subsequently
requested that the Minister of Public Safety (the Minister) review that
decision, and a review was undertaken by Mr. D. Proceviat, Manager,
Adjudications Division (the Minister’s Delegate). Upon completion of the
review, the Minister’s Delegate confirmed that the currency should remain
forfeited. Ms. Yang now seeks judicial review of the decision of the Minister’s
Delegate.
ISSUES
[2]
The issues raised by this application are as
follows:
1.
By addressing only the question of whether there
was a reasonable suspicion that the currency was the proceeds of crime and
failing to consider the personal and other circumstances of Ms. Yang, did the
Minister’s Delegate fail to act in accordance with his duties, as set out in s.
29 of the Act?
2.
Did the Minister’s Delegate impose an impossible
burden of proof on Ms. Yang?
3.
Was there a failure to provide procedural
fairness to Ms. Yang:
(a)
by failing to disclose certain submissions by
Officer Coopman; or
(b)
due to the fact that another official, rather
than the Minister’s Delegate, actually made the decision to confirm that the
currency should be forfeited.
BACKGROUND
[3]
The legislative scheme underlying this matter is
contained in the Act. Of particular relevance are the provisions related to
“Reporting of Currency and Monetary Instruments” contained in Part 2 of the
Act. These provisions have been interpreted and extensively discussed in Federal
Court of Appeal and Federal Court jurisprudence and need not be repeated here (see:
Tourki v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2007 FCA 186 aff’g 2006 FC 50; Dokaj v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue), 2005
FC 1437; Thérancé c. Canada (Ministre de la Sécurité
publique), 2007 CF 136; Sellathurai v. Canada (Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 208; Dag v. Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 427; Yusufov v.
Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 453;
Ondre v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2007 FC 454; Hamam v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2007 FC 691; Tourki v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 746; Majeed v. Canada (Minister of
Public Safety), 2007 FC 1082; Lyew v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety
and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 1117). The relevant sections of the
Act are attached to these reasons as Appendix “A”.
[4]
In brief, the facts of this application for
judicial review have engaged the Act as follows:
·
Ms. Yang failed to report that she was taking
more than CAN$10,000 out of the country, contrary to s. 12(1) of the Act;
·
Officer Coopman seized the currency as forfeit
because he found that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the
currency was the proceeds of crime (s. 18(2)) after which he provided a Notice
of Seizure to Ms. Yang (s. 18(3)(a));
·
Ms. Yang requested that the Minister review
Officer Coopman’s decision (s. 25); and
·
after submissions were made, a Case Synopsis was prepared by an
adjudicator, Ms. Archipow (the Adjudicator), which was then forwarded and
considered by the Minister’s Delegate who ultimately confirmed that the seized
currency should be forfeited (s. 29).
ANALYSIS
[5]
To begin, I note that there are certain facts in
this case that are not in dispute. First, Ms. Yang acknowledges that she
was in breach of s. 12(1) of the Act; that is, she acknowledges that she failed
to report the seized currency to a Customs officer. Secondly, it is not in
dispute that the Minister’s Delegate holds the delegated authority of the
Minister to render a s. 29 decision.
Standard of
Review
[6]
I turn to the standard of review applicable to
the issues in this application. The issues of the duty of the Minister’s
Delegate under s. 29 of the Act and of the burden of proof are questions of law
to which I will apply the correctness standard of review. Similarly, with
respect to the questions of procedural fairness raised by the Applicant, no
deference is due; the Minister’s delegate has either complied with the duty of
fairness appropriate for the particular circumstances in the case at bar or he
has breached it.
Issue #1: Did the Minister’s Delegate fail to act in
accordance with his duties, as set out in s. 29 of the Act?
[7]
The thrust of Ms. Yang's oral submissions is
that s. 29 of the Act requires the Minister’s Delegate to conduct a broad
inquiry and not merely determine whether there were sufficient grounds for
Officer Coopman to make the initial seizure. Ms. Yang points to the words of s.
29 which provide the Minister’s Delegate with three options. Specifically, once
the Minister’s Delegate decides that there was a breach of s. 12(1) (which is
the situation here), he may:
·
return the seized currency with or without a
penalty;
·
return some or all of any penalty paid; or
·
confirm that the seized currency is forfeited to
Her Majesty in right of Canada.
