] I summarize the Ministers’ account of events as follows. After completing his military service in 1986, Mr. Mahjoub went to Afghanistan to fight in the Afghan-Soviet War as a Mujahideen fighter, where he attained a senior position. He also joined the AJ terrorist group, a Sunni Islamic extremist group whose goal was to overthrow the Egyptian government by the use of violence and establish a government that it considered to be truly Islamic. Sometime in the late 1980s, Mr. Mahjoub assisted the AJ in the Afghan-Soviet War by arranging the travel of AJ Mujahideen from Afghanistan to Pakistan through Saudi Arabia. At some point, Mr. Mahjoub also became a member of a radical offshoot of the AJ, the Vanguards of Conquest (VOC) and acquired the |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [alias] Mahmoud Shaker. He also at some point acquired the alias “Mohammed Hasan.” After the Afghan-Soviet War ended in 1989 and until 1991, Mr. Mahjoub operated from Pakistan and Afghanistan recruiting new members for the VOC. In addition, || |||||||||| [in the 1990s] Mr. Mahjoub recruited a number of Egyptians to the VOC for training in South Lebanon in camps operated by Hezbollah, a militant Palestinian extremist group, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC, also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps), a militant arm of the Iranian government.

 

• [75] After obtaining a visa for his Egyptian passport to travel to Saudi Arabia on a pilgrimage in June 1991, Mr. Mahjoub went to Sudan in the fall of 1991 as part of the migration of the AJ and the closely associated and overlapping terrorist group Al Qaeda from Afghanistan to Sudan after the Afghan-Soviet War. This migration included leaders of these terrorist organizations, Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri and Mr. Osama Bin Laden. At that time, the Sudanese government welcomed terrorist groups onto its territory. In February 1992, Mr. Mahjoub was trusted enough by Mr. Bin Laden to be appointed to the position of Deputy Director-General, or second‑in‑command, of Althemar Almubarakah Agriculture Company, owned by Mr. Bin Laden. He worked closely with Dr. Mubarak Al Duri, the Director-General of the company who was also a member of the AJ involved in Mr. Bin Laden’s weapons of mass destruction program. Mr. Mahjoub was appointed manager of the Damazine Farm, a large farm that used agricultural activities as a front to hide AJ and Al Qaeda refresher training in weapons and explosives. He had knowledge of and was involved in these activities as manager of the farm. He held this position until May 1993

 

• [76] In 1993, a large number of VOC members were arrested and tried by the Egyptian government. A conflict ensued between Mr. Ahmed Husayn Mustafa Agiza, leader of the VOC, and Dr. Al Zawahiri, the leader of the AJ. As a result, the two groups further split, and Mr. Mahjoub followed Mr. Agiza, becoming part of Mr. Agiza’s faction. I note that the Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub recruited for the VOC from Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Afghan‑Soviet War, and worked in Sudan in 1992 and 1993, while maintaining that the VOC was created in 1993 during the split. This inconsistency in allegations is not explained by the Ministers. Mr. Mahjoub left Mr. Bin Laden’s company, Althemar, at about this time to pursue his activities with the VOC. Sometime prior to coming to Canada, Mr. Mahjoub became a member of the |||||||||||||||||||||||||| VOC Shura Council (ruling or advisory council) under Mr. Agiza’s leadership. He was involved at this time in planning the November 19, 1995 bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad. Also involved in the bombing were Mr. Agiza, Mr. Khadr, [and others] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.

 

• [77] Also in the early 1990s, whether before or after arriving in Sudan and before coming to Canada, Mr. Mahjoub recruited |||| Egyptian Arab Afghans to enter Egypt, form operational cells and make preparations for assassinations of Egyptian government officials. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.

 

• [78] Because the Sudanese government had started turning against terrorist groups and expelling them due to pressure from the Egyptian and United States governments, Mr. Mahjoub permanently moved from Sudan to Canada on December 30, 1995. AJ, Al Qaeda, and VOC members moved to Arab countries and various countries in the West in 1995 and 1996. Like Mr. Al Duri and Mr. Essam Marzouk, Mr. Mahjoub arrived in Canada using a false Saudi Arabian passport. Mr. Jaballah arrived in Canada in May, 1996, also using a false Saudi passport. The use of false Saudi passports by Mr. Mahjoub and other members of terrorist groups was prevalent because Saudi passports did not require a visa at the time to enter Canada. Further, if the false passport were challenged, the terrorist could claim asylum, as did Mr. Mahjoub.

 

• [79] Mr. Mahjoub invented a story to tell to the Canadian authorities that he had been arrested, tortured, and later persecuted by the Egyptian security apparatus for having been associated with a suspected member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political enemy of President Hosni Mubarak, who was then in power. The information that he gave to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) and the Immigration Review Board (IRB) contained some true facts, but he carefully omitted any details that could connect him with terrorism, such as his real role at Damazine Farm and the fact that the farm was owned by a Bin Laden company. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| The VOC and the AJ were at the time expanding their presence in Canada. Mr. Agiza was instructed by the leadership of the VOC to move his cell from Syria to Canada [in 1997] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [80] Mr. Mahjoub operated in Canada under the alias Ibrahim or Abu Ibrahim, along with other aliases. As a member of the Egyptian Islamic terrorist network, upon arrival, Mr. Mahjoub initially lodged with the Elsamnah family. The Elsamnahs were the in-laws of Mr. Khadr, who was a senior aide to Mr. Bin Laden and was involved in terrorist fund-raising efforts. Mr. Mahjoub was also in direct contact with Mr. Khadr. While in Canada, Mr. Mahjoub maintained regular contact with Mr. Marzouk, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Mr. Marzouk went by the “Nom de Guerre” of Adnan. Mr. Marzouk had served as an AJ trainer in assassination techniques and had also been involved in transporting Islamist extremists to camps run by Hezbollah. Mr. Marzouk would later travel to Baku, Azerbaijan to conduct a terrorist attack on the American Embassy in Baku in 1998. Mr. Marzouk was caught planning this attack with several associates, including Mr. Saqr.

• [81] While in Canada, Mr. Mahjoub also maintained contact with Mr. Al Duri, with whom he had a close relationship, and with Mr. Jaballah, a member of the AJ and close associate of AJ leader and founding Al Qaeda member Dr. Al Zawahiri |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. In 1997 and 1998, Mr. Mahjoub also contacted Mr. Ahmed Hassan Badiya, a fellow member of the VOC |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| who |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [had responsibilities] for the group in Kuwait. The Khadrs and Elsamnahs remained close family friends with Mr. Mahjoub.

 

• [82] Mr. Majhoub remained active as a member of the Shura Council |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| while he resided in Canada [and] ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| while AJ, the parent organization of the VOC of which Mr. Mahjoub was a member, signed on to the International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders (along with Al Qaeda) that issued a fatwa calling for members to kill Americans and their allies. This Front remained a danger to Canadian national security throughout this period and to this day. Upon Mr. Badiya’s arrest in Kuwait and deportation in early 1999, Mr. Mahjoub took on even more leadership responsibility within the VOC Shura Council to direct terrorist activities.

 

• [83] When the Service became interested in him, Mr. Mahjoub chose to lie and deny anything that he believed would lead the Service to discover his connection to terrorism unless he was confronted with the fact that the Service already knew a particular incriminating detail. He denied his travels to Afghanistan and Pakistan, his use of aliases, his participation in extremist activities, his support for violence, and his contacts with anyone connected to terrorism. Despite specifically denying these facts, he later admitted when confronted with these facts that he used the alias Abu Ibrahim, resided with the Elsamnahs, and knew Mr. Khadr.

 

• [84] Below, I summarize Mr. Mahjoub’s account of events derived primarily from his PIF, summaries of the multiple interviews with the Service, and Mr. Mahjoub’s transcript of proceedings before the IRB, all of which have been adduced in evidence. This account of events diverges significantly from the Ministers’ account.

 

• [85] In April 1986, the Egyptian security apparatus arrested Mr. Mahjoub because his address had been found on a university schoolmate when the latter was arrested on suspicion of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a political opponent to the Mubarak regime. Mr. Mahjoub was imprisoned and tortured for four months in an attempt to obtain a confession out of him, although Mr. Mahjoub had never had anything to do with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was released in August 1986 and allowed to complete his military service. Nevertheless, he continued to be persecuted as a suspected member of the Muslim Brotherhood and for his religious beliefs in Egypt from 1987 to 1991. By way of example, he was denied a job opportunity as an agricultural expert for the Egyptian Ministry of Justice because of the intervention of the ESS. He was also called in by the ESS several times in 1987 and 1988 and remained under close surveillance from 1998 on. His mother and brother Hamdi were arrested and interrogated about him. He was also prevented from traveling. As a result of his persecution, Mr. Mahjoub left Egypt in June 1991, taking advantage of an exception to his travel restrictions by going on a religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. He had never travelled outside of Egypt before June 1991.

 

• [86] In September 1991, Mr. Mahjoub made his way to Khartoum, Sudan because Sudan was a country to which he could travel without a visa as an Egyptian. Mr. Mahjoub expected to find work in Sudan because Sudan had a large agricultural sector, and his education was in agriculture. He found life difficult in Sudan, and it was difficult even for the Sudanese to find a job there. In addition, he was also under constant surveillance by Egyptian security agents, particularly in the market in Khartoum. He observed that many employees of institutions in Khartoum such as the Khartoum branch of Cairo University or Egyptian Irrigation in Sudan were working for the ESS. He had the intention of obtaining legal status in Sudan but lost his passport, and he feared going to the Egyptian embassy for a new one because it would bring him into contact with the Egyptian government. He obtained work on Damazine Farm as an agricultural engineer from February 1992 to May 1993, where he met Mr. Mubarak Al Duri, Director‑General of Althemar. Mr. Mahjoub’s work was legitimate work even though it was for Althemar, a company owned by Mr. Bin Laden, who had many legitimate business enterprises in Sudan and thousands of employees who had nothing to do with terrorism, which was kept secret. Because his wages were low at the farm, Mr. Mahjoub returned to Khartoum to trade goods in the market.

 

• [87] Tensions rose between the Sudanese government and the Egyptian government, the Egyptian government accusing Sudan of harbouring Islamists, its political enemies. These accusations were fabrications of the Egyptian government. Mr. Mahjoub was followed by Egyptians living in Sudan, and threatening letters were left outside or under his door because they suspected that Mr. Mahjoub supported the Islamists. He feared that the Egyptian intelligence service would assassinate him. Meanwhile, back in Egypt, his mother continued to be harassed by the Egyptian state security apparatus. She told Mr. Mahjoub not to return to Egypt for fear that he would be jailed or killed, and she told him that the Egyptian authorities had told her that they would find Mr. Mahjoub abroad and kill him. As the tensions rose between the two governments, he also feared extradition. He was perceived by the Egyptian government as a terrorist simply because he had lived in Sudan.

 

• [88] Consequently, Mr. Mahjoub left Sudan on December 30, 1995 to come to Canada. He felt that in Canada, he would be safer and free to practice his religion. He claimed asylum upon arrival. By chance in the airport, he came across Mr. El Jamal who noticed that he only spoke Arabic and helped him with his lost luggage, which contained the only photocopies he had of his passport and identity card. Mr. Mahjoub resided with Mr. El Jamal and knew Mr. Khadr only since he came to Canada and because he was well-known. He also began using the name Abu Ibrahim soon after his arrival in Canada for religious reasons, and particularly because his wife was expecting a son who would be named Ibrahim. Mr. Mahjoub stayed in contact with Dr. Al Duri from Althemar, but they discussed only legitimate business. Mr. Mahjoub did not know Mr. Marzouk, Mr. Agiza or Mr. Jaballah. It may have been Ms. Mona El Fouli, Mr. Mahjoub’s wife, or Mr. Hani El Fouli, Mr. Mahjoub’s stepson, who were in contact with either these three men or their wives. He never contacted Mr. Badiya, who is now a leading member of a legitimate Islamist political party in Egypt

 

• [89] Mr. Mahjoub was not open with the Service in his interviews because of his fear of the Egyptian authorities. His mother had told him that the Egyptian state security apparatus had informed her that they knew his address in Canada and would find him. Mr. Mahjoub’s two brothers were arrested in July 1997 by the Egyptian authorities. He was concerned that his refugee claim had come to the Egyptian authorities’ attention and had been the reason for his brothers’ arrest. He was also concerned that the Canadian authorities had provided Egypt with this information, and that providing the Canadian authorities with more information would lead to more trouble with the Egyptian authorities for himself and anyone he named. He was wrongfully convicted by an Egyptian military court of Islamic extremist activities in the Returnees from Albania trial in 1999 due to false confessions extracted by torture from detainees. Following the Arab Spring in early 2011 and the removal of the brutal Mubarak regime from power, the military court that convicted him has been found to have no jurisdiction over him, and others convicted in similar proceedings have since been exonerated in the Egyptian courts.

 

• [90] Mr. Mahjoub has never been involved with any Islamic extremist activities or groups, and he believes that his religion does not support the use of violence. The Egyptian government was simply out to get him because it suspected on the basis of a connection with a schoolmate and his residence in Sudan that he was a political opponent of the Mubarak regime. The case against Mr. Mahjoub is a fabrication by the Mubarak regime, through the use of torture, against an innocent man that the regime perceived to be a political opponent. The Service believed this fabricated story because of its failure to conduct a proper investigation.

 

 

V. Evidence

 

• [91] Throughout this proceeding, there was a large volume of evidence adduced supporting and refuting the Ministers’ allegations for the Court to process. It consisted of copies of physical evidence, witness testimony, expert witness testimony and reports, open source documentary evidence, classified Bibliographical Reference System (BRS, or their predecessor, NSR reports) including reports which summarized interviews with Mr. Mahjoub and other individuals, physical surveillance, intercepted communications, and information provided by foreign agencies. Where possible, summaries of the classified evidence were provided to Mr. Mahjoub and his counsel. By communication dated September 3, 2009, the Court indicated on consent, that “the Court will place no reliance on information tendered in private from human sources in support of the Ministers’ claims.”

 

• [92] In this section of the decision, I propose to broadly set out the evidence adduced by the parties including physical and documentary evidence and the testimony of lay and expert witnesses. I will explain the approach adopted in assessing certain evidence and comment on its general reliability. It is not my intention to give an overview of every witness who testified in this proceeding, only those who testified primarily to the reasonableness of the certificate or the reliability of the evidence pertaining to reasonableness. I will first turn to the Ministers’ evidence.

 

 

 

• [93] The Ministers’ case relies heavily on physical evidence, including documents belonging to Mr. Mahjoub, obtained in the course of the Service’s investigation at Mr. Mahjoub’s arrest, in a subsequent search of his premises, and in the course of the DES-1-00 proceeding. Except for the reference letter discussed at (d) below, I have determined this evidence to be admissible in the Warrants Decision (at paragraphs 171-183). I also find it to be the most reliable evidence adduced by the Ministers. This evidence consists of the following items:

1. Telephone toll records for Mr. Mahjoub and Mr. Marzouk (Exhibit A7, Tabs 1-13). These records are business documents made by the relevant telephone companies in the course of their normal business, and Mr. Mahjoub has not challenged their reliability.

2. Mr. Mahjoub’s “pocket litter”, copies of the contents of his pockets obtained upon his arrest including his personal address book (Exhibit A7 Tab 16; see M. Guay testimony, 25 October 2010, p.20). The Ministers have provided evidence that these items were obtained from Mr. Mahjoub upon his arrest. While Mr. Mahjoub submits that these items might not be authentic or might not belong to him, it was open to him to adduce evidence in support of this submission. No witnesses were called by him, and no other evidence adduced. I therefore found the physical evidence obtained in Mr. Mahjoub’s “pocket litter” to belong to Mr. Mahjoub and the copies of the address book to be a true copy of the original.

3. The August 12, 1998 letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub discussing investments (Exhibit A2, Tab 83). The Ministers have provided evidence that this letter was obtained from a locked briefcase at Mr. Mahjoub’s premises the day after his arrest. Apart from pointing out that this letter is adduced in evidence as a copy, Mr. Mahjoub does not appear to contest the reliability of this letter.

4. The October 17, 1993 reference letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub providing details of his employment for Althemar (Exhibit A2, Tab 10). This evidence was adduced in DES-1-00 and re-adduced in this proceeding. Again, other than the fact that it is a copy, Mr. Mahjoub does not appear to dispute the reliability of this letter.

 

 

• [94] The Ministers’ case relies in part on open source documents. While they are too numerous to list here, the broad categories of documents adduced to support the Ministers’ case are news articles, periodicals, books, encyclopaedias, online database entries, NGO publications, think tank publications, and both foreign and Canadian government publications. I found these documents to be admissible pursuant to paragraph 83(1)(h) of the IRPA. I note that Mr. Mahjoub and his experts have also relied on numerous open source documents in these categories in support of Mr. Mahjoub’s case. The Ministers also rely on the transcript of the USA v. Osama Bin Laden trial (United States District Court, S.D. New York, 2001 93 F.Supp.2d 484, Exhibit A12), particularly the evidence of Mr. Jamal Mohammed Al Fadl, the reliability of which I shall examine when I discuss Mr. Joshua Dratel’s evidence in Mr. Mahjoub’s case later in these reasons.

