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Two decisions held that there was acceptable service of a notice of objection where a letter (which met the requirements of a notice of objection) was served by a bailiff on the CRA’s office in Saguenay, [19] and where a notice of objection was delivered to the Halifax District Taxation Office but was not addressed to the Chief of Appeals. [20] Two other decisions of this Court went the other way, each noting that the language of subsection 165(2) of the ITA is mandatory, and holding that a notice of objection mailed to the Ottawa Technology Centre of the CRA [21] or to the Surrey Tax Centre, without being addressed to the Chief of Appeals, [22] was not validly served. [23]   In brief reasons for judgment delivered from the bench by Justice Sexton in McClelland, he considered a situation in which the taxpayer had sent a letter to a CRA Collection Enforcement Officer, and stated: The Income Tax Act required that a Notice of Objection must be sent to the Chief of Appeals. ... Ihama-Anthony sent to the CRA the documents which it had requested from him during the course of its audit, only to have those documents returned to him, without having been considered by the CRA. Had the CRA considered those documents before finalizing its audit, the results of the audit and the nature of the resultant reassessments may well have been more favourable from the perspective of Mr. ...

Mikhail were increased in order to reflect what was considered easiest for the CRA to accept – including the unreported Rebates in their income rather than the Corporation’s income. [25]   I found Mr. ... The appeal of that reassessment has been quashed and will not be considered further in this appeal. [2] Ms.  ... No amended corporate return was mentioned at the hearing and I therefore assume none was considered necessary or filed. [5] Paragraph 13 l. of the Reply to the Corporation’s Notice of Appeal refers to gift baskets but, based on the assumption in paragraph 13 k. and the evidence at trial, this seems to be an error and it appears that the reference should have been to gift cards. ...

., Lexis Nexis Canada Inc. 2014 wherein the author, after reviewing relevant principles of discovery, suggests at paragraph 23.11 that extrinsic aids should be admissible if they meet the threshold test of relevance and reliability and suggests that the views or reports of “a government employee participating in the legislative process” should be considered as part of the legislative history. ... It is my view that in a GAAR appeal, draft documents prepared in the context of a taxpayer’s audit or considered by officials involved in or consulted during the audit and assessment of the taxpayer should be disclosed. ... As Hogan J stated, these documents in the end may or may not be relevant or admissible at trial, but they can certainly lead to a train of inquiry that meets the lower threshold of disclosure in discovery: Superior Plus No. 1 at paragraph 35. [16]   Accordingly, even if this matter was a GAAR case, or the Appellant is correct in stating the disclosure test should be the same as in a GAAR case, the above test would not be met here as there is no evidence that any of the redacted documents were prepared in the context of the audit or considered by officials involved in or consulted during the audit or assessment. [17]   Since the Appellant also raised it, this case is also different from Canada v. ...

They argue that the CEO has not properly considered their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]. [2]   Ms. ... It is considered a very competitive riding with a historically small margin of victory. [12]   As such, the Applicants have requested that the CEO recommend a change in the date of the election as contemplated by subsection 56.2(4) of the CEA. ... Where, as here, the record is silent on how the CEO considered and balanced the Charter issues, it is impossible to for the Court to determine if the balancing was proportionate (Loyola at para 68).   ...

