Date: 20100721
Dockets: T-488-10
T-692-10
Citation: 2010 FC 774
Toronto,
Ontario, July 21, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Hughes
BETWEEN:
AIR
CANADA
Applicant
and
TORONTO PORT AUTHORITY
and PORTER
AIRLINES INC.
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
These
two applications have been brought by Air Canada and were heard
together on common evidence. Both deal with certain steps taken by the
Respondent Toronto Port Authority in respect of commercial airport operations
carried out at the Toronto Island Airport, now known
as Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport. The other Respondent
Porter Airlines Inc. is, at present, the only commercial passenger airline
operating out of that airport.
[2]
For
the reasons that follow, I find that the applications are dismissed.
I. The
Applications
1) T-488-10
[3]
This
application deals with what Air Canada characterizes as a decision made by
Toronto Port Authority dated December 24, 2009. On that day, TPA released a
bulletin entitled:
TPA announces capacity assessment results
for Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, begins accepting formal carrier
proposals
That bulletin read:
Third-party, IATA-accredited slot
coordinator will be appointed in early 2010 to manage carrier demand and slot
allocation process
Toronto – The Toronto Port Authority (“TPA”) today
confirmed that it has received a preliminary executive summary outlining the
results of an updated noise impact study and capacity assessment for the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (“BBTCA”). The findings of
the third-party study will now be refined to determine the number of daily
commercial flights and equipment mix that can be accommodated at the airport
during the coming years.
The comprehensive analysis evaluated all
key factors impacting airport operations, including:
▪ the 1983 Tripartite Agreement
▪ noise guidelines
▪ hours of operation
at the BBTCA and the impact of early morning and late evening flights on the
neighbouring community
▪ terminal, runway
and passenger ferry infrastructure limitations
▪ the availability
of parking and transportation options to and from Eireann Quay
▪ mix and types of
commercial, private and leisure aircraft
▪ helicopter and
MEDEVAC flights
“The Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport is
an attractive facility for passengers and carriers alike,” said Mark McQueen,
Chairman of the TPA Board of Directors, “But it has both a modest physical
footprint and is governed by the Tripartite Agreement, which serves to cap the
number of daily commercial flights that can operate from the BBTCA. Based upon
the informal requests we’ve received from commercial carriers, demand for new
slots far exceeds the supply available. This ‘slot controlled’ situation is no
different than other North American airports, such as Pearson, Vancouver, Newark Liberty, JFK, LaGuardia, or Washington Reagan. All major airlines
recognize that an airport can only award the slots that exist, even if that
won’t satisfy every carrier request – a circumstance that exists at most
slot-controlled airports.”
The third-party study considered current
BBTCA usage by leisure aircrafts and helicopters, in addition to the
approximate 2,500 life-saving MEDEVAC service operations per annum. The study
also considered that existing BBTCA commercial carrier operations will utilize
approximately 120 slots in the period leading up to April 2010, some of which
are designated as “Night Operations.” Night Operations are defined as services
operating between 6:45 – 7 a.m. and 10 – 11 pm. Under the existing Tripartite
Agreement, the BBTCA is closed to all non-emergency flights between 11 p.m. and
6:45 a.m.
“Now that we have the results in hand,
the Toronto Airport Authority will
initiate the next phase of the process,” said Geoff Wilson, President and CEO
of the TPA. “We will solicit formal business proposals for additional BBTCA
airline service, while ensuring that the process continues to remain open and
transparent.”
The next phase of the process will also
see the TPA appoint an independent, IATA-accredited slot co-ordinator to manage
commercial carrier demand at the BBTCA and allocate available slots. The
co-ordinator will act as a neutral party during commercial carrier negotiations
and be responsible for awarding slots based on internationally recognized
processes.
Based on the initial results of the study,
the TPA anticipates that once phase two of the new BBTCA terminal is fully
completed in the second half of 2010, between 42 and 92 additional commercial
slots will be available for award by the IATA-accredited slot coordinator for
utilization by incumbent and new commercial carriers under a number of
variables and scenarios. Further refinement to usage patterns by existing BBTCA
stakeholders is currently underway to determine the precise number of slots
that could be awarded among the incumbent and prospective new carriers. The TPA
expects updated data to be available in January 2010.
“Our objective is to increase and
diversify the number of destinations services by the airport,” added Wilson. “There are many attractive
short haul destinations that are still not served by the BBTCA and we are
anxious to continue improving choice and convenience for all travellers.”
The TPA will announce a process to
receive and consider proposals from prospective commercial carriers early in
the new year. All proposals will be expected to outline: i) proposed flight
destinations; ii) service frequency; iii) proposed equipment; iv) what
arrangements will specifically be made to handle a proponent’s passengers at
the BBTCA, and v) a commercial carrier’s long term commitment to BBTCA
passengers.
As is customary at many airports, all
commercial carriers providing service from the BBTCA will be required to enter
into a commercial carrier operating agreement (“CCOA”) with the TPA before they
can commence flight operations. Commercial carriers must also secure
appropriate terminal space from the City Centre Terminal Corp. – BBTCA’s
terminal operator – which has the exclusive right and contractual obligation to
provide all commercial carriers with access to its new facility once the
construction project is completed in 2010. To date, the TPA understands that no
commercial carriers have responded to the November 9, 2009 public call by City
Centre Terminal Corp. soliciting proposals to utilize the new BBTCA terminal.
“I encourage all prospective commercial
carriers with a desire to fly into the BBTCA in 2010 to take
advantage of the opportunity to utilize the new terminal,” said Wilson. “It is unclear how any
commercial carrier would expect to be granted slots through this process without
a clear plan as to how they intend to manage passenger traffic, security
screening and border clearance.”
With the rapid increase in monthly
traffic and the number of new carriers seeking access to the airport, the BBTCA
capacity study also identified the need for the TPA to make further capital
expenditures. In January 2009, the TPA Board moved to acquire a new, larger
ferry to accommodate the anticipated passenger growth that ultimately came to
pass in 2009.
“Despite the difficult recession, Porter’s
continued passenger growth, combined with new carrier proposals, means that our
task of modernizing the BBTCA is not yet complete,” continued
Mr. McQueen. “Over the near term we will be looking at what immediate
steps we need to take to ensure that passengers continue to enjoy the success
that has become the BBTCA.”
[4]
A
copy of this bulletin was sent to an official of Air Canada by an
official of TPA on December 24, 2009, under cover of a letter which stated, in
part:
Thank you for your letter dated December
23, 2009 and Mr. Rovinescu’s letter to Mr. Paul dated December 18, 2009.
Please refer to the attached Bulletin
which was released today and describes the progress on our assessment of
airport capacity as well as outlines the concepts for the process which will be
used to assess and allocate commercial scheduled service capacity.
It would be premature at this time to
comment on the information provided by you, as we are preparing a formal
process to receive and consider proposals from prospective commercial carriers
early in the new year.
With respect to terminal arrangements,
you will need to contact City Centre Terminal Corp.
[5]
Air
Canada, following
receipt of this letter and bulletin, filed the first of its two applications
for judicial review, T-488-10. The basis for the application was set out in the
Notice of Application as follows:
This is an application for judicial
review of the December 24, 2009 decision (the “Decision”) of the Toronto Port
Authority (the “TPA”) announcing a process (the “Proposed Process”) through
which it intends to award slots at the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (the
“Island Airport”) commencing in 2010. In the Decision, the TPA announced that
pursuant to the Proposed Process:
(a) it will appoint an
independent, IATA-accredited, slot coordinator to manage commercial carrier
demand and allocate slots at the Island Airport; and
(b) commercial carriers
will be required to make terminal arrangements exclusively with City Centre
Terminal Corp. (“CCTC”), a corporation related to or controlled by one or more
of the same individuals who are shareholders, directors or officers of Porter
Airlines Inc. (“Porter”), for terminal space at the Island Airport.
The relief requested was for:
(a) an Order setting
aside the Decision and the Proposed Process for the allocation of existing and
newly available additional slots as the Island Airport;
(b) an Order that the
TPA act within its jurisdiction pursuant to the Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1998,
c. 10 and in accordance
with the common law in its allocation of slots in (a) above;
(c) an Order enjoining
the TPA from taking any steps to implement the Proposed Process;
(d) costs of this
application; and
(e) such further and
other relief as to this Honourable Court seems just.
The balance of the Notice of Application
sets out recitals of fact and law of the type commonly found in a Statement of
Claim.
2) T-692-10
[6]
This
is the second of Air Canada’s two applications. It deals with what Air
Canada characterizes as a decision made by the Toronto Port Authority dated
April 9, 2010. On that day, TPA released a bulletin entitled:
Toronto Port Authority issues formal
Request for Proposals for additional carriers at Billy Bishop Toronto City
Airport
That bulletin read in part:
Appoints world’s largest independent
airport coordination organization to review formal business proposals and
oversee slot allocation for additional airline service
Toronto – The Toronto Port Authority
(“TPA”) today announced that a formal Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for additional
commercial airline carriers at the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport (“BBTCA”)
has been issued and is now available to interested, qualified proponents.
“As the BBTCA evolves into a world-class
city centre airport, it has been our stated objective to diversify the number
of destinations offered in an effort to meet the demands of our business and
leisure travellers,” said Geoff Wilson, President and CEO of the TPA.
“The issuance of the formal RFP is the next major phase of the transparent
process that we outlined in December. We’re excited about the opportunities and
additional airline services that this RFP will generate for the people of Toronto, which follows the parameters
stipulated by the Tripartite Agreement.”
Request for proposals for additional
carriers
To date, the TPA has received informal
expressions of interest from Air Canada (which the carrier has publicly
disclosed) and one U.S.-based commercial carrier. The TPA invites all qualified
industry parties interested in providing carrier services at the BBTCA to
participate in the RFP process.
“As the RFP contains
commercially-sensitive information, and given that related court proceedings
recently initiated against the TPA by Air Canada are ongoing, any party
interested in receiving the RFP must first enter into a standard commercial
non-disclosure agreement,” added Mr. Wilson. “We are committed to respecting
the confidentiality of all parties involved, and as such, the TPA will enter
into the same form of non-disclosure agreement with each interested party to
protect proprietary information contained in each new proposal.”
Comprehensive slot allocation process
To review the formal business proposals
received through the RFP process, the TPA also announced the appointment of
Airport Coordination Limited (“ACL”), an independent consultancy firm
specializing in demand and capacity assessment and scheduling process
management, to manage commercial carrier demand and allocate available slots
for the BBTCA.
. . .
As part of its responsibilities as an
independent slot coordinator for the BBTCA, ACL will implement a slot
allocation methodology that is similar to those used at other North American
airports such as Pearson, Vancouver, Newark Liberty, JFK, LaGuardia and Reagan.
Capacity assessment factors
The TPA also confirmed that it has
received the final results from the capacity assessment report for the BBTCA
conducted by a third-party consultant, Jacobs Consultancy, an US$11 billion
organization that is one of the world’s largest providers of technical
services. The study considered that existing BBTCA commercial carrier
operations will utilize approximately 112 slots in the period leading up to the
pending allocation of additional slots. After an extensive analysis that
evaluated the key factors affecting airport operations, Jacobs Consultancy
recommended that the maximum number of commercial slots available at the BBTCA
is 202 upon the completion of the new terminal.
According to the Jacobs Consultancy
analysis, which is based upon the 1983 Tripartite Agreement and obligations
contained in existing agreements with incumbents, approximately 90 additional
movements per day will be made available for allocation by ACL among the
existing commercial carrier and new carriers at the BBTCA upon the successful
completion of the new process. The recent acquisition of the Marylin Bell I, as
well as the completion of the new terminal facilities, makes possible the
increase in the number of slots available for allocation. Importantly, the 202
slot count is predicated upon the 1983 Tripartite Agreement and the necessary
NEF Contour analysis, as it governs facility usage and ambient noise. Under the
Tripartite Agreement, commercial and recreational flights are not permitted at
the BBTCA between 11 p.m. and 6:45 a.m.
The current and earlier NEF Contour
analyses heavily weigh Night Operations movements, which meaningfully and
artificially lowered slot counts in prior years. Under the NEF Contour formula,
a single operation between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. (defined as a Night Operation)
equates to approximately 16 Daytime Operation slots.
“We had a choice to make as an
organization: provide for 90 additional Daytime movements and zero Night
movements, or 10 Daytime movements and five Night movements,” added Mark McQueen,
Chairman of the TPA Board of Directors. As the two new airlines proponents have
requested more than 100 slots between them, we had no choice but to maximize
the number of slots available. We recognize that this approach did not produce
the number of slots sought, but we are governed by the airport’s limited
footprint and the Tripartite Agreement. The decision to prohibit additional
commercial Night Operations will uphold our curfew policy and minimize any
impact on the Waterfront community.”
Carbon offset efforts
To further mitigate the impact of the
BBTCA’s operations on the environment and its neighbouring communities, the TPA
will be acquiring carbon offsets in the near term.
. . .
[7]
A
copy of this bulletin was sent to an official of Air Canada by an
official of TPA on April 9, 2010, under cover of a letter which stated:
Further to our letter dated December 24,
2009, and your letter of inquiry dated January 13, 2010 we are attaching a
Bulletin which has been released today and announces the Request for Proposals
(“RFP”) process to consider additional carriers at the BBTCA.
As the RPF contains commercially
sensitive information, interested parties will need to first enter into a
standard commercial non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”). As the TPA is committed
to respecting your business confidentiality, we will also enter into the same
form of NDA.
As you have expressed interest in
providing service at the BBTCA, we are enclosing with this letter the Carrier
NDA for your perusal and execution. Once we have received your executed NDA, we
will forward the RFP and the TPA’s executed NDA.
We look forward to your participation in
this process.
[8]
On
May 4, 2010, Air Canada filed its second application for judicial
review, T-692-10, the basis for which is set out in its Notice of Application
as follows:
1. This is an application for
judicial review in respect of the April 9, 2010 decision (the “April
Decision”) of the Toronto Port Authority (the “TPA”) announcing a Request for
Proposals (the “RFP Process”) to allocate slots and otherwise grant access
to commercial carriers seeking access to the Billy Bishop Toronto City
Airport (the “Island Airport”).
2. The April Decision purports to
implement the TPA’s decision regarding a process (the “Proposed Process”)
for allocation of slots and access to the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport
(the “Island Airport”) announced on December 24, 2009 (the “December Decision”).
3. The Proposed Process is
described in the Applicant’s Notice of Application for judicial review of
the December Decision in the proceeding bearing Court File T-488-10 (the “December
Application”).