 

• [95] The use of open source documents by both parties in immigration proceedings is well‑established, such as the use of country reports, and the practice can benefit the prospective immigrant as much as the government. In addition, in this case, both parties have called expert witnesses who have assisted the Court in assessing the reliability of the documents. Mr. Mahjoub’s suggestion that open source documents are inherently insufficiently reliable to support the Ministers’ case is therefore without merit. Any reliability concerns with the open source documents, including the absence of testimony from the author of those documents, shall go to the weight I shall give to those documents.

 

• [96] Mr. Mahjoub makes specific arguments about the reliability of the Ministers’ open source documents based on the testimony of Professor Lisa Given. Mr. Mahjoub argues that in many instances, the Ministers’ open source documents do not indicate the name of the author, a critical piece of information in assessing the context, credentials, objectivity and affiliations of the author of the open source document (L. Given affidavit, Exhibit R30, paragraph 26). He also argues, on the basis of Professor Given’s concerns, that the absence of a date on some documents and the age of others are problematic in terms of assessing the currency of the information (ibid.). Additional problems with the Ministers’ open source documents that Mr. Mahjoub points out are: a dearth of peer-reviewed academic writing with the exception of encyclopaedia entries and one university publication (L. Given testimony, 29 November 2010, pp.115, 121-123), the absence of the original documents or translator information when a document was presented in translation (ibid. pp.97-98, 103), and the absence of references to the source of the information (for example ibid. pp.101-102). He submits that the Court should give the Ministers’ documentary evidence little or no weight.

 

• [97] The Ministers contend that the documentary evidence that they have adduced is reliable. They rely on Mr. Guay’s testimony that the documents were compiled by the Service with the assistance of its Information Centre, staffed by individuals with masters’ degrees in library science and experienced in research and the use of open source information (M. Guay testimony, 12 October 2010, pp.14-15, 40-42). To counter the points raised by Professor Given that not enough is known about the sources, the Ministers rely on the testimony of Mr. Guay that the analysts who selected the documents would have been provided with as much information as possible about the sources from the Information Centre in order to make an assessment of credibility and reliability. In addition, they submit that the documents are adduced as evidence for specific facts and that Mr. Mahjoub has failed to demonstrate that those facts are erroneous.

 

• [98] Given the diversity of the Ministers’ documentary evidence, I will weigh the individual documents adduced based on my assessment of their individual credibility and reliability. At this stage, it is useful to comment on the overarching approach that I have adopted in assessing the documents adduced by both the Ministers and by Mr. Mahjoub. It is of note that my general preference is to give more weight to the expert commentary on open source documents than on the open source documents themselves, given the experts’ years of research and experience in their fields which enable them to situate the documents adduced and determine their importance in the context of the broader body of open source documents available.

• [99] Professor Given and Professor Byman share approximately the same approach to evaluating documentary evidence. In assessing credibility and reliability of any document, they are both concerned with the publisher, the author, the author’s sources, the currency, and the context of the document or as Professor Given repeatedly put it, “currency, coverage, and authority” (L. Given affidavit, Exhibit R30, paragraph 5). I agree that these are crucial factors in determining what weight to give a document. I share Professor Given’s concern about translation: the reputation of that translator is also an important factor when assessing translated documents if the original is not available. These are all factors routinely considered by trial judges in assessing documentary evidence.

 

• [100] Because of Professor Byman’s expertise in the national security field and Professor Given’s lack of expertise in this field (for example her lack of knowledge concerning the well‑known British periodical Jane’s, which has been used in the military and security field for many decades), I prefer Professor Byman’s evidence on how the Ministers’ documents should be evaluated. The point of departure of Professor Given’s approach appears to be the health sciences field. On the basis of all of the evidence, I conclude that the rigour of open source documents available in health sciences is not often possible in the national security field. In addition, Professor Byman was familiar with the specific sources used by the Ministers and could speak to their reliability and credibility, whereas at times Professor Given did not have the requisite familiarity to be able to comment in any detail. In evaluating the Arabic language sources, Professor Gerges is the only witness who testified in these proceedings capable of specifically assessing their reliability and credibility due to his familiarity with the sources and his experience in the Arabic-speaking world.

• [101] I agree with Professor Byman that secondary sources such as the periodicals, books, encyclopaedias, and online databases cited by the Ministers, him, and Mr. Mahjoub’s expert witnesses can provide a helpful synthesis of a multitude of primary sources (D. Byman testimony, 26 October 2010, pp.157-158). I share his concern that some of the secondary sources cited by the Ministers in support of the SIR are outdated, but I shall also keep in mind that the bulk of what was written on a particular topic may only have appeared at a certain time (ibid. p.162). With respect to Jane’s in particular, I am satisfied by Professor Byman’s evidence that it is well-established and reliable for the information that it provides (ibid. pp.165-166). With the benefit of an expert more familiar with the national security field than Professor Given, the Court in this case may depart from Jalil v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 568 at pararaphs 24-25 and give the Jane’s evidence some weight. I note, however, that the reliability of the Jane’s articles cited by the Ministers is diminished by the fact that that they do not cite sources for their information (L. Given affidavit, Exhibit R30, paragraph 18).

 

• [102] News articles may have value as a secondary source if they compile information on a particular topic or trend, but their greatest value is as a primary source. Professor Gerges uses news sources extensively in his research and in his expert report. I agree with Professor Byman that they are particularly useful for the basic facts of unfolding events or for specific statements made by individuals, but they have limited utility in providing detail or in-depth analysis (D. Byman testimony, 26 October 2010, p.159). While their currency may be an issue, given that news stories can change with additional information, they are always valuable as a report of what a particular news agency or reporter observed going on at the time of publication. Professor Byman as a practice relies on the reputation of the newspaper and its journalistic standards; he does not generally research the background of a particular journalist unless there is specific cause for concern (ibid. p.150). I agree that the reputation of a newspaper and its journalistic standards are important factors in assessing such evidence.

 

• [103] The Ministers have adduced the Canadian Press’s statement of journalistic standards in evidence (Exhibit A28). The statement indicates that the Canadian Press is concerned above all with accuracy, even according it higher priority than speed, and with making observations rather than commentary in a news story. I am satisfied that many of Canada’s and the world’s major newspapers upon which the Ministers rely, from the National Post and the Toronto Star to the New York Times, Reuters, Le Figaro and Der Spiegel have similar standards. I am therefore satisfied that these newspapers would not knowingly publish radically biased, inaccurate or false information. The journalists are, however, limited by the bias and accuracy of the information they obtain. In my view, it is therefore of great assistance to the Court when a news article cites its sources. These sources, in turn, may be evaluated for their own reliability and credibility. At times, these sources must remain anonymous, but these news reports cannot be given the same weight as news reports naming and quoting their sources. I shall also consider the number and diversity of sources cited in an article as it provides not only corroboration, which is a critical factor (D. Byman testimony, 26 October 2010, p.151), but also an indicator that the news article is more balanced.

 

• [104] Concerning translation, I note that the translator of the Ministers’ foreign language newspaper articles is nearly always cited as the Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). According to Professor Byman, this service is a United States government service that is used by governments and academics and is generally considered to be of high quality (D. Byman testimony, 26 October 2010, pp.105-106). I accept Professor Byman’s opinion and have no concerns about the accuracy of the translations performed by the FBIS. Similarly, I have no concerns about the accuracy of the translations, primarily adduced by Mr. Mahjoub, provided by certified translators.

 

• [105] The reliability and credibility of the Arabic language news sources is not as obvious, but news agencies such as London’s Al-Sharq al-Awsat, Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, Al-Hayah and Al-Wasat, Paris’s Al-Watan Al-‘Arabi, and Egypt’s Al-Ahali and Al-Ahram Weekly Online may be particularly valuable in that they have access to sources that non-Arabic news agencies sometimes do not have. Professor Gerges indicated that in his academic research, he would sometimes use interviews and memoirs given to some of these news agencies by militants (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, pp.146-147). Professor Gerges also knew that Arabic newspapers such as Al-Hayah, which he described as “one of the leading newspapers”, directly covered the trials in Egypt (ibid. pp.66-67, 69). Professor Gerges says that this newspaper is “a London based newspaper owned by Saudi Arabia and it's a very popular, influential newspaper in the Arab world” (ibid. p.79). What Professor Gerges attacks is not the accuracy of the reporting, but instead the truth and the provenance of the statements made by individuals to the newspaper.

 

• [106] Given the lack of freedom of the press in Egypt at the time that the Al-Ahali and Al‑Ahram Weekly Online articles were published, I shall evaluate these articles assuming they reported in accordance with the Egyptian government’s desired message. I shall also give less weight to online or local news agencies whose reputation is unknown, such as Nile News and Tirana ATA.

 

 

 

 

• [107] In these proceedings, the preponderance of the classified evidence consists of summaries of intelligence known as BRS reports. These reports are authored by Service personnel and entered by them on the Service’s database.

 

• [108] By Order dated June 9, 2010, the Court excluded evidence for which there are reasonable grounds to believe was obtained from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As a result, a review of the record was conducted by the Ministers and the Special Advocates, and a number of BRS reports were excluded on consent. Similarly, by Order dated June 19, 2012 the Court excluded BRS reports concerning conversations to which Mr. Mahjoub was not privy, in accordance with the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Harkat. Again, the Ministers and the Special Advocates reviewed the record, and a number of BRS reports were excluded on consent.

• [109] I shall first make some general comments concerning BRS reports. BRS reports were at all relevant times created by Service employees and subject to internal verification by any other personnel who were witnesses to what happened and the author’s supervisor (M. Guay testimony, 15 October 2010, pp.140-142, 192-210). The Service cannot readily fulfill its mandate of advising the government on threats to the security of Canada if it does not accurately report information in its internal holdings. In this sense, the documents are similar to documents created in the ordinary course of business. In addition, the Service was at all relevant times subject to audit by the Inspector General and the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). While Mr. Mahjoub has adduced an Inspector General report indicating that there were inaccuracies in reporting during the 2005-2006 audit period (Exhibit R22), the Inspector General determined that the root cause of the problem was a 2005/2006 change in electronic system, and that one such report flagging a discrete cause cannot establish a trend of inaccuracy. On the record, I have no reason to doubt that the authors of the BRS reports would be accurate in their reporting and that any errors in the reporting would be inadvertent.

 

• [110] Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that in all BRS reports, the Service records only threat-related information in accordance with its mandate as understood at the time (P. Vrbanac testimony, 1 August 2012, pp.146-147). For this reason, the Service was selective in its reporting, and any omissions in the reports may not be discovered without access to other evidence, such as the testimony of the analyst. In considering the reports, I will therefore be cognizant that the reports may omit certain information.

 

• [111] It is useful to consider the BRS reports in two categories: primary and secondary reports. Primary BRS reports contain summaries of direct information from interviews, physical surveillance, intercepted communications, meetings with foreign agencies, and documents sent by foreign agencies. Secondary BRS reports consist of summaries of other BRS reports, which are not part of the record, for internal use or to be sent to foreign agencies.

 

• [112] Concerning primary BRS reports in evidence, these include reports of documents received from foreign agencies, reports of meetings with foreign agencies, reports of intelligence received from corporate sources, reports from Service interviews, and reports of intercepted communications. I will address each in turn.

 

• [113] Reports containing information from documents provided by foreign agencies usually quote the documents verbatim. Unless information is omitted, these reports are not subject to the Service’s editing and allow the reader to have direct access to the information that the Service received. Further, most of the BRS reports in this category are supported by the original documents from the foreign agencies which the Service has retained and are included in the record (Closed Exhibit ||||). These originals may be used to verify the accuracy of the BRS reports in this category. Consequently, these elements enhance the reliability of the BRS reports in this category.

 

• [114] The Reports of meetings with foreign agencies consist of the Service Liaison Officer’s (SLO’s) or other Service personnel’s first-hand account of the information provided at these meetings. Often, foreign agencies would only provide information to the SLO orally, |||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.Closed Exhibit ||||). On the record before me, I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the account reported. There is nothing to suggest that the SLO or other Service employees in preparing reports is motivated to do anything but accurately reflect the meeting. In fact, since there were other participants at the meeting who could verify the accuracy of the report, the individual preparing the report would have an interest in accurately reporting the meeting.

• [115] The reliability of the BRS reports may also depend on the agency from which its content was obtained. In the Foreign Agency Evidence Decision, I have expressed concerns about the reliability of evidence from ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

[certain agencies]. No arguments were raised concerning the reliability of other agencies, except to the extent that their information may have been obtained from |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [other agencies]. When the evidence supports a finding that information obtained from an agency is no more than recycled information ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, it will be assessed as though it is information from |||||| [the original] agencies. As a result of my concerns about the information obtained from |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [agencies with which I have concerns], I will consider its probative value on the basis of its content and the extent to which it is independently corroborated. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.

 

• [116] Concerning BRS reports summarizing information relating to foreign agency meetings, I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of the accounts of the information reported. Again, I shall keep in mind that the Service reports only threat-related information and may therefore have been selective in its reporting.

 

• [117] Reports from Service interviews with Mr. Mahjoub and others consist of summaries of the interviews written by one of the interviewers present at the interview and verified by any other Service Personnel present (M. Guay testimony, 15 October 2010, pp.140-142, 192-210). In the case of Mr. Mahjoub’s interviews, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [the interviewer who testified publicly did not recollect] taking notes. Mr. Guay testified that had any notes been taken, they would have been destroyed or retained by special authorization, in accordance with CSIS policy in place at the time. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [When notes were retained,] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| the BRS report essentially reflects the account in the interviewers’ notes.

 

• [118] I am satisfied that for the most part the BRS reports accurately report the content of the interviews conducted. It is noteworthy that individuals present at the interviews including the interviewee, or others present at the interview, could have been called to challenge the accuracy of the content of the interview. For instance, if Mr. Mahjoub did not wish to subject himself to cross‑examination, Ms. Mona El Fouli |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [who was] present during important interviews, could have been called to testify. In no instance was this done in this proceeding.

 

• [119] |||||||||||||| Mr. Guay |||||||||||||||||||||||||||| could [not] recall much about the conduct of the interviews beyond specific procedures and the purpose of the interviews. Consequently, no effective cross‑examination was possible on comments in the report pertaining to the demeanor of the interviewees. Demeanour, in comparison with the answers that an interviewee gives to questions, is much more open to the interviewer’s interpretation. Therefore, since I was not present and unable to independently assess the demeanour of the interviewees, I will give no weight to observations in the report relating to demeanour of the interviewees.

• [120] The BRS reports concerning intercepted communications between Mr. Mahjoub and another individual consist of intercepted telephone conversations. Generally, I have no basis to question the accuracy of the reported summaries of the intercepted communications. In all instances, Mr. Mahjoub was present and in a position to challenge the accuracy of the account of the summary. In several instances, he could have called his interlocutors to testify. In addition, I note that for the most part, the intercepts of Mr. Mahjoub’s conversations were not relied upon in support of the Minister’s case.

 

• [121] Concerning secondary BRS reports, one of their principal frailties is that they rarely indicate sources. Generally, the Service omits the source of information provided to foreign agencies to protect the source (L. Brooks testimony, 24 October 2012, ||||||||), and I observe that the summaries of intelligence for internal use also tend to omit sources. In addition, the secondary BRS reports are summaries of summaries and can be expected to contain less detail than the original report. It follows that secondary reports may be less reliable than primary reports depending on their content and the context in which they are adduced.

 

• [122] In these proceedings, notwithstanding the Court’s June 19, 2012 Order excluding evidence containing the content of intercepted communications to which Mr. Mahjoub was not privy, there remains on the record secondary BRS reports statements that likely derive from such evidence (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). While the content of such intercepts will not be considered by the Court, logistical information to establish that a call was made between two numbers on a particular date will be considered.

• [123] I now turn to consider the evidence of the Ministers’ witnesses.

 

• [124] |||||||||||||||||||||| [A CSIS witness] testified on September 29 and 30, October 1, 2, and 15, 2008, April 20 and 21, 2010, and October 9 to 12, 2012. |||||||||||||||||||||| [The witness] has been employed by the Service since 1991, and |||| began |||||| [his or her] career as an intelligence officer |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||| [His or her] positions included Investigator in Sunni Islamic extremism, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [The witness] gave contextual evidence about the significance to the Service of the classified intelligence adduced in support of the Ministers’ allegations, evidence concerning the Service’s opinion of the reliability of foreign agencies, and evidence about the Service’s methodologies, practices and policies.

 

• [125] The Ministers rely extensively on the testimony of |||||||||||||||||||| [the CSIS witness]. The Special Advocates |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| point out that [the witness] |||| was not qualified as an expert in intelligence matters, although at times [the witness] || “provided expert opinion on how various actors in the intelligence community operate”. They argue that the Court should give these opinions no weight.