[8]
In Ms. Yang's view, the Minister’s Delegate must
examine all relevant factors in order to make an informed and balanced decision
as to which of the options set out in s. 29 should be followed. In this case,
Ms. Yang submits that the Minister’s Delegate was under an obligation to
consider, under s. 29(a), whether the seized currency should be returned to her
on the basis of humanitarian and compassionate considerations. In other words,
Ms, Yang argues that the Minister’s Delegate must take into account not simply
whether there are grounds to suspect that the currency is the proceeds of
crime, but all other considerations put forward by her.
[9]
I do not agree. I first note that s. 29 does not
require the Minister’s Delegate to undertake a balancing exercise. This
statutory provision does not provide a list of factors that must be taken into
account; rather, it sets out that the Minister may decide in one of three ways
depending upon the situation before him or her. Ms. Yang would read into s. 29
obligations that do not exist.
[10]
Further, recent jurisprudence of this Court has
described the role of the Minister’s Delegate under s. 29. Most relevant, are
the comments of Justice Simpson in Sellathurai at para. 58, where she
stated as follows:
The Respondent
says that in enforcing Part 2 of the Act, the Minister's Delegate is engaged in
a balancing of the interests of the Applicant with those of the Canadian
public. However, I do not accept this characterization. In my view, the
balancing of private and public interests was done by Parliament when it
established the legislative scheme. A Minister's Delegate has a much
narrower role under s. 29. He is simply determining whether, on the facts in a
particular applicant's case, a forfeiture should be confirmed. [Emphasis
added.]
[11]
I agree with the comments of Justice Simpson. A
Minister’s Delegate does not err by focusing his attention on whether an
applicant has provided sufficient evidence to dispel an officer’s finding that
there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the seized currency is the
proceeds of crime. A Minister’s Delegate meets his or her obligations under s.
29 of the Act when he or she asks himself the question of whether the reasonable
grounds relied on by an officer still exist after all the evidence is reviewed.
In the context of this application, Ms. Yang's personal difficulties do not
address the question of the source of the seized currency. The Minister’s
Delegate did not err by not giving weight to these submissions.
[12]
Ms. Yang also asserts that seizure of her
currency does nothing to forward the objectives of the Act. In essence, Ms.
Yang argues that, under s. 29, the Minister’s Delegate must take into account
whether the objectives of the Act are achieved by this specific forfeiture. I
do not agree.
[13]
As described in the Act, the central component
imposed by Parliament is that anyone exporting or importing currency or
monetary instruments in excess of a certain amount must report to Customs
officials. Parliament saw fit to include serious penalties -- that is,
forfeiture in certain cases -- to ensure compliance with this obligation.
According to a plain reading of the Act, nothing more need be established. It
is unnecessary for a Minister’s Delegate to determine whether the purposes of
the Act are served by the forfeiture of the funds because the
legislative scheme of the Act already ensures that they are. In the case at
bar, after considering the evidence before him and concluding there were
reasonable grounds to suspect the seized currency was the proceeds of crime,
the Minister’s Delegate chose to maintain the seizure. In doing so, I am
satisfied that he correctly interpreted and fulfilled his mandate under s. 29
of the Act.
Issue #2: Did the Minister’s Delegate impose an impossibly
high burden of proof on Ms. Yang?
[14]
Ms. Yang submits that the Minister’s Delegate
imposed an impossibly high burden of proof on her. In her view, a review of the
decision demonstrates that there is no evidence that could have been produced
that could have satisfied the Minister’s Delegate.
[15]
At this point, it may be useful to summarize the
evidence that was before Officer Coopman when he made his finding of reasonable
suspicion.
[16]
When first confronted by Officer Coopman and
advised of the reporting requirements under the Act, Ms. Yang replied that she
did not need to complete a currency report. Suspicious of Ms. Yang's behaviour,
Officer Coopman asked Ms. Yang to produce all currency in her possession. Declining
to do so, she stated that she had $5,000 (later $9,000), in her luggage.
Ultimately, a search of her luggage revealed the equivalent of CAN$21,843.35 in
Canadian, American, Hong Kong and Chinese currency. Officer Coopman listed 15
reasons or grounds for concluding that there were reasonable grounds to suspect
that the money was the proceeds of crime. The grounds included:
1.
the fact the currency was concealed in separate
locations in Ms. Yang's luggage;
2.
the currency was not wrapped or packaged to banking
standards;
3.
Ms. Yang was uncooperative when asked to produce
the currency for examination;
4.
Ms. Yang was extremely nervous and agitated;
5.
