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.: — This appeal is taken as to two paragraphs relating to costs in an interlocutory order by the Tax Court joining one Helga Georg as a party to an appeal brought by the respondent against the appellant. ... We do not regard the failure of the counsel for the respondent to request solicitor/client costs as alone fatal to the decision to award them, since in our view courts should have discretion to impose them on their own motion where warranted — but only after alerting counsel that such costs are under consideration and allowing the opportunity for presentation of both sides of the argument. ...

doing business, the appellant has had a dispute with the office of Revenue Canada, Customs & Excise, with respect to its liability for the payment of sales taxes on the septic tanks it was manufacturing. ... The “transitional” provision enacted in 1985 will be in force until it has been repealed—which is not the case—or until it has become obsolete (see subsection 2(2) of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21) — which will not be the case until all applications filed before the coming into force of the 1985 Act have been dealt with. ...

.: — This is an appeal against a judgment of Addy, J. of the Trial Division of this Court whereby, upon motion made by the defendant, Her Majesty the Queen, pursuant to rule 419(1)(a) [1] of the Federal Court Rules, the action herein was dismissed on the ground that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action. ... No addition to the statement of claim could alter the real nature of the action and this is why, be it said incidentally, that I would now deny the application for leave to amend made orally by counsel for the applicant in the course of the hearing — and then taken under advisement. 2. ...

— because it is an objection, they say, which is not in any way within the scope of section 222 of the Income Tax Act and has nothing to do with the debt being recovered. ... In my opinion, a finding by a court that the contract on which the third party relies to challenge the legitimacy of the seizure, or to argue that it has nothing to pay, is a sham, or, though real, cannot be set up against the garnisher — which as I mentioned is the purpose of the Paulian action — is still a decision directly connected with compulsory execution of the judgment. ...

In September 1984 the appellant was contacted by Boots & Coots, a well control company based in Houston, Texas, with respect to an underground blowout in an exploratory gas well being drilled by Mobil Oil Canada Ltd (“Mobil”) off the coast of Nova Scotia. ... Interpreting the 1942 Convention The basic principles to be applied in interpreting the 1942 Convention or any bilateral tax treaty are those found in articles 31 & 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. ... Canada is a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development (“OECD”) which adopted a Model Tax Convention on Income & Capital (the “OECD Convention”) in 1977. ...

On this interpretation, subsection (7) could have application to taxpayers directly involved in contesting departmental interpretations before the Tariff Board or a Court or to those affected by an authoritative re-interpretation — this third group could include all taxpayers. ... A taxpayer who pays his taxes in good faith and under the general compulsion of the law should not be penalized for not challenging his Government’s right to the tax at every stage — annually, as recommended before us by counsel for the respondent. ... It provides that costs shall not be awarded — “unless the Court, in its discretion, for special reason, so orders” Since no special reasons were advanced, and none appear from the record, I would make no order respecting costs. ...

Finally, the learned judge followed the decision of this Court in Johnson & Johnson Inc. v. ... This Court was faced with a similar issue in Johnson & Johnson Inc. v. ... Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931). Nevertheless, strict adherence to an annual accounting system would create transactional inequities. ...

Shofar Investment Corp. [4] when, at page 5849 of the report, he approved of what Jackett, C.J. had said on the appeal in in the following excerpts from his judgment: — What we are concerned with here is "gross profit”. ... In fact, "inventory" then and in 1978 was defined in similar terms, viz: — ''inventory" means a description of property the cost or value of which is relevant in computing a taxpayer's income from a business for a taxation year. ... It reads as follows: — 9.(1) Subject to this Part, a taxpayer's income for a taxation year from a business or property is his profit therefrom for the year. ...

I * That is the background against which Thurlow A.C.J. found as a fact that the purpose of the expenditure was to alleviate the undesirable effects of traffic congestion on the ongoing operations of the shopping centre: The need or occasion for the expenditure, in my view, was the undesirable effects which traffic congestion was causing and could be expected to cause on the popularity of the shopping centre..? ... Moreover, while the undesirable effects of traffic congestion on the popularity of the shopping centre and on its prospects for competing with a rival shopping centre might conceivably have led to some other whole or partial solution involving an outlay of a capital nature, such as to restructure the shopping centre or its buildings or its means of access, and ress and some such outlays may indeed have been made), this is 0t whal t expimditure here in es on was for The mane ’ was not cid or change in 0r additions to the la' li " ULeilk. ises or the buildings thereon or in connection with the structure s of the plaintiff's business^ Rather, it was paid to induce the City to make changes on City property that could be beneficial to the plaintiff in achieving its object of promoting its business by enhancing the popularity of its shopping centre. [13] *[emphasis added] Here, the exchange of land and the payment for the relocation of Pierre Corneille Street are not severable. ...

[8] I $312,125.61 and the respondent’s position was that the proportion of the total estate tax deductible was $312,125.61 minus (a proportion of debts, funeral expenses, etc, and amounts [other than value of property passing on death] deductible under section 7) total value of property passing on death minus (debts, funeral expenses, etc, + all section 7 deductions):]: [9] According to the respondent’s calculation, the paragraph 11(1)(v) allowance in respect of the death benefit was $35,624.46. ... The executors equally have the right to apportion none of the $312,000 lump sum pension benefit to the lifetime annuity when, in fact: (i) 30% of such lump sum pension benefit were withheld and paid on account of income taxes; and (ii) the balance to pay Provincial Succession Duties and to obtain seizing of the Estate. + The lifetime annuity could only have come from the other assets of the Estate; not the pension fund, which was used for other purposes. ... I propose, therefore, to discuss the matter as though clause (B) were not in subparagraph (v)(i). + The word “property” acquires a special significance from its use in the Estate Tax Act. ...