Date: 20070320
Docket: T-165-07
Citation: 2007 FC 300
BETWEEN:
FERRING
INC.
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH, APOTEX
INC.
and NOVOPHARM
LIMITED
Respondents
and
Docket: T-2188-06
BETWEEN:
SANOFI-AVENTIS
CANADA INC.
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF HEALTH,
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and
NOVOPHARM INC.
Respondents
and
Docket:
T-2189-06
BETWEEN:
SANOFI-AVENTIS
CANADA INC.
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF HEALTH,
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and
APOTEX INC.
Respondents
and
Docket:
T-2196-06
BETWEEN:
SANOFI-AVENTIS
CANADA INC.
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF HEALTH,
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and
APOTEX INC.
Respondents
and
Docket:
T-2220-06
BETWEEN:
NOVOPHARM LIMITED
Applicant
and
THE
MINISTER OF HEALTH,
THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and
SANOFI-AVENTIS CANADA INC.
Respondents
AMENDED REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
HUGHES J.
[1]
These
reasons pertain to five separate applications for judicial review argued
consecutively, all of which deal with actions taken by the Minister of Health
following the release of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in AstraZeneca
Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 2006 S.C.C.
49, on November 3, 2006 (AstraZeneca).
[2]
The
core subject matter is the interpretation and application of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/93-133 as periodically
amended (NOC Regulations) and in particular, section 5(1) of those
Regulations. There is no doubt that the AstraZeneca decision had a
profound effect on this subject. Influenced by that decision the Minister
issued Notices of Compliance (NOC) to each of two generic drug companies Apotex
Inc. and Novopharm Limited notwithstanding patents listed by innovator drug
companies Ferring Inc. and Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. In one instance the
Minister would not issue an NOC and required Novopharm to address two patents
in the context of section 5 of the NOC Regulations. The result of the
Minister’s actions is that Ferring, Sanofi-Aventis and Novopharm have brought
judicial review applications in this Court seeking relief including the
quashing of the decisions made against their interests and for directions to
the Minister to take steps more favourable to their interests.
[3]
For
the reasons that follow, I find that all applications are to be dismissed, each
party to bear its own costs.
History of
the NOC Regulations
[4]
The
arcane nature of NOC proceedings makes it too easy to lose perspective as to
the objectives of the NOC Regulations, their purpose and intent. The
Supreme Court has offered guidance in this respect in three decisions, AstraZeneca
supra, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Canada (Attorney General)
[2005], 1 S.C.R. 533 (Biolyse), and Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v.
Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1998), 80 C.P.R. (3rd)
368 (Merck Frosst). The Federal Court of Appeal and this Court have
extensively dealt with cases under the NOC Regulations.
[5]
It
is useful to begin with the Food and Drug Regulations C.R.C. C. 870,
Part C, enacted under the provisions of the Food and Drug Act R.S.C.
1985, c. F-27. The objective of that Act is to bring safe and effective
medicines to market so as to advance the nation’s health; the law governing
approval of new drugs is to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the new
drugs before they can be put on the market (AstraZeneca, paragraph 12).
[6]
An
innovator drug company seeking to bring a new drug to market in Canada incurs costs
not only in the research and development leading to the drug, but in the trials
and testing required by the Minister in order to satisfy him that the drug is
safe and effective. There is no question that in almost every instance the
cost, effort and time involved are considerable, although Canada is not the
only country requiring government approval of this kind and much of this cost
may be spread out over several countries.
[7]
The
innovator company will seek approval to sell its drug in Canada, called a Notice
of Compliance (NOC), by filing with the Minister a New Drug Submission (NDS).
Once an NOC has been obtained, the innovator will be required to make any
supplemental filings by way of a Supplemental New Drug Submission (S/NDS).
Such supplemental filings may deal with a broad range of matters both
administrative and technical such as name changes, merger of corporations,
change in manufacturing circumstances and changes to the drug itself (AstraZeneca,
paragraph 19).
[8]
The
Food and Drug legislation contemplates another body of drug companies often
called generics. They seek to bring to the market in Canada what are
called by the innovators “copy-cat” versions of approved drugs. The Food
and Drug Regulations provide in section C.08.002.1 that a generic may file
what is called an Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS) in which the generic is
only required to demonstrate that it proposes to bring to market in Canada a
drug that is pharmaceutically equivalent (defined in section c.08.001.1) and
bioequivalent (not defined) to the Canadian reference product. In so
demonstrating, Parliament reasoned, the generic will have shown that its drug
will be equally safe and effective as the original (AstraZeneca,
paragraph 24). Thus, the generic will not have had to expend the considerable
costs in research that the innovator was required to do (Biolyse,
paragraphs 6 and 7).
[9]
The
Food and Drug Regulations define a “Canadian reference product” in
section 08.001.1 as a drug in respect of which an NOC has been granted and is
marketed in Canada; where the
drug is no longer marketed or for any other reason, the Minister can approve as
acceptable some other drug. In the Ferring proceeding before this Court the
Minister found that a drug acquired by Novopharm in the United
Kingdom
was acceptable. In oral argument, Ferring’s counsel raised some question as to
the provenance of this drug, however, this issue was not raised as an issue in
its memorandum of argument or in its Notice of Application and therefore was
not properly before the Court. In any event, this kind of decision is one
which clearly lies with the discretion of the Minister, not the Court.
[10]
Section
08.001.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations defines “pharmaceutical
equivalent” as a new drug that, in comparison with another drug, contains
identical amounts of the identical medicinal ingredients, in comparable dosage
forms, but does not necessarily contain the same non-medicinal ingredients
(sometimes called excipients).
[11]
The
Food and Drug Regulations do not define bioequivalence, however, all
parties are agreed that in most instances this is a measure of how much of the
medicinal ingredient is found in the bloodstream of a person measured over
certain intervals after the medicine has been administered. If the “profile”
thus obtained is identical, within appropriate limits, as between drugs that
are compared, these drugs are said to be bioequivalent. In some cases, such a
test is unnecessary, for instance where the drug is administered directly into
the bloodstream by injection or intended for topical application only, such as
eye drops.
[12]
The
Food and Drug Regulations section C.08.004.1 provide a delay such that
prior to October 5, 2006, the Minister was prohibited from issuing a NOC to a
generic in respect of certain types of drugs before five years after the
innovator receives its NOC. After October 5, 2006 the generic cannot apply for
an NOC in respect of certain types of drugs until six years after the innovator
received its NOC and the generic cannot get its NOC for at least two years
after that.
[13]
The
Minister, upon receipt of an ANDS from a generic, is required only to examine
the information provided by the generic as to the pharmaceutical equivalence
and bioequivalence of its proposed drug to that of the innovator. There is no
requirement that the Minister examine the data previously filed by the
innovator in support of its NOC (Bayer Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)
(1999), 87 C.P.R.(3d) 293 (F.C.A.)). Once the Minister is satisfied as to
pharmaceutical equivalence and bioequivalence the Minister has a duty to issue
an NOC to the generic without delay (Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General),
[1994] 1 F.C. 742 (C.A.).
[14]
At
this point consideration must turn to the NOC Regulations. These
Regulations lie at the intersection of the Food and Drug Act whose
objective is to bring safe and effective drugs to the Canadian market, and the Patent
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-4 which seeks to award a temporary monopoly to
innovators who disclose their invention to the public (AstraZeneca,
paragraph 12). It has been said that perhaps these Regulations were too
hastily formulated and do not cover procedural problems which might well have
been foreseen in this field of intensive competition (Schering Canada Inc.
v. Nu-Pharm Inc. (1996), 68 C.P.R. (3d) 332 (F.C.).
[15]
The
NOC Regulations were introduced in 1993. Prior to that time Canada had
a compulsory licence scheme, whereby upon making certain showings, a person
could obtain a compulsory licence from the Commissioner of Patents to work in Canada inventions
covered by a patent directed to a food or medicine. Compulsory licences were
dropped in 1993 and replaced by the NOC Regulations (Biolyse,
paragraphs 6 to 12). The Regulations are modelled rather imperfectly upon
similar provisions in the United States under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) codified as amended at 21
U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (1994), 180 A.L.R. Fed. 487 (officially
cited as Patent Laws and Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984).
[16]
The
Supreme Court in AstraZeneca has taken great pains to remind us that the
NOC Regulations were enacted pursuant to section 55.2(4) of the Patent
Act R.S.C. 1985, c.P-4, whose purpose was to permit early working of a
patented invention by persons such as generic drug companies for the purpose of
obtaining regulatory approval for their drugs so that they could enter the
market at an appropriate time (AstraZeneca, paragraphs 15, 16 and 38).
As stated in Biolyse, paragraph 50, Parliament recognized that early working
provisions could be abused thus created a balance designed to strengthen the hand
of patent owners against generic competitors.
[17]
An
earlier statement by the Supreme Court in Merck Frosst at paragraph 30
that the purpose of the NOC Regulations was simply to prevent patent
infringement by delaying the issuance of an NOC until such time as their
implementation in would not result in such infringement must be tempered by
what has been said by that Court in Biolyse and AstraZeneca recited
above. As stated in Biolyse at paragraph 53, it is not every use of a
patented invention that will trigger NOC Regulations.
[18]
With
the objects of the NOC Regulations in mind, the procedure established
shows that the Minister and two other parties are from time to time engaged in
the process. One party is identified as a “first person” who is defined in
section 2 and 4(1) of the Regulations as “a person who files or has filed a
submission for, or has been issued an NOC …”. This person is sometimes called
the “innovator” or “brand” drug company and, as provided in section 4(2)(c) of
the Regulations can be the owner of a pertinent patent or a licencee thereof,
or simply be a person who has the patent owner’s consent to deal with the
patent in respect of the Regulations.
