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She referred to several factors that she considered were indicative of “neglect [or] carelessness”, as set out in her audit report on this aspect (Exhibit R-1, tab 17). ... The CRA considered each of these immediate family executors and trustees to have been equally involved in the administration of the Appellant/Estate and spousal trust. ... Finally at para. 38 the Appellant/Estate pleaded that the Respondent, ha[d] not considered the applicability of the [p]rincipal [r]esidence [e]xemption for the Lynnbrook property or the various costs associated with the conveyance of the property. [34]   In the Respondent's reply, at subparas. 20(o) and (p), it is pleaded that the appealed reassessment was based on ministerial assumptions including that the Lynnbrook property, was not designated as a ‘principal residence’ for the purposes of para. 40(2)(b) of the Act and [n]o election pursuant to subsection 70(6.2) of the Act was made in respect of the [Lynnbrook property] in Harry’s terminal return for the 1995 taxation year. [35]   The evidence was that Mr. ...

While [A.B.] is not public about his HIV status, we emphasize that this aspect of his claim must be considered in light of the consequences he would face if his HIV status were to be revealed in the Bahamas [emphasis in original]. [11]   The PRRA application was supported by a lengthy affidavit from the applicant, corroborative evidence such as photographs and the applicant’s social media profile, statements from friends, letters from a psychotherapist and a social worker, and country conditions documentation.   ... As well, rather than assessing the evidence the applicant relied upon holistically, the officer approached the evidence item by item and concludes seriatim that individual items of evidence do not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that state protection will not be forthcoming, even though many of the items of evidence were not tendered for that purpose at all and even though it is the cumulative import of the evidence that does bear on this issue that must be considered.   I am prepared to accept that, despite how the decision is drafted, the officer actually considered the evidence cumulatively.   ...

It cannot have been Parliament’s intention that the IAD should completely ignore the findings of the ID, the specialized body that heard the witnesses, considered the other evidence, and then delivered detailed and thorough reasons in support of its conclusion. ... For instance, if a tourist wishes to stay on a family farm and work part-time just for room and board for a short period (i.e. one to four weeks), this person would not be considered a worker… [33]   The IAD then cites jurisprudence on the breadth of the definition, beginning with Yu Lung, where the applicant was found to have engaged in work even though her evidence was that she only helped customers for a brief time while her sister was away from the store to care for her sick child. ... All of these elements brought these activities within the definition of work. [40]   In the case at bar, the IAD does not appear to have considered how the facts of this case differ from the circumstances in the jurisprudence it cites. ...

The Applicant stated that in his culture, the status of “legally separated” is not considered a distinct marital status, persons are considered to be married until a certificate of divorce is issued, and at the time that he sought the second work permit, neither he nor his wife had applied for a divorce. ... By this I understand him to mean that he considered himself to be still married, although he and his then wife were living apart. [17]   The Respondent submits that the Applicant, in his November 22, 2017 work permit application which the Applicant submitted as the spouse of a skilled worker, the Applicant declared that he was married. ...

If the CRA accepts a disclosure as having met the conditions set out in this policy, it will be considered a valid disclosure and the taxpayer will not be charged penalties or prosecuted with respect to the disclosure. […] Conditions of a Valid Disclosure 31. ... Due to the nature of a particular disclosure, referrals to other programs within the CRA may be considered necessary in order to fully analyze the disclosure. 37. ... This infers that penalties are only applicable on taxable income, and on amounts that would have been disclosed in T1 adjustments and T1135 information returns. [44]   The Applicant relies on Wong at paragraphs 34 to 41 for the proposition that the lack of CRA warnings to the taxpayer that his disclosure may not be considered voluntary, together with the relevant information circular, constituted a promise to the taxpayer that his disclosure to the VDP would be accepted.   ...

However, the appellant argues that the CBSA did not break with its longstanding practices because it has consistently considered importer name change requests in the context of its evaluation of remission claims under TARO. ... To that extent, they may be considered reasonable in the abstract. [36]   The respondent claims, however, that the impugned decisions of the CBSA are at odds with past practices and past decisions. ... Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 at para. 131. [51]   Moreover, legitimate expectations is only one of the factors to be considered in determining what procedural fairness requires in a given context: Baker v. ...

In its memorandum, Atlantic Packaging refers to the six factors that have been considered by the courts in determining whether the gain realized on a disposition of a particular property is an income gain or a capital gain. ... The question for this Court is not whether the shares should be capital property, despite the lack of any evidence with respect to other transactions of a similar nature, but only whether this matter should be considered at this stage absent such evidence. [37]   In my view, the absence of this evidence is sufficient for this Court to reject Atlantic Packaging’s argument that this new issue should be considered by this Court. ...