4. The April Decision of the TPA:
(a) takes steps to have
the TPA enter into a contractual relations to award flight slots and otherwise
grant access to the Island
Airport to commercial carriers participating in the RFP Process;
(b) enables commercial
carriers to enter into non-disclosure agreements for the purpose of concluding
a commercial carrier operating agreement (“CCOA”) with the TPA;
(c) appoints Airport
Coordination Limited (“ACL”) as an “independent slot coordinator” to manage
commercial carrier demand and allocate slots at the Island Airport;
(d) permits ACL to
implement a slot allocation similar to that used at “other North American
airports such as Pearson, Vancouver, Newark Liberty, JFK, LaGuardia and Reagan”;
(e) permits the TPA to
receive expressions of interest, including from a U.S.-based commercial
carrier, and invites parties to participate in the RFP process.
[9]
The
relief claimed by Air Canada in this second Notice of Application requested:
(a) an Order setting
aside the April Decision and the RFP Process for the allocation of existing and newly available
additional slots at the Island
Airport;
(b) an Order setting
aside any contractual arrangements that have been made pursuant to or arising
from the April Decision or the RFP Process including, inter alia, such
arrangements that allocate slots or otherwise grant access to the Island Airport;
(c) an Order that the
TPA act within its jurisdiction pursuant to the Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1998,
c. 10 and in accordance with the common law in its allocation of slots at the Island
Airport;
(d) an Order enjoining
the TPA from taking any further steps to implement the April Decision or the
RFP Process;
(e) costs of this
application; and
(f) such further and
other relief as to this Honourable Court seems just.
[10]
Unlike
the first Notice of Application which set out a Statement of Claim-like
narrative, this second Notice set out the grounds for the application briefly
as follows:
THE GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION ARE:
5. As part of the December
Application, counsel for the TPA made certain representations to the Court on
March 23-24, 2010 and at a case management conference on April 12, 2010 concerning
the implementation of the Proposed Process while the December Application was
pending. As a result, Air Canada seeks to ensure that the implementation of that Proposed judicial
review.
6. Air Canada, in the December
Application, sets out the grounds for its application to set aside and enjoin
the implementation of the December Decision.
7. The April Decision in effect
implements the Proposed Process outlined in the December Decision.
8. Air Canada repeats and relies on the
same grounds set out in the December Application in this notice of application
challenging the April Decision.
[11]
Although
the Respondent Toronto Port Authority was the “decision-maker” in the matters
raised in both applications, Porter also was named as a party Respondent and
participated fully in these proceedings.
3) At
the Hearing
[12]
In
oral argument at the hearing of these applications, Counsel for Air Canada, Mr. Finkelstein
re-stated the relief claimed by his client as being:
1. A declaration that
the process followed by the Toronto Port Authority was fatally flawed;
2. That the April 2010
Commercial Carrier Operating Agreement (2010 CCOA) between the Toronto Port
Authority, Porter and Porter Aviation Holdings Inc. be set aside;
3. That the process
for allocation of slots at Billy Bishop
Toronto City Airport be commenced again in
a “proper” fashion including consultations with Air Canada.
II. The
Parties, BBTCA, Slots and IATA
[13]
The
Applicant, Air Canada, is Canada’s largest domestic and
international airline. It has corporate affiliation of one kind or another with
Jazz Air and earlier, Air Ontario which are and were smaller regional airlines
operating in Canada and to some
extent internationally. Air Canada presently serves the greater Toronto area
from facilities located at Pearson International Airport. The
Respondent Porter Airlines Inc. does not have facilities at Pearson.
[14]
The
Respondent Toronto Port Authority (TPA) describes itself this way in bulletins
that it has published, such as the bulletin of April 9, 2010:
The Toronto Port Authority was
incorporated on June 8, 1999 as a government business enterprise under the Canada Marine Act as the successor
to the Toronto
Harbour
Commissioners. It is a federal public authority providing transportation,
distribution, storage and container services to businesses. The TPA owns and
operates the Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, Marine Terminals 51 and 52,
and the Outer Harbour Marina. The TPA also
provides regulatory controls and public works services to enhance the safety
and efficiency of marine navigation and aviation in the port and harbour of Toronto.
[15]
The
Respondent Porter Airlines Inc. (Porter) is a commercial airline based at Billy
Bishop Toronto City Airport (BBTCA). It came into existence through predecessors
including those described as Regional Holdings (Regco) beginning in about 2002.
Porter has a number of affiliated entities including Porter Aviation Holdings
Inc., City Centre Terminal Corp. and others all dealing in one way or another
with operations of that airline and at that airport. The Respondent Porter
began commercial airline operations in about 2006 with two aircraft and limited
regional routes, and now has several more aircraft operating routes to many
places in Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes and the United States.
[16]
Not
a party, but central to these proceedings, is the airport located at the west
end of Toronto Island proximate the downtown core of the City of Toronto. Access is
provided by a ferry operating in what is known as the Western Gap. The airport
has operated under a number of names including Toronto Island Airport, Toronto City Centre Airport and Billy
Bishop Toronto City Airport (BBTCA). The land is owned by the City of Toronto and leased
to the Respondent Toronto Port Authority. Over the years, this airport has
served various functions, including providing facilities for medical emergency
aircraft and for “general aviation” (GA), which is a term indicating small
private and charter aircraft. Commercial passenger airline activities have from
time to time been carried out using this airport by City Express (now defunct),
Air Ontario, Jazz Air
and, more recently, Porter.
[17]
Another
term that must be discussed at the beginning is “slot”. Sometimes the word
“movement” is used instead. In commercial aviation terms a “slot” is used to
designate the provision for the taking off or landing of an aircraft - each is
a “slot”. In the context of these proceedings, there are “quiet time” slots
which are those occurring between 6:45 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.
and 11:00 p.m. Also used is the term “peak time” slots which indicates
those slots assigned at times when passenger traffic is greatest, such as
business travel in the early morning and late afternoon.
[18]
IATA
is the acronym for the International Air Transport Association, founded in
1945. It is an association comprised of airlines which represent over ninety
(90%) percent of the world’s scheduled international air traffic. Air Canada is a member,
Porter is not. No airport is a member; however, several airports can achieve a
status with IATA called “airport advisor”. BBTCA is not an airport advisor.
IATA publishes guidelines which are not mandatory but may be adopted for use by
airports for, among other things, slot management. Some airports, such as
Pearson, have adopted these guidelines. Other airports follow them to some
degree. Among these guidelines are those respecting slot management, wherein airports
are designated as Level l, Level 2 or Level 3. Level 1 essentially means that
slots are managed on a co-operative basis; Level 3 means that demand for slots
exceeds supply, and a slot co-ordinator has been appointed to manage slots and
impose the determinations made on the users. Moving up the levels usually involves
some consultation between the users, and on occasion those hoping to be users,
of the airport.
III. The
Evidence
[19]
All of the
parties filed evidence in these proceedings. Since the proceedings were taken
by way of applications, no live witnesses appeared before the Court. No party
raised any serious issue as to the credibility of any witness, nor does the
Court make any finding in that regard. All witnesses are considered to be
credible. Each party submitted expert evidence. Porter took objection to some
of Air Canada’s evidence, which I will note
below.
[20]
Orders
were issued in each of these applications to the effect that some of the
evidence filed would be sealed and remain confidential unless and until a
further Order of the Court was made in that respect. The hearings were held in
open Court.
[21]
In
particular, filed in evidence was:
A) For
the Applicant Air Canada
1. Affidavits
of Leslie Allan Lupo, sworn February 3, 2010 and May 14, 2010
together with exhibits as identified therein (Applicant’s Record, pp. 79-564).
He was cross-examined on June 9, 2010, and certain exhibits identified at
that time (Applicant’s Record, pp. 2757-2793). Lupo is Senior Legal Counsel at
the International Air Transport Association (IATA). It is unclear whether he is
giving evidence only as to the practices followed by IATA or going beyond that
to speak to expertise on “international standards.” To the extent that his
evidence goes beyond that of IATA I will give it little weight as his expertise
beyond IATA was not established.
2. Affidavits
of Gustavo Baumberger sworn February 5, 2010 and May 18, 2010 together
with exhibits as identified (Applicant’s Record, pp. 565-822). He was
cross-examined on June 15, 2010, and an exhibit identified at that time
(Applicant’s Record, pp. 2906-2961). Baumberger is Senior Vice-President of
Compass Lexicon, a consulting firm that specializes in the application of
economics to legal and regulatory issues. No objection was taken as to his
expertise.
3. Affidavits
of Marcel Forget sworn February 8, 2010, May 19, 2010 and June 7,
2010 together with exhibits as identified (Applicant’s Record, pp. 823-1235).
He was cross-examined on June 14, 2010, and an exhibit was identified at
that time (Applicant’s Record, pp. 2794-2905). A written response to an
undertaking was subsequently provided (Applicant’s Record, pp. 2962-2969).
Forget is Vice President of Network Planning of Air Canada. He was presented as a fact
witness. Porter’s Counsel raised concerns that some of Forget’s evidence did
not come from first-hand knowledge or was essentially argument of Counsel. I
will give this part of his evidence little weight.
4. Affidavit
of Alain Boudreau sworn February 8, 2010 together with exhibits as
identified (Applicant’s Record, pp. 1236-1389). He was cross-examined on June
7, 2010, and exhibits were identified at that time (Applicant’s Record, pp.
2521-2682). A written response to an undertaking was produced (Applicant’s
Record, pp. 2962-2969). Boudreau is Senior Director Air Canada Jetz and
Specialty Products for Air Canada. He was presented as a fact
witness. Porter’s Counsel raises an objection that some of Boudreau’s evidence
does not arise from first-hand knowledge. I will give this part of his evidence
little weight.
5. Affidavits
of Elize LeGraw, sworn March 26, 2010 and April 30, 2010 together with exhibits
as identified (Applicant’s Record, pp. 1390-1394 and 2486-2520). There was
no cross-examination. LeGraw is a law clerk in the office of the Applicant’s
solicitors. Her affidavits serve to provide certain documents.
6. Affidavit
of Janet Jones sworn May 19, 2010 together with exhibits as identified
(Applicant’s Record, pp. 1395-2312). There was no cross-examination. Jones
is a law clerk in the office of the Applicant’s solicitors. Her affidavit
serves to provide certain documents.
B) For the Respondent TPA
1. Certain
documents provided in response to the Applicant’s request under Rule 318
(Applicant’s Record, pp. 2314-2485).
2. Affidavit
of Alan J. Paul sworn April 26, 2010 together with exhibits as
identified (TPA’s Record, pp. 1-1423). He was cross-examined on June 8, 2010,
and an exhibit identified at that time (Applicant’s Record, pp. 2970-3135). A
written answer to undertakings was provided (Applicant’s Record, pp.
3233-3325). Paul is Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of the Toronto
Port Authority (TPA). He was presented as a fact witness.
3. Affidavit
of Dr. Michael Tretheway sworn April 29, 2010 together with exhibits as
identified (TPA’s Record, pp. 1424-1648). He was cross-examined on May 28, 2010,
and an exhibit identified at that time (Applicant’s Record, pp. 3326-3369). Tretheway
is Executive Vice-President and Chief Economical of InterVISTAS Consulting
Inc. with expertise in transportation economics. His evidence was presented as
that of an expert. No challenge was made as to his expertise.
4. Affidavits
of Geoffrey Wilson sworn April 30, 2010 and May 27, 2010 together with
exhibits as identified (TPA’s Record, pp. 1649-2013). Wilson was cross-examined on June 11, 2010 and
a written answer provided as to certain undertakings (Applicant’s Record, pp.
3136-3325). Wilson is the President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Toronto Port Authority (TPA). He is the successor to
the witness Paul. He was presented as a fact witness.
C) For the Respondent Porter
1. Affidavits
of Michael Deluce sworn April 29, 2010 and May 26, 2010, together with exhibits
as identified (Porter’s Record, pp. 1-1313). He was cross-examined on June 4,
2010, and an exhibit identified, subject to objection, at that time
(Applicant’s Record, pp. 3370-3468). A written answer to undertakings was
provided (Porter’s Record, p. 1359). Deluce is the Executive
Vice-President and Chief Commercial Officer of the Respondent Porter
Airlines Inc. (Porter) and several of its affiliate companies. He was presented
as a fact witness.
2. Affidavits
of Roger Ware sworn April 29, 2010 and June 2, 2010, together with
exhibits, as identified (Porter’s Record, pp. 1315-1356). He was cross-examined
on June 4, 2010, and an exhibit identified at that time (Applicant’s Record,
pp. 3370-3502). Ware is a PhD Professor of Economics at Queen’s University; his
expertise focuses on Industrial Organization, including antitrust economics and
competition policy and strategic behaviour. He was retained to critique
certain of the expert evidence submitted by the Applicant. His evidence
was submitted as expert evidence. No objection was taken as to his
expertise.
IV. The
Issues
[22]
Air
Canada states the
issues in its Factum simply as:
1. Are
the Decisions subject to judicial review?
2. Are
the Decisions invalid?
[23]
Toronto
Port Authority set out the matters that it submitted were at issue more fully
in its Factum:
(a) whether Air Canada may rely upon the grounds of
denial of procedural fairness and “formal and substantive
unreasonableness”, and breaches of statutes, none of which were enunciated in
the Notices of Applications for Judicial Review;
(b) whether Air Canada can properly pursue these
judicial review applications, given that it is not “directly affected”, the
Court’s discretion in respect of such matters, and its past history of
re-litigating the same or similar claims;
(c) whether the TPA, in
respect of its actions complained of in these applications, is a federal board,
commission or other tribunal, subject to judicial review;
(d) whether, if the
TPA’s actions complained of are subject to judicial review, it was under a duty
to consult Air Canada;
(e) whether the
Bulletin of December 24, 2009, and the announcement therein with respect to the
future process of slot allocation, is an order or matter capable of being
judicially reviewed;
(f) whether Air Canada is out of time to judicially
review the decision to allocate “grandfathered” slots to Porter;
(g) whether the TPA’s
actions complained of may be reviewed on the basis off “formal and substantive
unreasonableness”; and
(h) whether the
decisions at issue were made for an irrelevant or improper purpose.
[24]
Porter
put the issues more simply in its Factum:
(a) Can Air Canada properly pursue these
judicial review applications?
(b) Has the TPA
breached any duty of fairness it may have owed?
(c) Are the impugned
“decisions” of the TPA reasonable?
(d) Has the TPA acted
with an improper purpose?
[25]
Some
issues were not pursued, others restated or merged, and new issues arose during
the course of oral argument. As matters have evolved, at the end of the
hearing, the following issues emerged as those that I must address:
1. In
respect of the “decisions” at issue, was the Toronto Port Authority acting as a
“federal board, commission or other tribunal” so as to be subject to judicial
review of those decisions in this Court?
