Date: 20100219
Docket: A-587-08
Citation: 2010 FCA 52
CORAM: NADON
J.A.
SEXTON
J.A.
SHARLOW
J.A.
BETWEEN:
PHILIP ANISMAN
Appellant
and
CANADA BORDER SERVICES AGENCY
and
MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NADON J.A.
[1]
On January
7, 2007, the appellant and his wife, upon returning to Canada, declared imports of three bottles of
wine (2.5 litres in total volume) having a value of $500 per bottle. As a
result, the Canada Border Services Agency (the “CBSA”) collected from the
appellant a provincial alcohol mark-up in the amount of $537.13 to be remitted
to the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (the “LCBO”).
[2]
When it
collected the aforesaid mark-up from the appellant and his wife, the CBSA
purported to act on behalf of the LCBO pursuant to an Agreement entered into on
January 19, 1993.
[3]
The
appellant subsequently requested a refund from the CBSA, which then sought
instructions from the LCBO regarding the appellant’s request. On March 2, 2007,
the LCBO informed the CBSA that the mark-up collected from the appellant was
not refundable. On April 20, 2007, the CBSA wrote to the appellant, advising
him that his request for a refund was refused.
[4]
On July
16, 2007, the appellant wrote to the CBSA, making lengthy submissions as to why
it should reconsider its April 20, 2007, decision.
[5]
After
reconsideration of the appellant’s request for a refund, the CBSA wrote to the
appellant, advising him that his request was denied.
[6]
On March
26, 2008, the appellant filed an application for judicial review of the CBSA’s
decision refusing to refund him the sum of $537.13.
[7]
On July 4,
2008, the Deputy Attorney General of Canada, acting on behalf of the respondents,
brought a motion for an order dismissing the appellant’s judicial review
application on the grounds, inter alia, that the Federal Court did not
have jurisdiction to grant the remedies requested by the appellant because the
CBSA, in collecting $537.13 from the appellant and refusing to refund it, was
not acting as a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the
meaning given to that expression in s. 2 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.
1985, c. F-7 (the “Act”).
[8]
In
response to the respondents’ motion, the appellant filed a cross-motion for an
order granting him judgment on his application for judicial review and
requiring the CBSA to refund him the sum of $537.13 on the ground, inter
alia, that the respondents were not authorized by federal legislation to
enter into the Agreement with the LCBO.
[9]
The motions
were heard by Mr. Justice Barnes of the Federal Court on September 16, 2008. On
November 21, 2008, he dismissed the two motions.
[10]
Both
parties appeal from Mr. Justice Barnes’ decision. The appellant challenges that
part of the Judge’s decision which dismissed his motion for judgment on the
merits of his application for judicial review. The respondents, on the other
hand, have filed a cross-appeal challenging the Judge’s dismissal of their
motion seeking the dismissal of the appellant’s judicial review application.
[11]
I now turn
to the decision of the Federal Court.
Decision of the Federal Court
[12]
The Judge
first dealt with the respondents’ motion to dismiss the appellant’s judicial
review application. He began his discussion with this Court’s decision in David
Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C. 588, where we
held that an application for judicial review could be dismissed summarily where
the application was, in the words of Strayer J.A. who wrote for the Court, “so clearly
improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success” (p. 600). Strayer J.A.
went on to say that such cases were exceptional and did not include cases where
there was a debate regarding the adequacy of the allegations found in the
application. This led Mr. Justice Barnes to opine that where the ground for
dismissal was one of jurisdiction, the Court could entertain the motion.
[13]
The
learned Judge then reviewed the relevant legislation, namely, s. 3.1 of the
Ontario Liquor Control Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.18 (the “Liquor Control
Act”), which allowed the LCBO to enter into agreements with the Government
of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Revenue, with respect to
liquor brought into the Province of Ontario from any place outside Canada. The
Judge pointed out that the Government of Canada and the LCBO had entered into
such an Agreement on January 19, 1993, and he reproduced the relevant
provisions of the Agreement. Because these provisions are relevant to the
determination of the appeal, I will also reproduce them:
6. The
purpose of this Agreement is to confer responsibility on the Minister of
National Revenue for the collection, on behalf of the Board, of the markup
on a specified quantity of liquor that an individual brings, or causes to be
brought, into Ontario from outside Canada.
