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The principal argument of Quintal that the payments received by him from Élan were not includible in his income pursuant to TA s. 87 (similar to ITA s. 12(1)(x)) was that those amounts were not received by him “in the course of earning income from … property”: the intention was that the policy would be cancelled before he had any right to surrender the policy for any positive amount. In rejecting this submission, Gosselin JCQ stated (at paras. 47, 49, TaxInterpretations translation): The TA requires a life insurance policyholder to include in computing income on the disposition of an interest in the policy the amount by which the proceeds of disposition of the interest exceed the adjusted cost basis of the interest. … The Court notes, however, that the cash surrender value actually increased as soon as the first excess premiums were paid to the insurer, which deposited them in the Policy's investment account in search of financial performance resulting in interest on those investments, even though the cash surrender value could not be cashed out by Mr. ... Quintal by Élan were inducement payments since without them … he would never have purchased such an insurance policy at such a cost. ...

This KPMG plan, if it worked, had the tax advantage over the base case of permitting the tax-free distribution of the Gennium surplus to the family members by Satoma Trust – but instead, the Gennium dividends were retained in Satoma Trust for reinvestment. ... A more robust variant of the above tax plan (which apparently was not for the situation in which an asset-protection trust (i.e., FFLP) had already been formed) was reviewed by the KPMG GAAR Committee, who concluded that GAAR should not apply if it could be demonstrated that the s. 75(2) trust was put in place for asset-protection (or other non-tax) purposes – but otherwise it was more likely than not that GAAR would apply. ... Pilon informed of the risk of applying the GAAR did not end in 2005. … Timely advice on CRA's new approach could have led to rectification of the structure and minimized both the risk and the extent of an assessment. ...

Not only was Frigo not informed of the deficiencies relating to the GST of the suppliers … but also the tax authorities knew perfectly well that the registered suppliers had not paid the GST collected and did not ask the appellant any questions or alert it. The respondent authorized and even obliged these defaulting registrants to continue to collect GST on the respondent’s behalf. … I cannot interpret the ETA and the Regulations as imposing an undeclared obligation on every Canadian business purchasing commercial supplies to exercise additional due diligence with respect to each of its duly registered suppliers, which would include, as claims the respondent in this case, the examination of the physical establishment of the new supplier, its agreements with its personnel, its intention to use subcontractors to carry out the supply, and more — all without even being able to know if the duly registered and verified supplier is in arrears in the payment of GST collected, employee withholding taxes or provincial sales tax, or is otherwise not complying with its tax obligations. ...

Perram and Jackman JJ stated (at para. 11) that “where parties to a conveyance have agreed the purchase price for a transfer on sale then the consideration for the transfer is that agreed price” and that the “ordinary meaning of the language used by the parties [in the EBA] … suggests that what was to be paid by the Bottler to PepsiCo/SVC or their nominated seller was a price being paid for the concentrate and therefore ‘as consideration for’ the sale of the concentrate” (para. 13). ... In his reasons, Colvin J stated (at para. 197): [T]he EBAs … are properly construed as agreements to bottle, sell and distribute branded products, not as agreements for the supply of concentrate. It follows … that the amounts provided for by the EBAs as the prices for units of concentrate were partly amounts in consideration for the use of the trade marks which the Bottler was licensed to use. ...

., the Commissioners had been “enriched” only by £75), Lord Reed stated (at paras 29-30): … [T]he Managers could not both claim reimbursement of the output tax which they had paid to the Commissioners…on the basis that their supplies were exempt from VAT, and simultaneously assert an entitlement to retain the amounts which they had deducted as input tax, on the basis that their supplies were taxable. The Commissioners were not, therefore, enriched by the Managers’ retention of the notional £25, and the Managers have, in principle, no defence to a claim by the Lead Claimants for the restitution of that amount. … On the first issue, Lord Reed first noted (at para 33), respecting the requirement that the enrichment be at the claimant’s expense: The Lead Claimants owed no money to the Commissioners. Furthermore, the payment of the tax element of the invoices submitted by the Managers to the Lead Claimants was not the cause of the payment of tax by the Managers to the Commissioners: …the Managers were liable to account for tax to the Commissioners once they had supplied the relevant services He then found (at paras 71-73):...There was a transfer of value, comprising the notional £100, from the Lead Claimants to the Managers, under the contract between them. … There was a subsequent transfer of value, comprising the notional £75, from the Managers to the Commissioners. … These two transfers cannot be collapsed into a single transfer of value from the Lead Claimants to the Commissioners. … The first transfer did not even bring about the second transfer as a matter of causation.... ...

., Ms Ellison] “because of a court order under the Family Law Act 1975 ” (Australia). ... Jagot J found for the Commissioner (i.e., no rollover relief to Mr Ellison) partly on the basis of her doubts that there had been such a prior transfer (concluding (at para. 164) that “the orders vested statutory rights and a beneficial interest of some kind in Ms Ellison but … I do not consider that interest can be characterised as beneficial ownership.”) ... She made a guarded finding (at para. 148) that a person could have a proprietary interest in a specified portion of a larger pool of fungible assets, stating: [T]he weight of authority is that there can be a valid trust over a fungible pool of assets provided the assets and relevant proportions for the different beneficiaries are identified with sufficient certainty. … If, given the terms of the declaration and the nature of the property, the trustee is constituted as nothing more than a bare trustee on behalf of the beneficiary in respect of the beneficiary’s proportional interest, it may well be that there has been a change of ownership …. ...

In rejecting the appellants’ submission (at para. 32) that “the CCAA filing does not affect the right to accrue interest; it only stays the collection of that interest,” so that the common law “interest stops” rule applied to deny their claim for the post-filing interest, Rouleau JA stated (at paras. 34, 37, 41): [T]he same principles that underpin the conclusion that the interest stops rule is necessary in bankruptcy and winding-up proceedings – namely, the fair treatment of creditors and the orderly administration of an insolvent debtor’s estate- apply with equal force to CCAA proceedings. … [I]f the interest stops rule were not to apply in CCAA proceedings, the creditors who do not have a contractual right to post-filing interest would…have “skewed incentives against reorganizing under the CCAA”…. ...

In confirming a decision of the judge below to refuse to declare that the 2013 documents had retroactive effect to June 6, 2011, Lane JA stated: The Chambers judge...saw the application for a declaration for what it was – an attempt to obtain equitable relief not available from the Tax Court, which is a superior court of record but not a court of inherent jurisdiction, and to thereby attempt to determine the outcome of an assessment appeal by essentially binding the hands of that Court. … [He] recognized the specialized nature of the Tax Court and its jurisdiction to decide the ultimate issue concerning the tax implications of the rollover. ...

Lagotte Succession, 2017 QCCS 330 (Quebec Superior Court)-- summary under Subsection 70(6) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 70- Subsection 70(6) transfer of estate property to a beneficiary ordered to have “occurred, for tax purposes, at an amount equal to its adjusted cost base” A surviving spouse (Picard – who was not one of the residuary beneficiaries of the estate of his wife) argued that it was improper for the executor of the estate to choose for the devise to him pursuant to her will of an apartment building with a low tax basis to occur on a rollover basis under s. 70(6), as this imposed the property’s accrued tax liability on him. In rejecting this submission, Bisson JCS noted that the will specifically accorded the executor with the discretion to make tax elections for the benefit of any one or more legatees or for that of the general estate – so that the executor clearly was within his rights in not making a s. 70(6.2) election. ...

He stated (at paras. 32-35, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]he Agency felt unable to cancel more than the interest portion indicated in … the Interpretation Bulletin of 4% of the uncollected sales tax. ... This decision is … unreasonable. ...