Ms. Yang was unable to clearly explain the
origins of the currency and made numerous vague and contradictory statements
regarding its source and ownership; and
6.
Ms. Yang was unable to clearly explain her
purpose for exporting the currency.
[17]
It is important to note that Ms. Yang put
herself in the situation where her currency was seized. The reporting
requirement was explained to Ms. Yang and ignored. When confronted with the
hidden currency, it was Ms. Yang who provided the contradictory and suspicious
explanations for the origin of the currency.
[18]
After the seizure, both on her own and through
counsel, Ms. Yang made extensive submissions to the Minister’s Delegate. While
Ms. Yang took some exception to certain portions of the evidence of Officer
Coopman, most of her objections or disagreements were minor in nature. Indeed,
the overwhelming thrust of her submissions related to her personal
circumstances and the hardship she would suffer if the seizure were maintained.
On the critical question of the origin of the seized currency, Ms. Yang
provided very little beyond a statement from her father that he had given a
sizable amount of money to Ms. Yang.
[19]
Does this put an impossible burden on Ms. Yang?
Given the evidence that was before Officer Coopman, I acknowledge that Ms. Yang
was required to meet a heavy burden. However, the fact that her burden was
heavy does not necessarily mean that it was impossible to meet. Since I am not
in the position of the Minister’s Delegate, it would not be appropriate for me
to speculate as to what evidence would have satisfied him. However, as noted,
Ms. Yang provided nothing beyond a statement from her father that the money was
a gift. In addition to being completely inconsistent with her statements to
Officer Coopman, Ms. Yang's father's statement as to the source of funds was
not backed up by any financial information. Further, evidence that her sick
mother in China required the
seized currency provides no evidence whatsoever as to the source of the funds.
[20]
As has been established consistently by the
jurisprudence of this Court, there is an evidentiary burden on an applicant in
this situation (see for example, Dupre v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 1177; Ondre, above; Hamam, above; Yusufov,
above; Qasem v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 2008 FC
31). In Dupre, at paras. 37-38, Justice Layden‑Stevenson
described the process and burden on an applicant as follows:
Reasonable
grounds to suspect is a lesser but included standard of reasonable and probable
grounds to believe: R. v. Monney, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652. In my view, in
the circumstances, there was ample reason to suspect that the currency in Ms.
Dupre's possession is proceeds of crime. Ms. Dupre created that suspicion by
her conduct at the time of the seizure.
The onus then
shifted to Ms. Dupre to dispel the suspicion. To accomplish that end, she had
to persuade the ministerial delegate as to the lawful source of the funds. The
imposition of this requirement is logical given that Ms. Dupre is best--placed
to explain the origin of the currency that was in her possession. She simply
failed to meet that onus.
[21]
In my view, this case provides a very useful
summary of the burden on Ms. Yang. On the facts before me, it is
abundantly clear that Ms. Yang failed to dispel the suspicion that she herself
had raised. In short, she failed to provide sufficiently cogent evidence to put
the legitimate source of the funds beyond reasonable doubt.
[22]
In oral submissions, there was some discussion
of the recent decision of Justice O'Reilly in Qasem, above. In that
decision, Justice O'Reilly allowed the application for judicial review on the
basis that the Minister’s Delegate made an error of law by imposing a burden
and standard of proof on Mr. Qasem that was too high. In the record before
Justice O’Reilly, a key passage from the analysis provided that "the claimant
has not provided in sufficient detail and with enough credible, reliable and
independent evidence to establish that no other reasonable explanation is
possible" [Emphasis in original].
[23]
In the case before me, the only mention of the
burden on Ms. Yang by the Minister’s Delegate was:
You have
explained the source of the currency as being derived, in part from your own
savings, and in part from gifts of money given to you by your father. You have
provided a statement from your father attesting to this. However, this
statement fails to meet the burden of proof, in that it does not confirm the
legitimacy of the source of the currency.
…you have failed
to provide any legitimate documentary evidence or information to demonstrate
that the funds were legitimately obtained. Reasonable suspicion still stands
and, consequently, the funds are forfeited.
[24]
The only mention in the Case Synopsis prepared
by the Adjudicator was:
The claimant has
explained the source of the currency as being derived, in part from her own
savings, and in part from gifts of money given to her by her father. The
claimant has provided a statement from her father attesting to this. However,
this statement fails to meet the burden of proof, in that it does not confirm
the legitimacy of the source of the currency. It is important to note that the
onus is on the claimant to provide evidence of the legitimacy of the funds...