[…]
8. Where
the markup is in accordance with Canada’s international obligations and Canada
collects the tax imposed on the liquor under Division III of Part IX of the
Excise Tax Act, Canada will, on behalf of the Board, at its customs offices
in Ontario, with respect to the quantity of liquor set out in Annex A that
is brought, or caused to be brought, into Ontario by an individual:
a) accept
the consignment of the liquor from the individual;
b) carry
out the sale of the liquor from the Board to the individual;
c) collect
the markup on the liquor;
d) detain
the liquor, where the markup is not paid;
e) release
the liquor to the individual upon payment of the markup.
The Board
will notify Canada of any
change in the quantity of liquor set out in Annex A. Any such change will take
effect on the date indicated in the notice, or two calendar weeks after the
notice is received, whichever is later.
[…]
11. Canada’s
responsibilities under article 8 commence on the latest of
(a)
February 1, 1993,
(b) the
date on which legislation authorizing Canada to carry out
the provisions of article 8 comes into force, and
(c) the
effective date of the by-law.
12.
The markup to be collected by Canada will be
calculated in accordance with the Board by-law which may be amended from time
to time by the Board. The by-law will be made available to Canada at all
times. Canada may disclose
such by-law to anyone, at Canada’s discretion.
[…]
14.
An
officer as defined in section 2 of the Customs Act is authorized to carry out
the provisions of article 8, pursuant to paragraph 3.1(a) of the Liquor
Control Act.
[Emphasis
added]
[14]
I also
reproduce sub-paragraph 3.1(a)(ii) of the Liquor Control Act:
3.1 The Board
may enter into an agreement with the Government of Canada as represented by
the Minister of National Revenue, in relation to liquor referred to in that
agreement that is brought into Ontario from any place outside Canada:
(a) appointing
officers, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Customs Act
(Canada), employed at customs offices located in Ontario, as
agents of the Board for the purposes of:
…
(ii) collecting, on
behalf of the Board, the mark-up set by the Board from time to time in
relation to that liquor, …
[Emphasis
added]
|
3.1 La Régie
peut conclure avec le gouvernement du Canada, représenté par le ministre du
Revenu national, au sujet des boissons alcooliques qui y sont précisées et
qui sont introduites en Ontario en provenance d’un endroit situé hors du
Canada, un accord qui :
a) désigne à titre
de mandataires de la Régie les agents, au sens du paragraphe 2 (1) de la
Loi sur les douanes (Canada), qui sont employés dans les bureaux de douane
situés en Ontario, aux fins suivantes :
…
(ii) la perception,
pour le compte de la Régie, de la marge bénéficiaire sur ces boissons
alcooliques que fixe de temps à autre la Régie,, …
[Non-souligné
dans l’original
|
[15]
The
question of whether there is federal legislation authorizing the 1993 LCBO
Agreement is discussed below. At this point it is useful to note that, pursuant
to s. 103 of the Canada Revenue Agency Act, S.C. 1999, c. 17 (the “CRA
Act”), whatever authority the Minister of National Revenue had to act under
the 1993 LCBO Agreement was transferred to the CRA. In 2005, that authority was
transferred to the CBSA pursuant to the Canada Border Services Agency Act,
S.C. 2005, c. 38, c. 14 (the “CBSA Act”) (see sections 21 to 28).
[16]
The Judge
then drew attention to the fact that a LCBO by-law, which provided for a mark-up
on the value of wine imported into Ontario,
had been enacted in accordance with article 12 of the Agreement. The Judge
further indicated that in collecting the appropriate mark-up from the appellant
pursuant to the Liquor Control Act, the CBSA purported to act as an
agent of the LCBO.
[17]
At paragraph
6 of his Reasons, the Judge then set out the appellant’s position concerning
the respondent’s motion to dismiss:
[6] While the
Applicant concedes that the CBSA is authorized to act as an agent for the LCBO
under provincial law, he contends that there is no equivalent authority under
federal law. In the result, he says that the CBSA acted unlawfully and without
authority when it demanded and collected a mark-up on his wine.
