Docket: T-1977-13
Citation:
2017 FC 1099
Ottawa, Ontario, December 5, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
BETWEEN:
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TASEKO MINES
LIMITED
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
THE ENVIRONMENT and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and THE TSILHQOT'IN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND JOEY ALPHONSE, on his own behalf and on behalf of all
other members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation
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Respondents
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and
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THE MINING
ASSOCIATION OF CANADA, THE MINING ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE MINING
SUPPLIERS ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, THE ASSOCIATION FOR MINERAL
EXPLORATION, BRITISH COLUMBIA, and MININGWATCH CANADA
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Interveners
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
Review Panel Report [respectively Panel and Report] concerning the proposed New
Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine that was made pursuant to the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52 [CEAA 2012].
In the this case, the judicial review centers on findings in the Report with
respect to water seepage and impact on water quality in Fish Lake (Teztan Biny)
and the surrounding area.
[2]
The related file T-744-14 is an application for
judicial review of subsequent decisions by the Minister of the Environment
[Minister] and the Governor in Council [GIC]. The judicial review of those
decisions is found in Taseko Mines Limited v Canada (Environment), 2017
FC 1100.
[3]
The key dispute is the Panel’s conclusion that toxic
water seepage will be greater than Taseko Mines Limited [Taseko] estimated.
This conclusion ultimately led to decisions not approving the proposed mine.
[4]
Taseko seeks the following relief in respect of
the Panel and its Report:
[92] Taseko seeks a declaration that
the following findings of the Panel are invalid and are quashed or set aside:
(i) the
Panel’s determination that Taseko underestimated the volume of tailings pore
water seepage leaving the TSF;
(ii) the
Panel’s decision to accept NRCan’s upper bound estimate as the expected seepage
rate from TSF; and
(iii) the
Panel’s conclusion that the concentration of water quality variables in Fish
Lake and Wasp Lake would likely be a significant adverse environmental effect
(the “Impugned Findings”).
[93] Taseko also seeks a declaration
that the Panel failed to observe principles of procedural fairness in its
conduct of the public hearing process related to the environmental assessment
of the Project.
[94] Should the declarations sought by
Taseko be granted in whole or in part, it follows that the matter must be
remitted to the Panel to reconsider the Impugned Findings and remedy the
breaches in the Panel’s process (as applicable), and to then make new
determinations in accordance with the directions provided by this Court.
[Footnotes omitted.]
[5]
To set the background, the relevant legislation
is outlined below.
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52
43 (1) A review panel must, in
accordance with its terms of reference,
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43 (1)
La commission, conformément à son mandat :
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(a) conduct an environmental assessment of the designated project;
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a) procède à l’évaluation environnementale
du projet désigné;
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(b) ensure that the information that it uses when conducting the
environmental assessment is made available to the public;
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b) veille à ce que le public ait accès aux
renseignements qu’elle utilise dans le cadre de cette évaluation;
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(c) hold hearings in a manner that offers any interested party an
opportunity to participate in the environmental assessment;
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c) tient des audiences de façon à donner aux
parties intéressées la possibilité de participer à l’évaluation;
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(d) prepare a report with respect to the environmental assessment
that sets out
(i) the review panel’s rationale, conclusions and recommendations,
including any mitigation measures and follow-up program, and
(ii) a summary of any comments received from the public, including
interested parties;
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d) établit un rapport assorti de sa
justification et de ses conclusions et recommandations relativement à
l’évaluation, notamment aux mesures d’atténuation et au programme de suivi,
et énonçant, sous la forme d’un résumé, les observations reçues du public,
notamment des parties intéressées;
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(e) submit the report with respect to the environmental assessment to
the Minister; and
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e) présente son rapport d’évaluation
environnementale au ministre;
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(f) on the Minister’s request, clarify any of the conclusions and
recommendations set out in its report with respect to the environmental
assessment.
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f) sur demande de celui-ci, précise l’une ou
l’autre des conclusions et recommandations dont son rapport est assorti.
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…
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[…]
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126 (1) Despite subsection 38(6) and
subject to subsections (2) to (6), any assessment by a review panel, in
respect of a project, commenced under the process established under the
former Act before the day on which this Act comes into force is continued
under the process established under this Act as if the environmental
assessment had been referred by the Minister to a review panel under section
38. The project is considered to be a designated project for the purposes of
this Act and Part 3 of the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act,
and
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126 (1)
Malgré le paragraphe 38(6) et sous réserve des paragraphes (2) à (6), tout
examen par une commission d’un projet commencé sous le régime de l’ancienne
loi avant la date d’entrée en vigueur de la présente loi se poursuit sous le
régime de la présente loi comme si le ministre avait renvoyé, au titre de
l’article 38, l’évaluation environnementale du projet pour examen par une
commission; le projet est réputé être un projet désigné pour l’application de
la présente loi et de la partie 3 de la Loi sur l’emploi, la croissance et
la prospérité durable et :
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(a) if, before that day, a review panel was established under section
33 of the former Act, in respect of the project, that review panel is
considered to have been established — and its members are considered to have
been appointed — under subsection 42(1) of this Act;
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a) si, avant cette date d’entrée en vigueur,
une commission avait été constituée aux termes de l’article 33 de l’ancienne
loi relativement au projet, elle est réputée avoir été constituée — et ses
membres sont réputés avoir été nommés — aux termes du paragraphe 42(1) de la
présente loi;
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(b) if, before that day, an agreement or arrangement was entered into
under subsection 40(2) of the former Act, in respect of the project, that
agreement or arrangement is considered to have been entered into under
section 40 of this Act; and
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b) si, avant cette date, un accord avait été
conclu aux termes du paragraphe 40(2) de l’ancienne loi relativement au
projet, il est réputé avoir été conclu en vertu de l’article 40 de la
présente loi;
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(c) if, before that day, a review panel was established by an
agreement or arrangement entered into under subsection 40(2) of the former
Act or by document referred to in subsection 40(2.1) of the former Act, in
respect of the project, it is considered to have been established by — and
its members are considered to have been appointed under — an agreement or
arrangement entered into under section 40 of this Act or by document referred
to in subsection 41(2) of this Act.
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c) si, avant cette date, une commission
avait été constituée en vertu d’un accord conclu aux termes du paragraphe
40(2) de l’ancienne loi ou du document visé au paragraphe 40(2.1) de
l’ancienne loi relativement au projet, elle est réputée avoir été constituée
— et ses membres sont réputés avoir été nommés — en vertu d’un accord conclu
aux termes de l’article 40 de la présente loi ou du document visé au
paragraphe 41(2) de la présente loi.
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II.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[6]
The New Prosperity Gold-Copper Mine [the
Project] is a proposed open pit gold and copper mine in British Columbia, 125
km southwest of Williams Lake (in the traditional territories of the
Tsilhqot’in peoples). The $1.5 billion Project is said to provide a number of
jobs as well as (allegedly) a $340 million contribution to British Columbia’s gross
domestic product.
[7]
The Project is the successor to another proposed
mine, Prosperity, that was rejected by the GIC in 2010 following a federal
environmental assessment. The original design of the mine would have
necessitated draining the lake Teztan Biny.
