Docket: T-1072-15
Citation: 2017 FC 414
Ottawa, Ontario, April 27, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Brown
BETWEEN:
|
DALE KOHLENBERG
|
Applicant
|
and
|
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT
AND REASONS
I.
Nature of the Matter
[1]
This is an application for judicial review by
Dale Kohlenberg [the Applicant] pursuant to s. 18.1 of the Federal Courts
Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7, of a third-level grievance decision dated December
10, 2014 and June 2, 2015, in which the Applicant’s assigned work description
was found to be accurate. The Applicant, a Department of Justice lawyer himself,
was gowned and argued his own case before the Court.
II.
Facts
[2]
The Applicant is a lawyer at the Department of
Justice Canada [DOJ]. As part of an effort to reclassify all lawyers in its practitioners
(LA) group, the DOJ issued new, generic work descriptions to those employees in
that group. Accordingly, as a result of the re-classification, the Applicant
received a Legal Advisor – Regions – LA-2A work description in November
2011. This generic work description could not be changed; however, with
management’s agreement, it could be replaced with a different generic work
description.
[3]
The DOJ directed those who disagreed with the work
description (or classification) assigned in 2011 to discuss their situation
with management. The Applicant, as one such person, requested that he be
assigned what he believed to be a more appropriate work description and
classification. As a result of this request, he met with two more senior
lawyers in management at the DOJ: Daryl Schatz [Mr. Schatz] and Michael
Brannen [Mr. Brannen]. Mr. Schatz is the Regional Director of the Business and
Regulatory Law Portfolio. Mr. Brannen is the Deputy Regional Director of the
Saskatoon Office in the Prairie Region. The Work Description meeting took place
in December 2011.
[4]
Some six months later, the Applicant received a Review
& Update of Work Description [Work Description]. This Work Description,
dated June 18, 2012, advised the Applicant that his “work
description has been reviewed and updated and has been confirmed at the LAAAA02
[sic] occupational group and level, effective October 17, 2011.” This
confirmed the Applicant’s classification at the LA-2A position.
[5]
The Work Description document was signed by the “PRO OD&C Team, Human Resources, Prairie Region, Department
of Justice Canada” in Edmonton, Alberta [Prairie Region]. The Work Description
and classification was the same as that provided to the Applicant in November
2011. Although the actual details of the Work Description were provided to the
Applicant by way of a separate document, I will refer collectively to both the
LA-2A Work Description and the Review & Update document as the Work
Description. It is the appropriateness of this Work Description that was being
grieved by the Applicant.
[6]
The Applicant had the right under the Public
Service Labour Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22, s 2 [PSLRA]
to file two different grievances: a Work Description grievance and a Classification
grievance. The Applicant filed both; however the Classification grievance has
been held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Work Description grievance.
[7]
The Applicant filed his Work Description
grievance on July 9, 2012. He stated that the job description did not
accurately reflect the work he does or is expected to do. He argued that there
were three higher-level generic work descriptions that more accurately described
his work – two at the LA-2B level and one at the LA-3B level.
[8]
The differences between what he received and what
the Applicant seeks in his Work Description grievance are material; his sought-after
work description provides both higher salary and higher pension entitlements.
[9]
The Applicant is excluded from the DOJ lawyers’
bargaining agent, the Association of Justice Counsel [AJC], by virtue of having
provided labour relations advice to DOJ; he had at one time been in a more
senior management position. He was therefore not covered by the collective
agreement between the ACJ and DOJ. Significantly, the matters he sought to
grieve fell within the purview of the ACJ-DOJ collective agreement at the relevant
time.
[10]
That said, the Applicant was entitled to the
same three-level grievance procedure afforded to ACJ union members. Should he
be unsuccessful at the third level however, the Applicant would be required to
request and receive approval and representation by the ACJ in order to proceed
to adjudication before the Public Service Labour Relations Board [PSLRB]: PSLRA
s. 209(2).
[11]
The Applicant’s grievance was dismissed at all
three levels. After the third-level decision, as a formality, he applied to the
PSLRB to proceed to adjudication, but did so without the approval of the ACJ. Therefore,
the PSLRB declined to accept jurisdiction. The Applicant seeks judicial review
of the decision dismissing his third-level grievance.
[12]
The determinative issue in this case is
procedural fairness. The Applicant alleges that he was denied procedural
fairness at all three levels of the grievance procedure. I will therefore set
out the governing law concerning procedural fairness within the labour
grievance context and then apply it to the facts of this case.
[13]
Also at issue is the reasonableness of the
decision made by the third-level officer, Assistant Deputy Minister of the
Management Sector and Chief Financial Officer Marie-Josée Thivierge [ADM], who
dismissed the Applicant’s third level grievance.
[14]
As part of this analysis, I will assess the reasonableness
of each of the three decisions. However, it must be noted that the procedural
flaws in the second and third level grievance decision-making process (the
flaws in the second level decision flow through to the third) render the third
level decision unsustainable on judicial review; it must be set aside. Had the third
level decision not been flawed by procedural unfairness (including those at the
second level which flowed to the third), I would have upheld the third-level
grievance decision as reasonable.
III.
Standards of Review
[15]
Questions of procedural fairness are reviewed on
the correctness standard: Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,
2009 SCC 12 at para 43. In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir]
at para 50, the Supreme Court of Canada explained what is required when
conducting a review on the correctness standard:
When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing court will not
show deference to the decision maker’s reasoning process; it will rather
undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the court
to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the decision maker; if
not, the court will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.
From the outset, the court must ask whether the tribunal’s decision was
correct.
[16]
This Court has accepted, and I agree, that the duty
of fairness owed by an employer such as the DOJ to a grievor such as the
Applicant is at the low end of the spectrum: Begin v Canada (Attorney
General), 2009 FC 634 at para 9; Majdan v Canada (Attorney General),
2011 FC 146 at para 305 [Majdan]; Fischer v Canada (Attorney General),
2012 FC 720 at para 25; Tamborriello v Canada (Attorney General), 2014
FC 607 at paras 21-22; Chong v Canada (Treasury Board) (1999), 170 DLR
(4th) 641 (FCA)at paras 12-13; and Gladman v Canada (Attorney General),
2016 FC 917 at para 32.
[17]
However, as will be seen, being entitled to
fairness at the low end of the spectrum does not sanction a decision that, when
considered in its factual context, is not essentially fair.