…Based on the
information in this file, it is my opinion that the officer has met the
requirements of reasonable suspicion.
[25]
At first glance, the language used with respect
to Ms. Yang’s father’s statements (“this statement fails to meet the burden of
proof, in that it does not confirm the legitimacy of the source of the
currency”) suggests that she was required to prove with 100% certainty the
source of the funds. However, on closer inspection, it is evident that the
Minister’s Delegate was merely referring to that one piece of evidence in the
circumstances of the case. The Minister’s Delegate was, in effect, saying “this
piece of evidence is not enough to dispel reasonable suspicion given that you
earlier mentioned the name of ‘Tong’ as the source of the currency and given
that you provided no financial records”. With respect to the remainder of the
language used by the Minister’s Delegate and the Adjudicator, I note that it
merely mirrors the Act – there is no mention of the criminal standard that
caused concern for Justice O’Reilly.
[26]
In sum, when reading the decision and the
Adjudicator’s Case Synopsis, I am satisfied that the Minister’s Delegate did
not impose a too high or incorrect burden on Ms. Yang. Ms. Yang simply failed
to dispel the reasonable suspicion as to the source of the seized currency in
the view of the Minister’s Delegate.
Issue #3(a): Did the Minister’s Delegate ere by failing to
disclose certain documents of Officer Coopman to Ms. Yang.
[27]
Ms. Yang submits that the Minister’s Delegate
did not disclose two notes authored by Officer Coopman and sent to the
Adjudicator while she was in the process of preparing the Case Synopsis. Ms.
Yang submits that the Minister’s Delegate had a duty to disclose this material
in order to allow her an opportunity to address evidence prejudicial to her
position and bring forward evidence in response (Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor
General), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 at para. 40; May v. Ferndale
Institution, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 809 at para. 92).
[28]
There is no question that Ms. Yang must be
accorded procedural fairness. However, the duty of fairness does not
necessarily extend to providing every document to a party. The duty was
described by Justice Dawson in Hersi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 2136, at para. 20 (T.D.) (QL):
The ability to
meaningfully participate in the decision-making process requires clear notice
of the case to be met, a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and
submissions relevant to that case, and full and fair consideration of that case
by an impartial decision-maker
[29]
In considering whether the duty of fairness was
breached in this case, I observe first that Ms. Yang was
given the opportunity to file all the evidence and arguments she wished in
order to support her claim (Dag, above at para. 52; Kishavarz v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1309
at para. 22 (T.D.) (QL)). Indeed, as the Respondent correctly notes,
Ms. Yang has not made any submissions as to how the disclosure of the missing
information would have assisted her. Second, a review of the two memorandums
demonstrates that the only information that was not disclosed to Ms. Yang was
the conclusions of Officer Coopman; no new evidence was referenced. These
conclusions relied on factual records which were known to Ms. Yang (Dag,
above at para. 52). Accordingly, I do not find the missing information
would have been of any benefit to her and therefore its non‑disclosure,
in this case, did not result in a breach of procedural fairness.
[30]
It should be noted, however, that the Respondent
treads on dangerous ground when processes are put in place that allow
submissions to be made without disclosure. I would recommend that, in the
future, the Respondent put systems in place that would either remove the
ability of a Customs officer to provide further comment or provide disclosure
of such comments to an applicant.
Issue#3(b): Did another
official, rather than the Minister’s Delegate, actually make the decision?
[31]
Ms. Yang submits that Minister’s Delegate did
not conduct an independent review of the evidence or her submissions as he was
required to do (Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Anti-dumping Tribunal),
[1972] F.C.J. No. 90 (T.D.) (QL), rev’d [1973] F.C. 745 (C.A.), aff’d [1976] 2
S.C.R. 739). In Ms. Yang's view, the Minister’s Delegate merely rubber-stamped
the Case Synopsis which had previously been prepared for him by the
Adjudicator.
[32]
I do not agree. It is well-settled that a
decision maker is entitled to consult with other public servants before
rendering a decision provided the decision maker renders the decision
personally (CAE Metal Abrasive Division of Cdn Bronze Co. v. Canada, [1985]
1 F.C. 481 (C.A.); Sovereign Life Insurance Co. v. Canada (Minister
of Finance), [1998] 1 F.C. 299 at paras. 52-56; Burke v. Canada
(Employment and Immigration Commission), [1994] F.C.J. No. 890 at paras.
