Search - 哈尔滨到北京 公里数

S. 42 of the Patent Act conferred on the respondent (“Monsanto”), which held the patent on the Roundup resistant gene and related modified cells in Roundup-Ready Canola, “the exclusive right … of … using the invention and selling it to others to be used”. ... “Use” or “ exploiter ”, in their ordinary dictionary meaning, denote utilization with a view to production or advantage. 2. The basic principle in determining whether the defendant has “used” a patented invention is whether the inventor has been deprived, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of the full enjoyment of the monopoly conferred by the patent. … 5. ...

Gains and losses arising from hedging derivative contracts take on the character of the underlying asset, liability or transaction being hedged …. ... Purpose is ascertained objectively (Ludco …). … As the cases demonstrate, the primary source of ascertaining a derivative contract’s purpose is the linkage between the derivative contract and any underlying asset, liability or transaction purportedly hedged. ...

Reasons that “simply repeat statutory language, summarize arguments made, and then state a peremptory conclusion” will rarely assist a reviewing court in understanding the rationale underlying a decision and “are no substitute for statements of fact, analysis, inference and judgment” …. ... It cannot adopt an interpretation it knows to be inferior — albeit plausible — merely because the interpretation in question appears to be available and is expedient. ... Rather than confirming a meaningful presumption of deference for administrative decision-makers … the majority’s reasons strip away deference from hundreds of administrative actors subject to statutory rights of appeal; rather than following the consistent path of this Court’s jurisprudence in understanding legislative intent as being the intention to leave legal questions within their mandate to specialized decision-makers with expertise, the majority removes expertise from the equation entirely and reformulates legislative intent as an overriding intention to provide — or not provide — appeal routes; and rather than clarifying the role of reasons and how to review them, the majority revives the kind of search for errors that dominated the pre- C.U.P.E. era. ...

Being liable to tax is better understood as being “liable to be liable to tax”, meaning that taxes are a possibility, regardless of whether the person actually pays any …. ... This can be contrasted with fiscally transparent vehicles like partnerships that are not exempted from taxation but, rather, are not exposed to tax at all …. [A]rt. 4(1) … expressly states that residence is to be defined by the laws of the contracting state of which the person claims to be a resident. … [T]his preference for leaving the meaning of residence to domestic law is totally consistent with the scheme of the Treaty. … It is worth noting that the words “sufficient substantive economic connections” are conspicuous by their absence in the text of both arts. 1 and 4. ...

Purpose is ascertained objectively (Ludco …). While subjective manifestations of purpose may sometimes be relevant, the taxpayer’s stated intention … is not determinative. The taxpayer’s conduct is generally more revealing than “ ex post facto declarations” of the taxpayer …. ... Gains and losses arising from hedging derivative contracts take on the character of the underlying asset, liability or transaction being hedged …. ...

An approach to reasonableness review that respects legislative intent must therefore assume that those who interpret the law — whether courts or administrative decision makers — will do so in a manner consistent with this principle of interpretation. … [W]hatever form the interpretive exercise takes, the merits of an administrative decision maker’s interpretation of a statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision. ... Where, for example, the words used are “precise and unequivocal”, their ordinary meaning will usually play a more significant role in the interpretive exercise …. ...

…It would be incoherent — and indeed, unjust — for shareholders to benefit from limited liability while at the same time gaining a right of action in relation to faults committed against the corporation in which they hold shares…. The corporate veil is impermeable on both sides; just as shareholders cannot be liable for faults committed by the corporation, so too are they barred from seeking damages for faults committed against it …. ...

-dollar short-term debt obligations and derived around 86% of its income from such debt and from cross-currency and interest rate swaps with an arm’s length bank to effectively convert much of its income stream into fixed rated Canadian-dollar interest – although it also made intercorporate loans and loans to drivers working as distributors for a US affiliate. ... The context of the FAPI regime, which was to classify a foreign affiliate’s income and “not provide a method for assigning capital to the different businesses within a single corporation” (para. 49), confirmed this reading – and the contrary reading would cause the failing of the test by CFAs in their early years with significant capitalization but still building a customer base – and conversely, “it would be untenable to say that a foreign affiliate is conducting business with a lender or investor decades after receiving money from them” (para. 62). ... Regarding the alleged relevance of the parents’ corporate oversight as part of the conducting of Glenhuron’s business, “[f]undamentally, a corporation is separate from its shareholders” and its conducting its business “in accordance with policies adopted by the board of directors on behalf of the shareholders … but this does not change the fact that the corporation remains the party conducting business” – and treating oversight by a parent corporation as shifting the responsibility for conducting business was incompatible with the FAPI regime, in that if there is a “ controlled foreign affiliate … there is necessarily corporate oversight by its parent” (para. 64). ...

…It would be incoherent — and indeed, unjust — for shareholders to benefit from limited liability while at the same time gaining a right of action in relation to faults committed against the corporation in which they hold shares…. The corporate veil is impermeable on both sides; just as shareholders cannot be liable for faults committed by the corporation, so too are they barred from seeking damages for faults committed against it …. ... In particular (para. 42): [T]he loss of value from the trust patrimony that was suffered by Fiducie corresponds to the net value of the seniors’ residences once owned by Groupe Melior …. ...

Côté J indicated that the object, spirit, and purpose (“object”) of the business property exemption (which was an exception to the normal OECD model treaty approach) was to provide a “ tax break [that] encourages foreigners to invest in immovable property situated in Canada in which businesses are carried on (e.g. mines, hotels, or oil shales)” (para. 77). ... This did “ not depart from accepted usage such that the bargain struck in the Treaty could be upheld only if Luxembourg residents claiming benefits have ‘sufficient substantive economic connections’ to their country of residence” (para. 61). ... Canada “could also have insisted on a subject-to-tax provision” under which it would forego its right to tax capital gains only if the other state actually taxed those gains – but did not (para. 85). ...