The Supreme Court had held that the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act was suppletive and thus recognized a ten-year limitation period for collecting a tax debt. [23]   That holding went against the position of the Crown, which had argued that there was no limitation period for collecting a tax debt. [24]   On this issue, the Supreme Court considered the following, at paragraph 20 of Markevich:... ... [Emphasis added] [34]   Thus, the respondent argues that the Minister was entitled to assess the appellant under section 160 because this power to assess cannot be time-barred. [35]   In Addison & Leyen, it was held that the taxpayer could not apply for judicial review and rely on common law principles to derogate from section 160. [36]   However, both Rothstein J. in his dissent and the Supreme Court in a unanimous judgment recognized that the application of section 160 could be affected by another provision of the ITA. [37]   Since the issue of the impact of section 222 on the application of section 160 was not raised at the time, it should be considered whether the amendment of the provisions in section 222 can affect the application of section 160. [38]   The appellant submits that the new section 222 provides for a scheme that places a time limit on the Minister’s power to collect. ... From the moment the collection of a tax debt is time‑barred, it will be unnecessary for the Minister to assess a third party under section 160 because the debt can no longer be collected. [68]   This interpretation, while restrictive as to the scope of the phrase “at any time”, is consistent when sections 160 and 222 are considered together in the light of the rationales justifying the limitation period. [69]   Had Parliament intended to exclude section 160 from the application of section 222, it would have done so clearly and explicitly by preventing the collection of tax debts under section 160 from being time-barred. [70]   The appellant accepted the Minister’s assumptions of fact. ...

At this stage, the Court must determine whether the taxpayer's venture contained elements that suggest that it could be considered as a hobby or another personal activity. [34] If the activity do not contained a personal element and is clearly commercial, the Court does not need to conduct further enquiry and the activity will be classified as commercial. [35]   [29]   If there is a personal element to the activity, the Court must determine whether the activity has been carried on in a sufficiently commercial manner to constitute a source of business or property income. [36] This assessment should not be used to second-guess the business judgment of the taxpayer. It is the commercial nature of the taxpayer’s activity that has to be evaluated, not his or her business acumen. [37] The issue of whether or not a taxpayer has a source of business or property income is to be determined by looking at the commerciality of the activity in question. [38] The Court must determine whether the taxpayer intended to carry on the activity for profit and whether there is evidence to support that intention. [39] This requires the taxpayer to establish that his or her predominant intention was to make a profit from the activity and that the activity has been carried out in accordance with objective standards of businesslike behaviour. [40] The taxpayer must demonstrate that he or she had the subjective intention to make a profit from the activity and the Court must determine if that was the case by looking at a variety of objective factors. [41] In Stewart, the SCC stated that the objective factors listed by Dickson J. in Moldowan [42] are some of the factors that can be considered by the Court but that the factors will differ depending on the nature and extent of the activity. ... Brown did not attempt to explain to the Court why they should be considered as being part of the same activity. ...

Since the appellants did not raise an alternative argument that part of such expenses could reasonably be regarded as applicable to this claim, this issue was not considered by the Tax Court. [17]   The underlying premise in the appellants’ argument that the legal fees in question are deductible is that paragraph 8(1)(b) of the Act permits a taxpayer, in computing his or her income from an office or employment, to deduct an amount for legal expenses incurred to defend a claim that such taxpayer was overpaid. ... However, since the judgments in these cases were rendered in 2008 and 2011, these cases were decided before the amendments were adopted. [29]   The previous version of paragraph 8(1)(b) of the Act that was before the Courts in Fenwick and Chagnon was: 8. (1) In computing a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from an office or employment, there may be deducted such of the following amounts as are wholly applicable to that source or such part of the following amounts as may reasonably be regarded as applicable thereto 8. (1) Sont déductibles dans le calcul du revenu d’un contribuable tiré, pour une année d’imposition, d’une charge ou d’un emploi ceux des éléments suivants qui se rapportent entièrement à cette source de revenus, ou la partie des éléments suivants qu’il est raisonnable de considérer comme s’y rapportant: […] […] (b) amounts paid by the taxpayer in the year as or on account of legal expenses incurred by the taxpayer to collect or establish a right to salary or wages owed to the taxpayer by the employer or former employer of the taxpayer; b) les sommes payées par le contribuable au cours de l’année au titre des frais judiciaires ou extrajudiciaires qu’il a engagés pour recouvrer le traitement ou salaire qui lui est dû par son employeur ou ancien employeur ou pour établir un droit à ceux-ci; [30]   It is important to compare the current wording with the former wording that was considered in Chagnon and Fenwick. ... Magee, while correctly acknowledging that the context and purpose of a statutory provision must always be considered, comment that “[i]t would introduce intolerable uncertainty into the Income Tax Act if clear language in a detailed provision of the Act were to be qualified by unexpressed exceptions derived from a court's view of the object and purpose of the provision”: Principles of Canadian Income Tax Law (2nd ed. 1997), at pp. 475-76. ...