 

• [126] I find [the CSIS witness] |||||||||||||||||| to be a truthful witness and |||||| [his or her] evidence generally reliable. While [the witness] |||||||||||||||||||||| was not adduced as an expert witness, [the witness] |||| was called as a representative witness for the Service. As such, [the witness’] |||| evidence on |||||| [his or her] observations and experience as an intelligence analyst are helpful to the Court. Concerning the Special Advocates’ objections, these were raised and dealt with in my November 9, 2011 decision on the objection. At that time, I ruled that |||||||||||||||||||||| [the witness’] evidence would be admissible. As a representative witness of the Service, an agency with considerable expertise and resources in the field of intelligence, I accept [the witness’] |||||| evidence as reflecting the views of the Service on the matters noted above for which [the witness] |||| was called to testify. In the circumstances of this proceeding, where the record supports an inference that the Service was engaged in presenting the “best case possible for the government” (CSIS Witness #3 testimony, 26 July 2012, p.92), I will take into account the partiality of the Service’s evidence adduced through its witnesses when weighing [the witness’] |||||||||||||||||||||||||| testimony.

 

• [127] Specifically, |||||||||||||||||||||||| [the witness’] opinion with respect to the reliability of|||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [certain foreign agencies] is suspect. |||||||| [The witness’] experience with other agencies besides [the foreign agencies in question] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| provides a helpful comparator to |||||| [his or her] experience with ||||||||||||||, and |||| personal views of their comparative experience and professionalism have some weight. Nevertheless, I find that |||||| [his or her] glowing account |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [of the foreign agencies’] deep knowledge and |||| [his or her] focus on their knowledge and expertise overlooks their questionable motivations and human rights abuses (||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||). As indicated in my June 9, 2010 Reasons for Order, I found this aspect of |||||||||||||||||||||||| [the witness’] testimony not to be compelling.

 

 

 

• [128] Michel Guay testified on October 12, 13, 15, 18-22, 25 and December 1, 2010. Mr. Guay joined the Service in January 1992, where he worked in headquarters as an analyst until 1995. He then became an investigator in counter-terrorism matters in Toronto until approximately 2001. At the time of his testimony, Mr. Guay worked in human sources and operations support for the Service’s headquarters in Ottawa. As a representative witness for the Service, he testified in his capacity as an investigator on Sunni Islamic extremism and based on his experience interviewing Mr. Mahjoub in 1997. He gave evidence on the Service’s policies and procedures, its reliance on summaries with an emphasis on corroboration, its information and views on the VOC and AJ including the Service’s view of their threat to Canada, and its investigation into Mr. Mahjoub. Notably, he was unaware of the contents of the classified SIR.

 

• [129] Mr. Mahjoub criticizes the fact that Mr. Guay did not examine any human rights reports, and the fact that Mr. Guay was not the author of the SIR, was not involved in the preparation of the SIR, did not have knowledge of what information in the SIR was destroyed, was not involved in Mr. Mahjoub’s arrest, and was not aware of the contents of the classified SIR. He notes that Mr. Guay had no independent recollection of the interviews with Mr. Mahjoub. Mr. Mahjoub takes issue with Mr. Guay’s “willingness to blindly accept the translation results of Mr. Mahjoub’s wife and a certified translator.” Mr. Mahjoub contends that Mr. Guay’s testimony was “based in large part on inadmissible evidence and allegations that have since been excluded.” He appears to challenge the admissibility of Mr. Guay’s testimony as neither reliable nor appropriate because he was not the Ministers’ best witness, and he did not have the knowledge that CSIS Witness #3 had about the preparation of the SIR.

 

• [130] The Ministers rely heavily on Mr. Guay’s evidence without commenting on its reliability, except to defend their decision to adduce a witness who did not have knowledge of the classified SIR as a measure to avoid inadvertent disclosure.

 

• [131] Mr. Guay provided his testimony late in 2010. Objections to the admissibility of his evidence should have been raised at that time. It is too late to challenge the admissibility of Mr. Guay’s evidence two years after it was adduced. In any event, I find Mr. Guay to be generally credible and his evidence useful to the Court. Mr. Guay was adduced as a representative witness for the Service, providing the Service’s views on the evidence. The shortcomings in Mr. Guay’s testimony, alleged by Mr. Mahjoub, if accepted as such, will go to weight. I am of the same view with regard to the summaries of the interviews. The time to object to their admissibility has long since passed. As admissible evidence, I shall examine the interviews individually following the approach outlined at paragraphs 117-119 above.

 

• [132] Professor Byman testified on October 25-27 and November 1-2, 2010. Professor Byman is a Professor at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute. The Court qualified Professor Byman as an expert concerning terrorist groups, counterterrorism policy and intelligence, Middle East security and United States national security as it pertains to the Middle East (Transcript of proceedings, 26 October 2010, p.141).

 

• [133] Professor Byman gave evidence on the history of Egyptian Islamic extremist movements, in particular the evolution of the AJ, its terrorist activities, its relationship with Al Qaeda, and the existence of the VOC. He analyzed Mr. Mahjoub’s patterns of travel and employment in the 1990s and compared them to the patterns exhibited by terrorist groups at the time. Professor Byman also commented on the significance of individual allegations in the SIR and how they supported the Ministers’ allegations that he was a member of a terrorist organization. He emphasized the importance of corroboration in his testimony. It is noteworthy that Professor Byman gave his evidence explicitly assuming that all of the Ministers’ allegations about Mr. Mahjoub’s movement and activities, contained in the SIR, were true. The Ministers relied extensively on Professor Byman’s testimony.

 

• [134] Mr. Mahjoub points out that Professor Byman “… did little to no independent research on Mahjoub or the allegations against him.” Mr. Mahjoub also criticizes Professor Byman for having omitted, in the original version of his report, the detail that in 2008, Mr. Agiza received three million kroner in compensation from the Swedish government for his rendition to Egypt. Mr. Mahjoub further argues that the deficiencies in Professor Byman’s report have been outlined by Professor Wark, and that Professor Byman’s opinion on the existence, structure and organizational ties of the VOC are not based on independent research and “can only be seen to be speculation based upon a speculative theory of the supposed existence of the group.” He argues that Professor Byman was not aware of the existence of the VOC prior to this case and that his “comments with respect to the VOC are purely inferential based upon a speculative theory of the supposed existence of the group.” Finally, Mr. Mahjoub has adduced evidence to suggest that Professor Byman is in favour of extraordinary rendition and other controversial US government policies.

 

• [135] I find Professor Byman to be a credible witness and his testimony helpful to the Court. I found no reason to question his objectivity. His views on extraordinary rendition and other policies, as provided in Exhibits R10, R19 and R20, do not demonstrate bias but merely a viewpoint with which many may not agree but that is nevertheless nuanced, particularly given his US government audience. To the extent that his opinions differed from the opinions of other expert witnesses, these differing opinions will be considered and weighed, and in my analysis I will explain why I prefer one over the other. I reject the argument that Professor Byman did not base his opinion on the existence of the VOC on independent research. I am satisfied that he conducted his own review of available sources and came to an independent conclusion. Further, Professor Byman admitted that he took certain of the Ministers’ allegations as proven. Consequently, any of Professor Byman’s opinions based exclusively on the Ministers’ allegations without independently verifying them will only be considered if the Ministers establish the facts upon which the opinion is based. Finally, I acknowledge that Professor Byman’s evidence was limited by his admitted lack of field work in Egypt and his unfamiliarity with the Arabic language. However, I am satisfied that these limitations have not diminished the reliability of his opinions on the issues that he addressed.

 

 

 

• [136] Mr. Mahjoub also adduced a large volume of evidence in these proceedings, namely documentary evidence, two expert witnesses and a witness who was himself accused of being a VOC member in Egypt and had first-hand knowledge of a number of others accused of being members of the AJ and the VOC. Mr. Mahjoub chose not to testify in these proceedings.

 

 

• [137] Mr. Mahjoub adduced a large volume of open source documents as the Ministers did, and in my view, the same considerations apply concerning their reliability (see paragraphs 94-106 above). The preponderance of his documentary evidence consisted of reports from reviewing bodies, such as the SIRC, and reports from human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. These documents may be evaluated like any other open source documents, with particular attention to the reputation of the agency or institution reporting (I accept that the three examples I have given are reputable organizations).

 

• [138] Professor Wark testified on November 23-25 and 30, 2010. Professor Wark is an associate professor of history at the University of Toronto, and a visiting research professor for the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa. At the time of his testimony, Professor Wark was a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of several journals including Intelligence and National Security. He was the commissioning editor for the Studies in Intelligence series published by Frank Cass and Co., London, U.K. from 1994 to 2002. He has had extensive experience in the field of security and intelligence, including appointments to the Prime Minister’s Advisory Council on National Security, serving as a consultant for the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the Privy Council Office from 1996 to 1998, and his contributions to the Air India and Arar inquiries.

 

• [139] The Court qualified Professor Wark as an expert on international terrorism, counter‑terrorism and intelligence practices, sources of information available to the Service concerning terrorist organizations and activities rooted in Egypt and the Service’s capacity to investigate and evaluate this information, the Service’s use of open source information, the Service’s assessment of terrorist threats, the nature of terrorist activity in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, Al Jihad and the VOC, the Returnees from Albania trial, the Service’s threat matrix linking Mr. Mahjoub to Islamic extremist individuals, and counter terrorism and intelligence challenges. Professor Wark gave evidence critiquing the SIR and the Service’s “threat matrix” concerning Mr. Mahjoub, explaining the history, activities and movements of the AJ and VOC, particularly in the “Sudan period” 1991 to 1996, and commenting on Damazine Farm and the testimony of Mr. Al Fadl in the USA v. Bin Laden case.

 

• [140] The Ministers contend that “Professor Wark engaged in impermissible advocacy.” They contend that he “was prepared to pronounce on the reasonableness of the allegations contained in the Public Summary without the benefit of the classified SIR, or the disclosure of summaries of protected information which the Court has provided Mr. Mahjoub.” They argue that his report included commentary on whether the evidence meets the legal admissibility threshold and “purported to answer the ultimate legal question that the Court will have to decide” and argue that these comments “must be given no weight as they go beyond his expertise.” However, the Ministers rely on some of the other aspects of Professor Wark’s report and testimony.

 

• [141] Mr. Mahjoub contends that Professor Wark was not engaging in advocacy but instead was pointing out deficiencies in the support for the Ministers’ allegations in the SIR and questions left unanswered by the SIR. Mr. Mahjoub argues that this is not advocacy but an independent assessment of the SIR.

 

• [142] I find Professor Wark to be credible and his evidence helpful to the Court. Professor Wark did not, and could not have access to the classified SIR. The opinions he provides are based on the public SIR, and I accept them as such. Many of his criticisms of the Public SIR are real and are not undermined by any information contained in the classified SIR. To the extent that he opines on the sufficiency of evidence to establish any fact or whether the evidence meets the legal admissibility threshold, this evidence will be given no weight since it is for the Court as trier of fact to consider and determine such questions.

 

• [143] Professor Given testified on November 29, 2010. She was qualified to provide an assessment of the public sources used in the Public SIR and to provide evidence on Internet research and library science (L. Given testimony, November 29, 2010, p.2). Professor Given gave evidence on the indicia of reliability of documentary evidence. In particular, she testified to what were in her opinion the five major indicia of reliability: coverage, objectivity, accuracy, currency and authority. She then testified about the reliability of some of the open source documents in the public reference indices, commenting in particular on the lack of available information about Jane’s methodologies, the fact that many of the articles were not current, and the lack of author information for some of the articles. She testified to potential problems in the articles relied upon in the SIR. Often author information, sources, references, citations, translation information, and methodologies were absent from the articles. She noted that none of the articles relied upon by the Ministers were peer-reviewed.

 

• [144] The Ministers concede that Professor Given is credible. The Ministers argue that it is significant that Professor Given acknowledged her lack of expertise “in the field of terrorism or intelligence studies, and consequently lacked knowledge of even non-contentious matters in those fields.” They also point out that Professor Given was unfamiliar with Jane’s and could not dispute Oxford University’s librarians’ approval of the publication (Exhibits A25, A26 and A27). The Ministers further argue that “Dr. Given’s evidence amounted to advising the Court on how to weigh the evidence – a cornerstone of this Court’s role as trier of fact. This is a task the Court is very well equipped to undertake without the assistance of an expert.”

 

• [145] I find Ms. Given to be credible and her evidence helpful to the Court. While her testimony setting out a rigorous approach to follow when evaluating open sources is instructive, it is only useful to assist the Court in its own assessment of the evidence.

 

• [146] Mr. Dratel testified on December 14-15, 2010. Mr. Dratel is a New York attorney and one of the defence attorneys for Wadih El Hage, a defendant convicted on terrorism charges for involvement in the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in the USA v. Bin Laden trial. Mr. Dratel was qualified as an expert on United States national security and terrorism cases, in particular the embassy bombings (USA v. Bin Laden) case, and Al Qaeda‑related activities in Sudan from 1991 to 1996. He testified in particular to the credibility of the prosecution’s star witness in the USA v. Bin Laden trial, Mr. Jamal Al Fadl.

 

• [147] The Ministers submit that “Mr. Dratel’s evidence was not impartial or consistent and should be afforded little weight…” They argue that since he was counsel for one of the convicted defendants, he “arguably has an interest in disparaging the reliability of witnesses whose evidence led to his client’s conviction.” They also argue that his “evidence was inconsistent with much of the evidence that was adduced in, and accepted by, the United States District Court…and the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the East Africa Embassies bombings case.” In addition, the Ministers point to the expert evidence of Professor Wark who testified that Mr. Al Fadl was debriefed and underwent a polygraph test (W. Wark testimony, 24 November 2010, pp.59, 82). They also indicate that on appeal, the US District Court and the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony was corroborated by information found on the hard drive of Mr. El Hage’s computer (US District Court, USA v. Bin Laden et al, 2 November 2005, Exhibit A37; US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, USA v. Bin Laden et al, 24 November 2008, Exhibit A38). Finally, the Ministers submit that Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony about what happened at Damazine Farm is relied upon by academics and experts in the field. They argue that Mr. Dratel’s “opinion on the credibility of the witnesses in the Embassies bombings trial should not replace the US District Court’s findings or this Court’s assessment of the same.”

• [148] Mr. Mahjoub contends that Mr. Dratel was not partial because “even though he said having [sic] professional obligations toward Mr. El-Hage, Mr. Dratel assured the Court about the absence of conflict in relating his expertise in the present case and he also assured the Court to be [sic] well aware of his duty to assist the Court impartially.” Mr. Mahjoub further submits that Mr. Dratel conducted specific research into court materials and had expertise in US national security and terrorism cases, in particular the USA v. Bin Laden case. As such his information is useful to the Court. In addition, Mr. Mahjoub points to Mr. Dratel’s knowledge and access to the information beyond the access of the Court such as the classified information adduced in US national security cases.

 

• [149] Mr. Mahjoub argues that the Court should accept the argument of defence counsel in the USA v. Bin Laden trial that videoconference statements by Mr. Al Fadl during the defence investigation impugned his credibility. Mr. Mahjoub argues this particularly in light of the fact that the Court of Appeals pointed to “ambiguities and also elements that could have been fertile ground for impeachment defense”. Mr. Mahjoub also acknowledges, however, that the US Court of Appeals found these elements did not rise to the legal standard required for a new trial.

 

• [150] Finally, Mr. Mahjoub argues that Mr. Dratel’s testimony is valuable in that it demonstrates a lack of connection between Mr. Mahjoub and any of the activities that were discussed in testimony during the USA v. Bin Laden trial.

 

• [151] While I have no reason to doubt the credibility of Mr. Dratel per se, I have difficulty relying on his account of the evidence flowing from US national security cases in which he was involved because of his position as defence counsel for accused terrorists. Despite his assurances to the Court that he is not in a position of conflict, in the circumstances, I am not convinced that his assertion is credible. As such, I approach his evidence with caution and in the face of conflicting accounts on the issues he addresses; I will generally prefer the evidence of independent experts who have adduced evidence on the same issues.

 

• [152] I adopt this approach when considering the transcript of Mr. Jamal Al Fadl’s testimony. Professor Gerges expresses reservations about Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony, opining that he is a “fortune seeker, a man who basically there are many question marks about him [sic]” (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, p.148). The Professor nevertheless relies on his testimony, being selective about which pieces of testimony he uses (ibid.). Professor Wark relies on Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony significantly, opining that it is a “critical source, unique source, not without its own problems, of course, but unique source in terms of illuminating, to some degree, the activities of Al Qaeda in the early to mid-1990s” (W. Wark testimony, 24 November 2010, pp.35-36). He also opines that Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony is “drawn on by what I regard as all of the authoritative commentators on the Sudan” (ibid. p.49). Professor Byman also relies on Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony extensively and concludes that it “holds up very well over time” despite acknowledging a number of Mr. Dratel’s criticisms (D. Byman testimony, 1 November 2010, pp. 71-75).