[18]
In Dunsmuir above at paras 57, 62,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that a reasonableness standard of review
analysis is unnecessary where “the jurisprudence has
already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be
accorded with regard to a particular category of question.” In this
connection, a final-level grievance decision under s. 208(1) of the PSLRA
is reviewed on the standard of reasonableness: Girard v Canada (Attorney
General), 2013 FC 489 at para 16; Tibilla v Canada (Attorney General),
2011 FC 163 at paras 17-18; Boucher v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC
546 at para 13.
[19]
In Dunsmuir above at para 47, the Supreme
Court of Canada explained what is required of a court reviewing on the
reasonableness standard of review:
A court conducting a review for
reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable,
referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In
judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of
justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making
process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.
[20]
The Supreme Court of Canada also instructs that
judicial review on the reasonableness standard is not a line-by-line treasure
hunt for errors; the decision should be approached as an organic whole: Communications,
Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper,
Ltd, 2013 SCC 34. Further, a reviewing court must determine whether the
decision, viewed as a whole in the context of the record, is reasonable: Construction
Labour Relations v Driver Iron Inc, 2012 SCC 65; see also Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),
2011 SCC 62.
IV.
Relevant Provisions
[21]
At the time of the Applicant’s grievance in June
2012, he was an excluded member pursuant to s. 59(1)(c) of the PSLRA and
therefore not covered by the collective agreement for unionized DOJ lawyers. It
is common ground that his status as an excluded member was confirmed by order
of the PSLRB to that effect.
Managerial or
Confidential Positions
Application
|
Postes de
direction ou de confiance
Demande
|
59 (1) After being notified of an application for certification made in
accordance with this Part, the employer may apply to the Board for an order
declaring that any position of an employee in the proposed bargaining unit is
a managerial or confidential position on the grounds that
|
59 (1) Après notification d’une demande
d’accréditation faite en conformité avec la présente partie, l’employeur peut
présenter une demande à la Commission pour qu’elle déclare, par ordonnance,
que l’un ou l’autre des postes visés par la demande d’accréditation est un
poste de direction ou de confiance pour le motif qu’il correspond à l’un des
postes suivants :
|
…
|
…
|
(c) the occupant
of the position provides advice on labour relations, staffing or
classification;
|
c) poste dont le
titulaire dispense des avis sur les relations de travail, la dotation en
personnel ou la classification;
|
…
|
…
|
[22]
Despite his excluded status, the Applicant still
qualified as an “employee” under the PSLRA
for the purposes of the grievance process:
Definitions
|
Définitions
|
2 (1) The following definitions apply in this Act.
|
2 (1) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent
à la présente loi.
|
…
|
…
|
employee, except in Part 2, means a person employed in the public
service, other than
|
fonctionnaire Sauf à la partie 2, personne
employée dans la fonction publique, à l’exclusion de toute personne :
|
…
|
…
|
(i) a person who
occupies a managerial or confidential position; or…
|
i) occupant un
poste de direction ou de confiance; …
|
[emphasis added]
|
[soulignements ajoutés]
|
[23]
Under s. 208 of the PSLRA (found in Part
2 of that Act dealing with grievances), an employee such as the Applicant is
entitled to present an individual grievance in situations such as this. This is
not in dispute.
[24]
However, as an excluded employee not covered by
a collective agreement, the Applicant was not able to access adjudication under
the PSLRA without the approval of the applicable bargaining agent – in
this case, the AJC:
Reference to
Adjudication
|
Renvoi d’un
grief à l’arbitrage
|
209 (1) An employee may refer to adjudication an individual grievance
that has been presented up to and including the final level in the grievance
process and that has not been dealt with to the employee’s satisfaction if
the grievance is related to
|
209 (1) Après l’avoir porté jusqu’au dernier
palier de la procédure applicable sans avoir obtenu satisfaction, le
fonctionnaire peut renvoyer à l’arbitrage tout grief individuel portant sur :
|
(a) the
interpretation or application in respect of the employee of a provision of a
collective agreement or an arbitral award;
|
a) soit
l’interprétation ou l’application, à son égard, de toute disposition d’une
convention collective ou d’une décision arbitrale;
|
(b) a
disciplinary action resulting in termination, demotion, suspension or
financial penalty;
|
b) soit une
mesure disciplinaire entraînant le licenciement, la rétrogradation, la suspension
ou une sanction pécuniaire;
|
(c) in the case
of an employee in the core public administration,
|
c) soit, s’il est
un fonctionnaire de l’administration publique centrale :
|
(i) demotion or
termination under paragraph 12(1)(d) of the Financial Administration Act for
unsatisfactory performance or under paragraph 12(1)(e) of that Act for any
other reason that does not relate to a breach of discipline or misconduct, or
|
(i) la
rétrogradation ou le licenciement imposé sous le régime soit de l’alinéa
12(1)d) de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques pour rendement
insuffisant, soit de l’alinéa 12(1)e) de cette loi pour toute raison autre
que l’insuffisance du rendement, un manquement à la discipline ou une
inconduite,
|
(ii) deployment
under the Public Service Employment Act without the employee’s consent where
consent is required; or
|
(ii) la mutation
sous le régime de la Loi sur l’emploi dans la fonction publique sans son
consentement alors que celui-ci était nécessaire;
|
(d) in the case
of an employee of a separate agency designated under subsection (3), demotion
or termination for any reason that does not relate to a breach of discipline
or misconduct.
|
d) soit la
rétrogradation ou le licenciement imposé pour toute raison autre qu’un
manquement à la discipline ou une inconduite, s’il est un fonctionnaire d’un
organisme distinct désigné au titre du paragraphe (3).
|
Application of
paragraph (1)(a)
|
Application de
l’alinéa (1)a)
|
(2) Before
referring an individual grievance related to matters referred to in paragraph
(1)(a), the employee must obtain the approval of his or her bargaining
agent to represent him or her in the adjudication proceedings.