[19]
The
other party is called a “second person’ and is defined in section 2 of the
Regulations with reference to section 5(1). This definition is the nub
of the disputes now before this Court. It is repeated in full. This definition
was changed by amendments effective October 5, 2006 therefore the old and new versions
are set out:
Old Version
5.(1)
Where a person files or has filed a submission for a notice of compliance in
respect of a drug and compares that drug with, or makes reference to, another
drug for the purpose of demonstrating bioequivalence on the basis of
pharmaceutical and, where applicable, bioavailability characteristics and
that other drug has been marketed in Canada pursuant to a notice of
compliance issued to a first person and in respect of which a patent list has
been submitted, the person shall, in the submission, with respect to each
patent on the register in respect of the other drug.
…
|
5.(1)
Lorsqu’une personne dépose ou a déposé une demande d’avis de conformité pour
une drogue et la compare, ou fait référence, à une autre drogue pour en démontrer
la bioequivalence d’après les caractéristiques pharmaceutiques et, la cas
echeant, les caracteristiques en malibre de biodisponibilité, cette autre
drogue ayant été commercialisée au Canada aux termes d’un avis de conformité
délivré à la première personne et à l’égard de laquelle une liste de brevets
a été soumise, elle doit inclure dans la demande, à l’égard de chaque brevet
inserit au registre qui se rapporte à cette autre drogue :
…
|
New Version
5. (1) If a second person files a submission
for a notice of compliance in respect of a drug and the submission directly
or indirectly compares the drug with, or makes reference to, another drug
marketed in Canada under a notice of compliance issued to a first person and
in respect of which a patent list has been submitted, the second person
shall, in the submission, with respect to each patent on the register in
respect of the other drug,
…
|
5. (1) Dans le cas où la seconde personne dépose une
présentation pour un avis de conformité à l’égard d’une drogue, laquelle
présentation, directement ou indirectement, compare celle ci à une autre
drogue commercialisée sur le marché canadien aux termes d’un avis de
conformité délivré à la première personne et à l’égard de laquelle une liste
de brevets a été présentée — ou y fait renvoi —, cette seconde personne doit,
à l’égard de chaque brevet ajouté au registre pour cette autre drogue,
inclure dans sa présentation :
…
|
[20]
Sometimes
a “second person” is simply referred to as a “generic” however one must be
careful, particularly in the circumstances of these proceedings, not to
interchange those words too readily. The issue here is whether and when a
“generic” becomes a “second person” as defined the the NOC Regulations.
[21]
At
this point consideration is given to section 7(1) of the transitional
provisions included in the October 5, 2006 amendments to the Regulations as
that section purports to affect section 5(1). It states:
7. (1) Subsection 5(1) of the Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations, as enacted by section 2 of these
Regulations, applies to a second person who has filed a submission referred
to in subsection 5(1) prior to the coming into force of these Regulations and
the date of filing of the submission is deemed to be the date of the coming
into force of these Regulations.
|
7. (1) Le paragraphe 5(1) du Règlement sur les
médicaments brevetés (avis de conformité), édicté par l’article 2 du
présent règlement, s’applique à toute seconde personne qui a déposé la
présentation visée à ce paragraphe avant l’entrée en vigueur du présent
règlement, et la date de dépôt de cette
présentation est réputée être la date d’entrée
en vigueur du présent règlement.
|
[22]
The
full impact of the changes to section 5(1) brought about by the October 5, 2006
amendments does not need to be addressed here since the issue in these
proceedings is whether or not the particular generic at issue was a “second
person’ in the circumstances of events occurring before October 5, 2006. If
the generic was not a “second person” then section 5(1) was never engaged, thus
the transitional provisions are of no effect. If the generic was a “second
person” then it was such a person well before October 5, 2006 and would have
had to take the steps provided for by that section well before that time in any
event.
[23]
The
process devised by the NOC Regulations begins with section 3(1) (of the
old Regulations, it is now section 3(2), the wording is similar). That section
provides for a Register upon which patents may be listed by a “first person”.
That section imposes a duty on the Minister not only to maintain that list, but
to determine what patents may go on the list and to remove patents that have
been listed improperly. That is a particular duty imposed on the Minister (Novopharm
Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1998), 78
C.P.R. (3d) 54 (FC) at paragraph 19). At this stage a generic has no role. A
generic cannot compel the Minister to list or de-list a patent (Apotex Inc.
v. Canada (Minister of
National Health and Welfare), (2000), 3 C.P.R. (4th) 1 (F.C.A.)).
Where an innovator challenges the Minister’s decision in Court a generic has
not been allowed to intervene (Warner-Lambert Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of
Health),
(2000), 8 C.P.R. (4th) 302 (F.C.)). At this stage a listing does
not affect any particular generic.
[24]
The
criteria as to whether a patent is to be listed or not are set out in section 4
of the Regulations. There are a number of criteria, the most important of
which for purposes of this discussion is that the patent contains a claim for
the medicine or use of the medicine for which the particular NOC was granted,
section 4(2)(b) of the pre-October 5, 2006 (post October 5, 2006, Regulations
section 4(2) speak of a medicinal ingredient or use of a medicinal ingredient –
the distinction is not relevant here).
[25]
There
has been much jurisprudence discussing the nature and extent to which a link
between the medicine or use provided for in the innovator’s NOC must correspond
to the innovation claimed in the patent sought to be listed. It need not be
reviewed here. The important point to make is that there may be several NOCs
respecting a drug and patents are listed as against a particular NOC.
[26]
Once
a patent is listed, the Minister places any application for an NOC sought by a
generic in respect of the innovator’s particular NOC corresponding to that
list, on “patent hold”. That is, the Minister will not further process the
generic’s application until the generic has successfully dealt with the listed
patents in some way contemplated by the NOC Regulations, or those
patents expire, or, as AstraZeneca points out, the generic can
demonstrate that it is not a “second person” as described in the Regulations
and thus does not need to address the patents at all.
[27]
Previous
to the decision of the Supreme Court in AstraZeneca supra, the
practice has been that the generic would send to the listing party (the first
party) a letter, usually called a notice of allegation (NOA). That notice
would raise one or more of the grounds for allegation set out in section 5 of
those Regulations. In brief, the grounds are:
1. the generic will
wait until the patent expires;
2. the listing party
was not the person entitled to list the patent;
3. the patent has
expired;
4. the patent is not
valid;
5. the patent will not
be infringed.
[28]
There
is no specific provision in section 5 whereby a generic can allege, in its notice
to the innovator, that the patent should not have been listed in the first
place or that the generic is not required to address the patents listed at all.
[29]
The
innovator, upon receiving a notice of allegation can do nothing, in which case,
after 45 days have expired, the Minister is free to grant an NOC to the
generic. Doing nothing, or even losing proceedings subsequently instituted
does nothing to impair the innovator’s ability to commence and pursue an
ordinary patent infringement action. The innovator may, alternatively, choose
to institute proceedings under the provisions of section 6 (1) of the NOC
Regulations. Those proceedings may engage some or all of the listed
patents and some or all of the allegations raised by the generic. It is the
choice of the innovator at that point.
[30]
While
the Minister has a duty to issue an NOC promptly under the Food and Drug
Regulations, section 7 of the NOC Regulations require the Minister
to wait for up to 24 months before issuing such an NOC unless it is shown that
the innovator has done nothing for 45 days or that the proceedings instituted
by the innovator have been concluded in favour of the generic. This is a
legislated stay, it is not imposed by the Court order, it is imposed by the
Regulations. In Merck Frosst the Supreme Court of Canada at paragraph
33 described such a stay as “draconian”.
[31]
Once
proceedings are instituted, which in this Court is by way of a Notice of
Application naming the Minister and generic as respondents, the generic may,
under section 6 (5) (a) of the NOC Regulations move to strike the
proceedings on the basis that an asserted patent should never have been listed
in the first place. This is the first opportunity specifically given to the
generic for doing so. Section 6 (5) (b) permits the generic to move to strike
the proceedings for abuse and the like.
[32]
Thus
it would appear that a generic must wait until proceedings are commenced before
it can engage the issue as to whether the patent should have been listed at all
having regard to the provisions of section 4 of the NOC Regulations. As
discussed, the jurisprudence indicates that a generic cannot compel the
Minister directly to de-list a patent nor intervene in proceedings respecting
listings brought by the innovator.
[33]
The
AstraZeneca decision, supra has brought a new dimension to this
procedure. It has held that a generic need not address at all certain listed
patents under certain circumstances.
Understanding
AstraZeneca
[34]
Before
considering the meaning and effect of the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in AstraZeneca, it is necessary to consider the processes
involved in obtaining an NOC under the Food and Drug Regulations and the
listing of patents under the NOC Regulations.
[35]
Under
the Food and Drug Regulations an innovator will, on seeking an NOC to
market a new drug in Canada, file a great deal of information with the Minister
respecting that drug’s safety and effectiveness. In time, after much
discussion, Ministerial approval may be given and an NOC issued. That NOC is
indexed under the trade name for the drug; here in the case of Sanofi-Aventis,
it is ALTACE, and in the case of Ferring, it is DDAVP. A file number is given
to the submission for an NOC; however, that number can change in given
circumstances. In considering the submissions the Minister refers to the
subject as a “drug product” which, in accordance with the Minister’s policy
statements, is a term used to describe a collection of attributes concerning
the drug itself, the uses for which the drug is approved and its packaging and
labelling including a product monograph.