 

• [153] The general criticisms that Mr. Dratel raises are as follows:

A. …his penchant for personalizing things that didn’t happen to him but happened to others, testifying at the trial as if he did it personally but when you dig deeper or in the videoconference transcripts…you find that, in fact, he didn’t do the thing. It was, someone told him about it. Or it was another conversation that two other people had and he was present. His different versions of what happened in terms of training…is also typical or emblematic of his testimony, particularly when you compare it to his out of court statements…

 

(J. Dratel testimony, 14 December 2010, pp.213-214)

 

 

In essence, Mr. Dratel’s opinion is that because Mr. Al Fadl was being given large financial, sentencing, and immigration favours from the US government in exchange for his information, Mr. Al Fadl was “manipulative to the extreme” and motivated “to wrangle more concessions and advantages in return for his continued cooperation” with the US government, which included exaggerating what he knew and his own importance in Al Qaeda (J. Dratel Affidavit, Exhibit R39, paragraphs 51-53). Mr. Dratel points out that Mr. Al Fadl attempted to sell his information to many entities prior to presenting himself to the US government (ibid. pp.18-20). In addition, it is Mr. Dratel’s opinion that Mr. Al Fadl was deceptive in his testimony about leaving Al Qaeda because he had stolen a substantial amount of money from Al Qaeda, when in fact he had defrauded Sudanese banks and was working as much for the Sudanese National Islamic Front (NIF) as Al Qaeda (ibid. p.20).

 

• [154] I observe on the basis of the transcripts that Mr. Al Fadl exhibits behaviour inconsistent with someone exaggerating or falsifying his account. He refers to specific names, dates and locations that could be proven false. He also acknowledges the limitations of his knowledge, albeit more often than not under cross-examination. I note the following nuanced response he gave to the controversy at the time of his testimony surrounding the membership in Al Qaeda of Mamdoh Salim, one of the indicted defendents in the USA v. Bin Laden trial:

Q. By the way, do you know the real name of Abu Hajer al Iraqi?

A. Yes.

Q. What is it?

A. Mamdouh Salim.

 

(J. Al Fadl transcript, Exhibit A12, p.230)

 

Q….How did you know when a person was a member of al Qaeda?

A. If you see him make bayat [a signed oath to serve Al Qaeda] or somebody tell you or he do al Qaeda agenda or duty.

…

Q. Did anyone at al Qaeda ever tell you that Abu Hajer was not a member of al Qaeda?

A. Some people say that.

…

A. He [an Al Qaeda member] say Abu Hajer, he’s not al Qaeda member and he just work but he’s not member, he’s not al Qaeda.

Q. Did you see Abu Hajer among the al Qaeda people?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you ever told that there was anything you could not discuss in front of Abu Hajer?

A. No.

 

(J. Al Fadl transcript, Exhibit A12, pp. 420-421)

 

 

Mr. Al Fadl acknowledged the opinions of other Al Qaeda members although he had experience with Mr. Salim that is clearly indicative of Mr. Salim’s membership, and likely founding membership, in Al Qaeda:

Q. Did you meet anyone besides Abu Nofal al Saudi when you were at this guesthouse in Afghanistan?

A. Yes, I meet Abu Hajer al Iraqi.

…

[Mr. Fadl also testified to meeting Mr. Bin Laden there]…

Q. And do you recall anything in particular that Abu Hajer al Iraqi said that day during the meeting after the prayer?

A. He say similar what Bin Laden talk about, but he make lecture for all new people [recruits for the Afghan war] about Jihad Fardh al Ein [the duty to assist Muslims at war who cannot repel the enemy].

 

(J. Al Fadl transcript, Exhibit A12, pp.175-177)

Q. Did there come a time when al Qaeda left the Pakistan-Afghanistan area?

A. Yes. 

Q. Can you tell us where al Qaeda moved to?

A. To Sudan.

…

A. I remember in a guesthouse for al Qaeda people, or members, they start talking, in Afghanistan we don’t have too much work because the Russians, they left.

…

Q. Do you know who he [Bin Laden] sent to the Sudan to find out about the National Islamic Front?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was that?

A….Abu Hajer al Iraqi…[among others, and Abu Hajer al Iraqi reported back in a meeting Mr. Al Fadl attended]

 

(J. Al Fadl transcript, Exhibit A12, pp.215-217)

 

In addition, Mr. Al Fadl’s account of Mr. Salim as a member of the Al Qaeda Shura Council was corroborated by the statement of another defendant, Mr. Ali Mohammed, pleading guilty to terrorist charges (Allocution proceeding of Ali Mohammed, Exhibit R46).

 

• [155] While I am aware that the US District Court requires an applicant to pass a high threshold to order a new jury trial, on the basis of the record, I nevertheless agree with some of US District Court Judge Duffy’s comments on the specific credibility issues raised by Mr. Dratel. Judge Duffy found that the most concerning element of Mr. Al Fadl’s videotaped statements was the suggestion “that he fears a quid pro quo may exist between his testimony and his immigration status in the United States” (US District Court, USA v. Bin Laden et al, 2 November 2005, Exhibit A37, p.77). However, the judge commented that:

El-Hage chiefly asserts that the videotaped statements reveal that, in his testimony, al-Fadl “personalized [ ] event[s] that happened to someone else, thereby making for more dramatic and effective testimony that was insulated from effective cross examination.” I cannot agree. Although al-Fadl’s statements and testimony are not identical, this seems to be largely a product of ambiguities (rather than genuine inconsistencies) in both the testimony and the recorded statements.

 

(US District Court, USA v. Bin Laden et al, 2 November 2005, Exhibit A37, pp.84-85)

 

The District Court further notes that “…independent evidence and testimony corroborated al Fadl’s testimony on almost all significant subjects relating to El-Hage” (ibid. p.101) and that his testimony on the structure and history of Al Qaeda “was significantly corroborated (and in many cases, surpassed) by other evidence” (ibid. p.106). The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court’s analysis that Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony was largely corroborated (US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, USA v.Bin Laden et al, 24 November 2008, Exhibit A38, paragraph 136).

• [156] Moreover, it is in essence the unanimous opinion of Professors Gerges, Wark and Byman that Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony was often corroborated and valuable despite being at times ambiguous and potentially motivated by the hope of US government concessions. In light of my own assessment of Mr. Al Fadl’s detailed and often corroborated but sometimes ambiguous testimony, I adopt this opinion as well. I shall approach Mr. Al Fadl’s testimony with caution, examining particular facts he testified to for potential embellishment or contradictions, but like the US District Court, I do not accept the opinion of Mr. Dratel that the testimony is generally untrustworthy because Mr. Al Fadl was falsifying his account.

 

• [157] Professor Gerges testified on January 19-21, 2011. Professor Gerges is a social scientist with a Ph.D. in philosophy from Oxford University, specializing in Arab and Islamic politics, social movements, political Islam, American foreign policy towards the Muslim world and relations between the West and the world of Islam. He also holds a Masters degree in international history from the London School of Economics and Political Science, London University. From 1994 to 2009, he held the Christian A. Johnson Chair in Middle Eastern Studies and International Affairs at Sarah Lawrence College in New York. He authored Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (Orlando: Harcourt Press, 2006), and The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Professor Gerges has spent several years conducting field research in Egypt and interviewing political activists and civil society leaders.

 

• [158] The Court qualified Professor Gerges as an expert in Arabic and Islamic politics, social movements and history of Islam, as well as history and development of jihad and jihadist movements in Egypt (F. Gerges testimony, January 19, 2011, p.2). Professor Gerges gave evidence on the reliability of sources, the history and development of Islamic extremist movements in Egypt, in particular the AJ, and on the existence of the VOC. He also commented on the deficiencies of the SIR. It is noteworthy that Professor Gerges took a “macro” approach to his evidence, commenting primarily on broad trends, changes and continuities in the history of these movements and deliberately avoiding comment on specific operations or individuals within these movements, save where he made them a focus of his academic study.

 

• [159] Mr. Mahjoub contends that Professor Gerges is more reliable than Professor Byman because he has experience on the ground in Egypt. The Ministers argue that Professor Gerges’s evidence is flawed in that he “admitted that his expert report had more holes than he could fill and likely omitted information that would have assisted the Court.” They also contend that he “acknowledged that his interest was in social movements and not the specific elements of the groups himself”, a focus which limited the utility of his evidence to these proceedings. The Ministers take the position that it is significant that Professor Gerges testified that he had no “deep knowledge” of the operations of the AJ or “Mr. Mahjoub’s case in particular.”

 

• [160] I find Professor Gerges to be a credible witness whose evidence was helpful to the Court, particularly because of his direct knowledge of Egypt, his facility in Arabic and his interactions with significant players in the Islamist milieu. I reject the Ministers’ submission that Professor Gerges’s evidence is less valuable because it adopted a historical approach examining general trends in the Islamist movement. On issues within the scope of his reports, I found him to be both specific and rigorous. I found that Professor Gerges was transparent about the limitations of his expertise and research. While he did not testify to all of the issues before the Court, I nevertheless found his evidence generally compelling on the issues he did address.

 

• [161] Mr. Magdy Mohamed Mohamed Salem testified on September 9-13, 2012 by videoconference from Cairo, Egypt. Mr. Salem is a lawyer in Egypt who has specialized in representing individuals who were convicted by Military or State Security Tribunals in Egypt under the Mubarak regime. According to his testimony, he began his legal studies at the University of Cairo in 1993, but his studies were interrupted because he was imprisoned by the Mubarak regime as a result of his conviction in the 1993 VOC trial (Egyptian case 18/93, M. Salem testimony, 9 September 2012 pp.9, 11). He had previously been detained in 1982 in the “jihad case” for two years (ibid p.14). While in prison, he continued to study law by working closely with the lawyers of detainees. He completed his studies in 1998-2001, and he was qualified to practice law in 2001. Since his release following the 2011 Arab Spring, Mr. Salem has been working on behalf of those detained or convicted during the Mubarak regime, in particular by the state security apparatus or the Military and State Security Tribunals. At the time of his testimony, he was the head of the Egyptian Bar Association’s General Committee for Human Rights.

 

• [162] Mr. Salem was not qualified as an expert witness and gave evidence based on his personal experience, his contact with individuals involved, and his work as a lawyer, on:

1. the Mubarak regime’s Military and State Security Tribunal trials, including the nature of the proceedings, the evidence, his knowledge of the accused persons;

2. the use of torture by the Mubarak regime, including taking an individual’s family hostage, particularly in the context of these trials;

3. his personal history of arrests and detention in 1982-1983, 1990 after his extradition from Saudi Arabia, and 1993-2011;

4. the VOC trial (cases 18/93, 21/93, 23/93 and 24/93) and the trial of alleged AJ elements following the Egyptian embassy bombing in Pakistan (case 718/96);

5. his own work on the Returnees from Albania trial (case 8/98);

6. his knowledge of persons accused by the Mubarak regime of being members of the VOC and AJ;

7. the post-Arab Spring acquittal of many individuals convicted in Egyptian terrorism-related trials;

8. his knowledge and legal representation of Mr. Mahjoub’s brothers, and

9. Mr. Mahjoub’s current “criminal status” in Egypt.

 

• [163] Notably, Mr. Salem testified that Mr. Mahjoub was not a member of the VOC or AJ. He further testified that the Mubarak regime frequently framed individuals by fabricating accusations against them and then forcing detainees to provide confessions to support those accusations. He also testified that the VOC was a name created by Egyptian state security officials, and that no such organization ever existed. His view was that the VOC trials were conducted to justify the extended application of emergency laws in Egypt, and that he was chosen by the security apparatus as a leader of the VOC because he was older than most of the accused despite never having planned any violent or extremist activity. He testified that none of the individuals accused in the VOC trials were members of the AJ. In addition, he testified that the AJ was not a violent organization. He also testified that Egyptian case number 718/96 did not concern the Egyptian embassy bombing, as the Egyptian authorities claim, but rather served to round up accused members of Al Jihad. Finally, he testified that Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri was not as the media portrayed him, and that Sheikh Rahman, an extremist religious figure, was convicted in the USA v. Bin Laden trial as a result of conspiracy between the United States and Egyptian intelligence services. Mr. Salem admitted to being friends with Mr. Al Zayat, his lawyer and brother-in-law, who had described him in an article following an interview as a leading member of the Al Jihad. On cross-examination, Mr. Salem denied giving such an interview and explained that he is not a member of the AJ or VOC, yet this is how the security forces have portrayed him to the media.

 

• [164] The Ministers argue that Mr. Salem’s “evidence is not credible in many respects and should be given no weight” because it is “tainted by his admitted close association with many individuals in Egypt’s militant Islamist movement and those involved in terrorism” as demonstrated by certain inconsistencies in Mr. Salem’s testimony and his comments about his clients, Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri, and Sheikh Rahman in his testimony. The Ministers have adduced evidence, in particular reports of interviews that Mr. Salem allegedly gave, suggesting that Mr. Salem is himself a terrorist leader.

 

• [165] Mr. Mahjoub argues that Mr. Salem’s evidence, given his “first-hand knowledge of the Vanguards of Conquest cases, the Returnees from Albania case and the individuals named therein” is valuable and “almost entirely supported by source documentation and first-hand accounts”. Mr. Mahjoub also submits that the newspaper articles adduced by the Ministers do not undermine Mr. Salem’s credibility as he denied giving interviews claiming to be a VOC leader and explained that the article written by Mr. Al Zayat does not establish that he was an AJ member. Finally, Mr. Mahjoub contends that Mr. Salem’s credibility is not undermined by his close association with “members of the ‘Egyptian Islamic movement’” because he was forthright about his association, and it is logical as a lawyer working in this field that he would be in contact with persons accused of crimes during the Mubarak regime.

 

• [166] Mr. Salem’s first-hand account of the trials and of the accused persons is invaluable. However, it must be understood in its context. Accused persons, the principal source for Mr. Salem’s testimony, are motivated to protest their innocence whether they are guilty or not. In addition, individuals who have been involved in criminal and terrorist activity can seem like “good people” or victims of conspiracy in one’s own experience, even individuals such as Dr. Ayman Al Zawahiri (M. Salem testimony, September 12, 2012 p.28) and Sheikh Rahman (ibid, pp.102-103) who have made public statements promoting terrorism.

 

• [167] Mr. Salem’s credibility is undermined when he spoke in glowing terms about Dr. Al Zawahiri, the current and publicly proclaimed leader of Al Qaeda who personally signed on to the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, signed the 1998 fatwa urging violence, and took responsibility for terrorist attacks in books that he authored (for example F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, p.63). Professor Gerges’s expert opinion was that Dr. Al Zawahiri favoured violent attacks and saw civilian casualties as collateral damage, and demonstrated a “disregard for life and decency” (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, pp.177-178). Professor Byman points out that in Dr. Al Zawahiri’s memoirs, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, Dr. Al Zawahiri states that maximum casualties is the only language that the West understands (D. Byman Expert Report, Exhibit A19, p.28). Mr. Salem’s view that no individual accused in the Egyptian trials was a member of a terrorist group was blatantly contradicted by the expert testimony of Professor Gerges, who stated that individuals at Mr. Salem’s trial were singing the praises of Dr. Al Zawahiri and naming him as their leader (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, p.67).

 

• [168] Mr. Salem’s credibility is also impugned when he portrays Sheikh Rahman to be above all a victim of conspiracy. Sheikh Rahman was a religious figure who issued fatwas urging crime and violence, including the one relating to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and who made public statements supporting terrorism as a legitimate means of jihad. While I have no reason to doubt that Mr. Salem has suffered torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment during his detention by the Egyptian authorities, this terrible experience has had an understandably significant impact on his ability to assess the Egyptian regime and its opponents objectively, as these statements demonstrate.

 

• [169] Further, certain elements of Mr. Salem’s testimony raise concerns with his general credibility. First, Mr. Salem’s credibility is put into question by statements that he made with respect to his role as counsel. I agree with Mr. Mahjoub’s submission that Mr. Salem’s explained association with accused and convicted persons as a lawyer and fellow inmate alone cannot serve to undermine Mr. Salem’s credibility. However, while he was forthright about his association with and representation of accused Islamic extremists, Mr. Salem did not acknowledge the impact that his role as an advocate for these individuals might have on the objectivity of his

testimony. Instead, when queried about his ethical duties as a lawyer, Mr. Salem testified as follows:

Q.  Mr. Salem, I understand that you're a lawyer and your duties are to your clients, correct?

A.  God willing.

Q.  I take that as a yes?

A.  I'd love to do that.  I always try to say that and do that.

…

Q.  If his clients face charges, it's his duty as a lawyer to defend them?

A.  And the duty, as far as I'm concerned, in my work as a lawyer, is stipulated, basically that morale [sic] duty, by the morale [sic] duty.  And for this reason, I don't defend a person which the documents show that he is criminal or convicted?

 

(M. Salem testimony, September 12, 2012, p.26)

 

Q.  It's your obligation to present your client's case in the best possible way you can, correct?

A.  This is conditional on my convictions about the innocence of that person and that there must be a morale [sic] duty that I have to do.

 

(M. Salem testimony, September 12, 2012, p.106)

 

 

Q.  …  Are there ethical limits, sir, with respect to how you are to present your client's case that you must abide by as a lawyer in Egypt?

