Docket: A-435-15
Citation:
2017 FCA 15
CORAM:
|
TRUDEL J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
|
BETWEEN:
|
PROPHET RIVER
FIRST NATION AND
|
WEST MOBERLY
FIRST NATIONS
|
Appellants
|
and
|
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA,
|
MINISTER OF THE
ENVIRONMENT,
|
MINISTER OF
FISHERIES AND OCEANS,
|
MINISTER OF
TRANSPORT, AND
|
BRITISH
COLUMBIA HYDRO AND POWER AUTHORITY
|
Respondents
|
REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
BOIVIN J.A.
I.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This appeal is made in the context of the
building of a hydroelectric dam on the Peace River in Northeastern British
Columbia. The central question raised by this appeal relates to the scope of
the decision-making authority of the Governor in Council (GIC) when it must be
determined whether likely significant adverse environmental effects from a
project, such as the hydroelectric dam project at issue, are “justified in the
circumstances” in accordance with subsection 52(4) of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52 (CEAA 2012). Specifically,
the Court must determine whether the GIC, in circumstances where the designated
project has significant adverse environmental effects and adverse effect on lands
covered by a treaty, is required to determine if such effects constitute an infringement
to the treaty rights and, if so, whether such effects must be justified
according to the test set out in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075,
[1990] S.C.J. No. 49 (QL) [Sparrow]. It bears noting that in this
appeal, there is no challenge to the adequacy of the consultations undertaken
by the respondents.
[2]
Having considered the environmental assessment
(EA) process undertaken in the case at bar – including the evidence provided by
the appellants, the information obtained by the JRP, and the consideration of
Aboriginal rights and interests by the JRP – as well as the GIC’s powers under
subsection 52(4) of CEAA 2012, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
II.
BACKGROUND
[3]
The treaty at issue, Treaty 8, was signed on
June 21, 1899. It covers most of Northern Alberta, Northwestern Saskatchewan, Northeastern
British Columbia, and the Southwest portion of the Northwest Territories.
Treaty 8 expressly grants all treaty beneficiaries hunting, trapping and
fishing rights within the treaty territory. Existing Treaty 8 rights are
recognized and affirmed within the meaning of subsection 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 (Constitution Act, 1982).
[4]
The Prophet River First Nation and the West Moberly
First Nations (together, the appellants) are British Columbia Treaty 8 First
Nations. The respondent British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority (BC Hydro)
is a British Columbia provincial Crown corporation and the project proponent
under the CEAA 2012. BC Hydro purports to take up Treaty 8 lands for the Site C
Clean Energy Project (Site C Project), a hydroelectric dam on the Peace River.
The other respondents are the Attorney General of Canada, the Minister of the
Environment, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and the Minister of Transport
(the Crown).
[5]
The appellants appeal a decision of a Federal
Court Judge (the Judge) denying their application for judicial review of the GIC’s
decision (2015 FC 1030). The GIC’s decision at issue deemed that although the
Site C Project would likely cause significant adverse environmental effects – including
adverse effects on the Aboriginal peoples use of lands and resources for traditional
purposes – these effects were justified in the circumstances pursuant to subsection
52(4) of the CEAA 2012.
[6]
The application for judicial review at issue
(T-2292-14 reported as 2015 FC 1030) was heard consecutively with another
application for judicial review in Peace Valley Landowner Association v. Attorney
General of Canada and the Minister of the Environment, and British Columbia
Hydro and Power Authority (T-2300-14). The latter resulted in a separate
decision (2015 FC 1027) that is not subject to this appeal.
III.
FACTS
[7]
The Site C Project is planned to be the third
dam and hydroelectric generating station on the Peace River. Its projected construction
includes, amongst other infrastructure, an 83‑kilometre long reservoir
flooding approximately 5550 hectares of land and resulting in a total reservoir
surface area of approximately 9330 hectares. Up to 70% of the Peace River
Valley has already been flooded by previous hydroelectric developments. It is
not disputed that the Site C Project would flood approximately half of the
remaining 30% of the Peace River Valley.
[8]
The Site C Project was subject to review for
environmental effects under both the federal CEAA 2012 and the provincial
legislation in British Columbia (Environmental Assessment Act, S.B.C.
2002, c. 43 (BC Environmental Assessment Act)). The governments of
Canada and British Columbia entered into an agreement for a harmonized EA
process (amended to reflect the entry into law of the CEAA 2012, replacing previously
applicable federal legislation), including the establishment of a Joint Review
Panel (JRP) to avoid unnecessary delays and duplication. The JRP’s mandate flowed
from the CEAA 2012, the BC Environmental Assessment Act and the JRP
Agreement and Terms of Reference (Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 2, Tab E.62,
pp. 3351-3360).