|
(2) Pour que le
fonctionnaire puisse renvoyer à l’arbitrage un grief individuel du type visé
à l’alinéa (1)a), il faut que son agent négociateur accepte de le
représenter dans la procédure d’arbitrage.
|
[emphasis added]
|
[soulignements
ajoutés]
|
[25]
Final level grievance decisions are final and
binding where the individual grievance is not one that may be referred to adjudication
under s. 209 of the PSLRA, as here:
Binding Effect
|
Décision définitive
et obligatoire
|
214 If an individual grievance has been presented up to and including
the final level in the grievance process and it is not one that under section
209 may be referred to adjudication, the decision on the grievance taken at
the final level in the grievance process is final and binding for all
purposes of this Act and no further action under this Act may be taken on it.
|
214 Sauf dans le cas du grief individuel qui
peut être renvoyé à l’arbitrage au titre de l’article 209, la décision rendue
au dernier palier de la procédure applicable en la matière est définitive et
obligatoire et aucune autre mesure ne peut être prise sous le régime de la
présente loi à l’égard du grief en cause.
|
[26]
A work description grievance follows the
standard labour relations grievance process. Excluded employees who are not
covered by a collective agreement must follow the grievance procedures referred
to in the Public Safety Labour Relations Regulations, SOR/2005-79 [Regulations].
[27]
Under s. 64 of the Regulations, the
individual grievance process may consist of a maximum of three levels (also
referred to as “steps”). At each level or step,
the decision-maker is a representative of management. The following table, provided
by the Respondent, summarizes which individual(s) may act as step officer at
each stage of the grievance process. I have added in brackets the name and
title of the individual concerned in this case:
Level
|
Step Officer
|
First
|
Employee’s
manager or manager’s supervisor
[Mr. Schatz, Regional Director, Business
and Regulatory Law Portfolio]
|
Second (and third)
|
Progressively
higher levels of management
[Mr. Shenher, Acting Regional Director,
Prairie Region]
|
Final
|
Deputy
Minister (may be delegated)
[Ms.Thivierge, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Management Sector and Chief Financial Officer]
|
V.
Outline and analysis of the three steps in this
grievance process
A.
First-level grievance
before Mr. Schatz and general approach
[28]
The three step grievance process at issue
involved each level’s step officer being cognizant of the decision(s) below. I
will therefore look at each of the three steps and assess each on the grounds
of procedural fairness and reasonableness. That said I do this for analytical
and contextual purposes only, because only the third-level decision is the subject
of this judicial review. I also do this because the Applicant raises issues
with all three decisions, and because procedural unfairness or unreasonableness
in grievance levels one or two may flow through to and impact the third level
grievance decision.
[29]
The first-level grievance was heard by the
Applicant’s manager, Mr. Schatz. On July 9, 2012, the Applicant in
fact submitted his grievance to Mr. Brannen. In November 2012, the Applicant
submitted a memorandum to Mr. Schatz, as first-level step officer, which outlined
his submissions regarding his Work Description grievance. I should note that
the Applicant agreed in cross-examination that the grievance structure is such
that the first-level step officer is always the manager of the employee in
question.
[30]
In his November 2012 memorandum, the Applicant
set out his objections to the Work Description provided to him. He also requested
that Mr. Schatz voluntarily remove himself as first-level step officer on the
grounds of bias. The Applicant alleged that, as Mr. Schatz had confirmed the
Work Description that formed the basis of the Applicant’s grievance, Mr. Schatz
would be unable to act impartially as step officer. This, the Applicant
submitted, would result in a reasonable apprehension of bias and deny the
Applicant his right to a fair hearing.
The First-Level
Grievance
[31]
The first-level hearing occurred on November 9,
2012. The Applicant attended the grievance hearing and repeated the recusal
request he made in his memorandum to Mr. Schatz; once again, however, Mr.
Schatz refused to remove himself from the proceedings. The Applicant left the
hearing, and did so he said, so as to avoid giving the appearance of having
consented to Mr. Schatz acting as first-level step officer. On this point, I note
parenthetically that the Applicant could have stayed “under
protest”, although nothing turns on it.
[32]
On November 28, 2012, the Applicant’s grievance
was dismissed [First Level Decision]. Mr. Schatz reviewed the Applicant’s
submissions in making his decision and concluded that there was no issue of
bias for which he was required to remove himself as first-level step officer:
As the manager delegated and responsible for
the assignment of work and responsibilities, I believe I am well placed to
review this matter and make a determination, based on representations made, as
to whether or not your current work description accurately describes the work
and responsibilities that are assigned to you.
[33]
In my view, that finding is well justified.
[34]
Mr. Schatz noted the Applicant’s submissions
that the Work Description failed to properly describe his provision of
specialized legal services, the complexity of his workload and his leadership
role within the advisory group. However, Mr. Schatz concluded:
Having had the opportunity to review the
written material that you have provided as well as the work assigned to you, I
am satisfied that your current work description accurately describes your core
duties and responsibilities. In particular, I have noted the following
description contained under the heading of “Client Service Results” of your
work description, which reads:
“Provides a broad range of legal
services and legal advice in assigned areas of law/client departments or
agencies, typically on matters of considerable complexity, breadth, scope, risk
and/or impact, often involving multiple client department interests, horizontal
issues, the leadership and coordination of teams and resources, and having
implications on multiple client department and/or agency policy, process, and
business operations, as well as potentially on governing legislation.”
[35]
Despite the Applicant’s arguments to the
contrary, it is my respectful view that there was neither procedural unfairness
nor unreasonableness in the First-Level Decision.
[36]
There was no procedural unfairness because,
despite being pressed on this at the hearing before this Court, the Applicant was
unable to provide any evidence that Mr. Schatz made the decision that classified
the Applicant at the LA-2A level, or that he had determined the contents of the
generic Work Description being grieved. In fact, the evidence was that work
description (and classification) decision was made by the Prairie Region of the
DOJ in Edmonton. In addition, the allegation of bias is difficult to square
with the Applicant’s admission in cross-examination that the grievance
structure is such that, the first-level grievance officer is always the manager
of the employee in question. In this case, that manager was Mr. Schatz.