A.  Yes.

Q.  Please explain?

A.  In the beginning you are in front of two issues, first, the person who asked you to represent him, you have sufficient information about him and you know that he is a good person and that he is not a deviant person or extremist person for my morale [sic] duty to defend this person after I view the papers and to be sure of his innocence.

 

As for the second issue, if I don't know the person and I don't have sufficient information about him, then the morale [sic] and ethical duty requires that I have to collect enough information until I be sure, as far as I can get enough information, that he is a good person and, accordingly, I accept to defend him.  In all cases, this is governed by - in all cases we should believe we try to reach the conclusion that this person is good and that he is innocent.  In some cases a person might make a mistake, and then he realized that he made a mistake.  Such a person, in this case we can defend him, not because he didn't do something, but because he is, because he admitted that he committed a mistake.

 

(M. Salem testimony, 13 September 2012, pp.52-53)

 

• [170] If Mr. Salem’s practice was to represent only individuals he believed were innocent or repentant, as he attested, his approach had the potential to discourage prospective clients from relating any details connecting them with the alleged crime or terrorism for fear he may not represent them. Had he adopted this practice when he represented individuals he described in his testimony, I question whether those individuals were truthful in relating their personal circumstances to Mr. Salem. For this reason I impugn the reliability of Mr. Salem’s testimony relating to the accounts of these individuals.

 

• [171] Since he was not qualified as an expert and I have serious concerns relating to his objectivity and credibility, I give no weight to Mr. Salem’s evidence with respect to the membership or involvement of individuals in terrorism. In addition, I will give little weight to his generalizations, such as his view that no one who was accused in the Egyptian trials was a member of a terrorist group or involved in violence, that the Egyptian regime was regularly involved in conspiracy and fabrication, and that the VOC did not exist. I shall approach his testimony concerning particular facts with caution, assessing their credibility in light of corroborating or contradicting evidence, if any, on the record.

 

  V.  Analysis

 

• [172] I now turn to an analysis of the merits of this case. In these reasons, the following questions will be addressed:

1. Was Mr. Mahjoub a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in the subversion by force of a government or terrorism?

2. Was Mr. Mahjoub engaged in or did he instigate the subversion by force of a government or terrorism?

3. Was Mr. Mahjoub a danger to the security of Canada?

 

• [173] I shall deal with these questions in turn. Before doing so, upon consideration of all of the evidence, including summaries, available to Mr. Mahjoub, I find that Mr. Mahjoub was reasonably informed of the case to meet and was able to meet that case.

 

• [174] In order to answer this first question I will consider whether the Ministers have established that:

1. the alleged terrorist organizations, the AJ and the VOC, exist and are involved in subversion by force of a government or terrorism;

2. Mr. Mahjoub is connected to these organizations, and

3. the nature of the connection establishes reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub was a member.

 

• [175] Pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in espionage, subversion by force of a government or terrorism as set out in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of subsection 34(1) (the enumerated activities). It is therefore necessary to consider the history and activities of the AJ and the VOC to see if they are indeed organizations that are engaged in, have engaged in or will engage in the said enumerated activities. Further, since Mr. Mahjoub questions the very existence of the VOC, evidence supporting the existence of the VOC will also be considered.

• [176] The Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of the VOC Shura Council. In order to determine this issue, I will first determine whether such a Council exists as part of this analysis.

 

• [177] Understanding how the AJ and the VOC evolved and the key historic events that have impacted their formation and evolution is helpful in appreciating the issues before the Court in this proceeding. There is significant evidence on the record about the historic evolution of the Egyptian Islamic extremist movement and the two groups. Only the existence of the VOC is challenged by Mr. Mahjoub. This issue and the relevant evidence will be discussed more fully below. I do not propose to summarize evidence about historic evolution but only to provide the following indicators of the most likely historic chronology of these groups based on the record before the Court, in particular the testimony of Professor Gerges, and assuming the existence of the VOC. These are:

• Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sawid Qutb authored Milestones, the germinal text of the AJ, in the late 1950s and was executed in 1966, becoming the “living martyr” and an inspiration for future jihadists;

 

• The AJ was formed in 1970;

 

• The movement was strengthened by President Sadat’s domestic policies and attempted rapprochement to Islamists, and during the 1970s, Islamic groups formed in Egyptian universities;

 

• By 1979, the Egyptian Islamic extremist milieu was dominated by the AJ and Al Gam’aa Al Islamiya (AGAI);

 

• The Afghan-Soviet War began in 1979, prompting many Muslims, including AJ members, to travel to Afghanistan, train and fight to repel the Soviet invaders, becoming so-called “Mujahideen” fighters;

 

• The AJ and AGAI were united under Mohamed Farj, who authored The Absent Duty, the second text of the AJ that exhorted Muslims to violent jihad;

 

• The AJ and AGAI claimed responsibility for the assassination of President Sadat in 1981;

 

• The leaders of the AJ, Dr. Al Zawahiri and Dr. Sayid Fadl, in response to the apparently reckless assassination, adopted a strategy of training and cell formation for a military coup;

 

• Soviet troops in Afghanistan withdrew, and Al Qaeda began to form, under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden and Dr. Al Zawahiri in 1989, the AJ being a major influence on Al Qaeda’s structure and membership;

 

• The Communist government of Afghanistan toppled in 1992, which led to an influx of Mujahideen in the AJ;

 

• The AJ facilitated the movement of Mujahideen out of Afghanistan;

 

• While the AJ focused on Egypt, Al Qaeda began to focus on Western targets in 1991, as a result of the Gulf War and especially American military presence in Saudi Arabia;

 

• As a result of the mass arrest and trials of AJ members in the so-called “VOC trials” before the Eygptian military courts, a major split occurred in the AJ in 1993 which can be described as either:

• o A radical faction of the AJ, led by Ahmed Husayn Agiza, splintered from Dr. Al Zawahiri’s AJ and formed the VOC in 1993, or

• o While many members of the AJ renounced their allegiance to Dr. Al Zawahiri and left the organization, a radical faction within the AJ pressured Dr. Al Zawahiri to begin retaliatory attacks on Egypt, which he did under the name of the AJ’s old military wing, the VOC;

 

• Both the AJ and the VOC shared common goals and targeted high-level government and military officials in Egypt;

 

• Both the AJ and the VOC staged terrorist attacks in the mid 1990s, claiming responsibility for the following:

• o The assassination of Eygptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981 (AJ and AGAI)

• o The assassination of Egyptian Parliamentary Speaker Rifaat el‑Mahgoub in October 1990 (AJ)

• o The attempted assassination of Egyptian Interior Minister Hasan al-Alfi in August 1993 (AJ and VOC)

• o The attempted assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993 (AJ and VOC)

• o The attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on June 25, 1995 (AJ and VOC)

• o The bombing of the Eygptian embassy in Islamabad on November 19, 1995 (AJ)

• o The Luxor Massacre of tourists in Egypt on November 17, 1997 (AGAI), and in response, the VOC warned that orders have “already been given for attacks on Americans and Zionists not only in Egypt but elsewhere” (Al-Hayah, Exhibit A2, Tab 21)

• o Members are suspected to have been involved in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 and the attempted bombing of the US embassy in Albania that year because the AJ had issued a statement warning of retaliation against the US for extraditions (Al-Hayah, Exhibit A2, Tab 32).

 

• If the VOC had ever separated from the AJ, it re-integrated in the late 1990s, in approximately 1995;

 

• In July 1997, Abbud al-Zummur and five imprisoned leaders of the AGAI in Egypt called for a unilateral and unconditional cease-fire and an end to militant violence, a truce that Dr. Al Zawahiri rejected stating “[n]o truce can be made with apostates, who must repent or be killed” (Agence France-Presse, Exhibit A2, Tab 24), which pushed the AJ further towards Al Qaeda due to lack of resources;

 

• In 1998, Dr. Al Zawahiri, on behalf of the AJ, signed a fatwa permitting members to kill Americans and their allies anywhere in the world, and the AJ joined the “World Islamic Front for the Destruction of Jews and Crusaders” (see text of the fatwa reproduced in Al-Quds al-‘Arabi 23 February 1998, Exhibit A3, Tab 20);

 

• The AJ formally merged with Al Qaeda in June 2001, and

 

• After the AJ’s merger with Al Qaeda in June 2001, Al Qaeda conducted the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the White House and Pentagon in Washington D.C.

 

 

• [178] The record supports the Ministers’ contention that the AJ was a militant Egyptian Sunni Islamist organization with a blind cell structure and a strict policy of secrecy (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, p.109; 20 January 2011, pp.154-155). Both Professor Byman and Professor Gerges speak to the existence of the AJ and its involvement in terrorism. Professor Gerges testified that both the AGAI and the AJ were established, consolidated groups (F. Gerges transcript, 19 January 2011, p.50). Their goals were to overthrow the Egyptian regime through violent means (ibid. p.41). While there was some dissension within the AJ as to how to go about it, the AJ under the leadership of Dr. Al Zawahiri trained in a cell structure in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and from 1993 to 1995 conducted violent attacks on Egyptian officials and embassies until it no longer had the capacity to do so (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, pp. 45, 48; 20 January 2011, p.112; 21 January 2011, p.5).

 

• [179] The evidence on the record is virtually unanimous that the AJ and the AGAI were responsible for the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in October 1981 (for example F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, pp.28-29). The evidence confirms that the AJ was responsible for acts of terrorism against public officials in Egypt in the 1990s (for example D. Byman testimony, 28 October 2010, pp.33-34). The evidence also establishes that the AJ and the VOC both claimed responsibility for the November 1993 attempted assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister (D. Byman testimony, 28 October 2010, p.170). The AJ and the Sudanese NIF attempted to assassinate President Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995 (D. Byman testimony, 28 October 2010, p.28). In November 1995, AJ operatives detonated a car bomb outside the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing more than a dozen innocent people (M. Guay testimony, 12 October 2011, p.76). Dr. Al Zawahiri claimed the AJ responsibility for these attacks in his memoirs (D. Byman testimony, 28 October 2010, p.27). In 1998, the AJ was also involved in attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Indeed, the AJ also took credit for this attack and announced that two of its operatives had carried out the attack (Al-Hayah, 9 August 1998, Exhibit A2, Tab 33).

• [180] At that point, the AJ joined the “global jihad” led by Osama Bin Laden (D. Byman testimony, 28 October 2010, pp.38-39). The evidence establishes that the AJ had worked closely with Mr. Bin Laden in the 1990s and that AJ lieutenants made up a large part of Al Qaeda’s governing council at that time (J. Al Fadl transcript, Exhibit A12 pp.204-207). Professor Gerges testified that Al Qaeda was “a carbon copy” of the AJ and adopted its structure, and that the AJ leaders were trying to co-opt Al Qaeda for their own purposes (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, pp.22-23). Notably, the AJ was responsible for importing the tactic of suicide bombing into the Sunni Islamic terrorist repertoire, and Al Qaeda adopted this and other tactics from the AJ (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, p.169). For example, according to Lawrence Wright, Al Qaeda learned the tactic of having an initial explosion before the main explosion to draw people to their windows and inflict more casualties from the Islamabad embassy bombings (The Looming Tower excerpt, Exhibit A60). Under the leadership of Dr. Al Zawahiri, the AJ joined the “World Islamic Front the Destruction of Jews and Crusaders” in 1998, a well‑known and outspoken terrorist organization that included Al Qaeda (W. Wark Expert Report, Exhibit R24, pp.25-26; Al-Quds al’-Arabi, Exhibit A2, Tab 19). Dr. Al Zawahiri signed the fatwa published stating that Muslims should kill Americans, American civilians, and their allies anywhere in the world (ibid.; Al-Quds al-‘Arabi 23 February 1998, Exhibit A3, Tab 20).

 

• [181] It is clear that in the 1980s and early 1990s before its merger with Al Qaeda, the AJ was a potent force in the Egyptian militant jihadist movement. Professor Gerges on cross-examination had this to say on the issue:

 

Q.  You state in your report at paragraph 182, and I don’t think it’s controversial, you state in the 1980s and early 1990s that EIJ was a potent force?

A.  Yes, very potent. It was a vanguard group, even though there was a lot of dissension and many of their operations failed dismally and they didn’t have resources. You Jihad had well trained, very committed, ready to die.

Q.  It was one of the most aggressive and violent Jihad organizations?

A.  I would say EIJ was one of the most – used violence on huge scales, yes.

Q.  Just to clarify, would you agree one of the most aggressive and violent Jihadi organizations?

A.  That’s correct.

 

(F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, p.184)

 

• [182] The evidence of the existence and involvement of the AJ in the subversion by force of the government of Egypt and terrorism is overwhelming, compelling and disputed only in the testimony of Mr. Salem, which I do not find persuasive (M. Salem testimony, 12 September 2012, pp.33-34). I am therefore satisfied that the evidence supports a finding that at all times relevant to these proceedings, in particular 1981 to 2001, the AJ existed either as an independent entity or closely associated with Al Qaeda and engaged in the subversion by force of the government of Egypt and terrorism-related activities, including acts of terrorism resulting in the deaths of civilians, as contemplated in subsection 34(1)(f) of the IRPA.

 

• [183] Although the Ministers need only establish membership in one organization described in paragraph 34(1)(f), and I am satisfied that the AJ is a quintessential example of such an organization, much of the evidence they have adduced goes to the allegation that Mr. Mahjoub was a member of the VOC. I shall therefore also consider the evidence relating to the existence of the VOC and its alleged involvement in terrorism.

• [184] The Ministers claim that the VOC was a group affiliated with the AJ that emerged from a division within the AJ in 1993. The Ministers contend that those that left the AJ formed the VOC, and were reportedly led by Mr. Agiza and Colonel Makkawi. The Ministers also contend that the VOC was recognized as the military wing of the AJ. The Ministers believe that the VOC existed independently of the AJ but acknowledge there was tremendous overlap between the two groups. They say “the exact extent of the overlap and cooperation between the VOC and Al Jihad is difficult to discern in part because Ayman Al Zawahiri has claimed the VOC as his own and because of individuals who claimed to be part of the VOC also appeared to have ties with the Al Jihad and the broader Egyptian Islamic extremist movement.” They allege that its goals, as expressed through its public statements, paralleled those of the AJ, and that its initial focus on Egyptian figures eventually shifted to a global, anti-Western focus.

 

• [185] Mr. Mahjoub argues that the Ministers have failed to establish the existence of the VOC. He relies on the evidence of Professor Gerges as discussed below at paragraphs 191-194, pointing to the first of three hypotheses that Professor Gerges developed about the existence of the VOC, the hypothesis that Professor Gerges himself favours. Mr. Mahjoub contends that Professor Gerges’s first hypothesis, that the VOC was a fiction and that it did not really exist at all, is the most likely. Mr. Mahjoub also relies on the testimony of Mr. Salem on this point. Mr. Salem is the only witness in these proceedings who believes that the VOC is an invention of the Egyptian security apparatus (M. Salem testimony, 9 September 2012, pp.70-71). Mr. Salem was not qualified as an expert to give opinion evidence in this proceeding and I have concerns about his objectivity on such questions as discussed above at paragraphs 161-171 in these reasons. Further, none of the experts who adduced evidence share his opinion including those adduced by Mr. Mahjoub. Consequently, I reject Mr. Salem’s view on this point.

 

• [186] Much has been written about the VOC and its purpose, goals and structure. The public evidence adduced on the VOC consists of public declarations by the VOC, newspaper articles, interviews with known jihadists, and books by authoritative authors. The Court also had the benefit of the opinions of the expert witnesses on this issue.

 

• [187] Notwithstanding the different views held by the experts on the existence of the VOC, it is noteworthy that there are significant areas of agreement on the VOC. There appears to be no dispute that there is great deal of overlap between the VOC and the AJ both in terms of their membership and goals. The evidence supports that the VOC was formed as a result of disputes that occurred within the AJ over the years concerning leadership, operational tactics and strategic direction. Professor Gerges’s evidence on this point is revealing. He writes in his report that:

 

Time and again, I was told by former mid-level and senior members of al-Jihad that despite Zawahiri’s concerted efforts in the late 1980s and early 1990s to unify the organization, rifts continued to plague al-Jihad till its disappearance in 2001. Al-Jihad lacked the coherence and unity of al-Gama’a, as well as a viable social base and a centralized decision-making that directed the actions of most of its members. Decentralization and factionalism were the order of the day.

 

(F. Gerges Expert Report, Exhibit R57, paragraph 201)

 

Professor Gerges later explained on cross-examination that what he meant by “decentralized and factionalism” was that the AJ operated in decentralized cells or factions but all unified under Dr. Al Zawahiri’s dictatorial rule (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, pp.158-159).

• [188] Professor Byman also describes the AJ as a “fissiparous group”, which he defines as “a tendency towards division and internal division, so it divides a lot.” (D. Byman testimony, 27 October 2010, p.203). Professor Gerges indicated that there was often a clash of strong personalities within the AJ that led to splintering (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, p.161). He explained that this led to some individuals renouncing the AJ’s cause, such as Dr. Fadl, but not all individuals abandoned the cause simply because of a disagreement with Dr. Al Zawahiri.