[18]
The Judge
then turned his attention to the appellant’s argument. First, he opined that
the provisions of paragraph 13(2)(b) of the CBSA Act, which came
into effect in 2005, when read with paragraph 5(1)(c) thereof, were
sufficient to “now authorize the CBSA to enter into a mark-up agreement with
the LCBO of the sort that is in issue in this proceeding” (see paragraph 7 of
the Judge’s Reasons). These provisions read as follows:
5. (1) The
Agency is responsible for providing integrated border services that support
national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow
of persons and goods, including animals and plants, that meet all
requirements under the program legislation, by
…
(c) implementing
agreements between the Government of Canada or the Agency and the government
of a province or other public body performing a function of the Government in
Canada to carry out an activity, provide a service or administer a tax or
program;
…
13. (2) The
Agency may, for the purposes of carrying out its mandate,
…
(b) enter into an
agreement or arrangement with the government of a province, a department or
agency of the Government of Canada or any person or organization.
|
5. (1)
L’Agence est chargée de fournir des services frontaliers intégrés contribuant
à la mise en oeuvre des priorités en matière de sécurité nationale et de
sécurité publique et facilitant le libre mouvement des personnes et des biens
— notamment les animaux et les végétaux — qui respectent toutes les exigences
imposées sous le régime de la législation frontalière. À cette fin, elle :
…
c) met en oeuvre tout
accord conclu entre elle ou le gouvernement fédéral et le gouvernement d’une
province ou un organisme public remplissant des fonctions gouvernementales au
Canada et portant sur l’exercice d’une activité, la prestation d’un service,
l’administration d’une taxe ou l’application d’un programme;
…
13. (2) Dans
le cadre de sa mission, l’Agence peut :
…
b) conclure des
accords ou des ententes avec le gouvernement d’une province, un ministère ou
un organisme fédéral ou toute personne ou organisation.
|
[19]
Although
the Judge was satisfied that there was current valid federal legislation
conferring authority upon the CBSA to enter into an Agreement with the LCBO, he
was in doubt as to whether valid statutory authority existed in 1993, when the
Agreement was signed. He reviewed s. 7 of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal
Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. F-8 (the “Fiscal Arrangements Act”), which allowed for
federal/provincial agreements relating to the collection of a tax and this led
him to remark that there was authority for the proposition that the collection
of a provincial mark-up on liquor was not a tax. The Judge was also in doubt as
to whether the current legislation could, in his words, “give life to an
agreement executed some years before”. He wrote as follows at paragraph 8 of
his Reasons:
[8] […] As
far as I can tell from the supplementary submissions of the parties, there was
no other federal statutory authority in place in 1993 to support the Agreement.
The current legislative authority would provide sufficient support today but
those provisions all appear to post-date the Agreement. It is at least
debatable whether the current legislative authority could give life to an
agreement executed some years before. That may be the effect of Article 11
of the Agreement which provides that “Canada’s responsibility under
article 8 commences on the latest of…(b) the date on which legislation
authorizing Canada to carry out
the provisions of article 8 comes into force”. That article may be legally
sufficient to authorize the Agreement on the strength of s. 5 and s. 13 of the
CBSA Act and their statutory antecedents but because neither party addressed
this point in their submissions to the Court, I am not prepared to resolve the
motions on that basis. In short, I do not accept that the David Bull test
has been met with respect to this issue.
[Emphasis
added]
[20]
Thus, the Judge
concluded that the test enacted by this Court in David Bull, supra, had
not been met because of the uncertainty regarding the existence of federal
legislation authorizing the CBSA to enter into an Agreement with the LCBO when
it did so in January of 1993 and also because of his uncertainty as to whether
current federal legislative authority was sufficient to allow the CBSA to give
effect to the Agreement.
[21]
The Judge
then turned to the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, in regard to which
he said at paragraph 9 of his Reasons:
[9] Because
the Applicant has brought a motion effectively seeking judgment on the merits
for the return of the monies paid, I will, nevertheless, deal with the issue of
whether the CBSA decision to collect a mark-up from the Applicant falls within
the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction as fixed by s. 18 of the Federal Courts
Act. On the undisputed facts of this case, I do not believe that it does.