[9]
Pursuant to the agreement for a harmonized EA process,
the EA provided for three stages of assessment: the Pre-Panel Stage, the JRP Stage
and the Post-Panel Stage. The Pre-Panel Stage involved the production of Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) Guidelines and a determination of when the EIS, prepared
by the project proponent, was ready for review by the JRP. The JRP Stage
included a determination of the sufficiency of the EIS, in addition to public
consultations, including from Aboriginal groups, and the production of a report
in accordance with the CEAA 2012 and the JRP Agreement and Terms of Reference.
At the Post-Panel Stage, the federal and provincial decision-makers received
the JRP’s Report and other documents from the Canadian Environmental Agency.
[10]
The JRP Agreement and Terms of Reference limited
the scope of the JRP’s conclusions and recommendations regarding the effect of
the Site C Project on Aboriginal peoples and Aboriginal rights. It also
expressly stated that the JRP will not draw conclusions as to the nature, scope
or strength of asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights or whether those rights
have been infringed:
2.5 The Joint Review Panel will not make any conclusions or
recommendations as to:
a) the nature and scope of asserted Aboriginal rights or the
strength of those asserted rights;
b) the scope of the Crown’s duty to consult Aboriginal Groups;
c) whether the Crown has met its duty to consult Aboriginal Groups
and, where appropriate, accommodate their interests in respect of the potential
adverse effects of the Project on asserted or established Aboriginal rights or
treaty rights;
d) whether the Project is an infringement of Treaty No. 8; and
e) any matter of treaty interpretation.
2.6 The Joint Review Panel will describe any asserted or
established Aboriginal rights and Treaty rights that are raised during the
Joint Review Panel Stage and any impacts on those rights as articulated by
those Aboriginal Groups in the Joint Review Panel Report
(Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 2, Tab E.62, p. 3363).
[11]
The consultation and accommodation process with
Aboriginal groups was integrated into the EA from the outset and was set at the
deep end of the consultation spectrum. This process engaged Aboriginal groups
in on-going discussions, which notably included opportunities for Aboriginal
groups to provide feedback on a draft consultation and accommodation report.
[12]
On the basis of the EIS and other information
submitted by BC Hydro as well as public consultation – including submissions by
the appellants and other Aboriginal groups, – the JRP produced a report that
was made public on May 8, 2014.
[13]
In its report, the JRP concluded that the
project would likely have many significant adverse environmental effects, some
of which could be mitigated. Specifically, with respect to Treaty 8, the JRP
concluded that the Site C Project would likely cause significant adverse
effects on fishing opportunities and practices, on hunting and non-tenured
trapping, and on other traditional uses of the land. It found that the effects
on fishing, hunting and trapping could not be mitigated, nor could some of the
effects on other traditional uses of the land.
[14]
As part of the Post-Panel Stage, the federal
Minister of the Environment (the Minister) was required to make her EA decision
within 174 days of receiving the JRP’s Report, unless additional time would be
required to undertake more studies or collect more information (Appeal Book
Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 2, Tab E.62, p. 3360). Under the CEAA 2012 at
subsection 54(2), if the Minister concludes that the project is likely to cause
significant adverse environmental effects, the GIC then determines whether
those effects are justified in the circumstances.
[15]
Also as part of the Post-Panel Stage, a Federal/Provincial
Consultation and Accommodation Report (CAR) summarized the consultation with
Aboriginal groups and set out the Crown’s understanding of the seriousness of
the potential impact that the Site C Project could have on Aboriginal groups
with a view to avoiding, mitigating or accommodating the potential impacts on
Treaty 8 rights and other interests through the EA (Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2,
Tab E.65, p. 3569).
[16]
Aboriginal groups were invited to make written
submissions regarding the JRP’s conclusions and recommendations as set forth in
its report dated May 8, 2014. In particular, they were invited to raise
concerns that had not yet been addressed. Prior to the release of the CAR on
September 7, 2014, they were also invited on June 10, 2014 to comment on a
draft of the CAR. Aboriginal groups, including the appellants, submitted to the
Minister their position that the effects of the Site C Project would result in
an infringement of their rights under Treaty 8, an infringement that in their
view requires justification under the Sparrow test (Letters dated August
19, 2014, Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.65, pp. 3720-3723).
[17]
In the final CAR, the Crown disagreed with the views
expressed by the appellants, in particular with the approach as stated above:
Early in the EA Process, Treaty 8 First
Nations sought to engage the Crown in consultation regarding the nature and
scope of rights protected under Treaty 8. Extensive efforts were made by both
the First Nations and the Crown in examining this issue and communicating views
in an open transparent manner in order to focus consultations on the potential
impacts of the proposed Project on the First Nations’ treaty rights. The Crown
does not view the EA as a process designed to determine specific rights
recognized and affirmed under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982,
but instead, to reasonably understand the nature and extent of treaty rights
potentially being impacted by contemplated Crown actions in order to assess the
severity of potential impacts to them.
(Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.65,
p. 3572).
[18]
On October 10, 2014, the Minister determined in
her Decision Statement that the Site C Project was likely to cause significant
adverse environmental effects referred to in subsection 5(1) of the CEAA 2012
(Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.66, pp. 3729 and 3730). The Minister, in
accordance with subsection 53(1) of the CEAA 2012 established conditions – including
conditions related to the use of lands and resources for traditional purposes with
which BC Hydro must comply (Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.66, pp. 3731-3748).