[8]
In this second Project, Teztan Biny would not be
drained because the proposal relocates the tailings storage facility [TSF] and introduces
a lake recirculation water management scheme.
[9]
On November 7, 2011, the Minister stated that
the Project would undergo a federal environmental assessment under the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37 [CEAA] (later continued
according to the transition provisions of the CEAA 2012).
[10]
On August 3, 2012, the Panel was issued Amended
Terms of Reference that were consistent with the new CEAA 2012 provisions.
The Amended Terms of Reference dictated that the Panel must consider a number
of factors in assessing the environmental effects of the proposed project:
a. the
environmental effects of the Project including the environmental effects of
malfunctions or accidents that may occur in connection with the Project and any
cumulative environmental effects that are likely to result from the Project in
combination with other projects or activities that have been or will be carried
out;
b. the
significance of the environmental effects referred to in the above paragraph;
c. comments
from the public and Aboriginal groups that are received during the review;
d. measures
that are technically and economically feasible and that would mitigate any
significant adverse environmental effects of the Project;
e. the need for the Project and
alternatives to the Project;
f. the purpose of the Project;
g. alternative
means of carrying out the Project that are technically and economically
feasible, and the environmental effects of any such alternative means;
h. the
need for, and the requirements of, any follow-up program in respect of the
Project; and
i. the
capacity of renewable resources that are likely to be significantly affected by
the Project to meet the needs of the present and those of the future.
[11]
The Panel published Guidelines for the
Environmental Impact Statement [EIS] on March 16, 2012.
[12]
Taseko submitted an EIS on September 27, 2012,
purporting to deal with the deficiencies in the initial Prosperity project
proposal.
[13]
The Panel then engaged in discussions with
respect to the technical merits and adequacy of the EIS with “federal departments, the BC Ministry of Energy and Mines
(“BC MEM”), aboriginal groups, including the Tsilhqot’in National Government
(“TNG”), and Taseko.”
[14]
Taseko’s EIS described features of the proposed
TSF and predicted seepage using two computer models: a 3-dimensional model
representing the TSF as a horizontal plane, and 2‑dimensional model
representing the TSF as a vertical plane.
[15]
Natural Resources Canada [NRCan] identified
significant concerns with the EIS including “deficiencies
with both of Taseko’s models, the data upon which they were based, Taseko’s
proposal to rely on adding estimates from both models, and Taseko’s proposed
mitigation measures.”
[16]
As a result of these concerns, NRCan recommended
the Panel request that Taseko provide a more comprehensive model of 3D
numerical groundwater flow, which would address the deficiencies in the models
provided in the EIS.
[17]
In addition, other participants raised various
other concerns with respect to “proposed mitigation
measures, lack of hydrogeological data and uncertainty related to the range of
till hydraulic conductivities, and significant underestimation in Taseko’s
seepage estimates.”
[18]
On February 20, 2013, the Panel released its
Public Hearing Procedures, which outlined requirements for the conduct of
public hearings and topic-specific hearing sessions.
[19]
In a letter dated May 24, 2013, Taseko sought to
postpone dealing with the deficiencies. It indicated that differences in
technical issues could be dealt with after the Project received approval: “any difference in interpretation of technical data that
exists between NRCan and Taseko can be resolved by a specifically focused pump
test program, one which Taseko will undertake to refine the pit dewatering
system prior to development.”
[20]
Taseko therefore declined to develop the 3D
numerical groundwater flow model requested by the Panel.
[21]
On June 14, 2013, NRCan indicated that it was “in the process of developing a numerical groundwater flow
model to assess seepage from the base of the tailings storage facility, similar
to that requested by the Panel in SIR 12/14(A-a)” and offered to make
the findings of this study available to the Panel.
[22]
The Panel accepted this offer in a letter dated
June 21, 2013. At this time, the Panel also indicated that this information
would be made publicly available (online) by way of the project registry.
[23]
By June 20, 2013, the Panel found that the
environmental assessment could proceed to public hearings. These hearings began
on July 22, 2013, and were completed on August 23, 2013, when the final oral
arguments took place. The topic-specific, technical hearings took place between
July 25, 2013, and August 1, 2013.
[24]
On July 4, 2013, NRCan provided the Panel with
its 3D numerical model. On July 19, 2013, NRCan provided the Panel with written
submissions. In its July 2013 submissions, NRCan stated that “[s]eepage from the TSF was estimated at 8650 m3/d
(100 L/s) which is more than an order of magnitude greater than the proponent’s
3D model prediction [of 9 L/s].”
[25]
Taseko disputes the accuracy of this seepage
estimate characterization.
[26]
On August 21, 2013, NRCan submitted a Technical
Memorandum that provided “further clarification related
to the modeling approaches taken by Taseko and NRCan.”
[27]
The Panel issued its Report on October 31, 2013.
It is the NRCan Technical Memorandum on seepage and the Panel’s reliance on
these submissions in concluding that the seepage of toxic water from the TSF
would be greater than estimated by Taseko that lie at the heart of this
judicial review.
[28]
In addition to the Applicant Taseko and the Respondent
Attorney General of Canada [AG], the Court had the benefit of submissions as
Respondents by the Tsilhqot’in National Government [TNG] and Joey Alphonse on
his own behalf and on behalf of all members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation. The Mining
Association and MiningWatch Canada also appeared, but as intervenors.
[29]
The Panel Report is lengthy; however, the
impugned findings with respect to seepage are contained within a rather small
section of the Report. The majority of the impugned “findings”
and statements are located in a section of the Report titled “5.3.1.2 Views of Participants.” In this
section, the Panel summarized the conclusions and recommendations of NRCan, as
well as the conclusions of the independent expert Dr. Leslie Smith.
[30]
To put the matter in context, Table 5 of the
Report shows a “Comparison of Seepage Estimates taken
from the August 21, 2013, Natural Resources Canada Technical Memorandum to the
Panel.” As this Table is the subject of a great deal of debate, it is
reproduced here in full:
[BLANK]
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Taseko estimates (based on two different
models)
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Natural Resources Canada base case, based on its 3-D
model
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Post Closure seepage through bottom of the tailings
storage facility
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9 L/s (760 m3/d)
From 3-D model
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100 L/s (8650 m3/d)
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Main Embankment seepage (towards Fish Lake)
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28 L/s (2420 m3/d)
From 2-D model
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58 L/s (5087 m3/d)
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South and West Embankment seepage
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27 L/s (2333 m3/d)
From 2-D model
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29 L/s (2552 m3/d)
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Deep basin seepage (greater than 200
mbgs)
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0 L/s
(Natural Resources Canada claims Taseko’s 2D model
precludes this flux component)
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20 L/s (1699 m3/d)
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[31]
Continuing on its summary of NRCan’s conclusions
and recommendations, the Panel stated:
As indicated in the above table, pore water
seepage from the tailings storage facility basin was estimated by Natural
Resources Canada to be 100 L/s (8 650 m3/d) which was more than an
order of magnitude greater than what it considered to be Taseko’s comparative
prediction of 9 L/s. The Natural Resources Canada model showed that a further
20 L/s (1 699 m3/d) of seepage was predicted to flow to the deep
groundwater zone beneath the basalt flows that underlie the tailings storage
facility. Natural Resources Canada claimed that this latter flux was not
modeled in the Taseko’s 2D approach because an impermeable boundary was assumed
at the base of the basalt flows.
