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Smith J found that the taxpayer did not cease to be a director at the time Atcon Group was put into receivership, stating (at paras 69 and 70): [E]ven though section 60(1) of the NBBCA provides that “(…) the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by one or more directors”, those powers are displaced and may not be exercised by the directors until such time as the receiver or receiver‑manager has been discharged. Section 59 then provides that the receiver manager shall, upon completion of his duties, “send a copy of the final report to each of the directors”, clearly supporting the notion that directors who have not effectively resigned continue to hold office for purposes of the provincial legislation despite the court ordered appointment of EY as receiver‑manager. … I conclude that the Appellant did not cease to be a de jure director (MacDonald v. ...

. … If a unitholder receives a distribution of capital that is greater than his or her investment, subsection 40(3) treats the resulting negative adjusted cost base as a capital gain. … The fact that distributions of capital are not treated as income until they exceed the amount of a unitholder’s investment clearly indicates that Parliament viewed distributions of capital as being returns of the unitholder’s own investment. ...

After Sommerfeldt J accepted the taxpayer submissions that the surrender payments were deductible as to 75% under s. 111(5.2) (since supplanted by s. 111(5.1)), he went on to briefly describe the taxpayer’s argument, that would have been made in the alternative, that the surrender payments were made by the target companies “in the course of a … sale of… shares of the capital stock of the taxpayer” to the acquirers. He noted that International Colin Energy had found that there were “respectable arguments on either side of the question of whether subparagraph 20(1)(e)(i) … is to be confined to a sale by a corporation of its own shares, or may extend to a sale of its shares by its shareholders” (para. 134), and concluded that it was preferable for him to not address this issue. ...

Pizzitelli J applied the single supply doctrine in finding that the predominant element of what was being supplied by the dealer was an exempt supply of arranging for the insurance – and that the exclusion in (r.4) of the definition of an exempt financial services for promotional and various administrative services did not apply. ... In our case, that is the car buyer who buys the insurance product and he would clearly and objectively know he was buying insurance, not the expertise or training, or commercial efficacy or profitability of the Dealer or its staff as the predominant elements of the transaction, notwithstanding that such services … may have an ancillary role to play in his decision making process…. ...

(b)(i) of the s. 207.01(1) definition of “advantage,” Lamarre ACJ stated (at paras. 39, 40): It was … not necessary for the Appellant to know in advance which shares would be swapped. All that was necessary was that the Appellant have planned on doing swap transactions with the purpose of achieving the objectives of the series. … While the series of transactions never had a predetermined end point, all the transactions were completed in contemplation of the series. ...

The taxpayer’s principal, as a lay person, could not be expected to recognize the issue of triggering a change of use – and to expect him “to initiate a discussion with [the company’s accountant] concerning the possible application of a highly technical provision of the Act would be to hold him to an unrealistically high standard of care” (para. 46). Finally (at para. 49): Aridi … found that it was not sufficient to show negligence on the part of the taxpayer’s professional advisor in making the misrepresentation, and that the taxpayer must also be shown to have acted in a negligent or careless manner. ...

In finding that zero-rating was not available under s. 12(a), Lyons J stated (at paras 71, 78): …[P]aragraph 12(a) … denotes an intention that a third party carrier would need to be engaged where the supplier “ships” the property to a destination outside Canada. This construction aligns with Parliament’s intent that exported goods are available for use (by the recipient or its designate) only outside Canada. … As no third party carrier was engaged under a contract for carriage, I find that the appellant did not ship the Jewellery within the meaning of paragraph 12(a). ...

. … When making the subsection 297(2.1) assessment for the overpayment of the rebate, the Minister must consider subsection 296(2.1) since she is assessing an amount that became payable by the person under Part IX of the Act. … CRA in assessing must take into account any unclaimed new rental housing rebate that was available, as was the case here. ...

In rejecting this argument, D’Auray J stated (at para. 129): … [A]ssuming the buyers purchases were in violation of Apple policy[,] at most this made the purchase contracts voidable and not void. ... Although many of the receipts issued by the Apple stores had missing, fictitious or unreadable names for the buyers (as agents of Lohas), D’Auray J found that such deficiencies were cured in the case of purchases for which a “memo prepared by Lohas showed the name of each buyer, the iPhones purchases, the tax and the commissions paid” (para. 147) – so that ITCs were denied only for a relatively small number of purchases where this was not done. ...

Bocock J also found that the taxpayer was not entitled to relief against double taxation under the Canada-UK Income Tax Convention, stating (at para 14): … Because the amount has not yet been subject to tax in the UK (because it has been deducted from income before calculating income tax) there is no requirement under the Convention or section 126 of the Act to provide relief in Canada. ... Zong ultimately receives his pension in the UK, it may be subject to UK income tax and he may be eligible for relief in Canada through the FTC at such time, but not now. … ...