2. Is
Air Canada a “person
interested” who has standing to seek judicial review of those “decisions” in
this Court?
3. Were
the “decisions” of December 24, 2009 and April 9, 2010 of a kind that can be
the subject of judicial review in this Court?
4. Has
Air Canada properly
pleaded some of the grounds that it now urges in seeking judicial review?
5. Was
there an obligation upon the Toronto Port Authority to consult with Air Canada before
making the “decisions” of December 24, 2009 and April 9, 2010?
6. Were
the “decisions” both “formally” and “substantively” reasonable?
7. Did
the TPA have any obligation to provide “reasons” for its decisions, and
if reasons were provided were they adequate?
8. Were
the “decisions” made for an improper purpose?
V. Chronology
of Events
[26]
The
history of events involving the Toronto Island Airport, the
City of Toronto, the parties
to the proceedings, their predecessors and affiliates and others is lengthy and
complex. It would be impractical to set out every event in detail. I will
enumerate some of them in more or less chronological order:
1. The
Toronto Island Airport (which I will sometimes refer to as BBTCA) was built in
the early 1930s on land located on the west end of Toronto Island. This land
was, and continues throughout to be, owned by the City of Toronto. Ferry
service accessing BBTCA from the mainland commenced in 1964.
2. On
June 30, 1983, an agreement was entered into between the City of Toronto, the
Toronto Harbour Commissioners (predecessors of the Respondent Toronto Port
Authority) and the Minister of Transport respecting the Toronto Island Airport. That agreement
is usually referred to as the Tripartite Agreement. That agreement granted to
the Toronto Harbour Commissioners ( predecessor of the Toronto Port Authority)
a 50-year lease for the Island Airport and related facilities
subject to a number of terms and conditions such as the payment of rent. Among
other things, the lessee (Toronto Harbour Commissioners) was obliged to
regulate the overall frequency of aircraft movement so as to respect certain
noise restrictions. If the lessee defaulted and the default was not cured in a
timely way, the Minister of Transport was entitled to step in and run the airport,
failing which the airport would revert to the City of Toronto.
3. In
the 1980s, commercial airline service from BBTCA was established and operating
as a thriving service by an entity known as City Express. That entity was not
affiliated with or related to any of the parties to these proceedings. Service
was established linking BBTCA, Ottawa, Montreal, Newark and
elsewhere.
4. In
1991 City Express ceased its operations.
5. In
about 1990, Air Ontario, an Air Canada subsidiary, had commenced
operations from BBTCA. That entity and another Air Canada affiliate, Jazz
continued operations at BBTCA until 2006 when all operations by those entities
ceased. Initially, these operations were thriving, serving various destinations
from BBTCA; however, over the years the number of locations served, the
frequency of flights and care and attention paid to the facilities
diminished considerably.
6. On
June 11, 1998, Royal Assent was given to the Canada Marine Act, S.C.
1998, c. 10. That Act repealed earlier legislation respecting
navigation and shipping including the Toronto Harbour Commissioners’
Act 1985,
33-34-35 Eliz II, c. 10. The Canada Marine Act, S.C. 1986, c. 10, made
provision for Letters Patent to be issued to establish a port authority
(section 8) which Letters were not to be considered to be regulations but would
be published in the Canada Gazette (sub-section 8(3)).
7. On
June 8, 1999, Letters Patent became effective establishing the Toronto Port
Authority and setting out certain activities to be carried out by that
authority. Those Letters were published in the Canada Gazette, Part 1,
June 5, 1999. Section 7.2(j) authorized the TPA to operate the BBTCA in
accordance with the Tripartite Agreement. As of June 1999, Air Canada’s affiliate
airlines were the only commercial airlines operating out of that airport.
8. The
BBTCA was operating at a loss while the Air Canada affiliates were operating
there. By 2002, those operations had diminished considerably. The TPA had
continuing discussions with Jazz requesting that it commit to operations at the
airport. In the meantime, the TPA also commenced discussions with Porter’s
predecessors as to Porter establishing airline services from BBTCA and revitalizing
services and facilities there.
9. On
July 18, 2002, the Competition Bureau wrote a letter to the TPA with a copy to
Transport Canada respecting proposals made by RAH (a Porter predecessor) to the
TPA as to commencing a new regional airline service from BBTCA (then referred
to as TCCA). That letter stated that the Bureau understood that RAH intended to
ramp up operations significantly over a four-year period and was, among other
things, seeking an exclusive right to 143 of the 167 slots available. That
letter stated, in part:
In relation to the RAH
proposal, I would like to make three points.
First, Lester B. Pearson International Airport (“Pearson”) and TCCA are
close substitutes for one another for City of Toronto originating passengers with the same
destinations. TCAA
[sic] is not a market onto itself. The fact that one carrier may
dominate services on a particular service such as Toronto-Ottawa from TCAA [sic]
is only part of the competitive analysis. One would have to consider the
competition that would exist from carriers operating out of Pearson. For
passengers in the Greater Toronto Area and surrounding areas, other airports such as Hamilton
and Buttonville would also be relevant as they fall within the catchment area
of Pearson. AC dominates services out of the Pearson, and Pearson is by
far the major airport serving the City of Toronto and surrounding areas. Consequently,
even if a carrier other than AC were to provide the majority of services out of
TCAA [sic],
this carrier is unlikely to dominate any city pair service that is also
available from Pearson.
Second, as a general rule,
exclusivity under the Competition Act is only problematic where it would lead
to a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. Given the existing
dominance of AC, exclusivity of slots at TCAA [sic] to another carrier is
unlikely to meet this requirement.
Third, as a matter of
competition policy, exclusivity and the other restrictions contained in
the RAH proposal may not be desirable or necessary to encourage new
competition. The real concern of RAH is that AC will engage in predatory
behaviour by dramatically increasing capacity in the short term in order
to eliminate RAH. It is our view that these concerns could be addressed by
capping AC at its current slot usage or allocation for a sufficient period of
time to see if RAH can execute its business plan. We understand that AC was
using 24 of its 44 allocated slots up to the time of the public announcement of
RAH and then moved to using 38 slots in May of this year. It would appear,
therefore, that AC already has responded to some degree to the potential threat
of new entry at TCAA [sic]
by increasing service.
Given this fact, combined with
its existing dominance at Pearson, a cap on AC at 38 or 44 slots could be
justified as an interim measure to see if RAH or other new entrants could be
found to offer service out of TCAA [sic]. We do not think that
route exclusivity or change of gauge restrictions are necessary to address the
concerns noted above. If the Toronto Port Authority wants to grant RAH
exclusivity on all of the slots not used by AC, then we suggest that specific
milestones be put in place in order to encourage RAH to implement its business
plan in a timely manner.
10. On
September 6, 2002, the TPA and RAH enter into a memorandum of understanding
respecting establishment of an RAH airline service at the airport. A press
release to that effect was issued on October 4, 2002.
11. The
Competition Bureau sent a letter to RAH (Regco) dated February 10, 2003, providing
a competition assessment as to the proposals set out in the memorandum of understanding.
That letter stated, among other things:
The Proposed Agreement
We understand that Regional
Airlines Holdings Inc. (“Regco”) and the Toronto Port Authority (“TPA”) entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on September 6, 2002. The following is our
understanding of the relevant facts related to the MOU:
• All restriction
identified in the MOU are limited in time for a total period of 30 months
following completion of Period 2 as outlined in Schedule A of the MOU and defined
as the date of completion of the bridge linking the Toronto City Centre
Island and the main land (“the Bridge”). Our understanding is that the
present target date for completion of the Bridge is May 2004.
• TPA shall grant to Regco
an irrevocable option exercisable on or before February 28, 2003 to acquire
from the TPA the exclusive right to utilize 115 large turbo prop daily movement
slots (as that term is defined in Schedule A of the MOU) at the TCCA on a “take
or pay” basis.
• Regco shall commence
operating a regional airline based at the Toronto City Centre Airport (“TCCA”) upon completion of the Bridge.
• TPA shall only make
available to Air Canada and Air Canada Associates (as defined in the MOU)
between 22 and 32 large turbo prop movement slots.
• TPA shall only lease to
Air Canada or Air Canada Associates
space in the new terminal if Air Canada or Air Canada Associates cannot renew their existing
leases at their current location.
• TPA shall limit Air
Canada and Air Canada Associates to destinations
currently served by them collectively from the TCCA.
• TPA shall hold in
reserve 20 to 30 large turbo-prop slots. TPA shall not make available or
allocate to any other carrier any of the 20-30 movement slots held in reserve
to Air Canada and Air Canada Associates, or any other carrier to enable such
carrier(s) to provide service to or from the same destination as Regco.
• In the event that before
the expiration of the roll-out period, either the TPA increases the movement
slots available for large turbo-prop aircraft at the TCCA beyond 167, or any of
the 22-32 large turbo-prop slots allocated or to be allocated to Air Canada or
Air Canada Associates become available, TPA shall not grant such additional
slots to any party without first offering such movement slots to Regco.
• The slots allocated for
use by small turbo-prop aircrafts are not restricted for routes not served by
Regco.
• The Agreement does not
appear to affect the TPA’s ability to respond to demands of cross-border
carriers.
. . .
Competition Assessment
This matter was
reviewed under sections 75, 77 and 79 of the Competition Act.
Relevant Product Market
The starting point in
assessing Regco’s request is to define the relevant market (product and
geographic market) and consider the prima facie evidence provided by market
shares, and any other factors that might be relevant for interpreting the Act.
It is our view that
the relevant product market affected by the MOU is the provision of airline
services.
In terms of the geographic
dimension of the market, our view is that the relevant geographic market
encompasses the provision of airline services to and from the Greater Toronto Area. In this regard, we
consider that TCCA and Pearson draw passengers from the same catchment area and
that services from these two airports compete with one another.
We understand that
each airport has certain locational and other advantages that are not available
at the other airport. For example, because of the large scale and scope of
Pearson’s facilities, it can handle connecting traffic while TCAA [sic] is essentially
serving point-to-point passengers. However, it would appear from the evidence
that we have reviewed that either air carrier can provide a competitive service
for passengers travelling to or from the Toronto area, including passengers located close
to the downtown core.
This was the case in
the 1980’s when City Express competed with Air Canada on a number of routes offered at both
TCCA and Pearson and we do not see any reason why the situation would be
different in today’s environment. We also note the survey evidence that has
been done which shows that even with limited frequency and no significant price
differences between the service available at Pearson and at TCAA [sic], some passengers
continue to use air services offered from both airports. It would appear
to us very unlikely that even a monopolist carrier at TCAA [sic]
could exercise market power given the competing alternatives of flying to
Pearson and possibly other airports (Hamilton and Buttonville) in the region.
In light of the proximity of the two airports and the evidence of substitution
and competitive interaction from previous periods, it is our conclusion that
air services offered from either Pearson or TCCA are part of the same
geographic market.
Given this definition
of the relevant market, it is clear that Regco will not be dominant in terms of
airline services.
Sections 77 & 79
These sections apply
to dominant companies exploiting their market power in a way that substantially
lessens or prevents competition in the marketplace. Exclusive contracts when
they are entered into by dominant firms or are widespread in the market have
the potential to impede entry of new competitors. For this to be a concern under
the Competition Act, it would be necessary to show that Regco is a major
supplier under section 77 or to show dominance under section 79. Given the
definition of the relevant market, this is not the case. It would also have to
be shown that the exclusive contract was having the effect of preventing or
lessening competition substantially in the market. Given the existing dominance
of Air Canada, limited exclusivity of slots
at TCCA to a new entrant carrier is unlikely to meet this requirement.
Section 75
One of the elements of
the refusal to supply provision that would need to be satisfied in this case is
whether a person would be substantially affected or precluded from carrying on
business as a result of an inability to obtain slots. The Bureau has noted
that the TCCA will make available to Air Canada between 22 to 32 slots. We also
note that for many years, Air Canada has only utilized a limited number of slots at the
TCCA. In addition, based on the number of slots available to Air Canada and to
other carriers at Pearson, it would be difficult to argue that Air Canada or
another carrier has been substantially affected or precluded from carrying on business,
as a result of the arrangements set out in the MOU.
Conclusion
In light of the above,
it is our opinion that the proposal as set out in the MOU would not contravene
the provisions of sections 75, 77 and 79 of the Act, and that the Commissioner
would not have grounds for causing an inquiry to be made pursuant to paragraph
10(1)(b) of the Act.
This opinion is
predicated on the assumption that the facts are accurate and that no material
facts have been omitted or misrepresented in your submission. Finally, this
opinion will continue to be valid so long as the material facts on which it was
based remain unchanged and the conduct or practice is carried out as proposed.
This opinion will also continue to be valid unless there is an amendment of the
provisions of the legislation upon which it is based. Should you be uncertain
as to the impact of any amendment on the opinion you have received, you should
seek legal advice or re-contact the Competition Bureau. Of course, should there
be a change in the material facts in the future, our opinion would need to be
revisited.
12. Jazz
operations at BBTCA diminished. Its lease expired in November 2004 and Jazz
continued to operate on a month-to-month basis. By the end of 2005, Jazz had
ceased its shuttle bus services and was using only about six (6) slots daily at
BBTCA.
13. In
February 2006, the Commercial Carrier Operating Agreement (CCOA), under which
Jazz had been operating at BBTCA, came to the end of its term. TPA proposed a
new CCOA to Jazz but it was never signed. Porter announced the launch of its
airline service from BBTCA. Air Canada announced plans to reinstate
its service, and meanwhile commenced an action in the Ontario Superior Court
against TPA claiming extensive damages. This action has since been
discontinued. The Jazz month to month lease ended.
14. In
March 2006, Jazz filed an application for judicial review in the Federal Court,
T-431-06. This application was converted into an action. A second application
was filed by Jazz on August 8, 2006, T-1427-06. Both proceedings have since
been abandoned.
15. On
May 3, 2005, TPA and Porter (Regco and TCCA) entered into a Commercial Carrier
Agreement (the 2005 CCOA). That agreement stipulated that it was subject to the
Canada Marine Act and the Tripartite Agreement. It provided for an
initial “roll out” period during which Porter would receive a guaranteed number
of slots, following which Porter would continue to be entitled to those slots
on a “use it or lose it” basis. Porter was also entitled to “participate on a
fair basis” in respect of any additional slots as may become available from
time to time.
16. In
July 2006, Air Canada announced resumption of its services from BBTCA
and accepted bookings. Such services were never resumed and the bookings were
cancelled. In August 2006, the Competition Bureau announced that while it had
concerns as to Air Canada’s activities, they had been resolved by Air Canada’s undertaking
to stop such advertising and booking.