 

• [189] The evidence is undisputed that Mr. Agiza and Colonel Mohammed Makkawi had a disagreement with Dr. Al Zawahiri in 1993, potentially because of the 1993 trials (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, p.57; Al-Hayah, 20 December 2001, Exhibit A2 Tab 75; statement from Mr. Agiza’s wife in Al-Hayah, 22 December 2001, Exhibit A2 Tab 73; Human Rights Watch, May 2005, Exhibit R7, p.34; The Road to Al Qaeda, Exhibit A55 pp.68, 93-94). However, I agree with Professor Gerges’s view that due to the planning required for “spectacular” terrorist attacks such as the attacks on Egyptian officials in 1993 for which the VOC claimed credit, it is unlikely that the VOC was formed in 1993 due to this disagreement. More obviously, the Egyptian government was using the name “VOC” to describe the individuals charged in the 1993 trials, which have been cited in the evidence as the reason why Mr. Agiza and Colonel Makkawi split from Dr. Al Zawahiri.

 

• [190] I am instead persuaded that the VOC emerged prior to 1993. The fact that the VOC claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in 1993 and was named by the Egyptian authorities in the 1993 trials supports this conclusion. In addition, the memoirs of Hani Al Sebai, a former AJ author, while ambiguous on the issue of whether the name VOC was imposed on a group by the Egyptian government, stated that prior to 1993, the group that would be known as VOC had its own members and resources (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, pp.97-98, 106-107; September 2002 Interviews with Hani al-Sebai, Exhibit A57, pp.12-22). Professor Gerges considers Mr. Al Sebai, as a former member of the AJ, to be a reliable insider source, and I agree. Further, in his book Spectrum of Islamic Movements (Exhibit A53), Diia Rashwan affirms that the VOC was, at least until the end of 1992, the military wing of the AJ.

 

• [191] Mr. Mahjoub argues that Professor Gerges’s opinion is that the VOC does not exist. In my view, Professor Gerges’s opinion is more nuanced than this. In his report, Professor Gerges writes that the VOC is “shrouded in mystery and confusion” and that its very existence is contested. However, he acknowledges that “one must be very careful not to draw definite conclusions about VOC and to maintain healthy skepticism.” He indicates that the VOC “is an ambiguous entity that might have either existed for a brief moment or could have been invented for security reasons to confuse the Egyptian authorities and to divert attention from the mother group – al-Jihad” (F. Gerges Expert Report, Exhibit R57, paragraph 186).

 

• [192] Professor Gerges asserts that there exist three competing viewpoints about the VOC, all of which in his opinion are plausible:

1. that it never existed as an independent and autonomous group and was instead a name used to deceive outsiders;

2. that it acted as an arm or a front, an extension of AJ, and that Dr. Al Zawahiri, its executive leader, used it to carry out attacks against the Egyptian state, and

3. it was a tiny faction that broke away from AJ because of operational, as opposed to ideological or theological differences, and operated on its own within Egypt and without.

 

• [193] In his report (Exhibit R57, paragraphs 189-92), Professor Gerges goes on to explain why he prefers his first theory or viewpoint. In an interview with Montasser Al Zayat (a former mid‑ranking member of al-Gama’a in the 1970s and attorney for incarcerated radical Islamists), Mr. Al Zayat indicated to Professor Gerges that the VOC had not existed as an autonomous group and that its operators were loyal to Dr. Al Zawahiri, AJ’s executive leader. Mr. Al Zayat stated that during the 1993 trials of VOC suspects the accused voiced their allegiance to Dr. Al Zawahiri and made clear that they did not belong to a separate organization. Mr. Al Zayat insinuated that the Egyptian security forces exaggerated the importance of the VOC in order to garner public support. Further, during the trial, a mid-ranking suspect named Magdi Mohammed Salem (the same Mr. Salem who testified in these proceedings) scoffed at a journalist when asked if VOC was a separate entity. This is consistent with Mr. Salem’s testimony before the Court. Professor Gerges concluded that the VOC is more of a “rhetorical identifier for a number of militant groups’ media publications than an autonomous entity.”

 

• [194] In response to questions on The Spectrum of Islamic Movements (excerpted at Exhibit A53) which affirms that the VOC was once the military wing of the AJ, Professor Gerges attested, on cross-examination, that the VOC was a “namesake” used as a tool by Egyptian Islamic Jihad to divert attention from the real players. “…it did not exist as a substantive, as a real as a physical, as material faction like Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group” (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, pp.19-20). He further noted that Al Qaeda had used the moniker “Islamic Front for the Liberation of the Holy Place” to claim responsibility for the attacks on the US Embassies in East Africa and to deceive the authorities (ibid. 19 January 2011, pp.84-85).

 

• [195] In my view, none of the above reasons offered by Professor Gerges are necessarily inconsistent with the VOC’s existence in some form. If it existed as a diversion or moniker for the AJ, then it existed in some fashion and the evidence referring to the exploits of the VOC refer to the AJ or a sub-group of the AJ. Further, Professor Gerges makes clear that he is not prepared to discount his other two hypotheses. He attests: “…there are three plausible hypothesis [sic] and I think it would be extremely dangerous on my part to say that I dismiss the three hypothesis [sic]” (F. Gerges testimony, 21 January 2011, p.65).

 

• [196] In contrast to Professor Gerges, Professor Byman views the VOC as a distinct organization that was really a faction or splinter group of the AJ; however, the rift between the views held by the experts is not that significant. Professor Byman acknowledges that the circumstances surrounding the VOC are “murky” and he testifies that the VOC overlaps tremendously with the main AJ movement led by Dr. Al Zawahiri to the point where many operations were performed jointly and personnel were shared (D. Byman testimony, 27 October 2010, p.211). He also acknowledges that the VOC’s goals seem to be identical to those of the AJ (ibid. p.220). His conclusion that the VOC exists in some form is, qualitatively, not that different than the view held by Professor Gerges.

 

• [197] Professor Byman comments on the significance of the word “vanguard” in the title, “Vanguards of Conquest”. He attests:

The “vanguard" context is one that, to go back again to Sayyid Qutb, he talks about the importance of a vanguard that will create the Islamic state and be the prime movers.  And this concept is very important to Zawahiri in his thinking that this idea that a small group will seize power, be the leaders, and that you can't rely on mass mobilization.  So the vanguard concept is one that's important to Zawahiri and more broadly to the jihadist community.

 

(D. Byman testimony, 27 October 2010, p.225)

 

• [198] The meaning attributed to the word “vanguard” by Professor Byman is consistent with his view that the VOC is a distinct organization that was really a faction or splinter group of the AJ. The idea that a “small group will seize power, be the leaders” is consistent with the notion of creating a splinter group.

 

• [199] Professor Byman points to two attacks for which the VOC claimed responsibility, the assassination attempts on the Interior Minister in 1993 and President Mubarak in 1995 (D. Byman testimony, 27 October 2010, pp.221-222). He also testifies that the VOC cooperated with other groups in its operations, fueling the debate as to where the VOC ends and the AJ begins. Professor Byman points to the 1995 attempted assassination of Mubarak, which also involved members of the AGAI as well as members of the AJ. This, in his view, suggests a “combined front” (ibid. p.223). This evidence is consistent with his earlier evidence concerning the overlap between the VOC and the AJ. Nonetheless, Professor Byman opines that the VOC is a group that “has an independent existence to at least some degree” (ibid. p.225).

 

• [200] There is also the book; The Road to Al-Qaeda (a chapter of which was adduced as Exhibit A55) by Mr. Al Zayat, one of the authors relied upon by Professor Gerges, who relates the circumstances leading to the formation of the VOC. Mr. Al Zayat writes at page 68 of his book that:

The disagreements with Ogayza (Agiza) led to the formation of the Vanguards of Conquest. This was a crisis that weakened the group, which was one of the reasons why I disagreed with those who broke away from Zawahiri. I announced at the time that the Vanguards of Conquest was not a separate group, and that Islamic Jihad and the Vanguards of Conquest were two names for the same group led by Zawahiri.

 

 

This account lends support to the Ministers’ allegation that there existed an organized group dedicated to a terrorist cause called the VOC.

 

• [201] In The Spectrum of Islamist Movements (another excerpt of which was adduced as Exhibit A54), reference is made to the formation of the VOC. The author asserts that “Dr. Sayyid Imam (Dr. Fadl) continued to lead and guide the Jihad from Pakistan and Afganistan. In 1993, the organization was deeply shaken by the discovery of its military wing, the Vanguard of the Conquest…” (Exhibit A54, p.405). This provoked an internal crisis in the AJ leadership which eventually led to the resignation of Dr. Fadl and the selection of Dr. Al Zawahiri as the new, undisputed leader. This account lends support to the existence of the VOC as a military wing of the AJ.

 

• [202] On the record before me, I am satisfied that the VOC did exist. All of the theories advanced by the experts that testified before the Court accept that the VOC was, at a minimum, a name used in the media for a sub-group of the AJ or an organization used by Dr. Al Zawahiri as a front for the AJ. Even for this limited purpose, it can be said to exist. The evidence relating to its goals is undisputed. Whatever its level of independence from the AJ, the VOC shares the same terrorist goals adopted by the AJ which involve the violent subversion of the government of Egypt and terrorism.

 

• [203] While I find both Professor Gerges and Professor Byman to be credible witnesses who have similar views on this point, I prefer the evidence of Professor Byman relating to the degree of independent existence of the VOC. In my view, the VOC was more than a propaganda tool used solely by the AJ to divert attention from the real players, the view that Professor Gerges espouses because the evidence for independent existence is not “iron-clad” (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, pp.62-63). I accept that, at least to some degree, it had an independent existence. The evidence indicates that both the VOC and AJ had common goals and overlapped significantly in terms of personnel and leadership. The complex history of these secretive organizations makes it difficult to know with a high degree of certainty much about the organizational structure of the VOC, its nature, and exact ties with the AJ. Secretive terrorist organizations do not publish their organizational charts, nor do they issue membership cards.

 

• [204] Nonetheless, in my view, the most likely evolution of the VOC is, as related in The Spectrum of Islamist Movements, that it was the name of the military wing, or a set of militant cells, of the AJ prior to 1993. Whether this name was given to the sub-group to deceive the authorities is immaterial: the point is that the sub-group itself likely existed. After 1993, the name was adopted by a militant group that claimed responsibility for the 1993 attacks on the Egyptian Interior Minister and the Egyptian Prime Minister and the 1995 attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Ethiopia (F. Gerges testimony 19 January 2011, p.84). Whether that group was Dr. Al Zawahiri’s militant sub-group of the AJ that chose to pursue violent attacks on Egyptian officials and caused a rift with the remainder of the AJ that supported the ceasefire, or whether that group was a militant splinter group created by Mr. Agiza and Colonel Makkawi, is also immaterial. To reiterate: a finding that the VOC exists as an organization for the purposes of paragraph 34(1)(f) does not require that it be independent from another such organization.

 

• [205] The evidence reveals little about the organizational structure of the VOC, in particular about the existence of its Shura Council. Professor Gerges testified that there was no textbook on how Shura Councils are formed (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, p.53). However, he did acknowledge that in a book authored by “Abd al-Qadir’s ibn’abd al-‘Aziz”, an alias of former AJ leader Dr. Fadl, among other aliases, titled The Essential Guide for Preparation and also known as “the manual” for jihadists, Shura Councils are discussed (F. Gerges testimony, 20 January 2011, p.43). Indeed, Professor Gerges confirms that the book is influential and informative and qualifies it as important and critical. Dr. Fadl is reported to be held in great esteem among his peers (ibid. p.44). According to Diaa Rashwan (The Spectrum of Islamist Movements, Exhibit A54, p. 403), some regard Dr. Fadl’s scholarship and knowledge of the religious sciences as second to none; for these groups, he is a religious authority of great standing. In Dr. Fadl’s words, as cited in The Spectrum of Islamist Movements, the book is “a code for a Muslim vanguard, a unique and privileged generation who will bring change to the Islamic world.” This “manual on Jihad” is comprehensive. The following excerpts of The Spectrum of Islamist Movements (Exhibit A54) deal with Dr. Fadl’s treatment of leadership and the Shura Council in The Essential Guide for Preparation:

 

• § “Any group of three or more must appoint a commander to preserve a unified voice. The one who appoints the commander or Amir is the responsible leader who must select several lieutenants in order of preference.” (Third chapter)

 

• § “The author discusses the duties of the Amir and his general responsibilities towards his followers.” (Fourth chapter)

 

• § “However, consultation as a duty of the Amir occupies a large part of the book and is one of its most important issues. Firstly Dr. Fadl approves of the Amir consulting with men of learning and sound judgment in difficult issues.” (Fourth chapter)

 

• § “The commander has the sole right to select the members of the consultative body or shura and there is no stipulation that those whose advice he's asked should be a fixed set of people.” (Fourth chapter)

 

 

• [206] Professor Gerges confirms that: “even a shadowy elitist, highly radical and structured group like Al Jihad had its own Shura council” (F. Gerges testimony, 19 January 2011, p.50).

 

• [207] The above evidence establishes reasonable grounds to believe that any group, splinter group, or sub-group formed with the shared purposes and goals of the Islamic jihadist movement, including the VOC and the AJ, would have an executive structure, including a consultative body or Shura Council.

• [208] There is no direct public evidence concerning the Shura Council of the VOC. The evidence indicates that the VOC took responsibility for three terrorist attacks against Egyptian officials, incidents for which the AJ also eventually claimed responsibility. The evidence is undisputed that the AJ and the VOC were at least closely related organizations. There is also evidence to show that the VOC was involved in joint missions with the AJ, with whom it shared its jihadi objectives. Considering that Dr. Fadl’s manual for jihadists, used by the AJ, provides for leadership and a consultative body for “any group of three of more”, it is reasonable to infer that the VOC, either as a splinter group or a wing of the AJ, had a Shura Council.

 

• [209] One of the allegations against Mr. Mahjoub pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA is that he is a ranking member of the VOC, a radical wing of the AJ.The allegation does not call for a finding that the VOC is a stand-alone organization. The evidence here establishes that the VOC exists in some form as a splinter group, faction or military wing of the AJ with overlapping membership. In the circumstances, the extent of its independence from the AJ matters little. I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the VOC existed as an organization. As stated by Professor Wark in his expert report, whatever the form of the VOC’s existence, whether as a briefly-existing splinter group or the military wing of the AJ, its purpose was the violent subversion of the government of Egypt (W. Wark Expert Report, Exhibit R24, p.52). I therefore also find that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the VOC was engaged in the subversion by force of the government of Egypt. Finally, I am also satisfied on the evidence that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the VOC, whether a sub-group of the AJ or not, engaged in the terrorist activities for which it took credit, which included the killing of civilians.

• [210] I am therefore satisfied that the Ministers have established reasonable grounds to believe that the VOC existed, had a Shura Council, and engaged in both the subversion by force of the government of Egypt and terrorism.

• 2. Is Mr. Mahjoub connected to these organizations?

 

• [211] In support of their allegation that Mr. Mahjoub is a member of these organizations, the Ministers submit that the evidence supports Mr. Mahjoub’s connection to the organizations by reason of the following alleged facts that I have classified as follows:

• a) Mr. Mahjoub had contact with certain individuals;

• b) the individuals contacted are terrorists or members of the organizations;

• c) there is evidence, direct or indirect, that these contacts were made for the purposes of terrorism, subversion or related to membership in the organizations.

• d) the evidence of contact supports the allegation that Mr. Mahjoub is a member.

• e) there is other evidence of a connection between Mr. Mahjoub and the organizations to support the allegation that he is a member.

 

• [212] I propose to address each of the above allegations of fact in turn. However, before doing so, I will deal with the following four preliminary issues, namely: foreign agency reports that have not been summarized, the provenance of the BRS report in the SIR Reference Indices, Tab ||||||, the relevance of certain allegations against Mr. Mahjoub, and Mr. Mahjoub’s aliases.

 

 

 

• [213] In my Reasons for Order dated February 19, 2010 at paragraph 53, I indicated that I would reserve on determining whether the inability of the Service to disclose summaries of the content of certain evidence sourced from the foreign agencies to Mr. Mahjoub, by reason of the third party rule, violated Mr. Mahjoub’s fair trial right. I propose to address that issue at this time.

 

• [214] I have reviewed all of the evidence at issue and for the reasons that follow; I conclude that even though Mr. Mahjoub did not receive summaries of certain foreign agency reports, this did not violate his right to know the case to meet.

 

• [215] Many of the allegations contained in the foreign agency reports at issue were disclosed through identical or similar allegations contained elsewhere in the SIR. For instance, ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. This allegation was therefore effectively disclosed to Mr. Mahjoub.

 

• [216] In addition, allegations that could not be disclosed because of the third party rule were often disclosed through closely related open source information. For example, |||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

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• [217] Concerning the information contained in certain foreign agency reports not otherwise disclosed, none of the information would have any impact on Mr. Mahjoub’s case to meet. To the extent that Mr. Mahjoub was not aware of the classified details, the Special Advocates were aware of all of the classified information and it was open to them to use or challenge the information as they saw fit in order to protect Mr. Mahjoub’s interests.