[32]
This section of the Report went on to summarize
the submissions of Dr. Smith, who stated that the framework used by Taseko was
developed according to accepted practice; however, “the
Natural Resources Canada model has greater flexibility if the tailings storage
facility was explicitly included within the model grid.”
[33]
Dr. Smith explained the differences in seepage
estimates between Taseko and NRCan likely arose from differences in the hydraulic
conductivity used (that is, tailings, till, shallow bedrock), as well as
differences in till layers.
[34]
Dr. Smith ultimately estimated the TSF seepage
to be between 20 L/s and 100 L/s, and in his opinion “the
value would be likely towards the upper end of this range.”
[35]
In the section titled “5.3.1.3
Panel’s Conclusions and Recommendations,” the Panel identified
three potential seepage pathways from the TSF, and concluded that seepage of
tailings pore water from the TSF was the largest potential source of contaminant
loadings that would impact water quality in the area.
[36]
The Panel also identified the “fractured basalt intercalated with the glacial till in the
valley bottom” as a potential major seepage pathway.
[37]
Further, the Panel found that there was a dearth
of data: there was a “lack of detailed geotechnical
site investigations required to more reliably characterize the foundation of
the tailings storage facility, particularly till thickness, variability in the
overburden units, the likely existence of preferred pathways through the
fractured upper bedrock units, and the nature and extent of the seeps and
springs at the toe of the ridge west of the tailings storage facility.”
[38]
The Panel then summarized Taseko’s estimates of
solute migration in the absence of mitigation, as well as its predictions of
unrecovered seepage after mitigation. It found that despite the substantial
heterogeneity of the overburden and shallow bedrock, Taseko had represented all
overburden deposits “as one unit and assigned a bulk
hydraulic conductivity value.” Further, Taseko did not account for
spatial variation of particle size of the tailings.
[39]
Of particular relevance, the Panel accepted the
upper bound estimate put forward by NRCan and found that Taseko had
underestimated the rate of seepage from the TSF. The Panel concluded as
follows:
The Panel has determined that Taseko has
underestimated the volume of tailings pore water seepage leaving the tailings
storage facility and the rate at which the water plume would reach the various
lakes and streams downslope of the tailings storage facility, even with the
mitigations proposed.
The Panel accepts Natural Resource Canada’s
upper bound estimate as the expected seepage rate from the tailings storage
facility (see Table 5 above).
The Panel concludes that there is strong
evidence that the seepage from the tailings storage facility would be
significantly higher than estimated by Taseko, resulting in potentially higher
loading of contaminants in the receiving environment.
[40]
The Panel went on to make a number of
recommendations with respect to further monitoring, testing, and collecting
data, in the event that the Project proceeded.
III.
ISSUES
[41]
Each of the parties phrased their issues
slightly differently but in the end the issues the Court considers that must be
addressed are:
1.
Did the Panel fail to observe principles of
procedural fairness by accepting and relying upon the Technical Memorandum
without giving Taseko a fair opportunity to respond?
2.
Was the Panel's determination that Taseko
underestimated the volume of tailings pore water seepage leaving the TSF
unreasonable?
3.
Was the Panel's decision to accept NRCan's upper
bound estimate as the expected seepage rate from the TSF unreasonable?
4.
Was the Panel's conclusion that the
concentration of water quality variables in Fish Lake (Teztan Biny) and Wasp
Lake would likely be a significant adverse environmental effect unreasonable?
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[42]
Procedural fairness is subject to a correctness
standard of review: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009
SCC 12 at para 43, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 [Khosa].
[43]
The Panel findings with respect to seepage and
water quality are subject to a reasonableness standard of review. In a decision
concerning the old CEAA, Greenpeace Canada v Canada (Attorney
General), 2014 FC 1124 at para 37, 468 FTR 299, aff’d 2016 FCA 114, the Federal
Court of Appeal [FCA] stated: “issues raised by the
Applicants which challenge the exercise of discretion or assessment of evidence
attract a reasonableness standard of review.”
[44]
In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9
at para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, the SCC indicated that a reasonable decision is
one that is intelligible, transparent, and justifiable, and “falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which
are defensible in respect of the facts and law.” Reasonableness is a
deferential standard, and “as long as the process and
the outcome fit comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency
and intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own
view of a preferable outcome” (Khosa at para 59).
V.
ANALYSIS
A.
Issue 1: Did the Panel fail to observe
principles of procedural fairness by accepting and relying upon the Technical
Memorandum?
[45]
Taseko argues the following points:
•
acceptance of NRCan’s Technical Memorandum was
late which deprived Taseko’s experts of the opportunity to question the author
or provide technical submissions;
•
the Technical Memorandum contained errors,
particularly as to seepage, and these errors were incorporated into the Report;
•
the Technical Memorandum went beyond summarizing
NRCan’s perspective and introduced new evidence in a manner not contemplated by
the Public Hearings Procedures;
•
Taseko was owed a degree of procedural fairness
in accordance with the factors in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras 22-27, 174 DLR (4th) 193 [Baker];
•
Taseko asserts that, given the nature of the
decision, the Panel essentially performed a judicial function where procedural
fairness interests are heightened, especially as the Report was part of the
Minister and GIC’s decision making process under section 52 of CEAA 2012;
and
•
the acceptance of the Technical Memorandum
breached the duty of fairness owed as new evidence was introduced favourable to
one party and to which the other party had no opportunity to respond further. (CEP
Union of Canada v Power Engineers et al, 2001 BCCA 743, 209 DLR (4th) 208 [CEP
Union] (sometimes reported as CEP, Local 76 v British Columbia (Power
Engineers & Boiler & Pressure Vessel Safety Appeal Board)), relied
upon where the British Columbia Court of Appeal [BCCA] held that merely
restating evidence previously given may breach this principle.)
[46]
For the reasons below, Taseko was owed, and was
in fact afforded, a high degree of procedural fairness during the review
process.
(1)
High Degree of Procedural Fairness owed
to Taseko
[47]
Despite the Respondents’ submissions that a
party is not promised procedural perfection in any decision making process, it
appears that in this case the parties agree that Taseko was owed a high degree
of procedural fairness. The major disagreement between the parties is whether
the requisite degree of procedural fairness was in fact met.