[22]
As appears
from the above passage, the Judge was of the view that he should deal with the
question of whether the actions of the CBSA, in collecting a provincial mark-up
from the appellant, fell within the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under section
18.1 of the Act. He then stated his view that the Federal Court did not have
jurisdiction “on the undisputed facts of this case”. His reasoning on that
point is found at paragraphs 10 and 11 of his Reasons, where he writes:
[10]
While federal law provides for the CBSA to act on behalf of Ontario in
calculating and collecting a liquor mark-up, it is clear that the statutory
foundation for doing so is found in the Liquor Control Act, above. That
is the statutory source for the collection and remittance activity carried out
by the CBSA as agent for the LCBO. That is also the statutory basis for
the LCBO to enter into an agreement under which the formula to calculate the
mark-up is fixed.
[11]
It is obvious that the resolution of the substantive arguments in this case
would require this Court to interpret the provisions of provincial law and the
relevant contractual instruments that establish and define the right to collect
the LCBO mark-up. In my view, it is not the role of this Court to interpret
and enforce provincial law all the more so where, as here, neither the Province
nor the LCBO is a party to the proceeding. While the Applicant argues that the
Province could intervene that is not the point. If the interpretation and
application of provincial law is at the root of a proceeding, the Province or
its interested agencies should be involved as of right and the appropriate
forum for hearing the case on the merits is the Superior Court of the
Province. In short, this is not a task which falls within the
jurisdictional confines of s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act. […]
[23]
In support
of his view, the Judge relied, inter alia, on the reasoning of Madam
Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association
v. Canadian Dairy Commission, 2001 FCT 34, 200 F.T.R. 138, at paragraphs 46
to 50. This led him to the view that if provincial law is the source of a
decision-maker’s authority, “… that will usually be enough to oust the
jurisdiction of this Court, whether or not the decision-maker for other
purposes is a creature, in whole or in part, of federal law” (para. 12 of the
Judge’s Reasons).
[24]
Then, at
paragraph 13 of his Reasons, the Judge explained why it would not be
appropriate, in the circumstances of the case before him, to render judgement
on the merits of the appellant’s judicial review application. He wrote as
follows:
[13]
The Applicant’s argument that the Agreement is not legally valid because it
is not supported by federal legislation requires further and better submissions
and argument from the parties. That issue and its potential legal
ramifications, if any, are the only points which remain in issue on this
application. I would add that, even if there was and continues to be an
absence of statutory authority for the federal government to act as an agent
for the Province in the collection of a liquor mark-up, a question still
remains as to whether that would make any difference to the return of the
Applicant’s money. If the money was lawfully payable to the Province (an
assumption that this Court would have to make) the fact that the party
collecting it may have lacked the authority to do so may not lead to a
financial recovery by the Applicant. This, too, is an issue that the parties
have failed to address in argument.
[Emphasis
added]
[25]
It is
clear that the Judge dismissed the appellant’s motion for summary judgement because
of his view that further and better submissions were required with respect to
the question of whether there was federal legislation authorizing the CBSA to
enter into an Agreement with the LCBO. However, it is not quite so clear, in my
respectful view, why the Judge also dismissed the respondents’ motion,
considering that it was his opinion that the CBSA’s decision to collect a
mark-up under the Liquor Control Act and to refuse a refund thereof to
the appellant did not fall within the Federal Court’s jurisdiction under s. 18.1
of the Act.
Issues
[26]
In my
view, the principal issue in these proceedings is whether the Federal Court has
jurisdiction under section 18.1 of the Act to review the CBSA’s decision to
collect a mark-up from the appellant and his wife and its refusal to refund it.
Those are question of law in respect of which this Court can intervene if the
Judge erred.
Analysis
[27]
Section 18.1
of the Act provides that an application for judicial review may be made in
respect of decisions or orders of federal boards, commissions or other
tribunals. The question which must be determined in the proceedings before us is
whether the CBSA was a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”, as that
expression is defined in s. 2 of the Act, when it collected the provincial
mark-up on the bottles of wine imported into Canada by the appellant and his
wife and refused to refund the mark-up. If the answer is negative, then it
necessarily follows, in my view, that the respondents’ motion to dismiss must
be allowed and the appellant’s motion for summary judgment must be dismissed.