[37]
For completeness, I reject as without any merit
the Applicant’s allegation, advanced in his affidavit and repeated in oral
argument, that the First-Level Decision was improperly motivated in the sense
that Mr. Schatz denied the Applicant a higher work description to hold the line
on or maintain actual costs and thereby obtain annual performance pay bonuses
for himself. There is not a shred of evidence to support that assertion.
Reasonableness
of First-Level Decision
[38]
In terms of reasonableness, I am also unable to
agree with the Applicant. The decision is intelligible and transparent. It
recites the evidence filed by the Applicant. Mr. Schatz reviewed the
Applicant’s concerns as he had summarized them and answered them directly. He concluded
that the Applicant’s “current work description accurately
describes your core duties and responsibilities.” He pointed to the
specific provision in the contested Work Description and, in my respectful
opinion, reasonably found a match between what the Applicant did and the
contents of the Work Description. Given the deference afforded, I am satisfied
that the decision of Mr. Schatz is defensible on the facts and law and, as already
noted, not flawed by procedural unfairness.
B.
The Second-Level Grievance
Decision before Mr. Shenher
[39]
The Applicant’s grievance was then transmitted
to the second-level step officer, the Acting Regional Director for the Prairie
Region, Mr. Shenher. In addition to challenging the Work Description on the
merits, the Applicant also raised the issue of bias at the first level. No bias
allegation was directed against Mr. Shenher.
[40]
The Applicant’s second-level grievance was
dismissed on October 4, 2013 [Second-Level Decision]. Mr. Shenher concluded that
the Applicant’s “core functions fall within the skills
of a LA 2A counsel”; he held that the work the Applicant described himself
as doing “is within the generic work description”
being grieved. In denying the Applicant’s grievance, Mr. Shenher stated
that he “support[ed] the decision at the first level”.
[41]
The Second-Level Decision made no reference to
the Applicant’s allegations of bias against Mr. Schatz. I am unable to fault
Mr. Shenher on this point; as I found above, there was no procedural unfairness
in the First Level Decision.
Procedural Fairness
of the Second-Level Grievance Decision
[42]
In my respectful view, the decision at the second-level
was tainted by procedural unfairness. I make this finding for several reasons.
[43]
First, in making his decision on the Applicant’s
allegations, Mr. Shenher had before him a negative memorandum written by Mr.
Schatz and Mr. Brannen [Schatz/Brannen Memo]. This memo formed part of the
record before Mr. Shenher as the second level grievance officer. This memorandum,
material and relevant to the decision, was not disclosed to the Applicant: in
my respectful view, it should have been. In addition, the Schatz/Brannen Memo
is objectionable because it contains errors which the Applicant would have
corrected had he been afforded that opportunity. As a final point the
Schatz/Brannen Memo is objectionable because of its nature and the fact that it
was written by or at least co-authored by the first-level grievance officer,
Mr. Schatz.
[44]
I will consider these points in detail.
The
Schatz/Brannen Memo
[45]
Mr. Shenher, the second level grievance officer
requested a report on the Applicant from Mr. Schatz. Mr. Schatz was the
Applicant’s manager and he was also the first-level grievance officer. Mr.
Shenher made this request almost nine months after the Applicant filed his grievance
memorandum. Mr. Shenher asked Mr. Schatz to answer the following questions:
What duties were assigned/not assigned and
what was the time period in which these duties were assigned? Are these duties
within the scope of the LA2A work description? If not, where do these duties
fall and was acting pay provided to the employee if the duties were at a higher
classification group and level? If acting pay was not provided, what was the
reason?
If Dale should not have been doing these
duties, was Dale made aware by management that he should not be doing these
duties? If yes, when was Dale informed, what were the duties that he should not
be doing and has Dale been working within the scope of his work description
since the classification took place?
[46]
Notwithstanding the very long time it took to
ask for these answers, the 8-page Schatz/Brannen Memo dated September 27, 2013
was prepared and returned in a matter of three or four days. It was co-authored
by Mr. Schatz and Mr. Brannen. As may be recalled, Mr. Brannen was a DOJ
lawyer and manager who reported to Mr. Schatz. Mr. Brannen had met with both
the Applicant and Mr. Schatz to discuss the Applicant’s Work Description back in
December 2011.
[47]
The Schatz/Brannen Memo, after setting out a
lengthy “history and context” reported that:
…no management or team leader duties have been
assigned to Dale Kohlenberg.
To the extent that he has directly received
legal services requests and either acted upon the requests or assigned the
requests unilaterally, it has been contrary to the protocol that has been in
place for several years, as outlined above.
…
CONCLUSION
The materials reviewed above do not support
the claim that the core expectations and the core duties performed by Dale fall
outside the LA-2A Work Description. The duties generally require sound
knowledge, and his activities routinely fall into the categories of the Key
Activities, Critical Thinking and Analysis, Communication and Interaction,
Leadership, Physical and Sensory Effort, and Work Environment of the LA-2A Work
Description.
The above does not mean that he has never
been asked to perform duties demanding higher competencies, which he may well
possess. Similarly, particularly given the difficulties in attracting junior
counsel to advisory positions, Dale has been required to perform legal services
calling for competencies below the level of the Work Description.
[48]
In support of his grievance, the Applicant had
supplied many examples of his work product. Mr. Shenher attached examples in
his request for information to Mr. Schatz. The Schatz/Brannen Memo analysed and
commented on these various work products, which included opinions authored by
the Applicant, power point presentations, a factum, an agreement, various
emails and memos, memoranda and Memorandum of Understanding, a License to Use
and Occupy Crown Lands, and other documents.
[49]
The Applicant was not informed of the Schatz/Brannen
Memo, nor given any opportunity to respond to it. I was given no reason why
this document was not provided to the Applicant for his comments; the position
of the DOJ is that there was no obligation to do so. Because the Applicant was
not told of its existence, he was also unaware that the memo was co-authoried
by Mr. Schatz. While the Schatz/Brannen Memo is marked “Protected B”, it was filed and given to the Applicant
in the Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] in this Court docket, where the
Applicant saw it for the first time. The Schatz/Brannen Memo was part of the
record before Mr. Schenher; it is now part of the public record.