[48]
A review of the Baker factors indicates
that Taseko was indeed owed a high degree of procedural fairness during the Panel
process:
a)
Nature of the decision: the Panel process was geared towards making findings of fact, and
was designed so that all of the parties could put forward evidence and test the
evidence adduced in a quasi-judicial manner (including, for example,
cross-examination of experts). While the Public Hearing Procedures note that
the Panel will not be “bound by the strict rules of
procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings” that does
not, per se, lessen the degree of procedural fairness.
b)
Nature of the statutory scheme: there is no formal appeal mechanism to challenge the Report
(however, judicial review is available).
c)
Importance of the decision: although this is not the final decision in the process (the
Minister and the GIC made further decisions), it is undeniably crucial in terms
of providing the facts and information that the Minister and the GIC require to
make their determinations. (Indeed, in this case, the decisions of the Minister
and the GIC were consistent with the conclusions of the Report.)
d)
Legitimate expectations: the Public Hearing Procedures clearly laid out, in a fairly
detailed manner, how the Panel process would proceed. The Public Hearing Procedures
specifically state that the process should be “fair and
orderly.” However, the Panel had the power to and did in fact deviate from
these Procedures at times.
e)
Procedural choices made by the decision
maker: as noted above, the Panel had the power to
deviate from its own procedures (and it did so). Sometimes this was to Taseko's
benefit (i.e. allowing Taseko “a few extra days”
to respond to late submissions), and sometimes it was not. Deference should be
given to a decision maker's choice of process (Baker at para 27).
[49]
Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi, 2011 SCC 30, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 504 [Mavi], cited by the
Minister/AG, is not particularly dispositive. Mavi indicated that a
balance must be struck between the cost of a “fair”
process and the public interest in the government acting (and being perceived
to be acting) fairly. In this case, with strong public interests on either side
(economic and environmental interests, for example), the pendulum would seem to
weigh heavily in favour of ensuring fairness. Furthermore, this process was
likely quite expensive, and the Respondents have not provided any evidence that
additional procedural fairness measures would have been prohibitively
expensive.
(2)
Audi Alteram Partem
[50]
In Canadian Cable Television Assn v American
College Sports Collective of Canada, Inc, [1991] 3 FC 626 at 639, 81 DLR
(4th) 376 (CA), MacGuigan J.A. for the Federal Court of Appeal defined the
principle of audi alteram partem thus:
The common law embraces two principles in
its concept of natural justice, both usually expressed in Latin phraseology: audi
alteram partem (hear the other side), which means that parties must be
made aware of the case being made against them and given an opportunity to
answer it.
[Emphasis added.]
[51]
Although the Minister/AG cite Charkaoui v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 57, [2007] 1 SCR
350 [Charkaoui] for the proposition that the
“right to know the case to be met is not absolute,” I do not find that
decision to be particularly persuasive in this context.
[52]
Charkaoui was
decided in the context of national security concerns; indeed, shortly after the
Supreme Court of Canada [SCC] made the statement cited by the Minister/AG,
McLachlin CJC stated that “the Court has repeatedly
recognized that national security considerations can limit the extent of
disclosure of information to the affected individual” (at para 58). This
case does not present any similar circumstances that would warrant infringement
of the audi alteram partem principle.
[53]
Taseko’s position is that the submission of the
Technical Memorandum breaches this principle, and its argument is based on two contentions:
(1) that the Technical Memorandum was new evidence favouring NRCan’s position;
and (2) that Taseko did not have an adequate opportunity to respond to this
evidence.
[54]
Both of Taseko’s premises are flawed. The
Technical Memorandum did not contain new information; rather, this document
summarized the information that had already been presented to the Panel, and to
Taseko, in NRCan’s written and oral submissions. Therefore, Taseko already knew
the case that it had to meet before the submission of the Technical Memorandum,
and the case it had to meet did not change following the submission of the
Technical Memorandum.
[55]
Taseko’s argument that this was “new information” is premised on the contention that Dr.
Desbarats had, during cross-examination, abandoned the “order
of magnitude position.” However, the “order of
magnitude” comparison was only used when referencing the difference
between the two 3D models, and the “factor of two”
acknowledgement before the Panel was made with reference to Taseko’s 2D model.
[56]
Furthermore, this statement by Dr. Desbarats was
preceded by comments regarding the deficiencies of the 2D model and the
statement that it was “difficult to compare the two.”
As stated by the Minister/AG, “NRCan’s expert merely
acknowledged the math that “if” one was to include the 2D results in the
comparison – which he never accepted should be done – then Taseko still would
have underestimated seepage by a factor of two (2).”
[57]
Therefore, the Technical Memorandum did not
contain new information, and it did not constitute a departure from NRCan’s
previously stated position.
[58]
Further, CEP Union (relied upon by
Taseko) is distinguishable from this case. In CEP Union, the BCCA found
that the acceptance of written submissions that merely reiterated evidence
already given in oral submissions may breach the audi alteram partem
principle. However, in that case, only one of the parties was given the
opportunity to provide written submissions, and the opposing party was not
provided with a copy of these submissions (despite their request). The outcome
in CEP Union turned on the fact that only one party was given the
opportunity to provide written submissions. The BCCA stated:
[14] This takes me to the nub of this case.
Is there here a breach of the audi alteram partem rule? It appears to me
that the learned Chambers judge considered that there was not such a breach on
the basis that the written submissions merely restated information that either
the Director or Pacifica Paper had expressed aloud in the hearing. With
respect, I do not agree. The opportunity to present information and argument in
written form is valuable to a party. The opportunity after oral hearing, to
reorganize and restate a submission cannot be considered of no import, else to
poach upon a line from Browning, “What is writing for?”
[59]
This case is therefore distinguishable because
Taseko had the opportunity to provide final written submissions. Taseko was
also provided with a copy of NRCan’s submissions and given an opportunity to
respond.
[60]
The impugned language of “clarification” does not indicate that the Technical
Memorandum contained new information. As put forward by Taseko at the hearing,
it believed that it and NRCan had reached some sort of agreement on seepage
(that is, that the estimates were within a factor of two); NRCan’s Technical
Memorandum simply clarified its position that there was no such agreement. As
noted by the Minister/AG, this “clarification”
language indicated that NRCan wished to convey that its position was unchanged
following cross-examination and Taseko’s arguments. Taseko had already
responded to the information in the Technical Memorandum and had cross-examined
the relevant expert during the course of the review process. As noted below,
Taseko recognized during its final submissions that there was no convergence
between its own views and those of NRCan.
[61]
Finally, even if the Technical Memorandum was
found to contain new information, Taseko’s second premise is flawed because it
had the opportunity to respond to this information. Taseko had sought and
received permission to provide responses to any late-in-the-day technical
submissions. It chose to provide such responses to several documents, but not
to the Technical Memorandum.
[62]
Moreover, Taseko’s final Closing Submission
explicitly states that Taseko was aware that there was no convergence of views
between Taseko and NRCan on seepage. Taseko stated:
In any Tailings Storage Facility (“TSF”)
some seepage is normal – in fact it is an integral part of the design of a TSF.
While we had thought there was a convergence of views on seepage predications
between Natural Resources Canada (“NRCan”) and Environment Canada on
these issues during the hearing we have recently – somewhat surprisingly –
seen those agencies say they remain of different views.
[Bold emphasis in original; Underline emphasis
added]
[63]
In my view, this indicates that Taseko was aware
of the Technical Memorandum’s content; it also undercuts Taseko’s position at
the hearing that it believed there was an agreement between Taseko and NRCan
that the difference in seepage estimates was within a factor of two.