[28]
Section 2
of the Act offers the following definition:
Federal board,
commission or other tribunal:
“federal board,
commission or other tribunal” means any body, person or persons having, exercising
or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act
of Parliament or by or under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the
Crown, other than the Tax Court of Canada or any of its judges, any such
body constituted or established by or under a law of a province or any such
person or persons appointed under or in accordance with a law of a province
or under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 ;
|
Office fédéral :
« office fédéral »
Conseil, bureau, commission ou autre organisme, ou personne ou groupe de
personnes, ayant, exerçant ou censé exercer une compétence ou des pouvoirs
prévus par une loi fédérale ou par une ordonnance prise en vertu d’une
prérogative royale, à l’exclusion de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt et ses
juges, d’un organisme constitué sous le régime d’une loi provinciale ou d’une
personne ou d’un groupe de personnes nommées aux termes d’une loi provinciale
ou de l’article 96 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867.
|
[29]
The operative words
of the s. 2 definition of “federal board, commission or other tribunal” state
that such a body or person has, exercises or purports to exercise jurisdiction
or powers “conferred by or under an Act of Parliament or by or under an Order
made pursuant to a prerogative of the Crown…”. Thus, a two-step enquiry must be
made in order to determine whether a body or person is a “federal board,
commission or other tribunal”. First, it must be determined what jurisdiction
or power the body or person seeks to exercise. Second, it must be determined
what is the source or the origin of the jurisdiction or power which the body or
person seeks to exercise.
[30]
In Judicial Review
of Administrative Action in Canada, Vol. 1, looseleaf (Toronto: Canvasback
Publishing, 1998) at para. 2:4310, the learned authors, D.J.M. Brown and J.M.
Evans, state that in determining whether a body or person is a “federal board,
commission or other tribunal”, one must look at “the source of a tribunal’s
authority”. They write as follows:
In the result, the source
of a tribunal’s authority, and not the nature of either the power
exercised or the body exercising it, is the primary determinant of whether it
falls in the definition. The test is simply whether the body is empowered by or
under federal legislation or by an order made pursuant to a prerogative power
of the federal Crown. […]
[31]
That approach, in my
view, was correctly accepted by Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer in Canadian Restaurant
and Foodservices Association, supra, at paragraph 48.
[32]
Turning to the
present matter, there can be no doubt that in collecting the mark-up on the
wine brought into Canada by the appellant and his wife, the CBSA found its
authority in the Ontario Liquor Control Act and the
relevant by-law enacted thereunder. The CBSA clearly did not purport to collect
the mark-up under any federal legislation nor under any order made pursuant to
a prerogative power of the federal Crown. In other words, the source of the
CBSA’s authority was neither federal legislation nor an order made pursuant to
a prerogative power of the federal Crown, but rather provincial legislation.
[33]
Thus, when it
collected the mark-up on January 7, 2007, the CBSA was not acting as a “federal
board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act. I
hasten to add that in determining this question, it is irrelevant whether the
CBSA was authorized or not by federal legislation to enter into the Agreement
with the LCBO. Whether the CBSA was authorized or not, it collected the mark-up
on wine from persons returning to Canada, including the appellant and his wife,
during the period 1993 to 2007. In collecting the mark-up, the CBSA purported
to act as the agent of the LCBO and relied on the provisions of the Liquor
Control Act and the relevant by-law. It was not purporting to act under any
federal legislation. Consequently, it is my view that the CBSA was not acting
as a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” and the Federal Court does
not have jurisdiction regarding the collection of the mark-up and the CBSA’s refusal
to refund it.
[34]
If the appellant
wishes to claim a refund of the amount it paid to the CBSA, he must proceed
against LCBO, on whose behalf the CBSA was exercising the power to collect the
mark-up. In so concluding, I do not purport to make any comments regarding the
substance of the appellant’s submission that the Liquor Control Act did
not provide authority for the collection of the mark-up in the circumstances of
this case. Thus, whether the appellant was obliged to pay a mark-up to the
LCBO, based on the value of the wine brought into Canada, is a matter which
must be left for determination by the Superior Court of Ontario, which clearly
has jurisdiction in respect of the rights and obligations arising under the Liquor
Control Act.