The second (file number IMM-3194-18) is a decision dated June 20, 2018 determining that the Applicant’s claim was abandoned, as the Applicant’s counsel appeared at the hearing but failed to proceed with the claim [Second Decision by the second RPD member]. [2]   The parties have agreed that the Applicant will discontinue the second application, but the issue regarding whether the declaration that the second matter had been abandoned will be considered in these reasons. ... Abuse of process Abus de procédure (2) A Division may refuse to allow an applicant to withdraw from a proceeding if it is of the opinion that the withdrawal would be an abuse of process under its rules. (2) Chacune des sections peut refuser le retrait de l’affaire dont elle est saisie si elle constate qu’il y a abus de procédure, au sens des règles, de la part de l’intéressé. … […] Proceedings Fonctionnement 170 The Refugee Protection Division, in any proceeding before it, 170 Dans toute affaire dont elle est saisie, la Section de la protection des réfugiés: (a) may inquire into any matter that it considers relevant to establishing whether a claim is well-founded; a) procède à tous les actes qu’elle juge utiles à la manifestation du bien-fondé de la demande; (b) must hold a hearing; b) dispose de celle-ci par la tenue d’une audience; (c) must notify the person who is the subject of the proceeding and the Minister of the hearing; c) convoque la personne en cause et le ministre; (d) must provide the Minister, on request, with the documents and information referred to in subsection 100(4); d) transmet au ministre, sur demande, les renseignements et documents fournis au titre du paragraphe 100(4); (d.1) may question the witnesses, including the person who is the subject of the proceeding; d.1) peut interroger les témoins, notamment la personne en cause; (e) must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations; e) donne à la personne en cause et au ministre la possibilité de produire des éléments de preuve, d’interroger des témoins et de présenter des observations; (f) may, despite paragraph (b), allow a claim for refugee protection without a hearing, if the Minister has not notified the Division, within the period set out in the rules of the Board, of the Minister’s intention to intervene; f) peut accueillir la demande d’asile sans qu’une audience soit tenue si le ministre ne lui a pas, dans le délai prévu par les règles, donné avis de son intention d’intervenir; (g) is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence; g) n’est pas liée par les règles légales ou techniques de présentation de la preuve; (h) may receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances; and h) peut recevoir les éléments qu’elle juge crédibles ou dignes de foi en l’occurrence et fonder sur eux sa décision; (i) may take notice of any facts that may be judicially noticed, any other generally recognized facts and any information or opinion that is within its specialized knowledge. i) peut admettre d’office les faits admissibles en justice et les faits généralement reconnus et les renseignements ou opinions qui sont du ressort de sa spécialisation. ... She submits that it is apparent that the only factor which the Second Member considered was the fact that the Applicant refused to proceed with her claim on the scheduled day, and insisted on proceeding at a later date. ...

Requested Relief [17]   The application for leave and judicial review in IMM-6053-18 requests the following relief: An order in the nature of a declaration that, notwithstanding s. 112(2)(b.l) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the removal of the Applicant from Canada to Jordan, a country where risk is alleged, which CBSA has commenced efforts to execute and for which the Applicant remains detained under s. 58 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”), is in breach of ss. 7, 9 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, of the objectives and intended application of the laws under s. 3 of the IRPA, and of Canada’s obligations under international law, unless a risk assessment meeting the requirements of fundamental justice is completed and there is a finding of no risk; An order in the nature of a declaration that s. 112(2)(b.1) is of no force and effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, in the circumstances of this case- where refugee protection status has been cessated under s. 108(l)(e) upon a finding that the reasons the person sought refugee protection have ceased to exist and where the person remains detained to enforce removal- as it breaches the Applicant’s rights under s. 7 of the Charter, in that it denies the Applicant the right to a risk assessment with respect to risk factors that have not been assessed by an independent decision maker, thereby exposing the Applicant to a risk of torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment, and a risk to life upon removal to Jordan, and the delay in initiating this constitutionally protected process infringes the Applicant’s liberty rights; An order of mandamus compelling the Respondent to allow the Applicants to submit a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA”) immediately and compelling the same to be determined by the Respondent prior to the enforcement of the removal order against the Applicant; and An order in the nature of prohibition prohibiting the Respondent from proceeding with the execution of the removal order until such a time as the Applicant’s Pre-Removal Risk Assessment has been duly considered and a risk assessment meeting the requirements of fundamental justice is completed. [18]   The Applicant no longer seeks the relief indicated in paragraphs (c) and (d) above but is still seeking the declarations sought in paragraphs (a) and (b). [19]   The application for leave and judicial review in IMM-6054-18 asks the Court to set aside the Officer’s decision and refer the matter back to a different officer for redetermination in accordance with the Court’s reasons. ... The Respondent notes that if the Court were to hear this matter in spite of the mootness, it would be departing from its usual role of resolving live disputes between parties interested in the outcome of a case. [28]   The Respondent reminds the Court that the Supreme Court of Canada has held that courts ought not to hear Charter decisions in a factual vacuum and attempts to do so would trivialize the Charter and result in ill-considered opinions. ... Even if a case may be moot because there is no longer a live controversy or concrete dispute, it is nevertheless necessary to determine whether the Court should exercise its discretion to hear and determine the case on the merits where circumstances warrant. [33]   Three overriding principles are to be considered in this second step of a mootness analysis: (1) the presence of an adversarial relationship (Borowski at para 31); (2) the need to promote judicial economy (at para 34); and (3) the need for the court to show a measure of awareness of its proper role as the adjudicative branch of government (at para 40). ...