[50]
While the duty of procedural fairness at each
level of the grievance process lies at the low end of the spectrum in these
types of cases, in my respectful view, the duty still exists; it may not be
said that the duty of procedural fairness is non-existent.
[51]
The general principles regarding the content of
the duty of fairness in this connection are set out in in Re:Sound v Fitness
Industry Council of Canada, 2014 FCA 48 at para 54 [Re:Sound],
still apply. In Re:Sound, the Federal Court of Appeal stated:
[54] However, agencies must ensure
that, if they obtain information from third parties, they do not thereby
jeopardize parties’ participatory rights: to know and to comment on material
relevant to the decision; to have notice of the grounds on which the decision may
be based; and to have an opportunity to make representations accordingly. The
ultimate question for a reviewing court in every case is whether, in all the
circumstances (including respect for administrative procedural choices), the
tribunal’s decision-making procedure was essentially fair. This involves a
contextual and fact-specific inquiry.
[52]
This duty of fairness was breached in several respects.
[53]
First, withholding the Schatz/Brannen Memo from
the Applicant offended a most basic rule of procedural fairness; namely, that an
applicant is entitled to know the case against her or him. Here, the
Schatz/Brannen Memo provided a detailed and somewhat negative critique of the
Applicant’s various work products, in addition to providing responses to the questions
asked by Mr. Shenher.
[54]
The memo was undeniably relevant. And it was
material. In my respectful view, this memo in many respects constituted the
case against the Applicant. It set out material upon which the second-level grievance
officer made his decision. In my view, the Schatz/Brannen Memo was factored
into the final decision to dismiss the second level grievance. Therefore the
Applicant was entitled to have it provided to him, and to respond to it, even
given that the duty of fairness in this respect is at the low end.
[55]
I was pointed to no statutory basis on which the
Court might conclude that the duty to disclose is non-existent in a case such
as this. Nor, given the delay in asking for it, am I able to conclude that
considerations of urgency or delay justified keeping it from the Applicant. Nor
may I conclude that the Applicant, in effect, knew what was in the memo such
that he could or should have anticipated and addressed its comments without
seeing it. Little, indeed almost none of the information contained in the
Schatz/Brannen Memo was already on the record.
[56]
There is a second objection to this memo, namely,
that the second-level grievance officer should not have asked the first-level grievance
officer for such comprehensive input into the second-level decision. By
attaching the Applicant’s examples of work materials to his request for
information, it appears that comments were invited on essentially all of the
Applicant’s submissions. The questions themselves are quite broad. Overall, in
my respectful view, this created the appearance that the officer wanted answers
not only to the wide questions posed, but a substantial briefing on the
Applicant and his work for the DOJ.
[57]
It was therefore not unexpected that Mr. Schatz commented
extensively on the Applicant’s work, in addition to answering the questions. The
memo paints what I consider a somewhat negative picture of the Applicant.
[58]
I do not doubt that, particularly in smaller
offices, it may be necessary for a second-level grievance officer to request
specific information from a first-level grievance officer where that
information is necessary to complete his or her investigation. In this case,
however, not only was the request made by the second officer quite
comprehensive, but so was the response. This is all the more reason why the
Applicant should have had a chance to respond to it.
[59]
In this respect, the case at bar recalls the
discussion in Majdan, above, where this Court concluded:
[40] I find that the
Committee also breached its duty of fairness by not providing the applicant
with an opportunity to respond to the information obtained from Mr.
Vaillancourt. The respondent acknowledges that the Committee sought information
from Mr. Vaillancourt to clarify the applicant’s duties while she worked in the
GP. However, the respondent submits, he did not provide the Committee with any
useful information and therefore the Committee did not need to inform the
applicant of this information and provide her with an opportunity to respond.
…
[42] Thus, contrary to the
respondent’s submission, Mr. Vaillancourt’s information was not completely
duplicative of the information presented by the applicant. In the final
sentence, Mr. Vaillancourt characterized the GP as involving the provision of
expert advice, as opposed to a leadership or management role. This was not
benign or neutral information – Mr. Vaillancourt characterized the GP in a way
that would clearly merit a lower classification than that proposed by the
applicant.
[43] Thus, I do not
accept the respondent’s argument that Mr. Vaillancourt’s information had
no effect whatsoever to the Committee’s determination. Rather, I find that this
is similar to the undisclosed information in Bulat, above – the manager
in that case provided information that supported a lower classification than
the grievor sought. Similarly in this case, Mr. Vaillancourt’s information was
clearly detrimental to the applicant’s grievance (which is particularly
problematic given the fact that he was not her supervisor, and apparently had
an animus towards her).
…
[47] Even if there is a
low standard of fairness in classification grievances, this is one of those
cases where the Committee simply gave lip service to its duty.
[60]
Here, even lip service was not given.
[61]
A further point must be factored into this
analysis. In my respectful view, the manner in which the request and the
response were passed between the second- and first-level grievance officers,
coupled with the nature of the request and reply, transformed what was supposed
to be a multi-step grievance procedure into what in its appearance was a closed
loop; on the record, it appears that the second grievance officer, who
dismissed the grievance before him, relied excessively on the first level
grievance officer who had done the same.
[62]
In my respectful view, this breached the
fundamental rule that justice must not only be done, but it must be seen to be
done: R v Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 at para 15; Société des Acadiens v
Association of Parents, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549 at para 153; Wewaykum Indian
Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259 at para 67 [Wewaykum]; Heron
Bay Investments Ltd v Canada, 2010 FCA 203 at para 41 citing James v
Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2000] FCJ No 2135 (QL), 2000 CanLII
16700 at paras 51-52 (FCA) [James]; NCJ Educational Services Limited
v Canada (National Revenue), 2009 FCA 131 at para 39 citing James.
[63]
My view on this point is reinforced by the fact
that the second level grievance officer, with one exception, did not consult
any of the persons identified by the Applicant as references. This fact is not
in dispute. The only exception was Mr. Brannen who co-authored the report with
Mr. Schatz. While I do not say generally that all or any of an applicant’s
proffered sources of support must be consulted, the fact that virtually none
were consulted detracts from the appearance of fairness in this case.
