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After referring to the Quebec equivalent of s. 67, and in finding that the taxpayer had not met its burden of establishing that such assessments were incorrect, Allen JCQ stated (at paras. 63-64, TaxInterpretations translation): How can the plaintiff challenge the presumption of correctness of the notices of assessment where the 7.89% rate, considered to be reasonable and adopted by the defendant, falls within the range that its own expert considered to be a reasonable rate based on the current rates in the market for obligations with similar considerations and risks during the period in litigation? Doubtless, the rate of 7.89% corresponds to the lowest rate in the range, but it nonetheless is within that range and cannot be considered to be prima facie unreasonable. ...

However in cases where the payments are made for purchase of software as a product, the consideration paid cannot be considered to be for use of the right to use the software. ... State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 (SC)]… Clearly, the consideration paid for purchase of goods cannot be considered as ‘royalty’. ... Ltd [(2011) 332 ITR 222(Del)], this Court had reiterated the view that payment made by a reseller for the purchase of software for sale in the Indian market could by no stretch be considered as royalty.” ...

How can the plaintiff challenge the presumption of correctness of the notices of assessment where the 7.89% rate, considered to be reasonable and adopted by the defendant, falls within the range that its own expert considered to be a reasonable rate based on the current rates in the market for obligations with similar considerations and risks during the period in litigation? Doubtless, the rate of 7.89% corresponds to the lowest rate in the range, but it nonetheless is within that range and cannot be considered to be prima facie unreasonable. ...

The Queen, 2015 BCSC 1375-- summary under Solicitor-Client Privilege Summary Under Tax Topics- General Concepts- Solicitor-Client Privilege not necessary to provide legal opinion to rely on having consulted legal counsel Fitzpatrick J. found that CRA had failed to establish neglect or carelessness in the filing position of the taxpayer ("Wesbild") given that such position had been carefully considered by its in-house tax lawyer – and, furthermore, he had consulted outside counsel (Robert Kopstein). ... Fitzpatrick J. then stated (at paras. 174, 176-177): I [disagree]… that Wesbild cannot exonerate itself by merely showing there is a potential legal argument that would support the filing position and that it must show what legal arguments were actually considered before the return was filed. … The CRA invites the court to infer that there was no consideration of the legal issues by reason of the fact that Mr. ...

CRA considered that a court order was required to rectify the dating of the directors’ resolution, but did not oppose this application. Before amending the directors’ resolution nunc pro tunc to change its date to November 1, 2012, Dunphy J stated (at paras. 7, 9): This case is quite unlike… Birch Hill … decided by me…[where] [t]he rectification sought would have materially re-ordered the transaction in ways that nobody had considered at the relevant time. ...

She noted that the municipalities themselves considered that they controlled the companies, in most cases a majority of the company’s board was named by the municipality or chosen from among a list proposed by the municipality, their budgets were approved by the municipal Councils, they received much of their financing from the municipalities and their activities were integrated with those of the municipalities. Quenneville JCQ stated (at para. 167, TaxInterpretations translation): It is important to emphasize that it is not actual control which must be considered, but rather the potential for the municipality to exercise such control. ...

Both Teitelbaum and the ARQ considered that the right of Teitelbaum under the RCA was a right or thing within the meaning of the Taxation Act (“TA”) equivalent of ITA s. 70(2). Teitelbaum considered that the amount was not distributed to her by the estate as contemplated by the TA equivalent of ITA s. 70(3), so that it was not taxable to her. The ARQ considered that the amount had not been received by her qua beneficiary of Lewin’s estate, but by virtue of a designation of her (in Lewin’s will) as a beneficiary of “all pension plans and any annuities purchased therefrom.” ...

CRA considered that there was a requirement to recognize deemed interest income on the notes under Reg. 7000(2)(d) given that, in contrast to the usual equity-linked notes that were available to investors at the time, these notes had “internal puts,” i.e., SLT had the right to terminate the notes at any time, on 367 days’ notice, at the market value of the reference assets. On this basis, it considered that the “the maximum amount of interest thereon that could be payable thereunder in respect of that year” was the difference between the maximum value of the reference assets at the end of the year and the maximum value in the prior years, and assessed accordingly, to treat such annual increase as foreign accrual property income of SLT under element C of the s. 95(1) FAPI definition. ... In any event, the SLT shares are OIF caught by Section 94.1 ITA if they may “reasonably be considered to derive [their] value, directly or indirectly, primarily from portfolio investments of that or any other non-resident entity”. ...

No. 73, Meredith CJ synthesized the governing principles and articulated the following five rules respecting when property was a fixture, which he characterized as "settled law": (1) That articles not otherwise attached to the land than by their own weight are not to be considered as part of the land, unless the circumstances are such as shew that they were intended to be part of the land. (2) That articles affixed to the land even slightly are to be considered part of the land unless the circumstances are such as to shew that they were intended to continue chattels. (3) That the circumstances necessary to be shewn to alter the primâ facie character of the articles are circumstances which shew the degree of annexation and object of such annexation, which are patent to all to see. (4) That the intention of the person affixing the article to the soil is material only so far as it can be presumed from the degree and object of the annexation. (5) That, even in the case of tenants' fixtures put in for the purposes of trade, they form part of the freehold, with the right, however, to the tenant, as between him and his landlord, to bring them back to the state of chattels again by severing them from the soil, and that they pass by a conveyance of the land as part of it, subject to this right of the tenant. ...

Although 501 treated the acquired IP as depreciable property, it considered that Taxation Act s. 99 (equivalent to ITA s. 13(7)(e)) did not apply to reduce the capital cost to it of the acquired IP because, in SherWeb’s hands, the IP had been eligible capital property rather than depreciable property. ... Although he considered this to be a largely sufficient ground, he went on to refer to the definition of eligible capital property (which, similarly to the federal definition, relevantly required in effect that the amount to which the taxpayer is entitled for the property’s disposition is “not included in computing the taxpayer's income or any gain or loss of the taxpayer from the disposition of a capital property” (para. 104)- and found that this condition had been met as SherWeb had not reported any disposition of a capital property, and had instead correctly treated the costs of developing its software (its employees’ salaries) as “a recurring and current expense in and of themselves" (para. 115). ...