12-18 (T.D.) (QL)).
[33]
In this case, the Minister’s Delegate was
entitled to rely on the Adjudicator to prepare a Case Synopsis provided the
Minister’s Delegate retained his full decision-making authority and did
not feel bound by the Adjudicator’s recommendation. Turning to the facts before
the Court, I observe that:
1.
The Minister’s Delegate stated in his decision
that he was considering all the evidence before him – not just the Case
Synopsis.
2.
The independence of the Minister’s Delegate’s
review is confirmed by the significant differences between the reasons provided
in his decision and the Adjudicator’s Case Synopsis. In particular, the
Minister’s Delegate relied on some facts and reasoning that were not contained
in the Case Synopsis.
3.
The Case Synopsis provided no analysis with
respect to s. 27 of the Act in contrast to the decision of the Minister’s
Delegate.
[34]
In sum, I am satisfied that the Minister’s
Delegate did not merely “rubber-stamp” the Case Synopsis. The Minister's
Delegate exercised his discretion and decision-making authority. While the
Minister’s Delegate did ultimately agree with the Adjudicator’s recommendation,
this alone does not mean the Minister’s Delegate ceded his authority to render
the decision.
CONCLUSION
[35]
Although Ms. Yang characterizes the issues in
the case at bar as ones of law or procedural fairness, during oral arguments,
submissions were made which amounted to an attack on the merits of the
decision. In other words, Ms. Yang asserts that the Minister’s Delegate ignored
or failed to properly weigh the evidence that was before him. I do not agree.
[36]
To the extent that Ms. Yang's arguments put into
question the merits of the decision (rather than its lawfulness or procedural
fairness), the Minister’s Delegate’s decision is reviewable on a much higher
standard. Whether that standard be reasonableness (see for example, Sellathurai,
above; Dag, above) or patent unreasonableness (see for example, Thérancé,
above; Yusufov, above; Ondre, above), I am satisfied that the
decision, when read as a whole, meets the standard of review.
[37]
Before Officer Coopman was a body of evidence
that led Officer Coopman to conclude that there were reasonable grounds to
suspect that the seized currency was the proceeds of crime. Fifteen concerns
were expressed by Officer Coopman relating to everything from the demeanour of
Ms. Yang to inconsistencies and changes in her explanations. On the basis
of his findings, Officer Coopman seized the currency.
[38]
In her response and explanations, Ms. Yang
provided substantial information related to her personal and financial
circumstances. However, she provided very little in direct response to the
question of the source of the seized currency. A review of the record before
the Minister’s Delegate shows that the only evidence provided that directly
addressed the source of the currency was, in essence, a bare assertion that the
seized currency had been given to her by her father. This explanation by Ms.
Yang is not only at odds with the conclusion of Officer Coopman, it is directly
inconsistent with her explanation to Officer Coopman that the money had been
given to her by a man named Mr. Tong. Further, as noted by the Minister’s
Delegate, the father's affidavit was unsupported or uncorroborated. In these
circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Minister’s Delegate to prefer
the evidence of Officer Coopman and for the Minister’s Delegate to conclude
that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that the seized currency was the
proceeds of crime.
[39]
For the foregoing reasons, I am not persuaded
that the decision of the Minister’s Delegate should be overturned. In brief, I
am satisfied that:
1.
The
Minister’s Delegate correctly exercised his discretion as permitted under s. 29
of the Act;
2.
The
Minister’s Delegate did not impose an incorrect or impossibly high burden of
proof on Ms. Yang;
3.
The
failure to disclose the opinions of Officer Coopman to Ms. Yang was not, on the
facts of this case, a breach of procedural fairness; and
4.
The
decision of the Minister’s Delegate is reasonable in that it stands up to a
somewhat probing examination.
[40]
On the
question of costs, Ms. Yang submits that no costs should be awarded against
her. I see no reason not to award costs to the Respondent as the successful
party and will do so.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES
that the
application for judicial review is dismissed with costs to the Respondent.
“Judith
A. Snider”
Appendix “A”
|
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist
Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17
Currency and monetary instruments
12.
(1) Every person or entity referred to in
subsection (3) shall report to an officer, in accordance with the
regulations, the importation or exportation of currency or monetary
instruments of a value equal to or greater than the prescribed amount.
Seizure and forfeiture
18.