[36]
The
NOC that is issued will specify the manufacturer (not necessarily the actual
maker but the source of the drug for the Canadian market-place), the active
ingredient(s), the trade name, the permitted uses (indications) for the drug,
dosage strength (e.g. 5 mg or 10 mg, etc.) and dosage form (e.g. tablets,
capsules, parenteral, etc.) It is to be noted that what is not specified in
the NOC itself are things like what are the non-medicinal ingredients
(excipients), how the drug is actually made, or how the purity of the drug is
tested.
[37]
Labelling,
which the Minister considers to include packaging, labels and the product
monograph, is attached to the NOC. The product monograph is a document of a few
score of pages, available to the public, including health professionals, that
contains a great deal of technical information about the drug, specifications
of the active ingredient(s), the excipients, instructions for use, precautions,
certain test data and references to source material.
[38]
From
time to time changes are made to the drug labelling, conditions of manufacture,
corporate structure of the manufacturer, uses approved for the drug and other
matters. The Minister is to be kept advised as to these changes. Some changes
are considered relatively trivial and the innovator simply gives notice of the
change to the Minister. Other changes are considered more important and the
innovator must give notice to the Minister and receive approval before making
them. The most important of these changes require that a new NOC be issued
before the changes can be made. Section C.08.003(2) of the Food and Drug
Regulations sets out these changes that require a new NOC. They are:
C.08.003. (2) The matters specified for the purposes of subsection (1),
in relation to the new drug, are the following:
(a) the description of the new drug;
(b) the brand name of the new drug or
the identifying name or code proposed for the new drug;
(c) the specifications of the
ingredients of the new drug;
(d) the plant and equipment used in
manufacturing, preparation and packaging the new drug;
(e) the method of manufacture and the
controls used in manufacturing, preparation and packaging the new drug;
(f) the tests applied to control the
potency, purity, stability and safety of the new drug;
(g) the labels used in connection with
the new drug;
(h) the representations made with
regard to the new drug respecting
(i) the recommended route of
administration of the new drug,
|
C.08.003. (2)
Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), les éléments ayant trait à la drogue
nouvelle sont les suivants :
a) sa
description;
b) sa
marque nominative ou le nom ou code sous lequel il est proposé de
l'identifier;
c) les
spécifications de ses ingrédients;
d) les
installations et l'équipement à utiliser pour sa fabrication, sa préparation
et son emballage;
e) la
méthode de fabrication et les mécanismes de contrôle à appliquer pour sa
fabrication, sa préparation et son emballage;
f) les
analyses effectuées pour contrôler son activité, sa pureté, sa stabilité et
son innocuité;
g) les
étiquettes à utiliser pour la drogue nouvelle;
h) les
observations faites relativement :
(i) à la voie
d'administration recommandée pour la drogue nouvelle,
|
[39]
Some
changes, such as change of name, have no effect on the drug itself. Other
changes, such as changes to a method of manufacture, have potential to change
the drug itself. Yet other changes, such as changes in use of the drug, do not
affect the drug itself but serve to expand or vary the market for the drug. The
Minister, in looking at such changes, may say that the “drug product” (i.e.
drug plus use plus packaging) has changed, but the fact remains that the
chemistry of the “drug” has not.
[40]
A
new NOC will issue when changes occur in the areas listed in section
C.08.003(2) of the Regulations set out above. Where the change is one where the
manufacturer has changed or corporate entity merged or the like has happened,
the file number of the NOC may change. The new NOC will bear the date of issue
and certain information such as changed indications, or changed labelling or
product monograph. Each new NOC is considered to incorporate all previous NOCs
issued for the drug, together with the new changes.
[41]
Turning
to the NOC Regulations, they permit an innovator or its nominee to list
certain patents on a Register kept by the Minister. Those are the patents that
a “second person” must at a later time address. Section 4(3) of the Regulations
states that the innovator must submit such a list at the time that it files a
submission for an NOC. It is to be noted that any NOC submission that will
serve to provide a vehicle for providing a patent list. Thus, a submission for
a simple name change has been used to submit a new patent to be listed.
[42]
Sections
4(4) and 4(5) of the NOC Regulations, as they stood pre-October 5, 2006,
also permitted patents that had not yet been issued to be added to the patent
list provided that the patent had been applied for before the particular NOC submission
had been filed and the patent is added within 30 days from its issuance. Since there
can be many NOCs in respect of a drug, section 4(5) requires that where patents
are added, the innovator must specify the particular NOC to which the patents
are to apply.
[43]
Another
complexity must be added. Canada adheres to international conventions and
treaties respecting patents, including the Paris Convention and the Patent Co‑Operation
Treaty (PCT). In accordance with the Convention, a party may file a preliminary
patent application in a member country and, within a year, file a more
substantial application and, if there is identical subject matter with the
earlier application, a “priority” can be claimed for that subject matter, the
effect of which would be to make certain public disclosures by third parties irrelevant
for purposes of novelty or obviousness. The substantive patent application can
be filed under the provisions of the PCT, which means that only one filing in
one patent office takes place, usually in the United States, Europe or Japan. The
applicant then receives a period of up to about three years in which it can
file separate patent applications in all or whichever of the 130 or so member
countries of the PCT it chooses. Canada is one such country. If
an application is filed in a member country (called entering the national
phase), the application is given an effective filing date of the original PCT
filing. Thus, a third party will not know for up to three years whether a
patent application has actually been filed in Canada but, when it is filed, the
application is deemed to have been filed up to three years ago. For NOC
purposes then, under section 4(4), a filing date of the patent application that
precedes the NOC submission date can be deemed even though the actual filing
date in Canada was later, the deemed filing date was earlier according to PCT
obligations.
[44]
Once
the patent application is filed with the Canadian Patent Office, it is to be
published within 18 months of its Canadian filing date. If that date is the
deemed PCT filing date, then publications can be deemed to have occurred 18
months from the deemed filing date. As of the date of publication, actual or deemed,
a conditional right to receive reasonable compensation arises which
crystallizes only if a patent is actually granted with claims that are
essentially identical to those of the published application (section 55(1)(b)
of the Patent Act). A third person such as a generic could be liable for
“infringement” if it sold a drug as claimed in the patent application at any
time after the publication date but only if and when the patent issued with
such a claim.
[45]
A
person applying for a patent in Canada can control, to a large
measure, the speed with which a patent application proceeds through the Patent
Office. An application will not be examined until the applicant requests it (Patent
Act, section 35(1)). Responses to requests made by the examiner can be made
quickly or slowly, extensions of time can be requested (Patent Rules, s.
26) and early examinations can be requested (Patent Rules, s. 28). Thus,
a potential patent infringer may be left in doubt for a long time as to whether
there will be a patent at all and if so, when and what it will claim. In the
case of some of the Sanofi-Aventis patents at issue here, the evidence shows
that it took some 10 years after the deemed Canadian application date before
the patents were issued.
[46]
This
rather long narrative of the patent process was necessary since much of the
argument about the AstraZeneca decision has to do with “early working”
of a potential invention. As can be seen, there are many unknowns involved as
to if and when a patent will issue and if and when it could be placed on a
patent list under the NOC Regulations and, if so, as against which NOC.
The issue has properly been defined as a “minefield” for a generic seeking to
enter the market. The only truly relevant time for considering a patent is the
date when it is listed against an NOC. Even then, as will be considered later,
there may be a retroactive effect.
[47]
Turning
to the AstraZeneca decision, it is the third decision given by the
Supreme Court of Canada dealing with the relatively narrow and arcane field of
the NOC Regulations. That Court started with the case of Merck Frosst
where at paragraph 33 of its Reasons, the statutory freeze imposed by those
Regulations was described as “draconian”:
33. There
may be good policy reasons for the operation of the regulatory scheme in this
fashion. However, it would be manifestly unjust to subject generic drug
producers to such a draconian regime without at least permitting them to
protect themselves and reduce the length of the presumptive injunction by
initiating the NOC process as early as possible. As I have already said, this
is not inconsistent with s. 6(2) of the Regulations, which provides only that
the court shall make an order of prohibition "if it finds that none of
those allegations is justified" a finding which can only be made, at the
earliest, on the date of hearing. Thus, an application could properly be
rejected by the Federal Court as premature if the allegation made in its
support is not justified at that time. This is sufficient, in my view, to
discourage inappropriately premature applications. On the other hand, to
interpret the Regulations in the manner urged by the respondents would
effectively be to require generic drug producers to satisfy all requirements in
s. 5 and then to wait up to an additional 30 months before marketing the
desired product. This cannot be what was intended by the Regulations.
[48]
Eight
years later the Supreme Court considered the NOC Regulations in Biolyse,
supra. In Biolyse the Court explained that the NOC Regulations
were enacted so as to permit “early working” of a patent invention respecting a
drug by permitting generics to obtain an NOC to enter the market when a patent
expired and the permitted stockpiling during the term of the patent (now no
longer a permitted exemption). These provisions provided to the innovator
companies remedies in addition to the usual remedies under the Patent Act.
The Court said, at paragraphs 11 and 12 of Biolyse:
11. However,
having agreed to respect the 20-year monopoly granted by patents, Parliament
wished to facilitate the entry of competition immediately thereafter. It acted
to eliminate the usual regulatory lag of two years or more after expiry of a patent
for the generic manufacturer to do the work necessary to obtain a NOC.
Parliament did so by introducing an exemption from the owner's patent rights
under which the generic manufacturers could work the patented invention within
the 20-year period ("the early working exception") to the extent
necessary to obtain a NOC at the time the patent(s) expired (s. 55.2(1)) and to
"stockpile" generic product towards the end of the 20-year period to
await lawful market entry (s. 55.2(2)). In order to prevent abuse of the
"early working" and "stockpiling" exceptions to patent
protection, the government enacted the NOC Regulations that are at issue
in this appeal.