[64]
In summary, I can find no breach of the audi
alteram partem rule.
(3)
Legitimate Expectations
[65]
The general rule of “legitimate
expectations” provides that the content of the duty of procedural
fairness will be impacted if an individual is found to have a legitimate
expectation in the procedure to be followed or the outcome of a decision.
However, this is a procedural right, not a substantive one (Baker at
para 26). Of relevance to this case is the quote, “[i]f
the claimant has a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure will be
followed, this procedure will be required by the duty of fairness” (Baker
at para 26).
[66]
Taseko suggests that its legitimate expectations
may have been breached in two ways: (1) the Panel did not follow the
Public Hearing Procedures, and (2) Taseko had an expectation that it would be
able to respond to new evidence (in the Technical Memorandum) which was not
satisfied.
[67]
In Mount Sinai Hospital Center v Quebec
(Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41 at para 29, [2001] 2
SCR 281, the SCC stated that “[t]he doctrine of
legitimate expectations, on the other hand, looks to the conduct of the
public authority in the exercise of that power… including established
practices, conduct or representations that can be characterized as clear,
unambiguous and unqualified.” In this case, although the Public Hearing
Procedures were clear, they were not unambiguous nor were they unqualified. In
my view, Taseko did not have any legitimate expectations that the Public
Hearing Procedures would be followed in every instance rigidly because the
Panel had broad discretion to deviate from its own Public Hearing Procedures.
In addition, the Panel explicitly told all of the parties that it would be
accepting closing submissions up until a certain date, and that following this
date, Taseko would have a few days to respond to any technical submissions. The
Panel thus outlined the procedures that it intended to follow, and did
precisely that - it followed them.
[68]
Taseko has not shown that these Public Hearing Procedures
were not met in this case. Taseko identified two provisions in particular that
it claims were breached, as noted above:
2.7 If a participant files an expert
report as part of its submission, then that participant must arrange to have
the expert available to answer questions as part of the hearing when the
submission is presented…
2.18 Closing remarks must not be used to
present new information but should summarize the Interested Party’s perspective
on the hearing record and recommendations to the Panel.
[69]
The Technical Memorandum does not breach either
of these provisions. First, Dr. Desbarats was available for cross-examination
on NRCan’s Report. Second, the Technical Memorandum did not present new
information. Taseko did not request further cross-examination of Dr. Desbarats,
and given the fact that he had previously been cross-examined on the same
information, it is not clear what this would have accomplished. The Procedures
do not provide for further cross-examination following closing submissions.
[70]
As to the second point, Taseko did have a
legitimate expectation that it would have the opportunity to respond to any
final technical submissions. The Panel clearly, unambiguously, and repeatedly
affirmed that Taseko would have the opportunity to do so. However, these
expectations were satisfied in this case as discussed above in relation to audi
alteram partem.
[71]
Taseko had the opportunity to respond to the
Technical Memorandum in its closing submissions and in additional written
submissions. As noted above, Taseko had sought and received permission to have “a few days” to respond to submissions concerning
technical or specialized knowledge, and it referenced NRCan’s position (that
there was no convergence of the parties’ views on seepage) in its final written
submissions to the Panel.
[72]
Taseko’s decision not to substantively respond
to the Technical Memorandum is not a breach of any alleged legitimate
expectations.
[73]
Finally, as noted by the Minister/AG, the Court
may choose not to intervene if there is a lack of prejudice (Omer v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 494 at para 9). In this case, it is
not clear that Taseko faced any prejudice as a result of the purported
procedural irregularities it identified.
(4)
Failure to Object
[74]
If Taseko was concerned that any of the closing
submissions or memoranda breached procedural fairness, it had the obligation to
raise these concerns with the Panel. As in Geza v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124, [2006] 4 FCR 377, and Hennessy
v Canada, 2016 FCA 180, 484 NR 77, it is not open to Taseko to hold this
complaint in reserve as fuel for a judicial review.
[75]
In this instance, Taseko did object to
the late submissions in general. Before the Panel, Taseko’s representative
stated:
So my suggestion would be, number 1, that
we put a stop to these late submissions, particularly those by persons
having expertise or specialized knowledge that should be cut off, and we
need to have a few days at least to be able to assess those and respond.
And I don’t mind having the opportunity to
do that after final argument, if that is acceptable to the Panel. But we do
definitely need an opportunity to put an end to it.
As well, we’re not going to have an
opportunity to ask Mr. McCrory any questions, which is also part of
unfairness in the process. We won’t have an opportunity to challenge his
material.
[Emphasis added]
The Panel responded thus:
And just
before we go to the next speaker, I indicated to Mr. Gustafson this morning
that I would attempt to respond to his request this afternoon, and we are comfortable
affording you several days of time from the receipt of any new technical
documents to respond to us and - - yeah.
With that as our plan, that will possibly,
probably entail an extension past the closing remarks for any response by you
to new technical documents received.
[Emphasis added]
[76]
Taseko received what it asked for. It asked for “a few days” to deal with technical submissions if the
Panel accepted such submissions, and this concern was dealt with promptly and
appropriately by the Panel.
[77]
The obligation to raise concerns is relevant to
Taseko’s claim that the Technical Memorandum contained new evidence. Taseko did
not, at that time, claim that the reception of the Technical Memorandum was
unfair because it constituted new evidence. In addition, Taseko did not at any
point inquire as to the authorship of the Technical Memorandum or indicate that
failing to identify the individual author was a breach of procedural fairness.
(5)
Industry Interveners
[78]
In my view, it would be inappropriate to impose
any sort of rules of general application on review panels (as proposed by the Industry
Interveners) given the need for procedural flexibility and deference to chosen
procedures (and the broad discretion with respect to procedure conferred by the
CEAA 2012). What constitutes a reasonable opportunity to be heard may
vary according to the particular circumstances of each review panel.
[79]
In conclusion, the Panel did not fail to observe
principles of procedural fairness by accepting and relying upon the Technical
Memorandum.
B.
Issue 2: Was the Panel’s determination
that Taseko underestimated the volume of tailings pore water seepage leaving
the TSF unreasonable?
[80]
The Panel found that Taseko underestimated the
volume of tailings pore water seepage that would leave the TSF. Taseko submits
that this finding is unreasonable due to the Panel’s misapprehension of
Taseko’s TSF seepage estimation. In comparing a component of Taseko’s TSF
seepage estimate with the entire NRCan seepage estimate, Taseko claims “the Panel made an apples-to-oranges comparison that was
manifestly unreasonable.”
[81]
Taseko admits that the Panel correctly stated
Taseko’s seepage estimates at Table 3 of the Report for a total of 70 L/s of
seepage leaving the TSF. However, when summarizing NRCan’s comparison at Table
5 of the Report, Taseko argues that the Panel ignored its own accurate summary
of Taseko’s estimates. In Table 5, Taseko’s estimate of deep basin seepage
changes from 15 L/s to 0 L/s.