(1) If an officer believes on reasonable
grounds that subsection 12(1) has been contravened, the officer may seize as
forfeit the currency or monetary instruments.
Return
of seized currency or monetary instruments
(2)
The officer shall, on payment of a penalty in the prescribed amount, return
the seized currency or monetary instruments to the individual from whom they
were seized or to the lawful owner unless the officer has reasonable grounds
to suspect that the currency or monetary instruments are proceeds of crime
within the meaning of subsection 462.3(1) of the Criminal Code or
funds for use in the financing of terrorist activities.
Notice of
seizure
(3) An officer who seizes currency or
monetary instruments under subsection (1) shall
(a) if they were not imported or exported as mail, give
the person from whom they were seized written notice of the seizure and of
the right to review and appeal set out in sections 25 and 30;
…
Request for Minister's decision
25. A person from whom
currency or monetary instruments were seized under section 18, or the lawful
owner of the currency or monetary instruments, may within 90 days after the
date of the seizure request a decision of the Minister as to whether
subsection 12(1) was contravened, by giving notice in writing to the officer
who seized the currency or monetary instruments or to an officer at the
customs office closest to the place where the seizure took place.
If there is a contravention
29. (1) If the Minister
decides that subsection 12(1) was contravened, the Minister may, subject to
the terms and conditions that the Minister may determine,
(a) decide that the
currency or monetary instruments or, subject to subsection (2), an amount of
money equal to their value on the day the Minister of Public Works and
Government Services is informed of the decision, be returned, on payment of a
penalty in the prescribed amount or without penalty;
(b) decide that any
penalty or portion of any penalty that was paid under subsection 18(2) be
remitted; or
(c) subject to any order
made under section 33 or 34, confirm that the currency or monetary
instruments are forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada.
The Minister of Public Works and Government Services shall
give effect to a decision of the Minister under paragraph (a) or (b)
on being informed of it.
|
Loi sur le recyclage des produits de
la criminalité et le financement des activités terroristes, L.R. 2000, ch. 17
Déclaration
12. (1) Les personnes ou entités visées au
paragraphe (3) sont tenues de déclarer à l'agent, conformément aux
règlements, l'importation ou l'exportation des espèces ou effets d'une valeur
égale ou supérieure au montant réglementaire.
Saisie et confiscation
18. (1) S’il a des motifs raisonnables de croire
qu’il y a eu contravention au paragraphe 12(1), l’agent peut saisir à titre
de confiscation les espèces ou effets.
Mainlevée
(2) Sur
réception du paiement de la pénalité réglementaire, l'agent restitue au saisi
ou au propriétaire légitime les espèces ou effets saisis sauf s'il soupçonne,
pour des motifs raisonnables, qu'il s'agit de produits de la criminalité au
sens du paragraphe 462.3(1) du Code criminel ou de fonds destinés au
financement des activités terroristes.
Avis de la saisie
(3) L’agent qui procède à la saisie-confiscation prévue au paragraphe
(1) :
a) donne au saisi, dans le cas où les espèces ou effets sont
importés ou exportés autrement que par courrier, un avis écrit de la saisie
et du droit de révision et d’appel établi aux articles 25 et 30;
…
Demande de révision
25. La personne entre les mains de qui ont été saisis des espèces ou
effets en vertu de l'article 18 ou leur propriétaire légitime peut, dans les
quatre-vingt-dix jours suivant la saisie, demander au ministre de décider
s'il y a eu contravention au paragraphe 12(1) en donnant un avis écrit à
l'agent qui les a saisis ou à un agent du bureau de douane le plus proche du
lieu de la saisie.
Cas de contravention
29. (1) S’il décide qu’il y a eu
contravention au paragraphe 12(1), le ministre peut, aux conditions qu’il
fixe :
a) soit restituer les espèces ou effets ou, sous réserve du
paragraphe (2), la valeur de ceux-ci à la date où le ministre des Travaux
publics et des Services gouvernementaux est informé de la décision, sur
réception de la pénalité réglementaire ou sans pénalité;
b) soit restituer tout ou partie de la pénalité versée en
application du paragraphe 18(2);
c) soit confirmer la confiscation des espèces ou effets au profit
de Sa Majesté du chef du Canada, sous réserve de toute ordonnance rendue en
application des articles 33 ou 34.
Le ministre des Travaux publics et des
Services gouvernementaux, dès qu’il en est informé, prend les mesures
nécessaires à l’application des alinéas a) ou b).
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