12. The patent owner's
remedies under the NOC Regulations are in addition to all
of the usual remedies for patent infringement under the Patent Act.
[49]
One
year later, the Supreme Court again addressed the NOC Regulations in AstraZeneca.
At paragraph 15 of its Reasons the Court reiterated what it said in Biolyse,
the Regulations are directed at preventing infringement by those who choose to
take advantage of the “early working” provisions of section 55.2(4)d) of the Patent
Act:
15. Recognizing
that the "early working" and "stockpiling" exceptions could
be abused, Parliament balanced creation of these exceptions with implementation
of a summary procedure designed to strengthen the protection of patent owners
against generic competitors within the 20-year patent period. The
legislative solution is found in s. 55.2 of the Patent Act as follows:
55.2 (1) It is
not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell
the patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development
and submission of information required under any law of Canada, a province
or a country other than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction,
use or sale of any product. [The "early working" exception.]
(2) It is
not an infringement of a patent for any person who makes, constructs, uses or
sells a patented invention in accordance with subsection (1) to make, construct
or use the invention, during the applicable period provided for by the
regulations, for the manufacture and storage of articles intended for sale
after the date on which the term of the patent expires. [The
"stockpiling" exception.]
(3) The
Governor in Council may make regulations for the purposes of subsection (2),
but any period provided for by the regulations must terminate immediately
preceding the date on which the term of the patent expires.
(4) The
Governor in Council may make such regulations as the Governor in Council
considers necessary for preventing the infringement of a patent by any person
who makes, constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with
subsection (1) or (2) including, without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, regulations
(a) respecting the conditions that must be fulfilled before a
notice [e.g. of compliance] ... may be issued ...
(b) respecting the earliest date on which a notice [e.g. of
compliance] ... may take effect ...
(c) governing the resolution of disputes between a patentee or
former patentee and any person who applies for a notice [e.g. of compliance]
... as to the date on which that notice ... may be issued or take effect.
The grant of the regulation-making power in
s. 55.2(4) is thus expressly limited to prevention of infringement by a person
who takes advantage of the "early working" exception (s. 55.2(1)) or
(until its repeal) the stockpiling exception (s. 55.2(2)).
[50]
The
Court set out the issue presented by the generic (Apotex) at paragraph 18. If
the generic was not in the position to “early work” a patent, how could it be
subject to the Regulations at all:
18. If, as Apotex says,
it did not have the advantage of an "early working" of the
after-listed 037 and 470 patents, because they came too late and were not
incorporated in any product available to Apotex to copy, it is difficult to see
in principle why in respect of those patents Apotex should be subject to
the NOC Regulations regime, with a consequent further delay of two
years, and perhaps longer. The Apotex submission has already been pending since
April 27, 1993.
[51]
The
Court reviewed the provisions of section 4(5) of the NOC Regulations
which permit a later issued patent to be based against a specific NOC. The linkage
between the patent and a specific NOC was emphasized at paragraph 21:
21. I
emphasize the words in s. 4(5) that in the case of patents added afterwards,
"the first person must identify the submission to which the
patent list or the amendment relates, including the date on which
the submission was filed". In addition, s. 3(3) provides that
"[n]o information submitted pursuant to section 4 shall be included on the
register until after the issuance of the notice of compliance in respect
of which the information was submitted". These provisions, it seems to me,
provide an important key to understanding the scheme. Entry of the "Patent
list" does not destroy the linkage between the patent and the
submission(s) to which it relates, nor to the NOC to which the submission(s)
are directed. Specific patents are associated with one or more NDS, ANDS or
SNDS, which in turn (if approved) give rise to specific NOCs, which in turn
approve a specific manufacturer's product, which a generic manufacturer may
seek to copy. There is no linkage between the 037 and 470 patents and the
submissions that lead to the Losec 20 product copied by Apotex. Those
after-acquired patents were listed in relation to a SNDS dated January 22, 1999
by AstraZeneca for a new medical use for Losec 20 (treatment of H.
Pylori), a use for which the Apotex product is not approved, and to
an administrative SNDS submitted by AstraZeneca dated July 12, 2000, which
submission has nothing at all to do with the technology incorporated in Losec
20.
[52]
At
paragraph 22, the Court recognized that several lists in respect of several
NOCs could exist. The question was to identify which NOC, therefore which list,
was pertinent to the product that the generic copied:
22. Thus
understood, the s. 4(1) patent list in relation to a medication that goes
through various stages of development may become over time a list of lists, or
lists within a list. Section 4(5) ensures the Minister's ability to identify
the precise patents relevant to the "early working" by a generic manufacturer
of its copy-cat product. This identification is important heaving regard to the
limited purposes for which the NOC Regulations are authorized by s.
55.2(4) of the Patent Act.
[53]
The
concluding sentence of paragraph 23 of the Reasons reinforces the linkage of a
particular patent list to a particular NOC:
23. …
It is not to be presumed that s. 4(5) of the NOC Regulations insisted on
linking particular patents to particular submissions for no purpose.
[54]
This
linkage is important in considering what generation of the innovator’s drug the
generic wishes to copy. As stated by the Supreme Court, at the last sentence of
paragraph 28 of its Reasons:
28. …
If Apotex claims bioequivalence with Losec 20 it is important to be
precise about what generation of Losec 20 is the comparator drug.
[55]
This
linkage was again emphasized in the last sentence of paragraph 34 of the
Reasons which quoted from the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in the
case below:
34. …
However, as Noël J.A. also conceded, "it is the actual drug, from which
samples can be taken and used for comparative purposes, that is relevant to
the application of subsection 5(1) of the NOC Regulations" (para.
46 (emphasis added)).
[56]
The
Court then pointed out that the facts of the particular case before it led to
the conclusion that there could have been only one drug that could have been
used as a comparator, one that the innovator had discontinued marketing several
years ago. This does not mean that the decision is only relevant to
discontinued drugs. It simply means that, in that case, the comparator drug was
easily identified. As stated in paragraph 37:
37. The
whole obligation incurred by the generic manufacturer under the NOC
Regulations is based on its "early working" of patents embodied in
"another drug for the purpose of demonstrating bio-equivalence". The
only drug that fits the description is the version of Losec 20 approved
in the June 19, 1989 NOC.
[57]
The
Supreme Court then specifically addressed “The Broader Statutory Purpose”
of the NOC Regulations at paragraph 38 to 41 of its Reasons. The last
sentence of paragraph 39 clearly states that the generic only needs to address
that cluster of patents listed as against the particular NOC pertinent to the
generation of drug which it copied:
39. … In my view, s. 5(1)
of the NOC Regulations requires a patent-specific analysis, i.e. the
generic manufacturer is only required to address the cluster of patents listed
against submissions relevant to the NOC that gave rise to the comparator drug,
in this case the 1989 version of Losec 20.
[58]
In
paragraph 40, the Court recognized that if a later NOC was issued and the
generic made reference to it for a specific reason, that is, for purposes of
demonstrating bioequivalence, then patents listed against the later NOC would
also have to be addressed:
40. If
AstraZeneca had brought to market a Losec 20 product pursuant to the
later NOCs and if Apotex had made reference to that modified product for the
purpose of demonstrating bioequivalence, Apotex would have been required to
file a notice of allegation with respect to the 037 and 470 patents.
[59]
It
is important to note that the Supreme Court was quite specific in paragraph 40
as to the reason for the reference, it was for demonstrating bioequivalence. Section
5(1) of the NOC Regulations are specific in stating that a person is
only required to take steps to issue a notice of allegation to the innovator
who has listed patents (thus become a “second person”) if:
·
that
person has filed for an NOC;
·
that
person has compared reference or made reference to another drug;
·
for
the purposes of demonstrating bioequivalence;
·
and
that other drug has been marketed in Canada pursuant to an NOC; and
·
there
is a patent list pertinent to that NOC.
[60]
These
requirements are cumulative. Thus, if there is no comparison or reference for
the purpose of bioequivalence, section 5(1) is not triggered.
[61]
If
section 5(1) is not triggered, then the generic is not a “second person” and is
not required to file a notice of allegation. The NOC Regulations do not
come into play. The Supreme Court said, at paragraph 41 of its Reasons:
41. However,
it is clear that AstraZeneca did not market any product pursuant to the
subsequent NOCs and that the preconditions to any obligations of Apotex under
s. 5(1) were therefore not triggered.
Was the
Minister’s Position Correct?
[62]
There
is no specific procedure in the NOC Regulations whereby a generic can
inform the Minister or the Minister can inform the generic that certain
patents, even if properly listed, need not be addressed having regard to the
particular circumstances in which the generic finds itself. There is no
specific procedure in the NOC Regulations obliging either the generic or
the Minister to bring notice of those circumstances to the listing innovator or
give to the innovator it an opportunity to make submissions. Further, there is
no specific provision requiring that the question as to whether the generic
should address certain listed patents at all in its particular circumstances be
raised or addressed in any proceedings instituted under section 6 of the NOC
Regulations.
[63]
As
soon as the AstraZeneca decision was released in early November, 2006,
the Minister, with some prompting from some generics, set about to devise a
process for dealing with the question of setting a procedure for dealing with
whether a generic is required to address any particular listed patent. This
process is set out in affidavits of Anne Elizabeth Bowes, Associate Director of
the Therapeutic Products Directorate (TPD) which is the branch of the
Minister’s department dealing with the NOC Regulations. This process
involves only ANDS applications submitted by generics prior to the change in
the NOC Regulations of October 5, 2006. Ms. Bowes explains that it
involves two steps:
1.