17. On
October 23, 2006, Porter launched its service from BBTCA with two aircraft
flying to Ottawa. Since that
time, Porter has acquired several more aircraft and now services many more
destinations in Canada and in the United States. By 2008, the BBTCA
had become a profitable. No profit was ever made during the period that any of
City Express, Air Ontario or Jazz were operating from that airport.
18. In
2008, Jacobs Consultancy, a firm having expertise in airport capacity and slot
movement, was retained by TPA to provide advice and report on capacity at BBTCA
having regard to noise limitations imposed by the Tripartite Agreement and
other constraints. A report was made in 2008 which resulted among other things
in the purchase of a new ferry in 2009 to service the airport.
19. On
September 28, 2009, Air Canada wrote to TPA expressing an interest in
commencing service from BBTCA early in 2010. This was the first request since
February 2006 made by Air Canada or its affiliates for slots.
20. On
October 16, 2009, TPA released a public bulletin stating that it had received enquiries
from interested parties in participating in expanded services to be offered at
BBTCA. TPA indicated that it was in the process of receiving advice as to
capacity having regard to noise restrictions imposed by the Tripartite
Agreement.
21. On
October 22, 2009, officials from TPA and Air Canada met to
discuss Air Canada’s wish to
participate in the expanded facilities at BBTCA. Air Canada was unclear
as to the type of aircraft to be used or whether it or Jazz would be the
proposed participant. Air Canada expressed an interest in 60 slots. TPA
invited Air Canada to participate once further advice had been
received respecting the allocation process.
22. In
October 2009, TPA met with Transport Canada, who recommended that
TPA contact a slot co-ordinator at Pearson airport. It is not clear when that
person was contacted or what was discussed. It appears that the person is a Mr.
Smith, an employee of Air Canada. There is no document recording these
discussions.
23. In
November 2009 a Porter affiliate CCTC, which was building new terminal
facilities at BBTCA, announced that it would receive enquiries from others as
to participating in the use of such facilities.
24. Air
Canada
representatives met with TPA officials December 17, 2009. On December 18, 2009,
Air Canada wrote a
letter to TPA requesting that it be assigned seventy-four (74) slots.
25. In
December 2009, Jacobs Consultancy provided a draft report to TPA respecting
availability of a number of additional slots at BBTCA having regard to noise
and other constraints such as the ferry, ferry terminal, parking and other
matters. Among the proposals made was that TPA consider the appointment of a
slot co-ordinator to manage the allocation of available slots at BBTCA.
26. On
December 24, 2009, TPA released the bulletin with a copy to Air Canada which is the
subject of the first judicial review herein, T-488-10. The substance of this
bulletin has been set out in detail earlier in these reasons.
27. In
January 2010 Jacobs Consultancy provided its finalized report to TPA; it is not
identical in wording to the draft of December 2009. The recommendation that a
slot coordinator be appointed remained.
28. January
7, 2010, Air Canada met with TPA to discuss Porter’s existing slots, additional
slots and facilities as the Island Airport.
29. January
21, 2010, Air Canada contacted
CCTC to inquire about space in the new terminal. CCTC responds January 25,
2010, inviting formal discussion. The parties met February 5, 2010.
30. In
February 2010, TPA spoke to a person at London City Airport, London, England; an airport
that for years had dealt with slot problems with the assistance of a company
called Airport Coordination Limited (ACL). ACL was subsequently retained to
assist TPA with slot co-ordination. ACL was IATA accredited.
31. On
March 22, 2010, ACL provided a report to TPA making a number of recommendations
as to the management of slots at BBTCA.
32. April
9, 2010, TPA released the bulletin that is the subject of the second
application for judicial review, T-692-10. That bulletin invited formal
proposals from persons interested in acquiring slots at BBTCA. The details
have been set out earlier.
33. On
the same day, April 9, 2010, Porter and the TPA entered into a new CCOA – the
2010 CCOA. Air Canada was unaware of this event at the time.
34. April
20, 2010, the Commercial Carrier Operating Agreement of 2005 (2005 CCOA)
between Porter and TPA expired.
35. May
4, 2010, the second application for judicial review, T-692-10, was filed by Air
Canada.
36. Air
Canada responded to
TPA’s request for proposals on May 14, 2010 stating, inter alia, that it
accepts TPA’s mandate, objectives and guiding principles as identified in
section 1.2 of TPA’s request for proposals. Section 1.2 is too lengthy to
repeat in full, but among other things, states that a slot co-ordinator has
been appointed (ACL) to:
“…allocate slots to carriers in
accordance with TPA’s slot allocation methodology and scheduling guidelines.”
.
[27]
I
have not endeavoured to set out all the events, nor set out in detail what was
discussed or written, as the case may be. I have endeavoured to highlight major
events.
VI. Position of the
Parties
[28]
These
applications were well presented and argued by all Counsel. I thank them for
their courtesy and professionalism throughout. All Counsel argued forcefully
and well on behalf of their respective clients. As a result, many different
points have been raised for resolution. First, however, I will present an
overview of the position of each party.
[29]
Air
Canada is the Applicant.
It wants the TPA to undo its slot allocation process and start from scratch, in
consultation with Air Canada. It wants the 2010 Commercial Carrier Operating
Agreement, as signed with Porter, set aside, and that those parties, in the
meantime, abide by the terms of the 2005 CCOA. Air Canada is aware of the fact
that it is not well liked by Porter and possibly the TPA; however, its Counsel
argues that the applications are not about Air Canada, they are
about the TPA and the decisions that it has made. It is about what Air Canada
characterizes as the TPA’s failure to follow due process in allowing full participation
by everyone, not just TPA’s favourite partner, Porter, in the “licensing” of
slots at the airport. Air Canada’s Counsel argues that the TPA is acting as
a federal board, commission or other tribunal in this capacity, and is in that
capacity subject to the judicial review process of this Court.
[30]
TPA
argues that it is in respect of its operations at BBTCA acting as a commercial
entity, and is not subject to judicial review by this Court in that regard. It
argues that the “decisions” under review are not “decisions”, but announcements
and a request for proposals, and that Air Canada is not a “person interested”
therefore lacks standing to seek judicial review. TPA argues that it has
frequently consulted with Air Canada concerning the airport. TPA should be free
to make the normal business decisions that any ordinary business corporate
entity would make with interference by way of judicial review.
[31]
Porter
argues that it is the real target of Air Canada’s legal
activities. It argues that Air Canada and its affiliates left the island
airport to deteriorate, preferring to operate from Pearson airport; and only
when Porter, who was assuming all the risk, made the island airport viable, did
Air Canada wish to
muscle its way back in by whatever means. Air Canada should not
complain about Porter’s dominance at BBTCA, since Air Canada is the dominant
airline at Pearson and most other commercial airports in Canada.
[32]
What
the Court must keep in mind is that what is before it are two discrete applications
respecting certain “decisions” made by the TPA and processes followed by it
respecting those “decisions”. In order to deal with those discrete matters, the
Court must address a number of issues raised by the parties.
VII Issue #1: Is
the Toronto Port Authority a
“federal board, commission or other tribunal” so as to be subject to judicial
review?
[33]
Sections
18 and 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7 give the Federal
Court jurisdiction to issue an injunction and other forms of prerogative relief
and to judicially review and provide remedies in respect of a decision or order
of a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”.
[34]
The
Toronto Port Authority (TPA) was continued as a successor to the Toronto
Harbour Commissioners under the provisions of the Canada Marine Act, and
in particular, subsection 12(1) and Part I of the Schedule of that Act.
Letters Patent were issued to the TPA effective June 8, 1999. The purpose of
the Canada Marine Act is set out in section 4, subsections (a) to (h):
4. In recognition of the
significance of marine transportation to Canada and its contribution to the
Canadian economy, the purpose of this Act is to
(a) implement marine
policies that provide Canada with the marine infrastructure that it needs and
that offer effective support for the achievement of national, regional and
local social and economic objectives and will promote and safeguard Canada’s
competitiveness and trade objectives;
(a.1) promote the success
of ports for the purpose of contributing to the competitiveness, growth and
prosperity of the Canadian economy;
(b) base the marine
infrastructure and services on international practices and approaches that
are consistent with those of Canada’s major trading partners
in order to foster harmonization of standards among jurisdictions;
(c) ensure that marine
transportation services are organized to satisfy the needs of users and are
available at a reasonable cost to the users;
(d) provide for a high
level of safety and environmental protection;
(e) provide a high degree
of autonomy for local or regional management of components of the system of
services and facilities and be responsive to local needs and priorities;
(f) manage the marine
infrastructure and services in a commercial manner that encourages, and takes
into account, input from users and the community in which a port or harbour
is located;
(g) provide for the
disposition, by transfer or otherwise, of certain ports and port facilities;
and
(h) promote coordination
and integration of marine activities with surface and air transportation
systems.
|
4. Compte tenu de l’importance
du transport maritime au Canada et de sa contribution à l’économie
canadienne, la présente loi a pour objet de :
a) mettre en oeuvre
une politique maritime qui permette au Canada de se doter de l’infrastructure
maritime dont il a besoin, qui le soutienne efficacement dans la réalisation
de ses objectifs socioéconomiques nationaux, régionaux et locaux aussi bien
que commerciaux, et l’aide à promouvoir et préserver sa compétitivité;
a.1) promouvoir la
vitalité des ports dans le but de contribuer à la compétitivité, la croissance
et la prospérité économique du Canada;
b) fonder
l’infrastructure maritime et les services sur des pratiques internationales
et des approches compatibles avec celles de ses principaux partenaires
commerciaux dans le but de promouvoir l’harmonisation des normes
qu’appliquent les différentes autorités;
c) veiller à ce que
les services de transport maritime soient organisés de façon à satisfaire les
besoins des utilisateurs et leur soient offerts à un coût raisonnable;
d) fournir un niveau
élevé de sécurité et de protection de l’environnement;
e) offrir un niveau
élevé d’autonomie aux administrations locales ou régionales des composantes
du réseau des services et installations portuaires et prendre en compte les
priorités et les besoins locaux;
f) gérer
l’infrastructure maritime et les services d’une façon commerciale qui
favorise et prend en compte l’apport des utilisateurs et de la collectivité
où un port ou havre est situé;
g) prévoir la
cession, notamment par voie de transfert, de certains ports et installations
portuaires;
h) favoriser la
coordination et l’intégration des activités maritimes avec les réseaux de
transport aérien et terrestre.
|
[35]
Section
5 of the Act defines a number of terms including “airport” and “user”:
5. The definitions in this section
apply in this Part.
“airport”
« aéroport »
“airport” means an airport
situated in a port.
“letters patent”
« lettres
patentes »
“letters patent” means letters
patent as amended by supplementary letters patent, if any.
“port”
« port »
“port” means the navigable waters
under the jurisdiction of a port authority and the real property and immovables
that the port authority manages, holds or occupies as set out in the letters
patent.
“user”
« utilisateur »
“user”, in respect of a port,
means a person that makes commercial use of, or provides services at, the port.
[36]
Section
2 defines “port authority”:
“port authority”
« administration
portuaire »
“port authority” means a port
authority incorporated or continued under this Act.
[37]
Section
7 of the Act specifies where a port authority is or is not an agent of
the Crown:
7. (1) Subject to subsection (3), a
port authority is an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada only for the
purposes of engaging in the port activities referred to in paragraph 28(2)(a).
Not an agent of
Her Majesty
(2) A wholly-owned subsidiary of a
port authority is not an agent of Her Majesty in right of Canada unless, subject to subsection
(3),
(a) it was an agent of Her Majesty
in right of Canada on June 10, 1996; and
(b) it is an agent of Her Majesty
in right of Canada under an enactment other than
this Act.
Borrowing restriction
(3) A port authority or a
wholly-owned subsidiary of a port authority may not borrow money as an agent of
Her Majesty in right of Canada.
[38]
Subsection
28(1) of the Act provides that, inter alia, the TPA has the powers of a
natural person:
28. (1) A port authority is
incorporated for the purpose of operating the port in respect of which its
letters patent are issued and, for that purpose and for the purposes of this
Act, has the powers of a natural person.
[39]
Sub-section
28(2)(a) of the Act is the provision referred to in section 7 of the Act
under which an entity like the TPA would be acting as an agent of the Crown. Sub-section
28(2)(b) is directed to activities in respect of which it is not a Crown agent:
(2) The power of a port authority to operate a port is limited to the
power to engage in
(a) port activities related to shipping, navigation, transportation
of passengers and goods, handling of goods and storage of goods, to the extent
that those activities are specified in the letters patent; and
(b) other activities that are deemed in the letters patent to be
necessary to support port operations.
[40]
Section
29 of the Act is directed to railways and airports. Sub-section 29(3)
specifically deals with airports:
(3) Subject to its
letters patent, to any other Act, to any regulations made under any other Act
and to any agreement with the Government of Canada that provides otherwise, a
port authority that operates an airport shall do so at its own expense.
[41]
The
Letters Patent issued to TPA pursuant to the Canada Marine Act purport
to separate the powers exercised by the TPA under paragraph 28(2)(a) of that Act
(Crown agent) in section 7.1 of the Letters Patent from those exercised under
paragraph 28(2)(b) (non-Crown agent) in section 7.2 of the Letters Patent.