 

 

• [218] Although the admissibility of the BRS report |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||| (SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||) has not been formally challenged by the Special Advocates, their invitation for the Court to infer |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [the provenance of this information] raises concerns that the information was obtained as a result of torture and that the Court should consequently give it no weight. Consequently, I will consider the provenance of this report.

 

• [219] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [220] Despite the fact that [the CSIS witness] |||||||||||||||||||||| could not be certain of the source of this information on cross-examination (||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||), I find [the CSIS witness’] |||||| analysis that this information came from an interview |||||||||||||||||||||||| compelling. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||(Closed Exhibit ||||||, Tab ||) |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||[In the preceding paragraph, the Court reviewed the evidence of the apprehension of detainees.]

 

• [221] To assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that this information was derived from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, given my earlier findings relating to the treatment of detainees ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, it is necessary to determine whether |||||||||||||||| was in |||||||||||||||||| custody when the interrogation took place.

 

• [222] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [223] The Special Advocates took [the CSIS witness] |||||||||||||||||||||| through this BRS report and elicited the following testimony from [the witness] ||||||:

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It is therefore the Service’s view that this information was obtained by [a particular source] |||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [224] In light of |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| relevant evidence on the record, I do not agree with the Service’s view that this information came from [a particular source] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||). |||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

 

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• [226] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| This supports the likelihood that the detainees were in the custody of |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and not in |||||||||||||||||| custody at the time of the interrogation. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [227] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

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• [228] There is some indication that the information from |||||||||||||||||| was obtained from ill‑treatment ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. Consequently, I will give no weight to |||| [specific]reported statements in the BRS report. There is no indication that the remainder of the report derives from the ill-treatment. This part of the report will be considered and weighed in these proceedings (SIR Reference Indices Tab |||| and Closed Exhibit ||||, Tab ||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [229] I have deemed it unnecessary to consider two of the Ministers’ allegations against Mr. Mahjoub: the allegation that Mr. Mahjoub is wanted by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in terrorist acts, and the allegation that Mr. Jaballah, one of Mr. Mahjoub’s alleged contacts, was engaged in terrorism and a member of a terrorist organization.

 

• [230] Concerning the first of the two allegations, the Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub is wanted by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in terrorist acts and was accused of the Egyptian embassy bombing in Islamabad and has been charged in numerous cases. Both parties have adduced considerable evidence to establish or disprove the allegation that there have been charges against Mr. Mahjoub. However, even if the Ministers establish this allegation as a fact, the mere fact that he has been charged does not support a finding that Mr. Mahjoub committed the acts that he is wanted for. Consequently, this allegation on its own cannot support inadmissibility on security grounds pursuant to subsection 34(1). Without more information relating to evidence in support of these charges or about the Egyptian legal system, I give these charges no weight. Consequently, I shall not consider this allegation.

 

• [231] Concerning the second allegation, upon reviewing all of the evidence on the record, I have determined that there is sufficient evidence to convince me that the security certificate is reasonable without deciding the issue of whether Mr. Jaballah was engaged in terrorism or a member of a terrorist organization. As this is the case, and as there is an ongoing security certificate proceeding against Mr. Jaballah, I shall therefore only lay out the evidence relevant to Mr. Jaballah’s involvement in terrorism and terrorist organizations as it was presented to the Court and refrain from concluding on that evidence.

 

 

• [232] The Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub used many aliases, including variant spellings and arrangements of:

1. Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub (Mohammed Mahmoud, Mohamed Zeki Mohamed, or Mohammed Zeiki |||||||||||||| for his given names, and Mahgoub, Magoub, Mahjub, or Mahmoub for his surname);

2. Mahmoud Shaker (and variants, namely Shakr and Shakir);

3. Abu Ibrahim (or simply Ibrahim or Abrahim), and

4. Mohammed Hasan (and variants, ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

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• [233] Determinations concerning the above aliases are important in this proceeding as some of the evidence supporting the allegations against Mr. Mahjoub refers to these aliases without referring directly to Mr. Mahjoub. I shall therefore examine whether the Ministers have established reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Mahjoub was known by the following aliases or their variants: Mohammed Mahgoub, Mahmoud Shaker, Mohammed Hasan and Abu Ibrahim.

 

• [234] [The Ministers have adduced classified evidence connecting Mr. Mahjoub to “Mohammed Mahgoub” and variants.] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||

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• [235] Much of the biographical information |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| is corroborated by the biographical information provided by Mr. Mahjoub in his PIF (Mr. Mahjoub's modified PIF, Exhibit A2, Tab 3), with the exception of [one identifier] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. The Service was not concerned by this discrepancy.

 

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[The classified evidence connecting the name “Mahgoub” with Mr. Mahjoub uses a variety of unique identifying information to make the connection.]

 

 

• [239] Lastly, a letter sent to Mr. Mahjoub from his former employer identified him with this same spelling:

The Althemar Almubarakah Agriculture Company certifies that Mohamed Zaki Mohamed MAHGOUB worked as Deputy Director-General of the company and managed the Damazin Project for Pluvial Agriculture from February 1992 to May 1993...He is leaving on his own prerogative and due to personal circumstances. All the best to him in his future endeavours!

Dr. Mubarak Ali AL DOURI

 

Director-General of the Althemar Almubarakah Agriculture Company...

Khartoum

Date: 17 October 1993

[Emphasis added]

 

(Reference Letter to Mr. Mahjoub 17 October 1993, Exhibit A2, Tab 10)

 

• [240] Mr. Mahjoub has adduced evidence of persons bearing the same or similar names to him who were convicted in Egypt (see the Interior Ministry’s list of charges and convictions for Mr. Mahjoub, Exhibit R92). It is very unlikely that the individuals identified could possibly have been Mr. Mahjoub. He argues that given the number of people bearing similar names, it is likely that the Service has mis-identified Mr. Mahjoub. Mr. Mahjoub also challenges the Service’s identification of him as a suspected terrorist because a fingerprinting comparison was not done, unlike in the Jaballah case (Excerpt of Jaballah (Re) transcript, 8 December 2011, Exhibit R69).

 

• [241] I reject Mr. Mahjoub’s argument that he has been mis‑identified. The evidence adduced by the Ministers supporting the correct identification by the Service of Mr. Mahjoub as the individual in question is compelling. In my view, the divergences in spellings likely stem from transliteration issues from Arabic, in particular the Egyptian pronunciation of the “j” sound in Mr. Mahjoub’s name as a hard “g” sound that I observed during the testimony of Egyptian national Mr. Salem. I am also satisfied with |||||||||||||||||||||||| [the CSIS witness’] explanation of the minor discrepancy in |||||||||||||||| [the identifier] Given the corroborating [details] |||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| I find that when referring to the variant spellings for Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub listed at paragraph 232 above, ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [the evidence adduced by the Ministers pertains to] a person whom the Service has correctly identified as Mr. Mahjoub.

 

Mahmoud Shaker and variant spellings

 

• [242] Mahmoud Shaker, Shaker, Shakr or Shakir are among the important alleged aliases of Mr. Mahjoub. Besides supporting the allegation that Mr. Mahjoub was a Mujahideen fighter|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||||; Closed Exhibit |||||| Tab |||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.

 

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• [245] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

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[The Ministers have adduced certain classified information as evidence identifying Mr. Mahjoub as “Shaker” or one of its variants].

 

• [246] Mr. Mahjoub has specifically denied ever using the alias “Mahmoud Shaker”, stating that “he never used names other than his own, including Mahmoud SHAKER” (CSIS Interview 8 August 1997, SIR Tab |||; Exhibit A2 Tab 21), “Mahmour Shaker” or “Mahmoud Shukri” (CSIS Interview 13 and 20 January 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab |||; Exhibit A2, Tab 23).

 

• [247] The alias arose again during a third Service interview, and again he denied any association with this alias. The BRS report summarizes the interaction as follows:

…when asked if MAHJOUB was sure that the British authorities would not find the names and / or telephone numbers of Mohamed MAHJOUB, Mahmoud SHAKER, Abu Ibrahim, or Mohamed HASAN during any searches of the belongings of those arrested. MAHJOUB denied that any of these names were associated to himself. MAHJOUB clarified that he is known as Abu Ibrahim because that is the name of his youngest son.

 

(CSIS Interview 5 October 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab |||; Exhibit A2, Tab 22)

 

• [248] While I find Mr. Mahjoub’s clarification of his use of “Abu Ibrahim” suspect and convenient in the circumstances, and I find that |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [the classified information provides] evidence of this alias, I am nevertheless of the view that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Mahjoub used the alias Shaker.

 

• [249] In my view, it is critically important that no basis whatsoever is provided by [the Ministers] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| for connecting Mr. Mahjoub with the alias Shaker. |||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [250] While I have no reason to doubt that someone used the alias Mahmoud Shaker |||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| and it was likely a unique individual since the name was unusual |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| It could be based purely on |||||||||||||||||||||||| deductions and not on evidence. While I reject Mr. Mahjoub’s suggestion that Mahmoud Shaker was likely Ihab Saqr because of the similarity of the names, I accept the possibility that even rigorous agencies |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| could be wrong in deducing the true identity of an alias, as may have been the case with the FBI’s identification of Mohammed Ibrahim Makkawi as Saif al-Adel, a leading Al Qaeda member (NBCNews.com 23 November 2012, Exhibit R104; biikyamasr.com 2 March 2012, Exhibit R105; BBC Online 29 February 2012, Exhibit R106).

 

• [251] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [252] In the result, without an evidentiary basis, independent corroboration, or other indicia of reliability of this information ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, I find that the record does not establish that Mr. Mahjoub employs the alias Shaker.

 

 

• [253] The Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub employed the name “Mohammed Hasan” or “Hassan.” There are also variants on the record including |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| [The] evidence of Mr. Al Fadl in the USA v. Bin Laden trial that a man named “Abu Hassan el Masry”, “El Masry” meaning “the Egyptian” according to Professor Byman (D. Byman testimony, 27 October 2010, p.89) was an Althemar employee whom Mr. Al Fadl witnessed working in the same office as Mr. Al Duri in Khartoum sometime during or after 1991. Mr. Al Fadl claimed that he was an AJ and Al Qaeda member. Mr. Al Fadl does not further identify this person (USA v. Bin Laden transcript, Exhibit A12, pp.246-249).

 

• [254] Other than |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| there is no evidence on the record to link Mr. Mahjoub to the alias “Mohammed Hasan”. This name was included in a long list of aliases presented to Mr. Mahjoub in a Service interview. The Service observed that “when asked if MAHJOUB was sure that the British authorities would not find the names and/or telephone numbers of Mohamed MAHJOUB, Mahmoud SHAKER, Abu Ibrahim, or Mohamed HASAN during any searches of the belongings of those arrested”, Mr. Mahjoub, in the same exchange, “denied that any of these names were associated to himself” [emphasis added] (CSIS Interview 5 October 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 22). As I observed at paragraphs 246-248 above, the credibility of Mr. Mahjoub’s denials is questionable.

 

• [255] Nevertheless, on the basis of this evidence I am not prepared to draw an inference that Mr. Mahjoub used the name “Mohammed Hassan” as an alias.

 

• [256] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||).

 

• [257] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

• [258] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||).

 

• [259] Again, I find that the evidence is insufficient to establish that Mr. Mahjoub used the alias “Hassan” or its variants |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| In the result, I find that the record does not establish that Mr. Mahjoub employs the alias “Hassan”.

 

 

• [260] Another important alias allegedly used by Mr. Mahjoub is Abu Ibrahim, Ibrahim, or the variant spellings Abu Abrahim or Abrahim. Mr. Jaballah refers to an “Ibrahim” that he met at the home of Khadr’s in-laws, the Elsamnahs that the Ministers allege is Mr. Mahjoub (CSIS interview of Jaballah 5 March 1998, SIR reference indices Tab ||||||; Exhibit A2, Tab 15). Thus the connection of this alias to Mr. Mahjoub must be established before this evidence becomes probative.

 

• [261] Mr. Mahjoub admits that he went by the name Abu Ibrahim or Ibrahim in his interviews with the Service, but he and Ms. El Fouli provided two different explanations for the use of this name. On August 8, 1997, Ms. El Fouli explained that Mr. Mahjoub used “Abu Ibrahim” because Ibrahim was to be the name of their child who would be born on August 29, 1997. Her explanation is summarized in the BRS reports as follows:

When asked if he ever used the name Ibrahim, MAHJOUB stated that he went by the name Abu Ibrahim. Given that MAHJOUB's only son (actually step son) is Hamed Hani, the writer was confused by the Abu Ibrahim appelation [sic]. ELFOULI quickly explained that Ibrahim was to be the name of their son, with whom she was pregnant.

 

(CSIS Interview 8 August 1997, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 21)

 

• [262] The Service comment in the BRS report is that this reason was not believable. The Service persisted, asking Mr. Mahjoub again about this alias during his interview on January 13 and 20, 1998. The BRS summarizes Mr. Mahjoub’s response as follows:

Subject initially stated that he has never used any other name, but then indicated he is known by the nickname ABU ABRAHIM or ABRAHIM. He started using this name in accordance to the Islamic tradition, which recognizes Abrahim as a prophet, and especially after the birth of his Abrahim on 1997 08 29. I asked when the subject started using this nickname.

 

(At this point, subject mentioned that he had been interviewed twice by the SECURITY OF CANADA…

 

Subject started using the nickname ABRAHIM or ABU ABRAHIM two or three months after he arrived in Canada [February or March, 1996]. I asked why subject had started using this name prior to the birth of his son in 1997.

 

(Subject stated that if he had known this was going to be a security interview he would not have brought his friend…).

 

Subject stated he is only known by the name ABRAHIM or ABU ABRAHIM by a few friends in Canada. Subject refused to provide the names of these friends because something may happen to me. Subject did not explain this statement, but added, at anytime I am expecting the Egyptian government will do something against me. He immediately referred to public information about the Egyptian government sending squads to eliminate opposition people outside Egypt.

 

(Subject then referred to my questions and those asked by the SECURITY OF CANADA people as being like the interrogations by the Egyptians…) 

 

Subject stated he never used any other name in Egypt or Khartoum, Sudan, never used the named Mahmoud SHAKER, and only started using the name ABU ABRAHIM/ABRAHIM one and a half or two months after he came to Canada. Subject stated he started using this name right after he arrived in Canada because as a young Muslim man in a non-Muslim country I wanted God to give me a good wife and family.

[Emphasis added]

 

(CSIS Interview 13 and 20 January 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 23)

 

 

• [263] The Service commented that Mr. Mahjoub:

was quite uncooperative, evasive and accusatory, while maintaining his pleasant façade. He refused to provide information (i.e. the names of his friends who know him as ABU ABRAHIM), repeatedly rambled off topic, referred to my interview as an interrogation similar to the ones he had experienced in Egypt, and accused Canada of causing the recent harassment and arrest of his family and friends.

 

(CSIS Interview 13 and 20 January 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 23)

 

 

While I give no weight to the Service’s observations of Mr. Mahjoub’s demeanour, it is clear from the sequence of responses in the above passage that Mr. Mahjoub was being evasive.

• [264] Mr. Mahjoub explained his use of Abu Ibrahim again in October 1998. The BRS summarizes this explanation as follows:

… when asked if MAHJOUB was sure that the British authorities would not find the names and / or telephone numbers of Mohamed MAHJOUB, Mahmoud SHAKER, Abu Ibrahim, or Mohamed HASAN during any searches of the belongings of those arrested. MAHJOUB denied that any of these names were associated to himself. MAHJOUB clarified that he is known as Abu Ibrahim because that is the name of his youngest son.

 

(CSIS Interview 5 October 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 22)  

 

• [265] Since Mr. Mahjoub has, in several Service interviews, admitted to using the alias Abu Ibrahim, Ibrahim, Abu Abrahim or Abrahim, |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| there are reasonable grounds to believe that he used this alias in all of its variants.

 

• [266] An inconsistency in Mr. Mahjoub’s account makes pinpointing the date at which he began using this name difficult. He explains that he first used it in contemplation of his unborn son, which would have meant he started using the alias at the earliest in October 1996 when he was married to Ms. El Fouli, ten or eleven months before Ibrahim Mahjoub was born. Alternatively, he says that he began using it two or three months after he came to Canada, then he claims it was one and a half or two months after his arrival, and lastly he says as soon as he came to Canada “because as a young Muslim man in a non-Muslim country I wanted God to give me a good wife and family”. Mr. Mahjoub’s different accounts and inconsistencies explaining why and when he began using the alias Ibrahim raise questions as to why Mr. Mahjoub would be so imprecise on such a matter and causes me to question his credibility on the issue. I find that the most likely version is that Mr. Mahjoub began using the alias soon after his arrival.