First, the date on which the generic has purchased the comparator drug is used
to determine which notices of compliance have been issued in respect of that
comparator drug. The position of the Minister is that all patents listed in
respect of the relevant NOC as of that date must be addressed by the generic.
2. Second,
where further NOC’s have been issued to the innovator after the date of the
purchase of the comparator drug, the Minister makes a determination as to
whether the generic has made use of changes made to the comparator drug since
the original date of purchase. If the generic has made use of such changes,
then all patents added to the patent list subsequent to the date of purchase as
are pertinent to the changes of which the generic has taken advantage must be
addressed.
[64]
The
evidence shows that the Minister has regard to submissions made by the generic
or its lawyers as to the date of purchase of the comparator drug and whether
the generic has taken advantage of any subsequent NOC’s issued to the
innovator. As well, the Minister has regard to matters that are self evident
on the record of the ANDS application by the generic, such as the date upon
which data respecting the comparator drug was filed so as to establish a latest
date upon which such drug could have been purchased. The “default date” for
establishing the purchase of the comparator drug, in the absence of other
information, is taken to be the filing date of the ANDS.
[65]
I
find that the policy adopted by the Minister is consistent with the reasoning
of the Supreme Court of Canada in AstraZeneca and the applicable
provisions of the NOC Regulations and Food and Drug Regulations.
If I were to modify the policy, I would do so in two respects. First, the date
of purchase of the comparator drug is not a date that is required by the
provisions of either Regulation to be recorded or submitted. It is a date, the
existence of which is known only to the generic purchasing the drug. A better
date would be the filing date of the ANDS by the generic as that is a date of
record and is, logically, the last date upon which the comparator drug could
have been obtained by the generic. Second, with respect to the second criteria,
the changes made by the generic must be those as specified in section 5(1) of
the NOC Regulations, namely, for purposes of bioequivalence. This would
be consistent with AstraZeneca. These suggestions, even if they had been
implemented by the Minister before arriving at the decisions he did, would not
have changed the results of those decisions or this decision of the Court.
TRIPS
[66]
Counsel
for Ferring raised in oral argument, but not in that party’s factum, an
assertion that Canada’s Patent Act, including the NOC Regulations,
failed to comply with Canada’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(“TRIPS”) a World Trade Organization agreement to which Canada is a
signatory. This agreement was implemented into the laws of Canada by the World
Trade Organization Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1994, c. 47 and
appears at Annex 1C of that Act. That Act prohibits any action claiming a right
claimed to arise out of the TRIPS agreement without the consent of the Attorney
General of Canada. There has been no such consent in these proceedings.
[67]
Article
41 of TRIPS obliges member countries such as Canada to ensure
that there are effective enforcement procedures available to permit effective
action to deter infringement of rights such as patent rights and to provide
expeditious remedies. Ferring’s counsel asserts that Canada’s Patent
Act and the NOC Regulations fall short of such obligations. I would
be prepared to dispose of such argument summarily since it was not raised in
Ferring’s memorandum and was only raised in oral argument at the hearing. Such
an argument would require proper evidence before it could be properly adjudicated
upon. Simple assertions by counsel are insufficient.
[68]
Justice
Snider of this Court has rejected a similar argument recently in Laboratoires
Servier v. Apotex Inc., 2006 FC 1493 at paragraphs 76 to 79. I fully agree
with her analysis and conclusion. Therefore, I reject the argument that the Patent
Act and NOC Regulations do not comply with TRIPS. To the extent that
counsel seeks to nuance this agreement to state that somehow the NOC
Regulations must be read in a manner so as to be aggressively interpreted
in enforcing patent rights in light of TRIPS. I regret that argument. I have
determined the legal effect of those Regulations in accordance with the ordinary
principles established in Canadian law. TRIPS affords no particular bias.
Standard of
Review of Minister’s Decisions
[69]
It
is common ground between all parties that, in a judicial review proceeding such
as this, a decision of the Minister that is based on a determination of law is
to be reviewed upon a standard of correctness (AstraZeneca, paragraph
25). Where the Minister’s decision involves factual determinations and actions
based on such determinations, his decisions are entitled to deference. Kelen J.
of this Court reviewed extensively the degree of deference owed to the Minister
in such circumstances in AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of
Health) (2004), 36 C.P.R. (4th) 519 and at paragraph 36 of his
Reasons concluded that the standard was that of reasonableness. That conclusion
was affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal at paragraph 2 of their Reasons
reported at (2005), 40 C.P.R. (4th) 353. In such circumstances,
therefore, I will apply the standard of reasonableness, that is, the Minister’s
decision is entitled to deference; however, it must be understood that a
somewhat probing examination of the basis for the decision should be
undertaken.
Was the
Minister Functus?
[70]
Ferring
and Sanofi-Aventis argue that, at some point in the process, the Minister had
made decisions as to the status of the generics’ applications, such that the
Minister could not address or re‑address the issue as to whether the
generics were, in fact, “second persons” within the contemplation of the NOC
Regulations.
[71]
To
consider this issue, the course of the decisions to be made by the Minister
should be traced. First, under the Food and Drug Regulations, supra,
the Minister must examine an ANDS filed by a generic to determine if the drug
is bioequivalent with the Canadian reference product (section
C.08.002.1(1)(b)). Then the Minister must, based on information provided by the
generic, determine if the drug is safe and effective (section C.08.002.1(2)).
After completing an examination of the application and being satisfied, the
Minister shall issue an NOC (section C.08.002(1)(a)). As previously discussed,
the Minister has a duty to issue the NOC without delay (Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney
General),
[1994] 1 F.C. 742 (C.A.).
[72]
However,
at the point where the Minister would otherwise issue an NOC, the NOC
Regulations intervene. Section 7 of the NOC Regulations direct that
the Minister is not to issue an NOC before the latest of:
(a) (deleted);
(b) the day on which a
“second person” complies with section 5, that is, sends to the innovator who
has listed patents a notice of allegation;
(c) the date the patents expire;
(d) a notice of
allegation has been sent, 45 days have expired, and the innovator has done
nothing; and
(e) the innovator has
taken legal proceedings and 24 months have expired.
[73]
Subsequent
subsections make provision for the settlement or withdrawal of legal action and
expiry of relevant patents. If successful, the legal action prohibits the
Minister from issuing an NOC until the relevant patents expire.
[74]
Thus,
where the Minister is at the point of issuing an NOC, he must have regard to relevant
patents listed under the provisions of the NOC Regulations. If there are
relevant patents, the Minister puts the application on “patent hold”. Until the
Supreme Court decision of AstraZeneca, the “patent hold” would remain
until the transpiration of events under section 7 of the NOC Regulations.
[75]
AstraZeneca has told us
that section 7 only applies where a generic is a “second person” as provided
for in section 5(3)(d) of the NOC Regulations. As has happened in the
cases presently before this Court, the Minister has been persuaded that the
relevant generic is not such a “second person” in all cases but one.
[76]
The
innovators say that the Minister is functus and cannot visit the issue
as to whether a generic is a second person since there have been events which
preclude that from happening. These events are one or more of:
1. The
placing of the application on “patent hold” until section 7 plays out;
2. The
sending of a notice of allegation by the generic to the innovator under section
5(1); or
3. The
institution of proceedings in this Court by the innovator.
[77]
Neither
the Food and Drug Regulations nor the NOC Regulations make any
provision for the Minister to act like a tribunal, or to hear evidence, or to
consider submissions or to make rulings. The Minister is not acting in a
judicial or quasi-judicial role unlike that which was considered, for instance,
in Chandler v. Alberta Association of Architects, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848.
In that case, the Supreme Court stated at pages 861 to 864 that the doctrine of
functus officio which precludes a tribunal from reopening a decision
once made, should not be applied rigorously in respect of every sort of administrative
ruling.
[78]
In
the present case, the Minister is acting in a purely administrative capacity,
he is processing an ANDS from its submission to the issuance of an NOC. From
time to time, information is provided or sought and obtained and steps are
taken by the Minister. The Minister is not acting as a tribunal at all (Novopharm
Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1998), 78 C.P.R.
(3rd) 54 at paragraph 16 (F.C.) and Saskatchewan Wheat Pool
v. Canada (Canadian Grain Commissioner) (2004), 260 F.T.R. 310
at para. 24). This role is a continuing one of the type considered by the
Supreme Court of Canada in Comeau’s Sea Foods Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans) (1997), 142 D.L.R. (4th) 193. The
Minister, as explained by the Supreme Court in Comeau’s Sea Foods at
paragraphs 39 to 51 of its Reasons, is entitled to visit and revisit
circumstances from time to time as conditions change and new issues arise. It
is only when the final step is taken, in that case, the issuing of a fishing
licence, can the issue of functus arise. Here that final step is the
issuance of an NOC.
[79]
The
process here is analogous to considerations given by the Commissioner of
Patents under the Patent Act, supra, as to whether he will
entertain an application for a compulsory licence (Merck and Co. v. Brantford
Chemicals Inc. (2005), 37 C.P.R. (4th) 481 (F.C.A.)), or as to
whether he will involve a person who is not the person applying for a patent at
the point when the patent is allowed (Monsanto & Co. v. Canada
(Commissioner of Patents) (2000), 1 C.P.R. (4th) 500 (F.C.)). In
such situations, the actions of the Commissioner, or here the Minister, cannot
be and to be of such finality that they cannot be revisited where appropriate.