Decision under Judicial Review [6]   In its decision, the IAD considered the list of non-exhaustive factors set out in Ribic v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] IABD No 4, as endorsed in Chieu v. ... According to the IAD, such an assertion made him less credible, after having expressed remorse. [9]   The IAD also considered the applicant’s criminal record, which includes several criminal charges for which he was not convicted. ... The Court of Appeal concluded that this evidence was validly considered by the IAD because it was not admitted for the “basis of a further finding of inadmissibility”. [25]   I consider it very difficult to reconcile the observations of the Federal Court of Appeal in Balathavarajan with the case law of the Federal Court. ...

She referred to several factors that she considered were indicative of “neglect [or] carelessness”, as set out in her audit report on this aspect (Exhibit R-1, tab 17). ... The CRA considered each of these immediate family executors and trustees to have been equally involved in the administration of the Appellant/Estate and spousal trust. ... Finally at para. 38 the Appellant/Estate pleaded that the Respondent, ha[d] not considered the applicability of the [p]rincipal [r]esidence [e]xemption for the Lynnbrook property or the various costs associated with the conveyance of the property. [34]   In the Respondent's reply, at subparas. 20(o) and (p), it is pleaded that the appealed reassessment was based on ministerial assumptions including that the Lynnbrook property, was not designated as a ‘principal residence’ for the purposes of para. 40(2)(b) of the Act and [n]o election pursuant to subsection 70(6.2) of the Act was made in respect of the [Lynnbrook property] in Harry’s terminal return for the 1995 taxation year. [35]   The evidence was that Mr. ...

While [A.B.] is not public about his HIV status, we emphasize that this aspect of his claim must be considered in light of the consequences he would face if his HIV status were to be revealed in the Bahamas [emphasis in original]. [11]   The PRRA application was supported by a lengthy affidavit from the applicant, corroborative evidence such as photographs and the applicant’s social media profile, statements from friends, letters from a psychotherapist and a social worker, and country conditions documentation.   ... As well, rather than assessing the evidence the applicant relied upon holistically, the officer approached the evidence item by item and concludes seriatim that individual items of evidence do not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that state protection will not be forthcoming, even though many of the items of evidence were not tendered for that purpose at all and even though it is the cumulative import of the evidence that does bear on this issue that must be considered.   I am prepared to accept that, despite how the decision is drafted, the officer actually considered the evidence cumulatively.   ...

It cannot have been Parliament’s intention that the IAD should completely ignore the findings of the ID, the specialized body that heard the witnesses, considered the other evidence, and then delivered detailed and thorough reasons in support of its conclusion. ... For instance, if a tourist wishes to stay on a family farm and work part-time just for room and board for a short period (i.e. one to four weeks), this person would not be considered a worker… [33]   The IAD then cites jurisprudence on the breadth of the definition, beginning with Yu Lung, where the applicant was found to have engaged in work even though her evidence was that she only helped customers for a brief time while her sister was away from the store to care for her sick child. ... All of these elements brought these activities within the definition of work. [40]   In the case at bar, the IAD does not appear to have considered how the facts of this case differ from the circumstances in the jurisprudence it cites. ...