[64]
These are not my only concerns. I am left to
wonder why Mr. Shenher’s request for additional information was not sent to Mr.
Brannen instead of Mr. Schatz, given that Mr. Brannen was not the first-level grievance
officer, and had managerial responsibilities. In addition, he had expertise regarding
the Applicant’s work description, as evidenced both by his co-authorship of the
memo sent to Mr. Shenher and by his attendance with Mr. Schatz at the work
description interview with the Applicant in December 2011.
[65]
In my respectful view, there is also merit in
the Applicant’s assertion that the Schatz/Brannen Memo contained errors relating
to his role as “advisory team leader”. A review
of the material supports my conclusion that the Applicant was indeed an “advisory team leader”. Indeed, this was not disputed.
While the Respondent argued that the Applicant’s role as advisory team leader
did not qualify him to be considered a “team leader”
within the higher level work descriptions, in my respectful view as a
consequence of his role as “advisory team leader”,
he was still a “team leader”.
[66]
In my respectful view however, there is no merit
to the Applicant’s further submission that the second level grievance officer
should not have had or reviewed the decision of the first level grievance
officer. In my view, a second-level grievance officer does not act with
procedural unfairness if she or he considers a decision made at the first
level; while a de novo hearing in the grievance process requires that
the decision be made afresh, I do not agree with the Applicant’s position that
a decision at an earlier level as a legal matter must be ignored: MacPhail v
Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 153 at para 18, James v Canada
(Attorney General), 2015 FC 965 at paras 98-99.
Reasonableness
of the second-level grievance decision (alternative finding)
[67]
If the Second-Level Decision was not tainted by
procedural unfairness issues, I would have found that it meets the test of
reasonableness set out in Dunsmuir. As with the First-level Decision, the
Second-Level Decision assesses the allegations of the Applicant against the
Work Description at issue and concludes that the work described by the
Applicant “is within the generic work description.”
While, as the Applicant stresses, it does conclude that the Applicant’s work is
“adequately” reflected in his work description,
and while I agree that the word “adequately” is
not the best word to use, the decision read as a whole, without engaging in a
treasure hunt for errors, is reasonable in that is it defensible on the facts
and law.
C.
Third-Level Grievance
before the ADM
[68]
The Applicant pursued his grievance to the ADM
as the third-level grievance officer. In this connection, and in addition to
the submissions of the Applicant, the ADM received a report dated September 9,
2014 from Maximilian Baier [Mr. Baier], a Senior Labour Relations Advisor. Mr.
Baier’s report recommended that the Applicant’s grievance be dismissed. As with
the Schatz/Brannen Memo, Mr. Baier’s memo was not disclosed to the Applicant, nor
was the Applicant given any opportunity to respond to it in either his written
or oral submissions. The Applicant argues this was a breach of procedural
fairness that was particularly unfair because the report included both
irrelevant and admittedly incorrect information that may have factored into the
ADM’s final decision. I agree.
The Bias Decision
[69]
The third-level grievance was split into two
separate hearings. At the first hearing on November 6, 2014, the Applicant once
again raised the issue of bias. In her decision dated December 10, 2014, the
ADM dismissed this allegation [Bias Decision] for the following reasons:
The grievance procedure which is
administrative in nature is in line with the departmental Delegation of Human
Resources Authorities Instrument. Given the delegated authority, it is presumed
that the person making the decision at the first or second levels will probably
have had some involvement in, or knowledge of the matter under review. That
said, each level in the grievance process is considered a de novo hearing.
Your position appears to be that a
reasonable apprehension of bias exists from the structure of the grievance
process itself so that any decision I make could be influenced by the previous
decision-makers. After having reviewed the applicable jurisprudence, I have
concluded that the concept of bias does not apply generally to pre-adjudicative
processes such as the Department’s grievance process.
[70]
The ADM also noted that, at the time of his
grievance transmittal, the Applicant did not allege bias against the second
level grievance officer.
[71]
The Applicant made two objections to the Bias
Decision. First, he says that one cannot have a de novo hearing if previous
decision(s) are before a subsequent grievance officer. Second, he says that the
last sentence in the above excerpt mistakes his situation in that, for him,
there was no adjudicative process due to his status as an excluded employee. I
will deal with each objection separately.
De novo issue
[72]
On the de novo issue, I have already found
that a second-level grievance officer conducts a procedurally fair de novo
hearing notwithstanding she or he has the first-level decision for review in
the material in the docket or file. In this case, I am satisfied that the
reference to a de novo hearing in the ADM’s Bias Decision (and in Mr.
Baier’s report) refers to a process in which both the Applicant and Respondent
argue the matter afresh based on the same or new evidence, but in which proper
underlying decision(s) and material may also be considered.
[73]
I agree with the Respondent’s submission that a de
novo hearing at each step of the grievance procedure does not mean that the
record below is wiped clean. For example, when a grievance is referred to
adjudication, section 96 of the Regulations requires the employer to
file with the Board a copy of the grievance decisions made at each level below.
In my view, if the AJC had approved his request for adjudication before the
PSLRB, it would have all three decisions before it. This confirms my finding that
the use of the expression de novo in this context was not intended to be
understood in a stricter sense.
Wrong test
issue
[74]
Nor am I persuaded that the Applicant has reason
to complain that the wrong test was used because he was an excluded employee.
As noted previously, the fact that the Applicant is an excluded employee did
not as such result in his being unable to pursue his grievance to the PSLRB -
he could have done that had the AJC given its approval: PSLRA subsection
209(2). There was nothing in the record to say that approval would not be given;
at the time the ADM wrote her Bias Decision, it remained open that the AJC
would support the Applicant in a possible grievance. The Applicant is not
correct in asserting that adjudication was “never open”
to him. There was no mistake in respect of the applicable legal test in this
regard.
[75]
I also agree, and there was no dispute, that the
law is as set out in the Bias Decision, namely, that the concept of bias generally
does not apply to pre-adjudicative processes such as these grievance processes.
As stated in Brown & Beatty:
The requirement of impartiality, however,
does not apply to the pre-arbitration stages of the proceeding. Further, it has
been held that considerations of “bias” are not relevant in the composition and
operation of internal dispute-resolution mechanisms prior to the appointment of
a board of arbitrators.