[82]
Taseko also takes issue with comparisons made by
NRCan which, along with other errors, led to the Panel’s conclusion that Taseko
had significantly underestimated seepage from the TSF.
[83]
In my view, the Panel’s determination (for which
deference is owed) that Taseko had underestimated the volume of tailings pore
water seepage leaving the TSF, was reasonable.
[84]
The Panel was tasked with weighing scientific
evidence and making findings of fact thereon, and the Panel had the relevant
expertise to do so (the three member panel consisted of Dr. Bill Ross, a
professor in the area of environmental design, Dr. George Kupfer, a community
consultant, and Dr. Ron Smyth, a geologist). As discussed in Inverhuron
& District Ratepayers’ Association v Canada (Minister of the Environment)
(2000), 191 FTR 20 (FCTD), aff’d 2001 FCA 203 [Inverhuron], these
circumstances are relevant to the reasonableness assessment:
[71] It is worth noting again that
the function of the Court in judicial review is not to act as an “academy of
science” or a “legislative upper chamber”. In dealing with any of the
statutory criteria, the range of factual possibilities is practically unlimited.
No matter how many scenarios are considered, it is possible to conceive of one
which has not been. The nature of science is such that reasonable people can
disagree about relevance and significance. In disposing of these issues, the
Court's function is not to assure comprehensiveness but to assess, in a formal
rather than substantive sense, whether there has been some consideration of
those factors which the Act requires the comprehensive study to address.
If there has been some consideration, it is irrelevant that there could have
been further and better consideration.
[Bold emphasis in original; Underline emphasis
added]
[85]
Taseko argues that Table 5 and the subsequent
discussion are a mischaracterization of Taseko’s seepage estimates. However,
this section of the Report is simply a summary of NRCan’s position, and
it does not represent any of the Panel’s conclusions.
[86]
It is important to keep in mind, when reviewing
Table 5 and the summary of NRCan’s conclusions in the Report, that NRCan had
serious concerns with the modelling done by Taseko. Table 5 does not simply
repeat the estimates put forward by Taseko (and summarized earlier in the
Report). The “errors” cited by Taseko actually
represent scientific disagreements with respect to what NRCan believed could
reasonably be concluded from the Taseko models, in comparison with the
conclusions from its own model.
[87]
Therefore, it is inaccurate to say that NRCan
made “erroneous comparisons.” Explanations were
provided for the differences between Taseko’s own estimates (in Table 3) and
the numbers in NRCan’s conclusions (in Table 5), such as that NRCan believed
that Taseko’s 2D model precluded any conclusions on deep basin seepage (greater
than 200 mbgs) (bottom row of Table 5) and that only Taseko’s 3D model accounted
for seepage through the bottom of the TSF (top row of Table 5).
[88]
The “corrected”
Table 5 presented in Taseko’s Memorandum is therefore misleading and
problematic, as it does not accurately represent NRCan’s views. NRCan
was not bound to accept Taseko’s models or estimates; as noted in Inverhuron,
“[t]he nature of science is such that reasonable people
can disagree about relevance and significance” (para 71).
[89]
At no point in the Report does the Panel
indicate that it thought Taseko’s total seepage estimate was 9 L/s or that it
otherwise misunderstood Taseko’s seepage estimates. It summarized both Taseko’s
position and NRCan’s position, and it did so accurately.
[90]
At the hearing, Taseko invited the Court to
conclude that the Panel compared NRCan’s estimate of 100 L/s seepage against an
erroneous Taseko estimate of 9 L/s total seepage. However, the Panel did not
indicate that it relied on the comparisons in Table 5 in reaching its
conclusion.
[91]
It was open to the Panel to accept the modelling
and the estimates put forward by NRCan regardless of how they compared to
Taseko’s modelling and estimates. Furthermore, NRCan had raised concerns with
respect to the accuracy of simply combining Taseko’s 2D and 3D model estimates,
given the difference in methodologies; for this reason alone, it was open to
the Panel to treat Taseko’s “combined” estimate
of 70 L/s with some suspicion.
[92]
The Panel ultimately accepted NRCan’s upper
bound estimate: “[t]he Panel accepts Natural Resources
Canada’s upper bound estimate as the expected seepage rate from the tailings
storage facility (see Table 5 above).” There is no suggestion that the
Panel thought that Table 5 represented Taseko’s own estimates.
[93]
Moreover, even if the Court accepted that the
appropriate comparison was between Taseko’s estimate of 70 L/s and NRCan’s
estimate of 100 L/s, it was open to the Panel to conclude that Taseko had
nonetheless significantly underestimated the volume of seepage. No evidence has
been put forward by Taseko to show that a difference of a factor of two is
insignificant or inconsequential, and it would be inappropriate for the Court
to conclude that this is the case.
[94]
As discussed during the hearing, this is a
difference of 30 L/s more seepage every second of every day for decades – it
was open to the Panel to conclude that this was an underestimation of the
volume of seepage on Taseko’s part. Further, as noted by the TNG, the Panel was
not required to base its findings on any particular “scientific
threshold,” and Taseko failed to identify any such “scientific thresholds” that the Panel’s conclusions
failed to meet.
[95]
In conclusion, by arguing that Table 5 is
mistaken, Taseko is essentially attempting to reargue the technical and
scientific positions it took before the Panel. The Panel rejected Taseko’s
conclusions. In my view, it would be inappropriate for this Court to reweigh
the evidence and reach a different conclusion.
[96]
Furthermore, Taseko’s attempts to inject
ambiguity into the Panel’s findings would require a misreading of the Report in
a manner that defies common sense.
C.
Issue 3: Was the Panel’s decision to
accept NRCan’s upper bound estimate as the expected seepage rate from the TSF
unreasonable?
[97]
Taseko submits that the Panel’s acceptance of
NRCan’s upper bound estimate as the expected seepage rate is unreasonable
because:
a)
it relies directly upon the erroneous conclusion
that Taseko severely underestimated TSF seepage; and
b)
it accepts NRCan's model even though it is
materially different than the actual design of the TSF proposed by Taseko.
[98]
In summary, I have concluded that the Panel’s
decision to accept NRCan’s upper bound estimate as the expected seepage rate
from the TSF was reasonable. As discussed above (see Issue 2), the Panel’s
conclusion that Taseko underestimated seepage was reasonable; therefore, its
reliance on this conclusion in accepting NRCan’s upper bound estimate is
reasonable.
[99]
The SCC’s comments in Newfoundland and
Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011
SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 [Newfoundland Nurses], with respect to
reasonableness are relevant in this case:
[14] Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir
as standing for the proposition that the “adequacy” of reasons is a stand-alone
basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake
two discrete analyses — one for the reasons and a separate one for the result
(Donald J. M. Brown and John M. Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative
Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at §§12:5330 and 12:5510). It is a more
organic exercise — the reasons must be read together with the outcome and serve
the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a range of possible
outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was saying in Dunsmuir
when it told reviewing courts to look at “the qualities that make a decision
reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to
outcomes” (para. 47).