[80]
Even
in circumstances where the final step has been taken such as a prohibition
against the Minister from issuing an NOC by a Court order, the matter has been
revisited where the underlying patent has been held, in other proceedings, to
be invalid (Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Health and
Welfare), [1999] F.C.J. No. 662 at para. 14).
[81]
I
find, therefore, that the Minister cannot be said to have been functus
at any point in the process. The Minister is entitled, at a point where
appropriate, to consider whether a generic is, in the circumstances of the
case, a “second person” within the meaning of section 5(1) of the NOC
Regulations.
[82]
Does
the fact that Court proceedings have been commenced under the provisions of
section 6(1) of the NOC Regulations make any difference? Can the
Minister consider the status of a generic as a “second person” or not, after
such proceedings have been taken? Can the Minister issue an NOC once such
proceedings have been taken on the basis that the generic is not, in fact, a
“second person”?
[83]
The
NOC Regulations are a legislative scheme without which the Minister
would be obliged to issue an NOC without delay. Section 7 imposes a
legislative, not Court-ordered, stay on the issuing of an NOC until the expiry
of certain events, some of which contemplate Court proceedings. The Court
proceedings would not take place at all if a generic were not a “second
person”. Until the Supreme Court handed down its decision in AstraZeneca
in November 2006, the Minister and the generic were not sufficiently alert to
the issues as to what constitutes a “second person”.
[84]
The
Minister is charged with a duty to issue an NOC without delay. If the Minister
is persuaded that a particular generic in particular circumstances is not
caught up with the NOC Regulations, then a proper exercise of his duty,
notwithstanding Court proceedings, which owe their existence only to the NOC
Regulations, is to issue the NOC. As Reed J. said in Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), [1999]
F.C.J. No. 662, an order of the Court is not necessary for a Minister to issue
an NOC where the patent underlying a prohibition order has been declared to be
invalid. Similarly here, no Order of the Court is necessary. The mere existence
of Court proceedings cannot prohibit the issuance of an NOC where the
underlying basis for the Court proceedings is a nullity.
The Specific
Proceedings
FERRING
– T-165-07
[85]
Ferring
is an innovator or “first party” that markets a drug in Canada originally
under the name MINIRIN and subsequently DDAVP. This drug is principally used to
combat bedwetting. The first NOC for that drug was granted on March 18, 1993.
[86]
Ferring
challenges the decision of the Minister to issue NOCs to each of two generics,
Apotex and Novopharm, on January 22, 2007. Ferring asserts that the Minister
should have required that each of these generics address two patents listed by
Ferring on the Register, the so-called '833 and '335 patents.
[87]
A
complete list of relevant events is attached at Schedule A. However, for
purposes of the present analysis, as instructed by the Supreme Court in AstraZeneca,
the following events are relevant:
·
March
18, 1993 – First NOC issued to Ferring;
·
September
19, 2000 – A further NOC issued to Ferring for a new indication for the drug
Patent 1, 232, 839 was listed against this NOC;
·
April
20, 2004 – Novopharm acquires a comparator drug which is a United
Kingdom
version of DDVAP found acceptable by the Minister;
·
October
19, 2004 – Apotex acquires a Canadian version of DDVAP as a comparator drug;
·
December
14, 2004 – Novopharm files its ANDS with the Minister;
·
February
16, 2005 – Patent 1,232,839 expires;
·
September
6, 2005 – Apotex files its ANDS with the Minister;
·
November
21, 2005 – A further NOC issued to Ferring respecting a new manufacturing
process and slightly adjusted formulation;
·
December
7, 2005 – The '833 patent was added to the list respecting the
November 21, 2005 NOC;
·
February
8, 2006 – The '335 patent was added to the list respecting the
November 21, 2005 NOC;
·
June
27-28, 2006 – Apotex sends a notice of allegation on Ferring respecting the
'335 and '833 patents;
·
August
11, 2006 – Ferring commences proceedings under section 6(1) of the NOC
Regulations against Apotex;
·
October
31, 2006 – Novopharm’s application is put on “patent hold”;
·
November
3, 2006 – AstraZeneca decision released;
·
January
23, 2007 – The Minister issues NOC to each of Apotex and Novopharm.
[88]
As
can be seen, when each of Apotex and Novopharm purchased their comparator drugs
and when each filed their ANDS, the NOC that was extant at the time was that of
September 14, 2000. The '833 and '335 patents were not added until the further NOC
granted to Ferring on November 21, 2005. That further NOC could not have been
used by either Apotex or Novopharm for purposes of bioequivalence since
bioequivalence studies would have been filed with their ANDS which preceded
November 21, 2005.
[89]
Thus,
in accordance with AstraZeneca, the Minister, in doing a patent specific
analysis, needed to look only at patents listed against the NOC extant as of
the filing of the ANDS by the generics (or purchase date of comparator drugs).
The only relevant patent listed there was a Canadian patent 1,232,839, which
expired on February 16, 2005. Thus, no relevant patent remained in respect to
any NOC relevant to the generics.
[90]
The
fact that Apotex had sent a notice of allegation and proceedings had been
instituted by February is, as previously determined, irrelevant. Novopharm had
never sent a notice of allegation and no proceedings had been commenced.
[91]
I
find that the Minister’s decisions respecting Apotex and Novopharm were
correct.
Duty of Fairness
[92]
Ferring
makes a further argument that the decisions of the Minister were made without
warning to Ferring and giving it an opportunity to be heard. This, argues
Ferring, is unfair and contrary to the principles of natural justice.
[93]
The
Minister submits that the decision is administrative in nature and there is
nothing in the NOC Regulations or Food and Drug Regulations that
obliges him to advise an innovator who has listed patents as to whether a
generic is seeking an NOC or to afford the innovator a right to be heard before
a decision is made.
[94]
The
parties refer to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at
paragraphs 21 to 28 for the purposes of considering what the duty of fairness
might require in any particular circumstances. L'Heureux-Dube J. said in the
majority decision at paragraph 21 of that decision that the concept is eminently
variable and depends on the particular circumstances in each case. In paragraph
23 she stated that the closer a procedure is to a judicial process, the more
likely it would be that there would be procedural protection, such as that
afforded a litigant. Second, the terms of the particular legislation must be
considered. A third consideration is the importance to the individual affected.
Fourth is the legitimate expectation of persons challenging the decision. Fifth
is the choice of procedure afforded to the decision maker.
[95]
In
considering these criteria: first, the decision of the Minister to grant an
NOC, including whether a generic is caught up in section 5(1) is administrative
in nature; second, the Regulations do not specify any form of notice or hearing
being afforded to others; third, an innovator is affected by the decision in
that it may lose an opportunity to institute proceedings under the NOC
Regulations, thus losing an opportunity to gain a two-month stay, however,
this is an exceptional remedy and cannot be considered to be available as of right;
fourth, there is nothing in the Regulations such as would give an expectation to
an innovator to be consulted and heard before an NOC is given to a generic
other than to receive a notice of allegation if and when the generic is obliged
as a “second person” under section 5(1) to send such a notice, otherwise all
proceedings are confidential as between the generic and the Minister; fifth,
there is no choice given to the Minister as to whether to engage the innovator
or not.
[96]
There
is no history of the Minister notifying an innovator or affording it an
opportunity to be heard during the process of granting an NOC to a generic.
There is a reference, in the Trial Division Reasons in the AstraZeneca
case (2004), 36 C.P.R. (4th) 519 at paragraphs 55 and 56, to
communications between the Minister and the innovator. A review of the record
in that case indicates that the Minister wrote to the innovator on January 13,
2004, without disclosing that there was a pending NOC submission from a generic.
The Minister simply requested information as to whether the innovator’s LOSEC 20
capsules had been marketed in Canada since the date of its NOC on June 4, 1999.
The innovator was not asked to make submissions of any kind as to the impact that
the failure to market might have. There was no hearing of any kind conducted by
the Minister; there was a simple request for information.
[97]
The
Minister was not required to inform Ferring as to a generic’s pending NOC
submission; in fact, that submission is to remain confidential. Nor was the
Minister required to afford Ferring an opportunity to be heard before making a
decision as to whether the provisions of section 5(1) of the NOC Regulations
applied to the generic, or to issue an NOC to the generic.
Status of Ferring to Seek Judicial Review
[98]
Novopharm
takes issue as to the status of Ferring to seek judicial review of the
Minister’s decision that Novopharm was not a “second party” as defined in
section 5(1), whereby Novopharm received the NOC it sought without engaging the
provisions of the NOC Regulations.
[99]
Section
18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 affords any person
“directly affected” by a decision of a federal board, commission or other
tribunal the right to seek judicial review of that decision. As discussed in
respect of sections 3(1) of the NOC Regulations, a generic is not
afforded an opportunity to intervene in proceedings respecting the listing of a
patent or to seek de-listing since, at that point, no particular generic can be
seen to be “directly affected”. This is consistent with the law expressed in Rothmans
of Pall Mall Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.),
[1976] 2 F.C. 500 (F.C.A.) that a person who is simply a member of a class
generally affected by a decision, without more, has no status to seek judicial
review (see also Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Governor in Council), 2007 FC
232).
[100] It has been
found that a mere economic interest is insufficient to support status to seek
judicial review (Aventis Pharma Inc. v. Canada (Minister of
Health)
(2005), 45 C.P.R. (4th) 6 at para. 13). That decision was appealed
but the appeal was not proceeded with. In that case, the innovator, Aventis,
had apparently failed to list its patent in a timely fashion. The generic
Novopharm was awarded an NOC by the Minister. Aventis sought judicial review of
that decision. The Minister sought to strike out those portions of Aventis’
application challenging the issuance of an NOC.