Donald JM Brown & David M Beatty, Canadian
Labour Arbitration, ch 1 at para 1:5210; see also Wewaykum Indian Band v
Canada, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259 at para 77; Ocean Port Hotel Ltd v British
Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing Branch), 2001 SCC
52 at paras 19-24.
The ADM’s
decision on the merits
[76]
With the Bias Decision made, the Applicant
continued with his Work Description grievance. On June 2, 2015, after a hearing
before the ADM, his third level grievance was dismissed on the merits [Merits
Decision]. The ADM found:
With respect to your expertise it is clear
that you possess highly specialized knowledge in the area of real estate law
and, in particular, transactions relating to Crown lands. I have taken note of
the documentation that you provided which indicates that your expertise in this
area of law is valued by other counsel and stakeholders. However, I would
expect that a lawyer who has been practicing in a specialized field for a
lengthy period of time as you have, would develop considerable expertise in
that field. Consequently, I do not believe this expertise falls outside of the
normal expectations of a practicing LP-02, nor do I find I a reflective of a
duty that is outside the scope of your current work description.
With respect to your submission that you are
acting as a de facto advisory team leader in that you supervise the work
of several people from around the Prairie Region, I have been advised that the
employees to whom you assign tasks are less experienced counsel, paralegals and
support staff. Recognizing that you oversee some of their work, I also note
that you do not prepare annual assessments nor does anyone formally report to
you.
The LA-2A work description, as well as the
LP-02 practitioner work description, specifically sets out duties relating to
coaching, knowledge transfer and assigning tasks. Under “Key Activities”, the
work description states: “…providing coaching and knowledge transfer and
assigning tasks to less experience counsel, paralegals and support staff (e.g.
legal assistants) and overseeing the work related to assigned matters…providing
input to managers for performance evaluation and other purposes on the
performance of less experienced counsel, paralegals, students and staff they
have coached or supervised.” This portion of the work description recognizes that
it is common for any lawyer at the LP-02 level who is lead counsel on files to
assign tasks to junior counsel and paralegals and to plan and set priorities in
the delivery of legal services. I am satisfied that the scope of your day to
day duties and responsibilities are such that they are covered by the generic
work description.
With respect to the profile and sensitivity
of the files that you deal with on a routine basis, the work description states
that LA-2A/LP-02 counsel are expected to: “Provide a broad range of
comprehensive legal services to client departments and agencies…”; possess “…a
sound knowledge of the law…relevant to assigned matters…”; “…provide a full
range of legal services to respond to the needs of client departments and
agencies…”; and, “…provide legal and legal policy advice as well as service on
a range of comprehensive and challenging issues having broad reaching impacts….”
From the information before me, I am satisfied that the scope and sensitivity
of the files that you deal with on a day to day basis are captured within the
requirements of the work description.
[77]
There are two aspects of this decision to
review: whether it was tainted by procedural unfairness and whether it passes
muster on a reasonableness basis. In my respectful view, the Merits Decision is
procedurally flawed and must be set aside. Had I not made that finding, I would
have found it to be reasonable.
Procedural
fairness of the third-level grievance decision
[78]
The ADM’s decision is procedurally flawed and
must be set aside for several reasons. First, the ADM had before her Mr. Baier’s
report. I understand such memos are par for the course within the labour
relations context at this level of the grievance procedure. Indeed, the
Applicant acknowledged as much when he requested that material he had submitted
to Mr. Shenher at the second level be sent “to [the
ADM’s] office for review by [the ADM’s] office’s Labour Relations Officer
and/or delegate…” The ADM is entitled to the assistance of such staff
labour relations assistance.
[79]
Nevertheless, a procedural unfairness issue arises
from the failure to make the Applicant aware of the Baier report either by
giving him a copy or at the very least an adequate summary of it, together with
affording him an opportunity to respond. For the same reasons provided earlier in
relation to the Schatz/Brannen Memo, Mr. Baier’s report should have been given
to the Applicant so that he could respond to it. It was part of the record
before the ADM. It contained relevant and material information on the matter at
hand. In my view, it formed the basis of the case against the Applicant,
therefore - on first principles - the Applicant was entitled to have it, even
acknowledging that the duty of procedural fairness falls at the low end of the
spectrum in this connection.
[80]
Once again, I was pointed to no statutory basis upon
which the decision to withhold the Baier report might be based. There were no relevant
considerations of urgency or timeliness that I was pointed to. It cannot be
said that the report contained expected and non-controversial material. Nor may
it be said that the Applicant knew of its contents in advance and therefore did
not need an opportunity to comment upon it.
[81]
I was given no reason why the report could not
be shared with the Applicant, although counsel for the Minister noted a “labour relations privilege”. However, I was pointed
to no authority in that regard. In any event, it is too late for the Respondent
to claim privilege over a document that has already been disclosed to the Applicant
through its inclusion in the CTR (as a result of which it is also in the public
domain). As a matter of relevance, the Federal Court of Appeal recently set out
the process to claim privilege over a document that would otherwise be included
in a CTR: Bernard v Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2017 FCA 35.
[82]
In my respectful view, the Baier report
contained material errors that further support my conclusion that it should
have been provided to the Applicant for his review and response. First, the report
says that the Applicant “did not meet expectations in
his 2013-14 performance evaluation”. In a work description grievance, this
statement is quite material and prejudicial; it puts a cloud over the Applicant’s
knowledge of what he was required to do, i.e., his work description, the very
matter in dispute. As an aspersion, it also might affect his credibility when
outlining what he did. It may also insinuate that the Applicant lacks knowledge
about what his responsibilities actually are.
[83]
The statement was not correct; the Applicant
received three “fully meets” assessments and one
“exceeds” rating. None of these positive
assessments were noted by in the report. The fact is that the Applicant had successfully
grieved to remove what had been a negative assessment, the outcome of which was
its replacement with “fully meets” assessments;
this is what Mr. Baier should have reported if he wanted to touch that subject
at all. In cross-examination, the statement was admitted to be incorrect.
[84]
Secondly, the report noted that the Applicant
had been disciplined in the same year for certain “behaviours”.