[15] In assessing whether the decision
is reasonable in light of the outcome and the reasons, courts must show
“respect for the decision-making process of adjudicative bodies with regard to
both the facts and the law” (Dunsmuir, at para. 48). This means that
courts should not substitute their own reasons, but they may, if they find it
necessary, look to the record for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness
of the outcome.
[16] Reasons may not include all the
arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing
judge would have preferred, but that does not impugn the validity of either the
reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis. A decision-maker is
not required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however
subordinate, leading to its final conclusion (Service Employees’
International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn.,
[1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, at p. 391). In other words, if the reasons allow the
reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it
to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes,
the Dunsmuir criteria are met.
[Emphasis added]
[100] In this case, the Panel’s in-depth review of the submissions made by
all of the interested parties provides more than enough support for its
ultimate conclusions. Even if the Court found that the Panel did not make its
rationale for rejecting Taseko’s mitigation measures sufficiently clear, in my
view the record supports the Panel’s conclusions.
[101] Various participants submitted concerns regarding the mitigation
measures put forward by Taseko, and Taseko responded by stating that additional
studies would be done following the approval of the Project. Given the
conceptual and unproven nature of the mitigation measures and this lacklustre
response from Taseko, it was open to the Panel to not recommend that these mitigation
measures were reasonable. There was nothing unreasonable in finding that
satisfactory mitigation measures should precede project approval rather than
follow it.
[102] Furthermore, when Taseko’s efficiency ratios were applied to NRCan’s
pre-recovery seepage estimate, the result was far greater than Taseko’s post-recovery
seepage estimate (11.8 L/s instead of 2.40 L/s).
[103] With respect to the differences between the proposed TSF and the
NRCan model, the evidence indicates that the Panel understood these differences.
Further, it is not clear how the purported “wrong
design” in NRCan’s model prejudiced Taseko.
[104] Taseko submitted that NRCan assumed that no seepage would go through
the embankments, and that this was problematic because the fact that there was
to be seepage out of the sides was a mitigation function (the embankments
filter the water). However, the Panel had found that Taseko had assigned
homogenous values to the overburden deposits and the particle size of tailings;
therefore, the Panel did not accept that this “mitigation
function” would function exactly as described by Taseko.
[105] The other differences identified by Taseko, such as till thickness
(which Taseko did not even promise to deliver) and calibration, were also
understood by the Panel. There is no indication that the Panel improperly
assessed NRCan’s model instead of the actual proposed model – simply preferring
one model over the other is not sufficient to establish that the Panel assessed
the “wrong design.”
[106] Further, as noted by the Minister/AG, NRCan’s assumption actually
benefitted Taseko: if NRCan had modelled seepage through the embankments, this
undoubtedly would have increased its total seepage estimate.
[107] Taseko claims that the Panel’s failure to address seepage mitigation
breaches section 43(1)(d)(i) of the CEAA 2012 and section 2.2(d) of
the Amended Terms of Reference. However, section 19(1)(d) of the CEAA
2012 indicates that the environmental assessment must take into account “mitigation measures that are technically and economically
feasible and that would mitigate any significant adverse environmental
effects of the designated project” (emphasis added).
[108] Therefore, if the Panel did not agree that Taseko’s proposed
mitigation measures were feasible or that they would mitigate the significant
adverse effects, it did not need to take these into account. Further, the
Amended Terms of Reference indicate that the Panel is only required to identify
mitigation measures that it recommends.
[109] It should not be assumed that the Panel breached the statutory
requirements. In Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada, 2015
FCA 186, 388 DLR (4th) 685, rev’g 2014 FC 463, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 36711
(28 April 2016), the FCA considered an appeal from a decision of Russell J.,
wherein Russell J. had concluded that a joint review panel report created under
the CEAA did not comply with the legislation. The FCA stated:
[123] In the circumstances, the Panel
made no specific finding that it had complied with the consideration
requirements in paragraphs 16(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. However, it
is our view that in conducting the EA and preparing the EA Report, the Panel
must be taken to have implicitly satisfied itself that it was in compliance
with those statutory requirements. In applying the reasonableness standard
to this question, we must consider the Panel's decision as a whole, in the
context of the underlying record, to determine whether the Panel's implicit
conclusion that it had complied with the consideration requirements is
reasonable (see Agraira at paragraph 53).
[Emphasis added]
[110] Similarly, in this case, when the Report is considered as a whole it
is clear that the Panel considered the seepage mitigation measures put forward
by Taseko. The Report reviewed Dr. Smith’s comments on mitigation measures,
which were critical of Taseko’s failure to provide detailed information: “the suite of seepage interception measures Taseko had
proposed had been evaluated at a conceptual level only.”
[111] Further, the Report reviewed the critique by the British Columbia
Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources (i.e., “there remained uncertainties around the ability to limit and
collect the expected volume of seepage from the [TSF], and the ability to
effectively treat water to maintain water quality in Fish Lake and its
tributaries”). Therefore, unlike in the case of Bow Valley
Naturalists Society v Alberta (Minister of Environmental Protection) (1995),
[1996] 2 WWR 749, 177 AR 161 (ABQB), cited by Taseko, the Panel did not reach
its conclusions by flying in the face of “uncontradicted
evidence.”
[112] In addition, the Panel’s acceptance of NRCan’s upper bound estimate
was supported by the evidence of independent expert Dr. Smith, who stated that
the total TSF seepage was likely towards the upper end of a range of 20 to 100
L/s. Finally, it must be noted that, contrary to what is implied in Taseko’s
submissions, interested parties such as NRCan were not required to “refute” Taseko’s analysis – the Panel was not
required to assume that Taseko was correct unless shown otherwise.
D.
Issue 4: Was the Panel’s conclusion
that the concentration of water quality variables in Fish Lake (Teztan Biny)
and Wasp Lake would likely be a significant adverse environmental effect
unreasonable?
[113] Taseko submits that the findings with respect to seepage, discussed
above, “permeated” the Report. In a section on
the water quality of Fish Lake (Teztan Biny), the Report stated:
The Panel also notes that the seepage
from the tailings storage facility expected by Natural Resources Canada is considerably
greater than estimated by Taseko. On balance, the Panel concludes, as did
most presenters on this subject, that there would be higher concentrations of
water quality contaminants of concern in Fish Lake than modelled by Taseko.
[Emphasis added]
[114] Taseko argues the impugned seepage finding was directly responsible
for the Panel’s conclusion that the Project would lead to significant adverse
environmental effects on the water quality of Fish Lake (Teztan Biny) and Wasp
Lake. The water quality finding relies on the unreasonable seepage finding;
therefore, it cannot stand and is inconsistent with the requirements under the
Amended Terms of Reference.
[115] The Panel’s conclusion that the concentration of water quality
variables in Fish Lake (Teztan Biny) and Wasp Lake would likely be a
significant adverse environmental effect was reasonable. As discussed above,
the impugned seepage findings were also reasonable; therefore, the Panel’s
reliance on these findings in reaching a conclusion on water quality was reasonable.