[35]
Thus, although he
correctly concluded that the Federal Court did not have jurisdiction in respect
of the CBSA’s actions, the Judge erred in not allowing the respondent’s motion
to dismiss and in failing to dismiss the appellant’s motion for summary
judgment.
[36]
In the event that I
am wrong in finding that the Federal Court has no jurisdiction in this matter,
I will proceed to deal with the question of whether the CBSA had the legal
authority to collect the mark-up in issue.
[37]
As explained above,
the legal basis on which the CBSA purported to act when it collected the
mark-up is the 1993 LCBO Agreement. Pursuant to s. 3.1 of the Liquor Control
Act, the LCBO entered into an Agreement with the Government of Canada on
January 19, 1993, wherein customs officers (now CBSA agents) were appointed
agents of the LCBO for the purpose of, inter alia, collecting on its
behalf the mark-up set by the LCBO for the liquor referred to in the Agreement.
The Agreement, under paragraph 12 thereof, provided that the mark-up would be
calculated “in accordance with the Board [LCBO] by-law which may be amended
from time to time by the Board”. As I indicated earlier, the LCBO enacted a
by-law in accordance with article 12 of the Agreement. This by-law provides for
the calculation of the mark-up which the CBSA collected from the appellant and
his wife.
[38]
It is also useful to
remember that the Judge was satisfied that there was valid federal legislation now
authorizing the CBSA to enter into an Agreement with the LCBO, namely paragraphs
13(2)(b) and 5(1)(c) of the CBSA Act. However, he remained
in doubt as to whether there existed “any statutory authority for the federal
government to enter into the Agreement” (paragraph 8 of his Reasons) in January
1993. The Judge was also in doubt as to whether the CBSA Act was
sufficient to authorize the CBSA to give effect, in 2007, to the Agreement signed
on January 19, 1993. At paragraph 8 of his Reasons, he wrote that “[I]t is at
least debatable whether the current legislative authority could give life to an
agreement executed some years before.”
[39]
In my view, it is not
necessary to determine whether there existed, in January 1993, federal
legislation authorizing the Government of Canada to enter into the Agreement
with the LCBO. I am of this view because there has been, since 2005, valid
federal legislation authorizing the federal Government to enter into an
agreement of the type entered into in January 1993 with the LCBO. The Judge was
of the view, and I agree with him, that paragraphs 5(1)(c) and 13(2)(b)
of the CBSA Act are now, and were in 2007, sufficient to authorize
federal participation in the Agreement with the LCBO and to collect, on its
behalf, the mark-up prescribed by the relevant by-law.
[40]
The CBSA collected
the provincial mark-up from the appellant and his wife in 2007, at a time when there
existed valid federal legislation authorizing the Government of Canada to enter
into an Agreement with the LCBO. The fact that the Agreement was entered into
prior to the coming into force of the 2005 legislation is, in my view, irrelevant.
Article 11 of the Agreement foresaw the possibility that there might be a delay
in the enactment of federal legislation authorizing the Minister of Revenue (now
the CBSA) to enter into the Agreement and to give it effect. More particularly,
article 11 provided that Canada’s responsibility under article 8 of the
Agreement would commence, inter alia, on “the date on which legislation
authorizing Canada to carry out the provisions of article 8
comes into force…”. Hence, I am satisfied that on January 7, 2007, when the
appellant and his wife entered Canada with three bottles of wine, the CBSA was
authorized by federal legislation to give effect to the Agreement entered into with
the LCBO on January 19, 1993.
Disposition
[41]
For these reasons, I
would dismiss the appeal with costs, I would allow the cross-appeal with costs
and I would set aside the judgment of the Federal Court. Rendering the judgment
which ought to have been rendered, I would allow the respondents’ motion and dismiss
the appellant’s judicial review application, with costs, and I would dismiss
the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, also with costs.
“M. Nadon”
“I
agree.
J.
Edgar Sexton J.A.”
“I
agree.
K.
Sharlow J.A.”