[42]
Section
7.1 of the Letters Patent, subsections (c), (e) and (p) state:
7.1 Activities of the Authority Related to Certain Port
Operations. To operate
the port, the Authority may undertake the port activities referred to in
paragraph 28(2)(a) of the Act to the extent specified below:
(c) management, leasing or licensing the federal real
property described in Schedule B or described as federal real
property in any supplementary letters patent, subject to the
restrictions contemplated in sections 8.1 and 8.3 and
provided such management, leasing or licensing is for,
or in connection with, the following:
(i) those activities described in sections 7.1 and 7.2;
(ii) those activities described in section 7.3 provided such
activities are carried on by Subsidiaries or other third parties pursuant to
leasing or licensing arrangements;
(iii) the following uses to the extent such uses are not
described as activities in section 7.1, 7.2 or 7.3:
(A) uses related to shipping, navigation, transportation
of passengers and goods, handling of goods and storage of
goods;
(B) provision of municipal services or facilities in
connection with such federal real property;
(C) uses not otherwise within subparagraph 7.1(c)(iii)(A),
(B) or (D) that are described
in supplementary letters patent
(D) government sponsored economic development
initiatives approved by Treasury Board; provided such uses
are carried on by third parties,
other
than Subsidiaries, pursuant to leasing or licensing
arrangements;
(e) granting, in respect of federal real property
described in Schedule B or described as federal real property in any
supplementary letters patent, road allowances or easements,
rights of way or licences for utilities, service or access;
(p) carrying on activities described in section 7.1 on
real
property other than federal real property described in
Schedule C or described as real
property other than federal
real
property in any supplementary letters patent;
|
7.1 Activités de l’Administration liées
à certaines opérations
portuaires. Pour exploiter le port,
l’Administration peut se livrer aux activités portuaires mentionnées à
l’alinéa 28(2)a) de la Loi dans la mesure précisée ci-dessous :
c) sous réserve des restrictions prévues
aux paragraphes
8.1 et 8.3, gestion, location ou octroi
de permis
relativement aux immeubles fédéraux
décrits à l’Annexe
« B » ou dans des lettres patentes
supplémentaires
comme étant des immeubles fédéraux, à
condition que
la gestion, la location ou l’octroi de
permis vise ce qui
suit :
(i) les activités décrites aux
paragraphes 7.1 et 7.2;
(ii) les activités décrites au
paragraphe 7.3 pourvu
qu’elles soient menées par des Filiales
ou des tierces parties conformément aux arrangements de location ou d’octroi
de permis;
(iii) les utilisations suivantes dans
la mesure où elles
ne figurent pas dans les activités
décrites aux paragraphes 7.1, 7.2 ou 7.3:
(A) utilisations liées à la navigation,
au transport
des passagers et des marchandises et à
la manutention et à l’entreposage des marchandises;
(B) prestation de services ou
d’installations municipaux relativement à ces immeubles
fédéraux;
(C) utilisations qui ne sont pas
prévues aux divisions 7.1c)(iii)(A), (B) ou (D) mais qui sont décrites dans
des lettres patentes supplémentaires;
(D) projets de développement économique
émanant du gouvernement et approuvés par le Conseil du Trésor; pourvu
qu’elles soient menées par des tierces parties, à l’exception des Filiales,
conformément
aux arrangements de location ou
d’octroi de permis;
e) octroi d’emprises routières, de
servitudes ou de permis
pour des droits de passage ou d’accès
ou des services
publics visant des immeubles fédéraux
décrits à l’Annexe
« B » ou dans des lettres patentes
supplémentaires
comme
étant des immeubles fédéraux;
p) exécution des activités décrites au
paragraphe 7.1 sur
des immeubles, autres que des immeubles
fédéraux,
décrits à l’Annexe « C » ou décrits
dans des lettres patentes
supplémentaires comme étant
des immeubles autres que des immeubles
fédéraux;
|
[43]
It
must be noted that Schedule B, as referred to in subsection 7.1(c) of the
Letters Patent, has been intentionally deleted from the Letters Patent.
Schedule C of the Letters Patent describes the airport as “Real Property Other
than Federal Real Property”.
[44]
Section
7.2 of the Letters Patent defines activities under sub-section 28(2)(b) of the Canada
Marine Act, i.e. non-Crown agent activity. Sub-section 7.2 (j) as amended
by Supplementary Letters Patent January 3, 2004 is specifically directed to the
operation of the Toronto City Centre Airport.
7.2 Activities of the Authority Necessary
to Support Port
Operations. To operate the port, the Authority may
undertake the
following activities which are deemed
necessary to support port
operations
pursuant to paragraph 28(2)(b) of the Act:
(j) the operation and maintenance of the Toronto City
Centre Airport in accordance with the
Tripartite Agreement
among the Corporation of the City of Toronto, Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and The Toronto
Harbour Commissioners dated the 30th day
of June,
1983 and ferry service, and the
construction operation and maintenance of a bridge or tunnel across the
Western Gap of the Toronto harbour to provide access
to
the Toronto City Centre Airport;
[45]
Air
Canada argues that TPA is a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”
either because it is a Crown agent under sub-section 28(1)(a) of the Canada
Marine Act because, as authorized by section 7.1 of the Letters Patent it
is engaged in the “licensing” of slots, or that the source of power under which
the TPA was acting was a federal statute, the Canada Marine Act, and
thus its decisions in the exercise of that power is subject to judicial review.
[46]
I
will first deal with the Crown agent argument. It is clear that, in enacting sub-sections
28(2)(a) and (b) of the Canada Marine Act, Parliament intended that a
distinction be made in respect of activities which a corporation such as the
TPA could carry out and be a Crown agent, and those which it could not. Those
activities were delineated in sections 7.1 and 7.2 of the TPA’s Letters Patent.
[47]
Sub-sections
7.1(c) and (e) of the Letters Patent relate only to “Federal Real Property” as
described in Schedule B to the Letters Patent or in any supplementary letters
patent. Schedule B was intentionally deleted, and no supplementary letters
patent address the matter. In fact, Schedule C describes the airport as being
“Other than” Federal Real Property. Thus, sub-sections 7.1(c) and (e) cannot
make the TPA a Crown agent.
[48]
Sub-section
7.1(p) addresses “Property Other than Federal Real Property” as described in
Schedule C. Schedule C includes the Toronto City Centre Airport. Thus, Air Canada argues, that
sub-section is applicable to make the TPA a Crown agent if the allocation of
slots is considered to be a licensing activity.
[49]
Sub-section
7.2(j), which is part of the “non” Crown agent activity, directly addresses the
operation and maintenance of the airport. It is clear that the allocation of
slots is a fundamental part of such an operation. Given this clear language,
there can be no doubt that the TPA, in respect of the operation and maintenance
of the airport, including the allocation of slots, is intended by the Canada
Marine Act and Letters Patent created under that Act, not to be acting
as a Crown agent.
[50]
Air
Canada’s Counsel argued that slots were akin to a licence and should be
considered as a section 7.1 “licensing” activity as described by the Letters
Patent. I reject this argument. Sub-section 7.2(j) clearly embraces the
airport and its operation. No statute or Letters Patent describes a “slot” as a
“licence”. It cannot have been in the mind of the drafters to separate out the
allocation of slots from the operation and maintenance of the airport so as to
make the TPA a Crown agent in that narrow respect. As has been expressed many
times by the Courts: “the normal interpretive rule is that a specific
provision must prevail over a general one” e.g. Canada v. McGregor (1989), 57
D.L.R. (4th) 317 per Urie J.A. for the Federal Court of Appeal.
[51]
Turning
to the second argument made as to whether the TPA is a “federal board,
commission or other tribunal”, the Court must consider what powers were being
exercised by the TPA and the source of those powers. The Federal Court of
Appeal recently in Anisman v Canada (Border
Services Agency), 2010 FCA 52 as amended April 29, 2010, has instructed that
a two-step exercise has to be conducted. First, it must be determined what jurisdiction
or power the body or person seeks to exercise. Second, it must be determined
what is the source or the origin of the jurisdiction or power which the body or
person seeks to exercise. Nadon JA for the Court wrote at paragraphs 29 and
30:
29 The
operative words of the s. 2 definition of "federal board, commission or
other tribunal" state that such a body or person has, exercises or
purports to exercise jurisdiction or powers "conferred by or under an Act
of Parliament or by or under an Order made pursuant to a prerogative of the
Crown...". Thus, a two-step enquiry must be made in order to determine
whether a body or person is a "federal board, commission or other
tribunal". First, it must be determined what jurisdiction or power the
body or person seeks to exercise. Second, it must be determined what is the
source or the origin of the jurisdiction or power which the body or person
seeks to exercise.
a.
In
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, Vol. 1, looseleaf (Toronto:
Canvasback Publishing, 1998) at para. 2:4310, the learned authors, D.J.M. Brown
and J.M. Evans, state that in determining whether a body or person is a
"federal board, commission or other tribunal", one must look at
"the source of a tribunal's authority". They write as follows:
- In the result, the source of a
tribunal's authority, and not the nature of either the power exercised
or the body exercising it, is the primary determinant of whether it
falls in the definition. The test is simply whether the body is
empowered by or under federal legislation or by an order made pursuant
to a prerogative power of the federal Crown. [...]
[52]
Two
earlier decisions of the Federal Court considered the nature of the powers exercised
by a port authority: in both cases, the Halifax Port Authority. The first is Halterm
Ltd. v Halifax Port Authority (2000), 184 F.T.R. 16. In that case,
the Halifax Port Authority, like the TPA, was created pursuant to the Canada
Marine Act. The applicant Halterm was a terminal operator providing
stevedoring services and equipment used to load and offload vessels. It wanted
to renew its leases but found the terms offered by Halifax Port Authority to be
unacceptable and sought judicial review. Justice O’Keefe found that the port
authority was exercising federal power. He wrote at paragraph 29:
29 In the present case, when the Port
Authority is leasing or negotiating to lease federal real property to Halterm,
it is exercising powers given to it pursuant to the Canada Marine Act.
It is not exercising the private powers of a corporation as that wording is
used in Cairns, supra. It is exercising the powers specifically given to
it in the Canada Marine Act and thus, it is a "federal board,
commission or other tribunal" within the Federal Court Act when
negotiating leases. As a result, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Halterm's
judicial review application. This ground of the motion is therefore dismissed.
[53]
Subsequently,
Justice Mactavish of this Court also had to deal with the Halifax Port
Authority in DRL Vacations Ltd. v Halifax Port Authority, 2005 FC
860, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 516. In that case, the applicant was seeking to lease
premises from the port authority to operate a souvenir shop and alleged that it
was denied procedural fairness. Justice Mactavish found that the port authority
was not acting as a “federal board”. She distinguished, and in any event
declined to follow, Halterm. She wrote at paragraphs 53 to 62:
53 While I am satisfied
that HPA is an organization with public responsibilities, that is not the end
of the matter. It is necessary to go on to examine whether the particular
powers which have been exercised in this case are public in nature or are more
in the nature of private commercial activity.
54 What is in issue in this
case is the licensing of port space for what has variously been referred to in
these proceedings as a "souvenir shop", a "market" and a
"retail outlet". The purpose of the shop was described by counsel as
being to "enhance the port experience" of the passengers and crew of
cruise ships docking at the Port of Halifax.
55 In my view, such a
souvenir shop is a purely commercial enterprise, one which is incidental to the
HPA's main responsibility for managing port activities relating to shipping,
navigation, transportation of goods and passengers and the storage of goods. As
such, I find that the HPA was not acting as a "federal board, commission
or other tribunal" when it made the decision under review in this case.
56 As a
consequence, I am satisfied that the Court does not have jurisdiction to deal
with this application for judicial review.
57 In
coming to this conclusion, I am also influenced by the fact that in enacting
the Canada Marine Act and in creating the HPA, Parliament clearly intended to
ensure that the Port of Halifax is run in a commercially viable fashion. Entitling parties to
judicially review every decision made in relation to federally owned port
property, however incidental that decision may be to the operation of the port
itself would, in my view, be the sort of absurd and very inconvenient result
contemplated by Justice Thurlow in Wilcox, and, moreover, would be antithetical
to the achievement of Parliament's intent in creating the HPA.
58 The
fact that the space in question is on federal land is not determinative of the
issue, in my view. A number of the cases referred to above dealt with decisions
relating to the expenditure or management of public property -- that is tax
dollars. These monies are monies to which ordinary private companies would not
have access. Nevertheless, in cases such as Wilcox, Cairns and Toronto Independent Dance
Enterprises,
the courts have found that the institutions in question were not acting as
federal boards, commissions or other tribunals in making the decisions under
review.
59 In Halterm,
the Court was dealing with the lease of real property for a container port
terminal, whereas in this case, what is in issue is the licensing of space to
be [page534] used for a souvenir shop.
60 Halterm
is, therefore, arguably distinguishable from the present situation in that the
transaction in question in that case was much more directly related to the
business of the HPA as a port. In my view, the provision of a souvenir shop for
the passengers and crew of cruise ships is considerably more incidental to the
business of the Port of Halifax.
61 However,
for the reasons given, to the extent that Halterm is not distinguishable from
the present case, I must respectfully decline to follow it.
62 Before
closing, I should note that my decision should not be interpreted to mean that
the HPA could never be considered to be a "federal board, commission or
other tribunal" as contemplated by the Federal Courts Act. It is clear
that the question of whether an institution is acting as a "federal board,
commission or other tribunal" in a given set of circumstances is one that
has to be resolved on a case-by-case basis,
[54]
In
the present case, I return to the Letters Patent, which were drafted pursuant
to the Canada Marine Act and published in the Canada Gazette. The
Letters Patent were careful to separate out the operation and maintenance of
the airport from other activities to be carried out by the TPA. Subsection 28(1)
of that Act creates the TPA as a corporate “natural person”. Regard must
be had to the distinction made by the Federal Court of Appeal in Aeric, Inc.
v Chairman of the Board of Directors, Canada Post Corporation, [1985] 1
F.C. 127 between the exercise of powers expressly mandated by a statue and the
exercise of the general powers of management of a corporation. Where a statute
expressly mandates that a certain inquiry be conducted or decision made, that
is a power reviewable by the Court - general powers of management are not. Ryan
J. for the Court wrote at page 138:
The decision of the Chairman of the Board
which is under review was not made in the exercise of a general power of
management conferred on the Canada Post Corporation. His decision was made in
the exercise of an authority conferred on him by a regulation approved by the
governor in Council pursuant to the Canada Post Corporation Act. The authority
is an authority to entertain and dispose of an “appeal”. The respondent
suggested that the “appeal” is analogous to the sort of procedure often
established by a business firm to handle customer complaints. But the procedure
under section 6 of the Regulations (which I examine in detail below) is very
different from a mere system for settling complaints. The “appeal” provided by
section 6 is precisely that: it is an appeal. I am satisfied that the Chairman,
in entertaining and disposing of the appeal in this case, is a person within
the meaning of that word as it is used in the definition of “federal board,
commission or other tribunal” in the Federal Court Act.
[55]
In
the present case, the TPA was expressly empowered by its Letters Patent to
operate and manage the airport. This is normal business activity. I refer to
the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Irving Shipbuilding Inc.
v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 116, 314 D.L.R. (4th)
340 where that Court warned against judicial interference in circumstances
where, even though the Crown may be involved, normal business activity was
being carried on. Evans JA for the Court wrote at paragraph 21:
21 The fact that the power of the
Minister, a public official, to award the contract is statutory, and that this
large contract for the maintenance and servicing of the Canadian Navy's
submarines is a matter of public interest, indicate that it can be the subject
of an application for judicial review under section 18.1, a public law
proceeding to challenge the exercise of public power. However, the fact that
the Minister's broad statutory power is a delegation of the contractual
capacity of the Crown as a corporation sole, and that its exercise by the
Minister involves considerable discretion and is governed in large part by the
private law of contract, may limit the circumstances in which the Court should
grant relief on an application for judicial review challenging the legality of
the award of a contract.
[56]
In
the present case, I find that the TPA was not, in respect of the “decisions”
under review, acting as a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”. It was
operating and maintaining the airport as an ordinary commercial activity. This
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the “decisions” at issue.