[116] Furthermore, the water quality findings were supported by additional
evidence, including Taseko’s own admission that the water quality would not be
in line with guidelines for the protection of aquatic life. The likely
effectiveness of Taseko’s water treatment mitigation measures were questioned
by presenters for the TNG (“details on the
effectiveness of the treatment were not provided or modelled”), the British
Columbia Ministry of Environment (“unproven technology
over the long term [and] potentially costly”), and the British Columbia
Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Petroleum Resources (“[w]ater
treatment for the Project did not provide confirmation that the proposed water
quality objectives for Fish Lake (Teztan Biny) were likely to be either technically
or financially achievable”).
[117] Therefore, it was open to the Panel to reject the “unproven and unprecedented” proposals put forward by
Taseko.
[118] The Panel stated:
Based on the evidence, the Panel finds it is
unable to accept Taseko’s conclusion that the water treatment options proposed
would effectively mitigate the adverse effects of the Project on Fish Lake
(Teztan Biny) water quality. The Panel concludes that the proposed
recirculation scheme, the adaptive management plan and the water treatment options
are unlikely to work effectively in the long-term. On this basis, the Panel
concludes the “proof of concept” test proposed by Taseko for the environmental
assessment has failed.
[119] The Panel therefore did not rely solely on the impugned seepage
findings in reaching its conclusions on water quality.
[120] With respect to the precautionary principle, there does not appear
to be any dispute between the parties that the Panel was required to assess the
proposal in a precautionary manner. The purpose section of the CEAA 2012
states:
4 (1) The purposes of this Act are
|
4 (1)
La présente loi a pour objet :
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(a) to protect the components of the environment that are within the
legislative authority of Parliament from significant adverse environmental
effects caused by a designated project;
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a) de protéger les composantes de
l’environnement qui relèvent de la compétence législative du Parlement contre
tous effets environnementaux négatifs importants d’un projet désigné;
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(b) to ensure that designated projects that require the exercise of a
power or performance of a duty or function by a federal authority under any
Act of Parliament other than this Act to be carried out, are considered in
a careful and precautionary manner to avoid significant adverse environmental
effects;
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b) de veiller à ce que les projets désignés
dont la réalisation exige l’exercice, par une autorité fédérale,
d’attributions qui lui sont conférées sous le régime d’une loi fédérale autre
que la présente loi soient étudiés avec soin et prudence afin qu’ils n’entraînent
pas d’effets environnementaux négatifs importants;
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(c) to promote cooperation and coordinated action between federal and
provincial governments with respect to environmental assessments;
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c) de promouvoir la collaboration des
gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux et la coordination de leurs activités en
matière d’évaluation environnementale;
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(d) to promote communication and cooperation with aboriginal peoples
with respect to environmental assessments;
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d) de promouvoir la communication et la
collaboration avec les peuples autochtones en matière d’évaluation
environnementale;
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(e) to ensure that opportunities are provided for meaningful public
participation during an environmental assessment;
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e) de veiller à ce que le public ait la
possibilité de participer de façon significative à l’évaluation
environnementale;
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(f) to ensure that an environmental assessment is completed in a
timely manner;
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f) de veiller à ce que l’évaluation
environnementale soit menée à terme en temps opportun;
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(g) to ensure that projects, as defined in section 66, that are to be
carried out on federal lands, or those that are outside Canada and that are
to be carried out or financially supported by a federal authority, are
considered in a careful and precautionary manner to avoid significant adverse
environmental effects;
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g) de veiller à ce que soient étudiés
avec soin et prudence, afin qu’ils n’entraînent pas d’effets environnementaux
négatifs importants, les projets au sens de l’article 66 qui sont
réalisés sur un territoire domanial, qu’une autorité fédérale réalise à
l’étranger ou pour lesquels elle accorde une aide financière en vue de leur
réalisation à l’étranger;
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(h) to encourage federal authorities to take actions that promote
sustainable development in order to achieve or maintain a healthy environment
and a healthy economy; and
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h) d’inciter les autorités fédérales à
favoriser un développement durable propice à la salubrité de l’environnement
et à la santé de l’économie;
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(i) to encourage the study of the cumulative effects of physical
activities in a region and the consideration of those study results in
environmental assessments.
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i) d’encourager l’étude des effets
cumulatifs d’activités concrètes dans une région et la prise en compte des
résultats de cette étude dans le cadre des évaluations environnementales.
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(2) The Government of Canada, the
Minister, the Agency, federal authorities and responsible authorities, in the
administration of this Act, must exercise their powers in a manner that
protects the environment and human health and applies the precautionary
principle.
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(2)
Pour l’application de la présente loi, le gouvernement du Canada, le
ministre, l’Agence, les autorités fédérales et les autorités responsables doivent
exercer leurs pouvoirs de manière à protéger l’environnement et la santé
humaine et à appliquer le principe de précaution.
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(Court’s underlining)
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(La Cour souligne)
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[121] However, there is clearly a conflict between the parties as to what
this entails. Taseko’s proposal relied on adaptive management; that is, Taseko
proposed that environmental risks and mitigation measures could be dealt with during
further stages of development. Other parties considered this an inadequate approach,
and sought more information on the risks and feasibility of mitigation.
[122] The Panel recognized the possibility of adaptive management, but
found that it could not defer important decisions to the next stage of the
process. In the Report, the Panel referenced the requirement that it act in a
precautionary manner and stated, with respect to water quality in particular:
Taseko declined to provide some materials
requested by the Panel and by other participants (e.g., description of water
quality model for Fish Lake). To deal with the resulting uncertainties, the
Panel considered various risk management strategies, including adaptive
management in some circumstances. However, when the Panel concluded the
potential adverse environmental effects were potentially “significant”, it did
not agree that deferring decisions on the approach to manage the risk to
subsequent regulatory processes is appropriate. It is necessary at the
environmental assessment stage for the Panel to determine if a significant
adverse effect is likely and to consider if and how the risk can be managed to
acceptable levels.
If, after
reviewing the record of information for the review, the Panel decided that
there were serious uncertainties about a potential adverse environmental effect
and the ability to manage that effect and the risk of serious or irreversible
environmental harm was high, then the Panel adopted a precautionary approach.
[Emphasis
added]
[123] It was reasonable for the Panel not to accept Taseko’s “vague assurances” that it would engage in adaptive
management in order to deal with adverse environmental effects. The Panel
sought information on environmental effects and mitigation measures, and Taseko
refused to provide this information. It was entirely reasonable, and in line
with the Panel’s (reasonable) interpretation of the precautionary principle,
for the Panel to conclude that the concentration of water quality variables in
Fish Lake (Teztan Biny) and Wasp Lake would likely be a significant adverse
environmental effect.
[124] Indeed, acceptance of vague adaptive management schemes in
circumstances such as these would, in my view, tend to call into question the
value of the entire review panel process – if all such decisions could be left
to a later stage, then the review panel process would simply be for the sake of
appearances.
VI.
CONCLUSION
[125]
For these reasons, the Court concludes that:
a)
The Panel did not breach any procedural fairness
/ audi alteram partem / legitimate expectation principles; and
b)
The Panel’s factual findings were open for it to
make and were reasonable.
[126] Therefore, this judicial review will be dismissed with costs to the
Respondents.