[101] The Aventis
decision, particularly from paragraphs 9 to 19, indicates that Aventis first
argued before a Prothonotary of this Court that the Minister had, in issuing an
NOC, acted unfairly in respect of his analysis as to safety and effectiveness.
At the Trial Court level Aventis shifted ground and argued that it had a de
facto monopoly that was destroyed by the issuance of an NOC to a generic,
thus it was a “person interested” in seeking judicial review of the decision to
issue that NOC. It was held at paragraph 13 that the fact that Aventis did not
gain the opportunity to invoke the NOC proceedings was insufficient so as to
afford it status to seek judicial review.
[102] I make the
same finding here. As far as Novopharm is concerned, Ferring had no right to be
given notice or an opportunity to be heard before the Minister made a determination
that the generic, in its particular circumstances, did not have to engage the NOC
Regulations. Ferring retains all of its NOCs and its patent listing, they
are unaffected. Ferring retains the right to commence patent infringement
proceedings. Ferring simply lost an opportunity to commence NOC proceedings in
the Court, just as Aventis had no such right. This is merely a commercial
interest.
[103] Therefore, I
find that Ferring, in the circumstances, has no status to seek judicial review
as against Novopharm. This is a further reason why Ferring’s application will
be dismissed as against Novopharm. Apotex did not raise this issue.
Sanofi-Aventis:
General
[104] Sanofi-Aventis
is an innovator or “first party” that markets a drug in Canada under the
name ALTACE (ramapril). It has been directed toward treatment of hypertension.
The first NOC for the drug was received by Sanofi-Aventis on October 8, 1993.
Sanofi-Aventis subsequently was granted four Canadian patents, two described as
the '387 patent and the '549 patent were directed toward treatment of patients
with increased risk of cardiovascular event, these are the so-called HOPE
patents. It also received two other patents called '089 and '948 directed to
other uses which have been called non-HOPE in these proceedings. Sanofi-Aventis
has received an NOC that would permit it to market ALTACE for the HOPE indication
but has not received such approval for the non-HOPE indications. Thus, it has four
patents but can only market the product for the uses claimed in two of them.
[105] Two generics,
Apotex and Novopharm, want to market their generic versions of ALTACE in Canada but only for
old uses. They say that they do not want to market them for the HOPE or
non-HOPE indications.
[106] The Minister
issued an NOC to Apotex on December 12, 2006. However, the Minister maintained
that Novopharm had to address the non-HOPE patents by way of notice of
allegation under section 5(1) of the NOC Regulations. Sanofi-Aventis and
Novopharm have applied for judicial review of these decisions. Those
applications will now be dealt with specifically.
SANOFI-AVENTIS V. NOVOPHARM – T-2188-06
NOVOPHARM
V. SANOFI-AVENTIS – T-2220-06
[107] These two proceedings
are closely related and can be addressed together. Attached as Schedule B is a
more complete listing of relevant events; however, the following are the most
pertinent:
·
October
8, 1993 – Sanofi-Aventis receives its first NOC respecting ALTACE;
·
February
13, 2001 – Sanofi-Aventis receives a further NOC respecting ALTACE (submission
066094);
·
June
22, 2001 – Novopharm purchases ALTACE for use as a comparator drug;
·
December
24, 2001 – Novopharm files an ANDS for its generic version of ALTACE;
·
October
14, 2003 – Novopharm’s submissions approved but put on “patent hold”;
·
November
6, 2003 – Sanofi-Aventis granted a further NOC (submission 082094);
·
November
10, 2003 – The '089 patent (non-HOPE) added to patent list respecting NOC
066094;
·
June
25, 2004 – the '948 patent (non-HOPE) added to patent list respecting NOC
066094;
·
March
17, 2005 – The '549 patent (HOPE) added to patent list respecting NOC 082026;
·
June
28, 2005 - '387 patent (HOPE) added to patent list respecting NOC 082094;
·
September
14, 2005 – Novopharm serves a notice of allegation on Sanofi-Aventis respecting
the two HOPE and two non-HOPE patents;
·
October
31, 2005 – Sanofi-Aventis commences NOC proceedings in the Court respecting all
four patents;
·
November
3, 2006 – AstraZeneca decision released;
·
December
8, 2006 – The Minister advises Novopharm (copying Sanofi-Aventis) that
Novopharm was no longer required to address the HOPE patents but was required
to address the non-HOPE patents;
·
December
15, 2006 – Sanofi-Aventis initiates judicial review proceedings T-2188-06
respecting the Minister’s decision that Novopharm did have to address the HOPE
patents;
·
December
15, 2006 – Novopharm commences judicial review proceedings respecting the
Minister’s decision that it did have to address the non-HOPE patents.
[108] Not relevant to this
determination is an ANDS filed by Novopharm for 1.25 mg. version of its generic
drug, nor is another patent, 1,341,206 which has been dealt with in other
proceedings at the trial level and is awaiting a decision of the Court of
Appeal.
[109] The rationale for the
Minister’s decision was set out in the last two pages of his letter of December
8, 2006 as follows:
Novopharm
purchased the comparator drug, ALTACE, on June 22, 2001.
NOCs
were issued to sanofi-aventis on October 8, 1993, October 30, 1994, June 5,
1996, December 31, 1996 and February 13, 2001 for the comparator drug in
respect of submission numbers 08257, 24206, 043465, 033131 and 066094,
respectively. The '948 patent was added to the Patent register in respect of
all of these submissions. The '089 patent was added in respect of all the
submissions except for 08257 As a result, both the '948 and '089 patents must
be addressed under subsections 5(1) and 5(2) of the PM(NOC) Regulations.
After
the date of purchase of the comparator drug, an NOC was issued to
sanofi-aventis on November 6, 2003 in respect of submission number 082094. Both
the '549 and '387 patents were added to the Patent Register in respect of this
submission. Both patents, along with the '948 and '089 patents, are currently
the subject of an ongoing application for an order of prohibition in T‑1979-06.
Since Novopharm’s ANDS has been on patent hold since October 14, 2003, it
has not made use of the changes made to the comparator drug as a result of
submission 082094. Therefore, Novopharm does not have to address the '549 and
'387 patents.
Note,
however, that at this time, the TPD is unable to issue an NOC to Novopharm for
the products noted above, as, in our view, we are bound by the 24 month stay
imposed by the PM(NOC)
Regulations in respect of the prohibition proceeding in T-1979-06. You will,
therefore, be required to dispose of that proceeding prior to the issuance of
an NOC.
[110] This rationale is
consistent with the direction given by the Supreme Court in AstraZeneca.
Patents that have been listed in respect of an NOC that was in existence at the
time when the comparator drug was acquired (here it could equally have been the
date Novopharm filed its ANDS as either date was after NOC 066094 and before
NOC 082094). The Minister performed a patent specific analysis, linking the
relevant patents to the relevant NOC as directed in AstraZeneca.
[111] Novopharm argues that it
is irrational to require that it address the two non-HOPE patents since, it
argues, they could not have “early worked” these patents. Novopharm argues that
it has never sought approval from the Minister for an NOC that would include
the non-HOPE uses. Second, it argues, Sanofi-Aventis itself never received an
NOC for non-HOPE uses. Third, Novopharm argues that it obtained its reference
product before the non-HOPE patents had issued. Fourth and fifth, Novopharm
argues that AstraZeneca requires a technology-related examination of each
patent and it did not adopt the technology. Sixth, Novopharm argues that since
these patents are related to use and not a medicine itself, bioequivalence is
not a factor, only clinical studies indicating patents, thus there is no
bioequivalence.
[112] As to all of Novopharm’s
arguments, the last sentence of AstraZeneca paragraph 39 is pertinent:
39. …
In my view, s. 5(1) of the NOC Regulations requires a patent-specific
analysis, i.e. the generic manufacturer is only required to address the cluster
of patents listed against submissions relevant to the NOC that gave rise to the
comparator drug, in this case the 1989 version of Losec 20.
[113] With this statement is mind,
sections 4(4) and 4(5) of the NOC Regulations pre-October 5, 2006 (the
new Regulations contain similar provisions as sections 4(5) and 4(6)) must be
considered:
4 (4) A
first person may, after the date of filing of a submission for a notice of
compliance and within 30 days after the issuance of a patent that was issued
on the basis of an application that has a filing date that precedes the date
of filing of the submission, submit a patent list, or an amendment to an
existing patent list, that includes the information referred to in subsection
(2).
(5) When a first person submits a patent list or an
amendment to an existing patent list in accordance with subsection (4), the
first person must identify the submission to which the patent list or the
amendment relates, including the date on which the submission was filed.
|
4
(4) La première personne peut, après la date de dépôt de la demande d’avis de
conformité et dans les 30 jours suivant la délivrance d’un brevet qui est
fondée sur une demande de brevet dont la date de dépôt est antérieure à celle
de la demande d’avis de conformité, soumettre une liste de brevets, ou toute
modification apportée à une liste de brevets, qui contient les renseignements
visés au paragraphe (2).
(5) Lorsque la première personne soumet,
conformément au paragraphe (4), une liste de brevets ou une modification
apportée à une liste de brevets, elle doit indiquer la demande d’avis de
conformité à laquelle se rapporte la liste ou la modification, en précisant
notamment la date de dépôt de la demande.
|
[114] These provisions allow
patents to be listed against a previous NOC provided that the application for
the patent was filed before that NOC application was filed and the patent is
submitted for listing within 30 days of its issuance. As we have seen, some
patent applications can linger in the Patent Office for 10 years or so which
means that there is plenty of potential for listing newly issued patents
against old NOCs.