[57]
Nonetheless
I will address the other issues raised in case of an appeal.
VIII Issue #2: Is
Air Canada a “party directly
affected” who has standing to seek judicial review of the “decisions” at issue?
[58]
I
will consider this issue on the assumption that the TPA is, contrary to what I
have found, a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”.
[59]
Section
18 of the Federal Courts Act is silent as to who can apply for judicial
review except, in subsection 18(3), which directs that remedies can only be
obtained by application for judicial review under section 18.1. Sub-sections
18.1(1) and (2) state that an application for judicial review can only be
brought by the Attorney General of Canada or anyone “directly affected”.
[60]
For
some time, it has been considered that a commercial interest alone was not
sufficient to make a person “directly affected” such that they would have
standing to seek judicial review. The leading case often relied upon is Rothmans
of Pall Mall Canada Ltd. v Canada (Minister of National
Revenue),
[1976] 2 F.C. 500. In that case, the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed an
application for judicial review of an excise tax decision respecting certain
configurations of
cigarettes manufactured by competitors of
the applicant, but not the applicant. LeDain JA for the Court wrote, at
paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16:
12 The complaint of the appellants is
that the change in departmental policy was adopted without first giving them an
opportunity to be heard and that it had the effect of conferring a competitive
advantage on the respondent companies by permitting them to market a longer
cigarette for the same amount of excise duty as is paid by the appellants. The
appellants do not contend, nor is there any evidence to suggest, that they
themselves have had any interest in marketing a cigarette with a tobacco
portion of less than four inches but an overall length, including the filter
tip, of more than four inches. They do not seek the interpretation which they
contend to be the correct one in order to permit them to do anything in
particular that they are not able to do now, but rather to prevent the
respondent companies from doing something which is thought to give the latter a
commercial advantage.
13 I am in agreement with the learned
Trial Judge that such an interest is not sufficient to give the appellants the
required status or locus standi to obtain any of the relief sought in their
application. The appellants do not have a genuine grievance entitling them to
challenge by legal proceedings the interpretation which the respondent
officials have given to the definition of "cigarette" in section 6 of
the Excise Act for purposes of their administrative application of the Act.
Such interpretation does not adversely affect the legal rights of the
appellants nor impose any additional legal obligation upon them. Nor can it
really be said to affect their interests prejudicially in any direct sense. If
it permits the respondent companies to do something which the appellants are
not doing, it is because the appellants choose not to do it.
14 The appellants do not derive any
rights, procedural or otherwise, from what may have been their own assumption
as to how section 6 of the Excise Act would be applied to a cigarette in which
the tobacco portion is less than four inches long but the overall length,
including the filter tip, is more than four inches. Before May or June, 1975,
officials of the Department had not been called on to consider this question so
there was no basis in their action for such an assumption. In so far as the
interpretation is to be considered a "change" of administrative
policy it can only be considered as such in relation to the internal memorandum
circulated by Horner at the beginning of June. When the question was raised by
the respondent companies in May and June the departmental officials were under
no duty to advise the appellant companies and offer them an opportunity to make
representations. I know of no authority which supports a general duty, when
considering a change of administrative policy to be applied in individual
cases, to notify and offer anyone who may be interested an opportunity to make
representations.
. . .
16 The circumstances in the present
case are quite different and afford no basis for a conclusion that the
respondent officials acted unfairly toward the appellants. There had been no
previous representations by the appellants as to how the definition in section
6 in the Excise Act should be applied to cigarettes of the kind introduced by
the respondent companies. There had been no undertaking to the appellants with
respect to this question. Nor did such practice as there was with respect to
industry representation give any reasonable expectation that representations of
the kind made by the respondent companies, involving a matter of a competitive
nature, were such as would come from the industry as a whole or be promptly
communicated to the industry as a whole. In any event, the appellant companies
learned of the proposed policy soon after it was adopted and had an opportunity
to make representations.
[61]
I
followed this case, as well as others in Aventis Pharma Inc. v Canada (Minister of
Health),
2005 FC 1396, 45 C.P.R. (4th) 6. I also cited Merck Frosst Canada
Inc. v Canada (Minister of
National Health and Welfare) (1997), 146 F.T.R. 249 where Hugessen J.
wrote at paragraph 11:
11 Some of the cases have used
concepts such as absence of standing and non-justiciability as a convenient
shorthand to describe this limitation on the patentee's rights. Seizing on this
the applicants argue, based on such cases as Canada v. Finlay, [1986] 2 S.C.R.
607, Canada v. Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 and Operation Dismantle
v. Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, that they do indeed have standing
and that the issues that they raise are, in fact, justiciable. The argument
mistakes the form for the substance. It is not lack of standing or
justiciability in the strict sense of those words which prevents the applicants
from raising non-compliance with the health and safety concerns of the Food and
Drug Act, and Regulations; it is simply that those matters are of no concern to
them and cannot be raised by them in an attack on a decision of the Minister to
issue an NOC. It is the Minister himself who is charged with the protection of
the public health and safety and no private interest of the applicants arises
from his alleged failure to perform his duties with respect to other persons.
[62]
Subsequently
in Ferring Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health), 2007 FC
300, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 19, I found that a mere economic interest was insufficient
to allow standing. I wrote at paragraphs 99 and 100:
99 Section 18.1 [as enacted by S.C.
1990, c. 8, s. 5; 2002, c. 8, s. 27] of the Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 [s.
1 (as am. idem,
s. 14)] affords any person "directly affected" by a decision of a
federal board, commission or other tribunal the right to seek judicial review
of that decision. As discussed in respect of subsections 3(1) of the NOC
Regulations, a generic is not afforded an opportunity to intervene in
proceedings respecting the listing of a patent or to seek de-listing since, at
that point, no particular generic can be seen to be "directly affected."
This is consistent with the law expressed in Rothmans of
Pall Mall Canada Limited v. Minister of National Revenue (No. 1), [1976] 2 F.C. 500 (C.A.) that a person who is simply a
member of a class generally affected by a decision, without more, has no status
to seek judicial review (see also Apotex Inc.
v. Canada (Governor in Council),
2007 FC 232).
100 It has been found that a mere
economic interest is insufficient to support status to seek judicial review (Aventis Pharma Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health) (2005), 45 C.P.R. (4th) 6 (F.C.), at paragraph 13). That
decision was appealed but the appeal was not proceeded with. In that case, the
innovator, Aventis, had apparently failed to list its patent in a timely
fashion. The generic Novopharm was awarded an NOC by the Minister. Aventis
sought judicial review of that decision. The Minister sought to strike out
those portions of Aventis' application challenging the issuance of an NOC.
[63]
I
was reversed on this point by the Federal Court of Appeal in Ferring Inc.
v Canada (Minister of
Health),
2007 FCA 276, 370 N.R. 263, where Richard CJ for the Court wrote, at paragraph
5:
5 We
differ from Justice Hughes on only one point. As an alternative basis for
dismissing the application of Ferring Inc., Justice Hughes concluded that
Ferring Inc. did not have standing to bring an application for judicial review
of the decision of the Minister. We do not agree. In our view, Ferring Inc. did
have standing to challenge that decision because it was made by the Minister in
the course of his administration of the NOC Regulations. However, that does not
alter the outcome because Justice Hughes dismissed the application of Ferring
Inc. on the merits.
[64]
The
matter was recently reviewed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Irving
Shipbuilding Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 116, 314
D.L.R. (4th) 340. In that case, a subcontractor challenged an award
of a contract. The subcontractor argued that it would have been engaged by the
contractor who lost the bid. The challenge was on the basis of lack of
procedural fairness. The Trial Judge found that the subcontractor did not have
standing. The Court of Appeal, Evans J.A. writing for the Court, considered
the issue of standing on the basis that it had to be addressed in context; in
that case, in the context of procedural fairness, and that the court should not
become entangled in a semantic wasteland nor attempt to formulate or apply
various “tests”. He wrote at paragraphs 28, 32 and 33:
28 In my view, the question of the
appellants' standing should be answered, not in the abstract, but in the
context of the ground of review on which they rely, namely, breach of the duty
of procedural fairness. Thus, if the appellants have a right to procedural
fairness, they must also have the right to bring the matter to the Court in
order to attempt to establish that the process by which the submarine contract
was awarded to CSMG violated their procedural rights. If PWGSC owed the
appellants a duty of fairness and awarded the contract to CSMG in breach of
that duty, they would be "directly affected" by the impugned
decision. If they do not have a right to procedural fairness, that should
normally conclude the matter. While I do not find it necessary to conduct an
independent standing analysis, I shall briefly address two issues that arose
from the parties' submissions.
…
32 To
attach the significance urged by the respondents to Parliament's choice of the
words "directly affected", rather than any of the common law standing
requirements ("person aggrieved" or "specially affected",
for example) would, in my view, ignore the context and purpose of the statutory
language of subsection 18.1(1). As the Supreme Court of Canada said recently in
Khosa (at para. 19):
- ... most if not all judicial
review statutes are drafted against the background of the common law of
judicial review. Even the more comprehensive among them ... can only
sensibly be interpreted in the common law context ...
33 Moreover,
since all these terms are somewhat indeterminate, Parliament's choice of one
rather than another should be regarded as of relatively little importance. See
also Thomas A Cromwell, Locus Standi: A Commentary on the Law of Standing in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at
163-64 ("Locus Standi"), especially his apt description (at 163) of
the "semantic wasteland" to be traversed by a court in attempting to
apply the various "tests" for standing, both statutory and common
law. Although directed at differences between the French and English texts of
subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act, the following statement in Khosa
(at para. 39) seems equally apt in the interpretation of the words
"directly affected" in subsection 18.1(1):
- A blinkered focus on the textual
variations might lead to an interpretation at odds with the modern rule
[of statutory interpretation] because, standing alone, linguistic
considerations ought not to elevate an argument about text above the
relevant context, purpose and objectives of the legislative scheme.
[65]
From
all of the foregoing, I conclude that there is no simple formula whereby a
person having a commercial interest can be said to lack standing simply on that
basis. The context of the situation and the basis for judicial review must be
considered.
[66]
Here
Air Canada has had a
degree of involvement with the BBTCA and the TPA for some considerable time.
Air Canada has, through
affiliates, operated from that airport. It has been involved in continuing
discussions with the TPA, who is in charge of operating and maintaining that
airport. The basis upon which judicial review is sought rests on allegations of
lack of procedural fairness. I find that Air Canada has standing to bring these
applications but only if TPA were a “federal board, commission or other
tribunal”, which I have found otherwise.
IX Issue #3: Were
the “decisions” of December 24, 2009 and April 9, 2010 of a kind that can be
the subject of judicial review in this Court?
[67]
Section
18.1 of the Federal Courts Act permits judicial review of a “decision or
an order” of a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”. In addressing
this issue I will assume that, contrary to my finding, the TPA is such a
“federal board, commission or other tribunal”.
[68]
When
dealing with a body that is clearly a “federal board, commission or other
tribunal”
the Courts have been quite strict in looking at the appropriate legislation and
considering whether what has been done is a “decision” as mandated by that
legislation. If it is not, then there can be no judicial review. An example is Democracy
Watch v Canada (Conflict of Interest and Ethics
Commissioner), 2009 FCA 15, 387 N.R. 365 (F.C.A.) where Richard CJ for
the court wrote at paragraphs 10 and 11:
10 Where administrative action does
not affect an applicant's rights or carry legal consequences, it is not
amenable to judicial review (Pieters v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2007]
F.C.J. No. 746, 2007 FC 556 at paragraph 60; Rothmans,
Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (1998), 148 F.T.R. 3 at paragraph 28; see also Canadian Institute of Public and Private Real Estate Cos. v.
Bell Canada, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1103,
2004 FCA 243 at paragraphs 5 & 7).
11 The applicant has no statutory
right to have its complaint investigated by the Commissioner and the Commissioner
has no statutory duty to act on it. There is no provision in the Act that
allows a member of the public to request that the Commissioner begin an
examination. Indeed, the Act specifically contemplates the
route
which a member of the public should take if it wishes to present information to
the Commissioner:
·
44....
·
(4)
In conducting an examination, the Commissioner may consider information from
the public that is brought to his or her attention by a member of the Senate or
House of Commons indicating that a public office holder or former public office
holder has contravened this Act. The member shall identify the alleged
contravention and set out the reasonable grounds for believing a contravention
has occurred. ...
* * *
·
44. [...]
·
(4) Dans le cadre de l'étude, le commissaire peut tenir
compte des renseignements provenant du public qui lui sont communiqués par tout
parlementaire et qui portent à croire que l'intéressé a contrevenu à la
présente loi. Le parlementaire doit préciser la contravention présumée ainsi
que les motifs raisonnables qui le portent à croire qu'une contravention a été
commise. [...]
[69]
However,
a broader approach has been taken by the courts where the functions in question
were within the overall scope of the enabling legislation. Such a situation was
considered by Justice Mactavish of this Court in Shea v Canada (Attorney
General)
(2006), 296 F.T.R. 81, where this Court was asked to review procedures
respecting the selection of persons for managerial positions. She wrote at
paragraphs 42 to 44:
42 The absence of a
"decision" is not a bar to an application for judicial review under
the Federal Courts Act, as Section 18.1 provides the Court with jurisdiction to
grant relief to a party affected by "a matter" involving a federal board,
commission or other tribunal: Canadian
Museum of Civilization Corp. v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 70396 [2006] F.C.J. No. 884, 2006 FC 703, at para. 47.
43 The role of this Court thus extends
beyond the review of formal decisions, and extends to the review of "a
diverse range of administrative action that does not amount to a 'decision or
order', such as subordinate legislation, reports or recommendations made
pursuant to statutory powers, policy statements, guidelines and operating
manuals, or any of the myriad forms that administrative action may take in the
delivery by a statutory agency of a public programme.": Markevich v. Canada,
[1999] 3 F.C. 28 (QL) (T.D.), at para. 11, reversed on other grounds, [2001]
F.C.J. No. 696, reversed on other grounds, [2003] S.C.J. No. 8. See also Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)
[2004] F.C.J. No. 138, 2004 FC 85, at para. 8.
44 A wide range of administrative
actions have been found to come within the Court's jurisdiction: see, for
example Gestion Complexe Cousineau (1989) Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Public Works and Government Services), [1995] 2 F.C. 694; Morneault
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001]
1 F.C. 30 (C.A.), and Larny Holdings (c.o.b Quickie
Convenience Stores) v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2003] 1 F.C. 541 (T.D.) .), 2002 FCT 750.
[70]
Mactavish
J dismissed that application as premature.