 

• [267] The Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub has maintained an extensive array of extremist contacts, namely: Mr. Ahmed Husayn Mustafa Agiza, Mr. Mubarak Al Duri, Mr. Mahmoud Jaballah, Mr. Ahmed Said Khadr, and Mr. Essam Hafiz Marzouk. I will deal with each of these contacts in turn by considering the evidence adduced, both public and classified, relating to whether or not Mr. Mahjoub had contact with these individuals.

 

  i. Mr. Agiza

 

• [268] The Ministers contend that Mr. Mahjoub had direct contact with Mr. Agiza. They base their claim on [classified evidence] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||(SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| There is no other evidence on the record to establish a direct connection between Mr. Mahjoub and Mr. Agiza.

 

• [269] To accept [the Ministers’ evidence] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| that Mr. Mahjoub and Mr. Agiza were close associates ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||, one would have to presume that membership is established|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Membership is the very allegation that the Ministers must establish; it cannot be presumed. I therefore conclude on the evidence that the contact between Mr. Mahjoub and Mr. Agiza is not established.

 

ii. Mr. Al Duri

 

• [270] Next, the Ministers contend that Mr. Mahjoub was in contact with Mr. Al Duri (also spelled “Al Douri”), primarily on the basis of two letters, one found in a locked briefcase during a search of Mr. Mahjoub’s residence in the course of a warrant-authorized search on June 27, 2000,and the other provided to the Court during the previous security certificate proceedings by Ms. Mona El Fouli. The first letter, dated August 12, 1998, is addressed to Mr. Mahjoub at his former address at 25 St. Dennis Drive, Apt. 1710 (Letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub, 12 August 1998, Exhibit A2, Tab 83). It is signed “Your brother, Mubarak AL DOURI”. The second letter, a reference letter for the Althemar Almubarakah Agriculture Company dated October 17, 1993, mentions “Mohamed Zaki Mohamed MAHGOUB” by name as the manager of the “the Damazin Project for Pluvial Agriculture from February 1992 to May 1993”, and it is signed “Dr. Mubarak Ali AL DOURI” (Reference Letter to Mr. Mahjoub 17 October 1993, Exhibit A2, Tab 10). Mr. Mahjoub’s PIF (Mr. Mahjoub’s modified PIF, Exhibit A2, Tab 3) states in the work history section that from February 1992 to May 1993 he worked on the “Al‑Damazin Farm,” providing corroborating detail that Mr. Al Duri and Mr. Mahjoub were working for the same company.

 

• [271] Mr. Mahjoub’s address book, found in a search incidental to his arrest, also contained references to Mr. Al Duri. An entry refers to the “telephone number in London, England, friend of Mubarak ALDOURI - 1 814 508637” (Addresses and telephone numbers on Mr. Mahjoub at the time of his arrest by CIC 26 June 2000 SIR Reference Indices Tab |||||| Exhibit A7 Tab 16). Also, the two telephone numbers written next to the name “Mubarak” in Mr. Mahjoub’s address book are the same as the United Arab Emirates personal and cellular phone numbers (0097165335163 (535163) and 00971506505847) provided to Mr. Mahjoub in the August 12, 1998 letter (Letter from Mr. Al Duri to Mr. Mahjoub, 12 August 1998, Exhibit A2, Tab 83).

 

• [272] There is no evidence that Mr. Mahjoub has ever denied that he was in contact with Mr. Al Duri.

 

• [273] In my view, the above evidence clearly establishes that there was contact between Mr. Mahjoub and Mr. Al Duri.

 

  iii. Mr. Jaballah

 

 

• [274] Further, the Ministers contend that Mr. Mahjoub was in contact with Mr. Jaballah on the basis of an entry found in Mr. Mahjoub’s address book, which read: “Abu Ahmed - 289-2361”. (Addresses and telephone numbers on Mr. Mahjoub at the time of his arrest by CIC 26 June 2000, SIR Reference Indices Tab |||| Exhibit A7 Tab 16). That entry proved to be Mr. Jaballah’s phone number. In an interview with the Service, Mr. Jaballah confirmed that his telephone number was (416) 289-2361 (CSIS interview of Jaballah 5 March 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||; Exhibit A2, Tab 15). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||).

 

• [275] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||).

 

• [276] The Ministers contend that Mr. Jaballah met Mr. Mahjoub at the Elsamnahs’ home. || |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [277] In an interview with the Service, Service personnel asked Mr. Jaballah whether he knew Mr. Mahjoub. The BRS report on the interview summarizes Mr. Jaballah’s responses as follows:

JABALLAH was then asked when he first met Mohammed MAHJOUB. When JABALLAH did not recognize the name, the writer provided MAHJOUB's aliases as Mahmoud SHAKER, Mohammed HASSAN, and Abu Ibrahim. After a moment of reflection, JABALLAH indicated that although these names are not familiar to him, he had met an individual named Ibrahim on one occasion at the residence of Ahmed Khadr's in-laws, the ELSAMNAHs. JABALLAH said, further, that his wife was close to the ELSAMNAHs and visited them often. When asked if this as the first and only time he had met Ibrahim, JABALLAH concurred.

 

(CSIS interview of Jaballah 5 March 1998, SIR reference indices Tab ||||; Exhibit A2, Tab 15)

 

I note that Mr. Mahjoub was not living at the Elsamnahs’ by the time Mr. Jaballah arrived in Canada in May 1996, for he had [already] moved out with Mr. El Jamal ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. Nevertheless, since Mr. Mahjoub’s address book included the Elsamnahs’ contact information, it is possible that Mr. Mahjoub met Mr. Jaballah in a later visit to the Elsamnahs’ home, and Mr. Mahjoub was the “Ibrahim” of which Mr. Jaballah spoke (Addresses and telephone numbers on MZM at the time of his arrest by CIC 26 June 2000, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||; Exhibit A7 Tab 16). Ms. El Fouli testified in the previous security certificate proceeding that the Khadrs and Elsamnahs were close friends of her family, making this possibility still more likely (Transcript of Proceedings DES-1-00 2 March 2001, Exhibit A45 pp.784, 786, 869-870).

 

• [278] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). |||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 

• [279] Mr. Mahjoub has twice denied knowing Mr. Jaballah to the Service during interviews. The interviews are summarized in BRS reports as follows:

MAHJOUB was shown a photo of Mahmoud JABALLAH and asked if he had even seen this individual in Toronto, or if he had ever come into contact with him overseas prior to coming to Canada. Instead of answering directly, MAHJOUB spoke at length about how busy he was with his job. Because of this, MAHJOUB continued he had very little time even for his family let alone for socializing. MAHJOUB indicated that he did not have the time to attend mosque and since coming to Canada had not made any contacts in the local Muslim community. As neither MAHJOUB nor ELFOULI recognized the individual in the photo, the writer then asked if MAHJOUB recognized the name Mahmoud JABALLAH or Abu Ahmed', to which MAHJOUB responded in the negative, again citing his lack of time for socializing because of his employment."

 

(CSIS interview 24 October 1997, SIR Reference indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 25)

 

 

It was then explained to MAHJOUB that earlier same date (1999 03 31), Mahmoud JABALLAH (aka: Abu Ahmed) was arrested...MAHJOUB immediately denied knowing anyone named Mahmoud JABALLAH or Abu Ahmed. MAHJOUB continued that he had been questioned many times by the Service regarding JABALLAH and MAHJOUB was tiring of the questions. MAHJOUB became very angry and began to furiously point at the writer, accusing the writer of trying to meet with Mona ELFOULI behind MAHJOUB's back.

(CSIS Interview 31 March 1999, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 24)

 

• [280] Concerning the first of these interviews, the Service commented as follows:

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(CSIS Interview analysis 24 October 1997, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 25)

 

• [281] Notwithstanding the above-discussed denials by Mr. Mahjoub, I am nevertheless satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that contact between Mr. Mahjoub and Mr. Jaballah is established. In coming to this conclusion, the evidence that I find most compelling is Mr. Jaballah’s telephone number found in Mr. Mahjoub’s address book, which contained a limited number of entries. This evidence, considered in conjunction with the other evidence discussed above |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||| and Mr. Jaballah meeting an individual named “Ibrahim” at the Khadr residence, provide a basis for finding reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Jaballah was a contact of Mr. Mahjoub prior to Mr. Jaballah’s arrest.

 

iv. Mr. Khadr

 

• [282] The Ministers further submit that Mr. Mahjoub was in contact with Mr. Khadr, primarily on the basis that Mr. Mahjoub admitted to knowing Mr. Khadr. The BRS report of a Service interview with Mr. Mahjoub states that in response to a query about whether he knew Mr. Khadr, “MAHJOUB responded that both he and his wife were acquainted with KHADR, but he had not known KHADR before he (MAHJOUB) came to Canada” (CSIS interview 8 August 1997, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 21). This version of events is corroborated by Ms. El Fouli’s testimony in the previous security certificate proceedings (Transcript of proceedings DES-1-00, 2 March 2001, Exhibit A45, pp.786, 789).

 

• [283] In another Service interview a year later, Mr. Mahjoub denied that he knew Mr. Khadr, although he quickly reversed his position and confirmed that he knew Mr. Khadr. The BRS report describes Mr. Mahjoub’s response to the same query as follows:

MAHJOUB denied knowing Ahmed KHADR. When the writer pointed out that this was surprising given that MAHJOUB resided with KHADR's in-laws the ELSAMNAH's, MAHJOUB suddenly recalled knowing KHADR and stated that 'everyone knows Ahmet KHADR'. MAHJOUB and ELFOULI both claimed that MAHJOUB met KHADR through ELFOULI as ELFOULI is friends with KHADR's wife. Neither MAHJOUB nor ELFOULI could explain how their claim could be accurate since MAHJOUB had stayed with KHADR's in-laws before meeting ELFOULI. MAHJOUB revealed that KHADR remains in Pakistan but did not know what KHADR was doing over there. MAHJOUB is unaware if KHADR intends to return to Canada.

 

(CSIS Interview 5 October 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 22)

 

• [284] In my view, this misinformation provided to the Service by Mr. Mahjoub during the interview establishes that Mr. Mahjoub was attempting to conceal that he knew Mr. Khadr. This behaviour combined with the fact that Mr. Mahjoub resided with the Elsamnahs, Mr. Khadr’s in‑laws, supports an inference that Mr. Khadr was a contact of Mr. Mahjoub.

 

• [285] In a further Service interview several months later, Mr. Mahjoub reportedly became angry after he was shown a magazine article that contained a photograph of Mr. Khadr.

When shown the MacLean's magazine about the Egyptian Embassy bombings, MAHJOUB immediately pointed to the accompanying news photo of Ahmed Said KHADR...and began to shout in Arabic. ELFOULI translated that MAHJOUB had discussed KHADR during the previous interview and had nothing to add. MAHJOUB was advised that aside from the photo of KHADR, the articles were about the EGYPTIAN embassy bombing in Pakistan in 1995 11.

 

(CSIS Interview 31 March 1999, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 24)

 

 

• [286] Further [the Ministers have adduced classified evidence that Mr. Khadr used the Elsamnahs’ residence as his address in Canada] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||Further, Ms. El Fouli indicates in her testimony that Mr. Mahjoub had contact with Mr. Khadr (Transcript of Proceedings DES-1-00, 2 March 2001, Exhibit A45, p.787).

 

• [287] I am satisfied that the Ministers have established that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Khadr is a contact of Mr. Mahjoub.

 

v. Mr. Badiya

 

• [288] Next, the Ministers allege that Mr. Mahjoub is a contact of Mr. Badiya, supporting this allegation with evidence that they were in telephone contact.

 

• [289] At Mr. Mahjoub’s Immigration Screening interview with the Service, Mr. Mahjoub reportedly affirmed that he lived at “25 St. Dennis Drive, Apt. 1710, Toronto, tel: 416-429-9951 since 1996 11 with his wife, stepson, and son. Subject [Mr. Mahjoub] has never had any visitors or friends stay with him” (Immigration screening interview 28 January 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). Mr. Mahjoub used this telephone number, (416) 429-9951, registered to Ms. El Fouli, until his arrest in June 2000. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

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(|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference indices Tab ||||||)

 

[Mr. Mahjoub made calls to a Kuwaiti number in 1997 and 1998, Exhibit A7 Tabs 14 and 15]

 

 

• [290] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||).

 

• [291] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||

 |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). [The Service learned that a Kuwaiti number called from Mr. Mahjoub’s home telephone number belonged to an individual named Ahmad Hussein Badeta Alsaeied, who was deported from Kuwait in January 1999 for his ties to the VOC.]

 

• [292] Mr. Michel Guay, a Service witness, testified that he was unsure whether two people could be subscribed to the number in question (M. Guay testimony, 20 October 2010, pp.99-100). Nevertheless, [a CSIS witness] |||||||||||||||||||||| testified that it was the Service’s belief that “Badeta Alsaied and Badiya are the same person, Abu Khalid, |||||||||| of the Vanguards of Conquest” ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||. The Service provides no justification to found this belief.However, the record provides the following evidence connecting these names to the same person.

 

• [293] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). [The Ministers have adduced evidence that Mr. Alsaied was deported from Kuwait in January 1999 for his ties to the VOC.] Further, the Ministers provide an Arabic language newspaper article reporting that two suspects were extradited from Kuwait, “Badi” and a man by the name of “Fahmi”, at this time (Al-Quds al-'Arabi, 21 April 1999, Exhibit A2 Tab 79). It is the Service’s belief that “Badi” is Mr. Badiya (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||). Mr. Magdi Salem testified that “Badi” (spelled in the List of Candidates of the Al-Nour Party, Exhibit R96, to which he was referring as “Badie”) is Mr. Badiya, the current leader of the Islamist Al-Nour political party in Egypt (M. Salem testimony, 10 September 2012, pp.51-52).

 

• [294] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||| On the basis of this evidence, I am not prepared to find that Mr. Alsaied is an alias of Mr. Badiya. More than one individual was deported from Kuwait at that time due to alleged connections with the VOC, and more than one individual could have been registered to that telephone number. The evidence therefore does not establish that Mr. Alsaied is an alias of Mr. Badiya.

 

• [295] Mr. Mahjoub denied knowing Mr. Badiya in a Service interview, summarized in the BRS report as follows:

The writer replied that they wished to inform MAHJOUB that, in addition to the arrest of JABALLAH, several open information articles stated that Essam MARZOUK (aka: ADNAN), Ihab SAQR and Ahmed BADIYA from Kuwait, were presently in Egyptian custody and standing trial on terrorism charges. Again MAHJOUB became very angry and denied knowing these individuals. The writer advised that this was not true and this was an opportunity for MAHJOUB to explain his relationship with these individuals before the Egyptians obtained this information through their own investigations. MAHJOUB was silent for a moment and then accused the Service of being worse than the Egyptian authorities.

[Emphasis added]

 

(CSIS Interview 31 March 1999, SIR Reference indices Tab ||; Exhibit A2, Tab 24)

 

The evidence suggests that Mr. Mahjoub was in contact with either Mr. Badiya or Mr. Alsaied, both alleged members of the VOC.  However, the record does not establish reasonable grounds to believe that Badeta Alsaied and Badiya are the same person and that Mr. Mahjoub was consequently a contact of Mr. Badiya.

 

vi. Mr. Marzouk

 

• [296] Finally, the Ministers submit that Mr. Mahjoub was in contact with Mr. Marzouk, also founding this submission on evidence of telephone communications between them.

 

• [297] The Ministers have provided evidence that Mr. Marzouk’s residential telephone number was in contact with Mr. Mahjoub’s residential telephone number (416) 429-9951. Mr. Marzouk’s number at 6-13625 76th Avenue, Surrey BC, (604) 572-8151 made the following relevant calls:

(416) 429-9951  1997 05 11 - 1 minute

1997 06 08 - 8 minutes

    1997 07 13 - 27 minutes

    1997 07 27 - 1 minute

    1997 07 27 - 20 minutes

 

(Telephone toll records, Exhibit A7 Tabs 1, 3, 5-13)

 

 

• [298] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||Mr. Guay |||||||||| testified that they were obtained from the telephone companies “via subpoena by the Department of Justice counsel in 2000 or 2001” (M. Guay testimony, 25 October 2010, p.20). It is evident from the toll records themselves that they come from BCTel and Cantel (see Exhibit A7, Tabs 1, 3-13).

 

• [299] |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||). I am satisfied on the basis of this evidence that Mr. Marzouk likely made all of the above noted calls to Mr. Mahjoub.

 

• [300] As outlined in paragraph 289 above, the Ministers have provided evidence from Mr. Mahjoub that his residential phone number from November 1996 to the time of his arrest in June 2000 was (416) 429-9951. He also stated in the interview that he had no visitors or friends stay with him at his home (Immigration Screening Interview 13 and 20 January 1998, SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||; Exhibit A2, Tab 23).

 

• [301] Because Mr. Mahjoub has made submissions to the effect that the calls between the numbers associated with him and with Mr. Marzouk could have been made by Ms. El Fouli, the calls to Mr. Marzouk require greater specificity in determining the date at which Mr. Mahjoub began to use (416) 429-9951. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| (|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| SIR Reference Indices Tab ||||).