[115] Time and again it has
been said that the NOC Regulations are not a masterpiece of logic or
draughtmanship. They say what they say.
[116] AstraZeneca tells us that a generic
must address patents “linked to” the NOC that is relevant to the comparator
drug. The fact that later issued patents can be listed in respect of that NOC
is an artifact of the way the NOC Regulations are drafted.
[117] Novopharm will have to
address these patents, and did, in a notice of allegation. Sanofi-Aventis has
instituted proceedings in respect of those allegations. The matter will have to
be determined in this Court in accordance with the NOC Regulations.
SANOFI-AVENTIS V. APOTEX – T-2189-06 AND
T-2196-06
[118] These are proceedings
involving Sanofi-Aventis and another generic, Apotex. A more complete listing
of events is set out in Schedule C; however, the following events are most
pertinent:
·
October
8, 1993 – Sanofi-Aventis receives its initial NOC for ALTACE;
·
October
2002 – Apotex purchases samples of ALTACE for use as a comparator drug;
·
July
22, 2003 – Apotex files an ANDS for its generic version of ALTACE;
·
November
6, 2003 – Sanofi-Aventis receives a further NOC pursuant to its submission
082094;
·
March
17, 2005 – The 2,382,549 (HOPE) patent was added to the list respecting NOC
082094;
·
June
28, 2005 – The 2,382,387 (HOPE) patent was added to the list respecting NOC
082094;
·
November
29, 2005 – Apotex serves Sanofi-Aventis with a notice of allegation respecting
the two HOPE patents;
·
January
17, 2006 – Sanofi-Aventis commences NOC proceedings in this Court respecting
the two HOPE patents;
·
October
2006 – Sanofi-Aventis revises its product monograph;
·
November
3, 2006 – The AstraZeneca decision is released;
·
December
8, 2006 – Apotex revises its draft product monograph to incorporate some but
not all changes made by Sanofi-Aventis in its revised monograph;
·
December
12, 2006 – The Minister issues an NOC to Apotex;
·
December
14, 2006 – Apotex revises its product monograph to remove certain material.
[119] As can be seen, as of
the date that Apotex acquired the comparator drug, October 2002, and as of the
date it filed its ANDS, July 22, 2003, none of the HOPE or non-HOPE patents
were on any patent list respecting any NOC issued to Sanofi-Aventis.
Subsequently, the two non-HOPE patents '089 and '948 were added to an earlier
NOC dated February 13, 2001 as a result of the retroactive provisions of
sections 4(5) and 4(6) of the NOC Regulations. Those patents are no
longer at issue since Sanofi-Aventis proceedings in respect of them were
dismissed. The remaining two patents, the HOPE patents '549 and '387, were
added to an NOC dated November 6, 2003 which was subsequent to the filing by
Apotex of its ANDS.
[120] Having regard to the AstraZeneca
decision, the Minister, in his December 8, 2006 letter to Apotex, does not need
to address the two HOPE patents since they were not listed in respect of any
NOC in existence at the time Apotex filed its ANDS.
[121] The Minister further
said in his letter of December 8, 2006 that since Court proceedings were still
extant, those proceedings had to be terminated before an NOC issued. As I have
found, he was not correct in this regard. In any event, the Minister changed
his mind, and issued an NOC to Apotex on December 12, 2006. As I have found,
the Minister was not functus and could issue that NOC.
[122] Sanofi-Aventis raises an
issue concerning Apotex’s product monograph. They say that as of December 12,
2006, when the NOC was issued, the product monograph which was attached to the
NOC contained material copied from Sanofi-Aventis’ monograph which could
suggest that Apotex was encouraging the use of its product for the HOPE indications.
This issue, says Sanofi-Aventis, means that the Minister should have left the
matter for the Court to decide.
[123] The Minister’s letter of
December 13, 2006, to Apotex shows that he considered the product monograph. In
discussing the two HOPE patents at the third page of that letter, he said:
Those
patents were added in respect of Sanofi-Aventis S/ANDS number 082096 for a
change to the product monograph for ALTACE. A comparison of the Sanofi-Aventis
product monograph with the Apotex product monograph shows that Apotex has not incorporated
the change.
From the Minister’s letter of December 13, 2006
to Sanofi-Aventis’ lawyer, it is clear that before issuing the NOC to Apotex,
written and oral submissions were made by Sanofi-Aventis’ counsel to the
Minister and he considered them.
[124] The Affidavit of Hems,
Director of Regulatory Affairs for Apotex, sworn February 12, 2007, sets out
the history of a succession of draft product monographs filed by Apotex with
the Minister and how, in many respects, wording from Sanofi-Aventis’ product
monographs as they existed from time to time, was copied. As explained by Hems
at paragraphs 8 to 17 of his affidavit, typically the monographs of a generic
are not significantly different from that of the reference brand.
[125] Hems explains that
language specific to HOPE indications had been in draft Apotex monographs since
Apotex’s initial filing of its ANDS. This language was copied from an earlier
Sanofi-Aventis monograph of 2001, that is, from a monograph that predates the
issuances of the HOPE patents and their addition to a later NOC, by about three
years.
[126] In October 2003 Apotex
added the phrase:
…
and for the management of patents at increased risk of cardiovascular events.
to a section of the monograph dealing with
Action and Clinical Pharmacology (Hems calls this the “A and CP” language).
That monograph of October 2003 also contained what Hems calls “Plasma Language”
which is not associated with HOPE. It says:
Following
a single administration of up to 5 mg of Ramipril, plasma concentrations of
ramipril and tamiprilat increase in a manner that is greater than proportional
to dose; after a single administration of 5 mg to 20 mg of ramipril the plasma
concentrations for both are dose-proportional. The non-linear pharmacokinetics
observed at the lower doses of ramipril can be explained by the saturable
binding of ramiprilat to ACE.
[127] The December 12, 2006
monograph was attached to Apotex’s NOC materials, the old HOPE language of 2001
as well as the October 2003 A and CP language and the Plasma Language. While
irrelevant, Apotex removed the HOPE and A and CP language from a revised
monograph submitted to the Minister on December 14, 2006. This, however, was
after the issuance to Apotex of the NOC about which Sanofi-Aventis now makes an
issue. Hems was cross-examined and his evidence was not impaired.
[128] The issue before this
Court is whether the Minister’s decision to issue the NOC was reasonable having
regard to the state of Apotex’s NOC as of December 12, 2006. There is no doubt
that the Minister had the monograph before him and had received whatever
submissions Sanofi-Aventis wanted to make. There is no evidence as to the oral
submissions of Sanofi-Aventis’ counsel to the Minister, but there is in
evidence that counsel’s letter to the Minister of December 11, 2006 where,
particularly at pages 2 to 4, the monograph is addressed at length.
[129] The considerations given
by the Minister to the monograph is set out at paragraphs 66 and 67 of the
affidavit of Ann Bowes, previously referred to, sworn February 9, 2007. She
says:
66. Both the '549 and '387 patents
were added in respect of Sanofi’s S/NDS 082094. As described above in
paragraphs 43-49, the S/NDS was filed in order to, first, add wording to the
“Action and Clinical Pharmacology” section, and second, make an addition to the
“Management of Patients at Increased Risk of Cardiovascular Event” indication
of the product monograph for ALTACE. While the first change was approved, the
second was not. Furthermore, an examination of Apotex’s approvable product monograph
on patent hold, showed that Apotex did not incorporate this change. Apotex’s
draft product monograph is attached as Exhibit “P”.
67. In any event, none of the
changes that were introduced to Sanofi’s product monograph as a result of S/NDS
082094 reflected a change to the drug product, ALTACE, such that Apotex would
have to address the '549 and '387 patents.
[130] Ms. Bowes was
cross-examined on her affidavit and nothing in the transcript changes what was
said above or impairs it in any way.
[131] Apotex submitted the
Affidavit of Dr. Gordon Moe, a cardiologist, who provided an affidavit
testifying that the Plasma language had no relationship to the HOPE study or
HOPE patents. He was cross-examined and this testimony was not impaired.
[132] Dr. Bernard Sherman,
President of Apotex, provided an affidavit testifying that all HOPE language
was removed from the product monograph just after the NOC was issued to avoid
any suggestion of impropriety. Sanofi-Aventis apparently chose not to
cross-examine Dr. Sherman.
[133] Sanofi-Aventis filed the
affidavit of Laurent-Didier Jacobs, its Vice President of Medical Affairs. He
traced some of the history of Sanofi-Aventis’ and Apotex’s product monographs
but drew no conclusions. He was not cross-examined.
[134] Considering the decision
of the Minister and the record before him as well as the evidence of the
parties, it is clear that the Minister’s decision as to the Apotex product
monograph was reasonable. The Minister has expertise in these matters and
consideration of product monographs is part of what the Minister is required to
do. It cannot be said, for purposes of judicial review, that the decision
should be set aside.
[135] Therefore, the decision
of the Minister to grant an NOC to Apotex will not be set aside.
Conclusion and Costs
[136] As a result, I find that
the Minister’s decision in each case, was correct; therefore, each application
for judicial review will be dismissed. Further, Ferring’s application against
Novopharm, as part of T-165-07, will be dismissed on a second ground, raised
only by Novopharm, that Ferring lacked status to seek judicial review.
[137] As to costs, I will make
no order. Each party will bear its own costs. These are the first opportunities
any party has had to deal with the effects of the Supreme Court decision in AstraZeneca
and no party should be penalized in costs for having taken or defended these
proceedings.
“Roger
T. Hughes”