[71]
Most
importantly, Irving Shipbuilding must be considered. Evans JA for the
Court considered the issue of whether there existed a “reviewable decision” in
the context of the enabling legislation. In that case, there was a statutory
authority imposed on the Minister to award contracts for, in that case,
submarines. Evans JA said that where the exercise of the Minister’s discretion
is given considerable scope, the Court should be reluctant to step in. However,
where a procurement process is closely linked to a statutory power, the greater
the likelihood of judicial review. Evans JA wrote, at paragraphs 21 to 25:
21 The fact that the power of the
Minister, a public official, to award the contract is statutory, and that this
large contract for the maintenance and servicing of the Canadian Navy's
submarines is a matter of public interest, indicate that it can be the subject
of an application for judicial review under section 18.1, a public law
proceeding to challenge the exercise of public power. However, the fact that
the Minister's broad statutory power is a delegation of the contractual
capacity of the Crown as a corporation sole, and that its exercise by the
Minister involves considerable discretion and is governed in large part by the
private law of contract, may limit the circumstances in which the Court should
grant relief on an application for judicial review challenging the legality of
the award of a contract.
22 This Court reached a similar
conclusion in Gestion Complexe Cousineau (1989) Inc. v. Canada
(Minister of Public Works and Government Services), [1995] F.C.J. No. 735, [1995] 2 F.C. 694 (C.A.) at paras.
7-17 ("Gestion Complexe"). The Court held that the exercise by a Minister of
a statutory power to call for tenders and to enter into contracts for the lease
of land by the Crown could be the subject of judicial review under the former
paragraph 18(1)(a) of
the Federal Court Act as a decision of "a federal board, commission or
other tribunal".
23 Although not addressing the
particular issue in dispute in the present case, Justice Décary, writing for
the Court, also emphasized the difficulties facing an applicant in establishing
a ground of review that would warrant the Court's intervention in the
procurement process through its judicial review jurisdiction. Thus, he said (at
para. 20):
- As by definition the focus of
judicial review is on the legality of the federal government's actions,
and the tendering procedure was not subject to any legislative or
regulatory requirements as to form or substance, it will not be easy, in
a situation where the bid documents do not impose strict limitations on
the exercise by the Minister of his freedom of choice, to show the
nature of the illegality committed by the Minister when in the normal
course of events he compares the bids received, decides whether a bid is
consistent with the documents or accepts one bid rather than another.
24 This view of the Court's
jurisdiction is consistent with that generally adopted by other courts in
Canada: see Paul Emanuelli, Government
Procurement, 2nd ed. (Markham, Ontario:
LEXISNEXIS, 2008) at 697-706, who concludes (at 698):
·
As a
general rule, the closer the connection between a procurement process and the
exercise of a statutory power, the greater the likelihood that the activity can
be subject to judicial review. Conversely, to the extent that the procurement
falls outside the scope of a statutory power and within the exercise of
government's residual executive power, the less likely that the procurement
will be subject to judicial review.
English
authorities on public contracts and judicial review are considered in Harry
Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell and Andrew Le Sueur, de Smith's
Judicial Review, 6th ed. (London:
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2007), 138-45, where courts generally require an
"additional public element" before concluding that the exercise by a
public authority of its contractual power is subject to judicial review, even
when the power is statutory.
25 Consequently, on the basis of both
authority and principle, I agree that the award of the submarine contract by
the Minister of PWGSC is reviewable under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act
as a decision of a "federal board, commission or other tribunal" made
in the exercise of "powers conferred by or under an Act of
Parliament" (section 2).
[72]
In
the present case, the TPA is given a broad mandate respecting the operation and
maintenance of the airport. No specific procedural requirements are set down.
As I have found, TPA is acting as any other private sector commercial
corporation and not as a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”.
[73]
The
“decisions” at issue here are not really “decisions” at all. They do not
determine anything. The bulletin of December 24, 2009 is an announcement that
certain studies had been conducted and that “now that we have the results in
hand [the TPA] will solicit formal business proposals” and that “an independent,
IATA-accredited slot co-ordinator” will be appointed. The bulletin stated that
further announcements will be made.
[74]
In
the context, there is no “decision or order” made. An announcement was made
that soon proposals will be solicited by the TPA. In fact, that was done and
Air Canada submitted a
proposal. In fact, ACL, an IATA-accredited slot co-ordinator was retained. Air Canada has not complained
of that appointment. There simply is no “decision or order” in the December
2009 bulletin.
[75]
The
April 2010 bulletin requested interested parties (such as Air Canada) “to
participate in the RFP (Request for Proposal) process” and announced the
appointment of ACL as slot co-ordinator. Again there is no “decision or order”
affecting Air Canada. In fact,
Air Canada submitted a
Proposal and has made no complaint as to the appointment of ACL. In submitting
its Proposal, Air Canada agreed with TPA’s guiding principles and
appointment of ACL as slot co-ordinator as set out in its response dated May
14, 2010.
[76]
The
steps taken by TPA, as announced in its December 2009 and April 2010 bulletins,
are those respecting the normal commercial operation of the airport. They are
not steps specifically mandated by any legislation, nor are those steps
specifically directed to Air Canada. They are not “decisions or orders” of the
type for which judicial review is available in this Court.
X Issue #4: Has
Air Canada properly pleaded the
grounds upon which it is now relying for judicial review?
[77]
Both
of these cases have proceeded by way of an application. Rule 301 of the Federal
Courts Rules sets out what the Notice of Application must contain:
301. An application shall
be commenced by a notice of application in Form 301, setting out
(a) the name of the
court to which the application is addressed;
(b) the names of the
applicant and respondent;
(c) where the
application is an application for judicial review,
(i) the tribunal in
respect of which the application is made, and
(ii) the date and
details of any order in respect of which judicial review is sought and the date
on which it was first communicated to the applicant;
(d) a precise
statement of the relief sought;
(e) a complete and
concise statement of the grounds intended to be argued, including a reference
to any statutory provision or rule to be relied on; and
(f) a list of the
documentary evidence to be used at the hearing of the application.
[78]
A
respondent does not need to file anything more than a Notice of Appearance as
set out in Rule 305.
305. A respondent who intends to oppose an application
shall, within 10 days after being served with a notice of application, serve
and file a notice of appearance in Form 305.
[79]
The
jurisprudence varies widely as to what a Notice of Application should set out
and how detailed it must be. The reason for such varied jurisprudence is
because of the various sorts of matters that are considered by way of an
application: immigration, public service disputes, citizens challenging
government decisions, copyright infringement and, in cases such as this,
complex commercial matters. Subsection 18.4(1) of the Federal Courts Act
directs that an application shall be heard and determined in a summary way
without delay. However, subsection 18.4(2) permits an application to be converted
into an action, if appropriate. An earlier application brought by Jazz Air was
converted into an action and has since been abandoned.
[80]
Rule
301 requires a precise statement of the relief sought and a complete and
concise statement of the grounds intended to be argued. Rule 75 permits a
document, for instance, a Notice of Application, to be amended. The purpose in
clearly setting out the relief sought and grounds to be argued is not only that
the other parties will know the case to be met and not be caught by surprise,
but also so that the Court hearing the matter will know what issues it will
have to consider and determine. The Court does not wish to be confronted at the
hearing with a new argument or different relief to be sought. An appellate
Court should not be confronted with an assertion that the Trial Judge did not
appreciate the un-pleaded argument made or direct the reasons and judgement to
new or different arguments or relief sought.
[81]
The
Court has, for instance, in complex cases brought under the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133, taken a strict
position respecting not only a Notice of Allegation, which is not a Court
document, but also the Notice of Application instituting the Court Procedure.
As an example, there is the decision of Layden-Stevenson J (as she then was) in
AstraZeneca
AB
v Apotex Inc., 2006 FC 7, 46 C.P.R. (4th) 418, where she
wrote at paragraphs 11, 18 and 19:
11 Astra argued, both in its written
submission and in oral argument, but did not plead, reliance on the doctrine of
issue estoppel. After hearing from both parties, I invited Astra to consider
(prior to its reply) whether it wished to abandon its position. It did not. I
will therefore address this question.
…
18 I reject Astra's argument that the
requirement in Rule 301(e) can be characterized as a technical argument that
elevates form over substance. The rule mandates that an application is to be
commenced by a notice of application that must set out a complete and concise
statement of the grounds intended to be argued. I also reject the submission
that the jurisprudence does not evince the application of the rule to
proceedings brought under the Regulations. In this respect, I refer
specifically to Pharmacia Inc. et al. v. Minister of National Health and
Welfare et al. (1995), 60 C.P.R. (3d) 328 (F.C.T.D.) at pp. 339, 340 aff'd. (1995),
64 C.P.R. (3d) 450 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 1. See also: Bayer AG et al. v. Apotex
Inc. et al. (2003), 29 C.P.R. (4th) 143 (F.C.) and Pfizer Canada Inc. and
Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc. and the Minister of Health, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1730,
2005 FC 1421.
19 If the intervening decision of the
Court of Appeal crystallized Astra's issue estoppel argument, as alleged, Astra
could have utilized Rule 75 which provides that the Court may on motion, at any
time, allow a party to amend a document, on such terms as will protect the
rights of all parties. Rule 75 applies to all proceedings. An application is a
proceeding (see: Rules 61 and 300). Indeed, Astra was aware of Rule 75 for it
utilized it in Court File No. T-1747-00, a matter that concerned the same tablets
and the same parties, in its application for an order of prohibition under the
Regulations. As for the timing, as Mr. Radomski notes, the Federal Court of
Appeal's decision was issued on November 3, 2003. The evidence in this matter
was far from complete at that time. Dr. Lindquist's (Astra's expert witness)
second affidavit was not sworn until April 15, 2004. Apotex filed four
affidavits after that date and Dr. Lindquist's third affidavit was not sworn
until September 24, 2004. At no point, did Astra seek to amend its notice of
application.
[82]
However,
the Courts have also taken a more flexible approach, particularly where no
party has been taken by surprise and some general wording contained in the
grounds can be taken to support the arguments made at the hearing. An example
of this approach is that taken by de Montigny J in Kinsey v Canada (Attorney
General),
2007 FC 543, 313 F.T.R. 88 where he wrote at paragraphs 31 to 34:
31 Before turning to the substantive
issues in this application, I must deal with two preliminary objections made by
the respondents. First, counsel argued the constables did not raise the main
grounds of their application in either their notice of application or
supporting affidavits. Rather, they only raised them in their application
records for the first time. Counsel cited Williamson
v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005]
F.C.J. No. 1186, 2005 FC 954, for the proposition that a party cannot raise
issues on judicial review that were not raised in his initial notice of
application and supporting affidavits.
32 Rule 301(e) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 (the Rules), states that applications are commenced by a
notice of application setting out, inter alia, "a complete and concise statement of the grounds
intended to be argued, including a reference to any statutory provision or rule
to be relied on." This rule is meant to give a respondent the opportunity
to address the grounds of review in his affidavit and ensure no one is taken by
surprise.
33 In the present case, the applicants
submitted in their notices of application that the Commissioner had erred in
fact and in law, and had breached a principle of natural justice or procedural
fairness. This is no doubt a cryptic way to set out the grounds of review. It
reflects, unfortunately, a practice that is becoming more and more common - to
simply paraphrase the text of s. 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act as the grounds for the
application. Such a practice must definitely be discouraged, and counsel should
strive to particularize the grounds they intend to argue to conform to the
spirit of the Rules. This would certainly help both parties frame their
arguments more precisely from the outset and eventually focus the debate.
34 Having said this, I am not prepared
to refuse considering the constables' arguments on this basis. First of all,
the respondents have not provided any evidence tending to demonstrate that they
were taken by surprise or prejudiced in preparing their record or submissions.
In light of the fact that the constables' careers are at stake, I would also be
extremely reluctant to prevent them from making all the submissions they
articulated in their original memorandum. A delay could have been granted if
the respondents felt it was necessary, but none was requested. Indeed, counsel
for the respondents did not really push that point at the hearing.
[83]
In
the present application, Air Canada’s Counsel, at the hearing, expressed the
relief sought differently from that set out in either Notice of Application.
Air Canada now wants
the whole allocation of slots process set aside, including the 2010 CCOA
between TPA and Porter. It wants a new process begun in which TPA “consults
with” Air Canada. The grounds
for this relief, as argued at the hearing, were that Air Canada had a right to
be consulted essentially because it had a “legitimate expectation” that it
would be consulted and that slot allocation decisions made in its absence are a
nullity. Further, Air Canada argues that it was unaware, until the
evidence was provided by the Respondents in the second application, that a new
agreement, the 2010 CCOA, had been entered into.
[84]
The
Respondents, in their written material and in their argument, have met Air Canada’s arguments
as to a right to be consulted and had legitimate expectations that it would be.
Therefore I will deal with them.
[85]
Air
Canada raised other
arguments, including lack of proper reasons and lack of “formal” or
“substantive” reasonableness. These grounds were not set out in its Notice of
Application and only the latter, “formal” and “substantive” reasonableness, was
raised and met in written and oral argument. I will deal with these arguments in
case of an appeal, but I will nonetheless dismiss them for lack of a proper
pleading.
XI Issue #5: Was
there an obligation on the Toronto Port
Authority to consult with Air Canada before
making the “decisions” of December 24, 2009 and April 9, 2010?
[86]
The
argument made by Air Canada in support of its allegation that it
should have been consulted before either of the two “decisions” were made by
TPA, is convoluted.
[87]
Air
Canada points to
the Worldwide Scheduling Guidelines formulated by IATA which contains
provisions such as section 4.6 to the effect that where a change of level in
the manner in which slots are to be allocated is contemplated, “interested
parties should be consulted”. Air Canada says that TPA’s
December announcement which stated that an “IATA-accredited slot co-ordinator
“would shortly be appointed” was an indication that the TPA would adhere to
IATA guidelines. Further, Air Canada says that its affiliate, Jazz, was offered
(but never signed) a draft CCOA by TPA in 2006 which contained a provision,
article 5.4(f), that Jazz would acknowledge that the airport is “an IATA-constrained
airport”. Similar language appears in the 2005 CCOA between Porter and TPA but
not in the 2010 CCOA between those parties.
[88]
The
Respondents argue that it is too far a stretch to say that TPA was in any way
obligated to follow IATA protocol. It is not a member of IATA and the airport
is not an IATA affiliated airport. Further, they argue that the IATA protocol
is just a guideline and in the circumstances only users, and not prospective
users, of the airport are recommended for consultation. Yet further, the
reference in a draft contract, never signed, to an affiliate of Air Canada
several years ago to IATA, and the reference in the December bulletin to an
IATA-accredited slot co-ordinator, do not in any way give rise to any
obligation assumed by the TPA to follow IATA protocol nor to any reasonable
expectation by Air Canada that this would be done.