The plural use of the word “behaviour” indicates
that there were more than one incident reasons leading to the the Applicant being
disciplined. However, in fact, there was only one behaviour for which he had
disciplined, and the evidence was that the disciplinary action was grieved down
to one-fifth of that originally assessed. Mr. Baier was unable to point to the
relevance of this comment in the context of a work description grievance. Additionally,
the report stated that the Applicant did not prepare annual assessments for
anyone, which appears to have been inaccurate. The report is, once again, a generally
negative one.
[85]
Of these, the inaccurate attack on the Applicant’s
competence is the most serious. In my respectful view, it went directly to the
Work Description and what the Applicant did (as opposed to what he said he did).
He should have had an opportunity to see and respond to the report. In all the
circumstances, I am unable to say that the report had no impact or effect on
the ADM’s decision. The following from the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision
in Re:Sound is on point, even at the low end of the procedural fairness
spectrum:
[83] …Only in the clearest cases will
an administrative decision vitiated by such a serious breach of procedural
fairness as occurred here be permitted to stand on the ground that it would
have made no difference to the tribunal’s decision: see, for example, Canadian
Cable Television Association v. American College Sports Collective of Canada,
Inc., [1991] 3 F.C. 626 (F.C.A.). This is not one of them.
[86]
An additional issue of procedural unfairness arises
because the ADM also had the Schatz/Brannen Memo before her, prepared as it was
for the second-level grievance officer. As discussed above, the Applicant had not
seen the Schatz/Brannen Memo, nor was he given an opportunity to comment on it.
I found no reason for Mr. Shenher to keep it from the Applicant. For the
reasons set above underlying my finding that Schatz/Brannen memo should have
been shared with the Applicant at the second level, it should have been shared
with him at the third level. The failure to do so vitiated the third level
decision. I appreciate that the duty of procedural fairness is at the low end
of spectrum. However, to ignore what happened here is to say there is no duty
of procedural fairness in these cases, which is not my conception of the law
concerning relevant and material information such as this.
[87]
Respondent’s counsel notes that this Applicant
has access to the Federal Court on judicial review, where he will see the
entire record against him. However, the remedy of judicial review does not
support the DOJ’s decision to keep from the Applicant relevant and material documents,
including material that makes, or in large part makes the case against him. A
hearing in this Court is not a cure for procedurally defective proceedings
below, if only because the normal remedy is reconsideration. Judicial review in
this Court is conducted on the record; in my respectful view, the required record
is one generated by grievance officers who have heard both sides in an
essentially fair manner. Where that is the case, this Court reviews the
reasonableness of the decision, not its correctness. The Federal Court is not
simply another step in the grievance procedure, because while grievance
officers deal with the merits of a case, this Court normally does not.
[88]
On the basis of the above, I would grant
judicial review, set aside the Third-Level Decision and remit it for
reconsideration on terms discussed later in these Reasons. I find no merit in
the Applicant’s request for special directions: Canada (Attorney General) v
Gilbert, 2009 FCA 76 at paras 22-23.
Reasonableness
of the Third-Level Grievance Decision (in the alternative)
[89]
If I had not found procedural fairness issues
requiring the third level grievance to be re-determined, I would have found the
ADM’s decision to be reasonable. As with the two prior decisions, the ADM
considered the Applicant’s position and reviewed what the Applicant did against
the generic Work Description he had been given. While the ADM unreasonably
rejected the Applicant’s claim that he was a “team
leader” (the second-level officer made the same unreasonable finding),
the balance of the findings of the ADM are defensible on the record; what the Applicant
did matched up with the generic Work Description at issue.
[90]
Stepping back and viewing the reasonableness of
the decision taken as an organic whole, without treating the judicial review
process as a treasure hunt for errors, it is my view that the Third-Level Decision
is intelligible and, in addition, is defensible on the facts and law as
required by Dunsmuir (except regarding the procedural fairness issues).
VI.
Conclusion
[91]
Judicial review is granted. The matter will be remanded
for reconsideration at the third level by a different grievance officer with
the assistance of a different staff relations advisor, and on the basis of a
record that excludes the Schatz/Brannen Memo, the Second-Level Decision and the
Baier report, but which shall include the First-Level Decision and such other
submissions as the parties may be permitted to file. The Applicant asked for
hearing of a maximum of 10 days which he says he might have received had
adjudication been available, i.e., if the AJC approved, but and with respect,
this is a matter for engagement with the new third level grievance officer; therefore
no such order is made.
VII.
Costs
[92]
Both parties seek costs and in the normal course
costs follow the event. At the end of the hearing, I asked both parties to
advise what lump sum costs should be awarded in the event they were successful.
The Applicant requested $3,500.00 for fees plus $1,713.77 for disbursements;
the Respondent sought a lump sum award in the amount of $1,500.00.
[93]
I have considered a number of factors: the fact
that the Applicant was successful; the general rule that costs follow the event;
the fact, however, that the Applicant is a self-represented litigant in respect
of whom there was no evidence of foregone remunerative activity; and, the fact that
this is a slightly more complex judicial review than some. I have also
considered the Applicant’s argument that this case warrants a special order of
costs to express the Court’s disapproval of the Respondent’s conduct, but have
concluded otherwise on the evidence in that is a straightforward case of
procedural unfairness to be remedied by judicial review. In my view, a
reasonable all-inclusive lump sum cost award (inclusive of fees, disbursements,
taxes and all other assessable amounts) is $2,500.00, which the Respondent
shall pay to the Applicant.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.
Judicial review is granted, and the decision of
the ADM as third-level grievance officer is set aside.
2.
The matter is remanded for reconsideration by a
different third level grievance officer assisted by a different staff relations
officer.
3.
In such reconsideration, the different third
level grievance officer shall proceed on the basis of a record that excludes
the Schatz/Brannen Memo, the Second Level Decision, the Baier report, and the
decision of the third level grievance officer, but which shall include the
decision of the first level grievance officer and such other submissions as the
parties are permitted to make.
4.
The Respondent shall pay an all-inclusive lump
sum to the Applicant for costs hereby fixed at $2,500.00.
“Henry S. Brown”