[89]
I
have not set out in detail other references to IATA pointed out by Air Canada’s Counsel in
other TPA documents. Those documents were never seen by Air Canada or any
affiliate before the evidence was presented in these proceedings, and the references
are as fleeting as those in the documents discussed above.
[90]
There
clearly was no obligation imposed upon, nor undertaken by, TPA to follow
rigorously or at all any IATA protocol. Did Air Canada have
“reasonable expectation” that it would?
[91]
The
doctrine of reasonable or legitimate expectation was considered recently by
the Supreme Court of Canada in two decisions. The first is Mount Sinai
Hospital Centre v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC
41, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 281 in which Binnie J for the Court wrote that an existing
permit holder was owed a duty of fairness by the permit issuer when modified
permits were to be granted. A party has a right to procedural fairness
dependent on the nature of that party’s interest and the nature of the power
exercised by the authority. The remedy, however, is to grant procedural relief
even though such relief may result in substantive relief. Binnie J wrote at
paragraphs 18, 29, 30, 35 and 36:
18 If the respondents did not have a
"right" to a modified permit, they nevertheless had a direct
financial interest in the outcome of their application sufficient to trigger
the duty of procedural fairness. They were, after all, existing permit holders.
Their request was for permit modifications. As stated by Le Dain J. in Cardinal
v. Director of Kent Institution, supra, at p. 653:
- This Court has affirmed that there
is, as a general common law principle, a duty of procedural fairness
lying on every public authority making an administrative decision which
is not of a legislative nature and which affects the rights, privileges
or interests of an individual...
…
29 Under our case law the availability
and content of procedural fairness are generally driven by the nature of the
applicant's interest and the nature of the power exercised by the public
authority in relation to that interest: Brown and Evans, supra, p. 7-13 et
seq.; D. J. Mullan, "'Confining the Reach of Legitimate Expectations' Case
Comment: Sunshine Coast Parents for French v. School District No. 46 (Sunshine
Coast)" (1991), 44 Admin. L.R. 245, at p. 248. The doctrine of legitimate
expectations, on the other hand, looks to the conduct of the [page304] public
authority in the exercise of that power (Old St. Boniface, supra, at p. 1204)
including established practices, conduct or representations that can be
characterized as clear, unambiguous and unqualified (Brown and Evans, supra, at
p. 7-41). The expectations must not conflict with the public authority's
statutory remit.
30 The doctrine of legitimate
expectations is sometimes treated as a form of estoppel, but the weight of
authority and principle suggests that an applicant who relies on the doctrine
of legitimate expectations may show, but does not necessarily have to show,
that he or she was aware of such conduct, or that it was relied on with
detrimental results. This is because the focus is on promoting
"regularity, predictability, and certainty in government's dealing with
the public": S. A. de Smith, H. Woolf and J. Jowell, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action (5th ed. 1995), at p. 417, to which the editors add, at
p. 426, that insisting on estoppel-type requirements would
·
involve
unfair discrimination between those who were and were not aware of the
representation and would benefit the well-informed or well-advised. It would
also encourage undesirable administrative practice by too readily relieving
decision-makers of the normal consequences of their actions.
The
High Court of Australia espouses a similar view:
- But,
more importantly, the notion of legitimate expectation is not dependent
upon any principle of estoppel. Whether the Minister can be estopped in
the exercise of his discretion is another question; it was not a
question raised by the appellant. Legitimate expectation does not depend
upon the knowledge and state of mind of the individual concerned,
although such an expectation may arise from the conduct of a public authority
towards an individual...
- (Haoucher v. Minister for
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1990), 19 A.L.D. 577,
per Toohey J., at p. 590)
See
also Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995), 183
C.L.R. 273 (H.C.).
…
35 In
affirming that the doctrine of legitimate expectations is limited to procedural
relief, it must be acknowledged that in some cases it is difficult to
distinguish the procedural from the substantive. In Bendahmane v. Canada,
supra, for example, a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal considered the
applicant's claim to the benefit of a refugee backlog reduction program to be
procedural (p. 33) whereas the dissenting judge considered the claimed relief
to be substantive (p. 25). A similarly close call was made in Canada (Attorney
General) v. Canada (Commissioner of the Inquiry on the Blood System), [1996]
3 F.C. 259 (T.D.). An undue focus on formal classification and categorization
of powers at the expense of broad principles flexibly applied may do a
disservice here. The inquiry is better framed in terms of the underlying
principle mentioned earlier, namely that broad public policy is pre-eminently
for the Minister to determine, not the courts.
36 The classification of relief as
"substantive" however should be made in light of the principled basis
for its exclusion rather than as a matter of form. Where, as in Bendahmane v. Canada, relief can
reasonably be characterized as procedural in light of the underlying principle
of deference on matters of substantive policy, then generally speaking it
should be.
[92]
The
matter was addressed again by the Supreme Court of Canada two years later in Canadian
Union of Public Employees (C.U.P.E.) v Ontario (Minister of Labour),
2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 where Binnie J for the majority (there were
several in dissent) wrote that the doctrine of legitimate expectations required
that the Court consider whether there were established practices, conduct or
representations that could be characterized as clear, unambiguous and
unqualified. He wrote at paragraph 131:
131 The doctrine of legitimate
expectation is "an extension of the rules of natural justice and
procedural fairness": Reference
re Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.),
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 525, at p. 557. It looks to the conduct of a Minister or other
public authority in the exercise of a discretionary power including established
practices, conduct or representations that can be characterized as clear,
unambiguous and unqualified, that has induced in the complainants (here the
unions) a reasonable expectation that they will retain a benefit or be
consulted before a contrary decision is taken. To be "legitimate",
such expectations must not conflict with a statutory duty. See: Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1170; Baker,
supra; Mount Sinai, supra,
at para. 29; Brown and Evans, supra, at para. 7:2431. Where the conditions for its application
are satisfied, the Court may grant appropriate procedural remedies to respond
to the "legitimate" expectation.
[93]
In
the present case, I find no clear, unambiguous or unqualified established
practice or conduct or representation by the TPA. Notwithstanding Air Canada’s Counsel’s
able argument, there is simply insufficient evidence upon which this Court can
find that Air Canada had any legitimate expectation that it would be consulted
by TPA before any decision was made as to slot allocation.
[94]
I
add two matters. First, the evidence is clear that throughout the relevant time
period there were meetings and correspondence with and between TPA and Air Canada. Air Canada has never
been reluctant to make its views known to the TPA.
[95]
The
second matter is that Air Canada has provided no evidence as to what it would
say if a broader reaching consultation was to be Ordered. We do know that it
wants more slots, including slots at favourable times. It already told TPA that.
Air Canada’s Counsel, Ms. Batner, made a considerable presentation as to how,
in her view, the number of slots could be increased; particularly if
adjustments were made to the “quiet time” slots. I am in no position to
evaluate such submissions, even if relevant. There is no evidence to support
those submissions. I have no idea whether the submissions take into account all
the relevant factors and constraints. Air Canada has provided
no evidence to support these submissions and no evidence that these are the
submissions that it would have made to TPA, or that it was in any way precluded
from making these submissions.
XII Issue #6: Did
TPA “decisions” lack “formal” or “substantial” reasonableness?
[96]
Air
Canada’s Counsel
argue that each of the TPA “decisions” at issue lack both “formal” and
“substantive” reasonableness. I have dismissed this argument for failure to
plead it, but deal with it anyway in case of an appeal.
[97]
Counsel
argues that the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 established new grounds (not standards) for
judicial review: a decision must be both “formally” and “substantively”
reasonable. Reference is made to the majority decision written by Bastarache
and LeBel JJ at paragraph 47:
47 Reasonableness is a deferential
standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two
previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before
administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular
result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable
conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of
acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
[page221] justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.
[98]
I
disagree. That Court is directing its mind to a standard, not a ground.
Paragraph 47 begins with the words “Reasonableness is a deferential standard...”
Paragraph 48 begins with the words, “The move towards a single reasonableness standard...”
[99]
What
that Court was addressing in paragraph 47 when it spoke of “formal”
reasonableness is as set out in the second last sentence, “...the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility”. What that Court was
addressing when it used the word “outcomes” is whether, as set out in the last
sentence of paragraph 47, the decision “falls within the range of possible
acceptable outcomes.”
[100] In the
present applications, the December bulletin is clear, as is the April bulletin.
Both set out what TPA intends to do and why: it intended to, and then did,
appoint a slot co-ordinator. It intended to, and then did, receive proposals
from prospective users, including Air Canada.
[101] Not
articulated in the “pleadings”, but argued, was the validity of the 2010 CCOA between
TPA and Porter. Air Canada was not previously advised that this would be
entered into by those parties. It did not have a right or expectation to be
advised. That was a commercial business decision that TPA was entitled to make.
TPA’s actions were within the acceptable range of reasonable actions and should
not be set aside on the assumption, which I have found to be otherwise, that
TPA is subject to judicial review.
XIII Issue #7: Did
the TPA have any obligation to provide “reasons” for its decision and, if
reasons were provided, were they adequate?
[102] In addressing
this argument I repeat that it has been dismissed for failure to “plead” it and
because the TPA is not subject to judicial review in this respect. Nonetheless,
in case of an appeal, I will address it.
[103] The “duty” to
provide reasons rests on what the Supreme Court of Canada said in Baker
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817
where L’Heureux-Dubé J for the Court wrote at paragraphs 43 and 44:
43 In my opinion, it is now
appropriate to recognize that, in certain circumstances, the duty of procedural
fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision.
The strong arguments demonstrating the advantages of written reasons suggest that,
in cases such as this where the decision has important significance for the
individual, when there is a statutory right of appeal, or in other
circumstances, some form of reasons should be required. This requirement has
been developing in the common law elsewhere. The circumstances of the case at
bar, in my opinion, constitute one of the situations where reasons are
necessary. The profound importance of an H & C decision to those affected,
as with those at issue in Orlowski, Cunningham, and Doody, militates in favour
of a requirement that reasons be provided. It would be unfair for a person
subject to a decision such as this one which is so critical to their future not
to be told why the result was reached.
44 In my view, however, the reasons
requirement was fulfilled in this case since the appellant was provided with
the notes of Officer Lorenz. The notes were given to Ms. Baker when her counsel
asked for reasons. Because of this, and because there is no other record of the
reasons for making the decision, the notes of the subordinate reviewing officer
should be taken, by inference, to be the reasons for decision. Accepting
documents such as these notes as sufficient reasons is part of the flexibility
that is necessary, as emphasized by Macdonald and Lametti, supra, when courts
evaluate the requirements of the duty of fairness with recognition of the
day-to-day realities of administrative agencies and the many ways in which the
values underlying the principles of procedural fairness [page849] can be assured.
It upholds the principle that individuals are entitled to fair procedures and
open decision-making, but recognizes that in the administrative context, this
transparency may take place in various ways. I conclude that the notes of
Officer Lorenz satisfy the requirement for reasons under the duty of procedural
fairness in this case, and they will be taken to be the reasons for decision.
[104] What must be
recognized is that the “duty” to provide “reasons” arises only in “certain
circumstances” and that duty may be fulfilled, for instance, by the simple
provision of notes. Those certain circumstances may arise where there is a
legislated provision that reasons should be provided and may also arise where
the process is adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative. However, the circumstances
are quite different when dealing with normal commercial transactions such as
those at issue here. There is no “duty” to provide persons potentially
interested with “reasons” for every “decision” made. Transactions would grind
to a halt.
[105] No reasons
were required here.
XIV Issue#8: Were
the “decisions” made for an improper purpose?
[106] Air Canada argues that
TPA, throughout the process, favoured Porter, and that its decisions were made
to give Porter an unfair advantage respecting the use of the BBTCA.
[107] Air Canada points out
that the letters provided by the Competition Bureau in 2003 were based on the
premise that Porter would be given exclusivity at BBTCA only for a limited
period of time, and that time has now gone by. Porter was initially granted up
to 112 slots which, by the 2010 CCOA, were effectively grandfathered. Porter
was also given, in the 2005 CCOA, a “fair” share of new slots. Porter was given
45 of the 90 new slots in the 2010 CCOA. Porter continues to enjoy almost all of
the prime time slots.
[108] TPA argues
that it made a proper business decision. It sought advice from sources,
including Jordan and ACL; and based on that advice, while not following every
piece of advice, it made rational, unbiased business decisions.
[109] Porter argues
that Air Canada or its affiliates essentially abandoned the BBTCA, preferring
to run its Toronto operations
from Pearson airport where it is the major airline and Porter does not operate.
Only when Porter began making a success of BBTCA did Air Canada want to get
back in. Porter warns that caution should be exercised in dealing with Air Canada given the
past history of neglecting the BBTCA and squeezing out competition there.
[110] It was not
unreasonable for TPA to grandfather Porter’s existing slots, nor was it
unreasonable to interpret a “fair” proportion of allocation of new slots to be
one-half of those slots. There is no evidence before me to suggest that TPA and
Porter were doing anything more than engaging in normal, reasonable commercial
activity. As I have found, there is no expectation that Air Canada should have
in some way been consulted during the process.
[111] The
situation, while not identical to, is akin to that considered by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Irving Shipbuilding where Evans J.A. for the Court
wrote at paragraph 46:
46 The context of the present dispute
is essentially commercial, despite the fact that the Government is the
purchaser. PWGSC has made the contract pursuant to a statutory power and the
goods and services purchased are related to national defence. In my view, it
will normally be inappropriate to import into a predominantly commercial
relationship, governed by contract, a public law duty developed in the context
of the performance of governmental functions pursuant to powers derived solely
from statute.
[112] It is not for
this Court to rewrite or set aside what is in reality a commercial contract
simply because one of the prospective parties believes it should have gotten a
better deal.
CONCLUSIONS AND COSTS
[113] In conclusion,
both applications will be dismissed. The TPA is not acting as a “federal board,
commission or other tribunal” in the circumstances here; it made no “decision”
that is subject to judicial review. Air Canada had no right
or legitimate expectation to be consulted before TPA made slot commitments to
Porter or otherwise.
[114] Counsel at
the hearing advised that the parties may well agree as to the disposition of
costs. I will therefore leave that matter to them, provided however that if
they cannot agree within a reasonable period any one or more of them may, by a short
letter addressed to me, seek a further order and directions as to costs.
JUDGMENT
FOR THE
REASONS PROVIDED
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
1.
These
applications are dismissed; and
2.
The
parties are to agree as to costs within a reasonable time, failing which any of
them may by a short letter apply to this Court for an order and directions in
that respect.
“Roger
T. Hughes”