Because of the significance of the environmental effects, the Minister referred
the matter to the GIC as required by subsection 52(2) of the CEAA 2012.
[19]
The GIC subsequently determined that the effects
associated with the Site C Project on the Peace River were justified in the
circumstances, pursuant to subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012. As a result, the Site
C Project was issued federal authorization to proceed by Order in Council 2014-1105
dated October 14, 2014:
Whereas BC Hydro has proposed the
development of the Site C. Clean Energy Project (the “Project”), near Fort St.
John, British Columbia;
Whereas, after having considered the Report
of the Joint Review Panel – Site C Clean Energy Project and taking into account
the implementation of mitigation measures that the Minister of the Environment
considered appropriate, the Minister has decided that the Project is likely to
cause significant adverse environmental effects;
Whereas, after having made this decision,
the Minister has, in accordance with subsection 52(2) of the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act, 2012 (“the Act”), referred to the Governor in
Council for its consideration and decision the matter of whether those effects
are justified in the circumstances;
Whereas the Government of Canada has
undertaken a reasonable and responsive consultation process with Aboriginal groups
potentially affected by the Project;
Whereas the consultation process has
provided the opportunity for dialogue and for the exchange of information to
ensure that the concerns and interest of the Aboriginal groups have been
considered in the decision-making process;
Whereas the consultation process has
included opportunities for the Aboriginal groups to review and comment on
conditions for inclusion in a decision statement to be issued by the Minister
under the Act that could mitigate environmental effects and potential impacts
on the Aboriginal groups;
Whereas the Minister will consider the views
and information provided by the Aboriginal groups when the Minister determines
the conditions to be imposed on the proponent in the decision statement;
Whereas the consultation process undertaken
is consistent with the honour of the Crown;
And whereas the concerns and interests of
Aboriginal groups have been reasonably balanced with other societal interests
including social, economic, policy and the broader public interest;
Therefore, His Excellency the Governor
General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of the Environment,
pursuant to subsection 52(4) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
2012, decides that the significant adverse environmental effects that Site
C Clean Energy Project proposed by BC Hydro in British Columbia is likely to
cause are justified in the circumstances.
(Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.66,
p. 3749).
[20]
On November 5, 2014, the Prophet River
First Nation and West Moberly First Nations (as applicants, now the appellants)
brought an application for judicial review of the GIC’s Order. On August 28,
2015, the Judge dismissed the application. He found that the Crown had met its
duty to consult and accommodate and that there was no requirement on the part
of the GIC to determine the appellants’ treaty rights and whether the Site C
Project unjustifiably infringed their treaty rights under subsection 35(1) of
the Constitution Act, 1982 pursuant to the analysis set out in Sparrow.
It is that decision that is subject of this appeal.
IV.
The Judge’s
decision
[21]
In rendering his decision, the Judge set forth
the factual background of this case and provided an overview of the process
which culminated in the decision of the GIC to approve the Site C Project. The
Judge then addressed the standard of review. He determined that matters relating
to procedural fairness as well as the issue of whether there is a duty to consult
and the extent of that duty ought to be reviewed under the correctness standard.
All other matters were to be reviewed on a reasonableness standard due to the
high degree of deference owed to the GIC as an elected body acting “under legislation
with which it is familiar” and because the consultation process and adequacy of
consultation are questions of mixed fact and law.
[22]
The Judge framed the powers of the GIC under
subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012 as a matter of jurisdiction. He held that the
GIC did not have jurisdiction under subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012 to decide
whether the Site C Project would constitute an infringement of the appellants’
treaty rights. The Judge recalled that decisions of the GIC are owed
considerable deference as they are based on polycentric considerations and a
balancing of a variety of interests. While recognizing that the Supreme Court
of Canada made it clear that the judicial review process is a flexible one, the
Judge expressed the view that it has its limits, and cannot extend to a
determination that requires a developed evidentiary record. However, the Judge
acknowledged that although a final determination with respect to infringement
of treaty rights requires a more robust evidentiary record, the consideration
of infringement on treaty rights must still be part of the consultation process
(Judge’s reasons at para. 53).
[23]
The Judge also found that the appellants had failed
to establish a basis upon which to find that they held a legitimate expectation
that treaty rights infringement would be addressed by the GIC. With respect to
the duty to consult, the Judge found that the Crown’s duty was met (Judge’s
reasons at para. 54). After noting that the appropriate degree of consultation
in the present matter was at the deep end of the spectrum, he canvassed the measures
undertaken by BC Hydro, the Minister and Cabinet (GIC) (Judge’s reasons at paras.
62-69). Contrary to the appellants’ assertion, the Judge held that the duty to
consult, though extensive and broad in scope, did not extend to a final
determination of treaty rights infringement. Rather, it was sufficient that treaty
rights and the issue of infringement be considered. He found this to have been the
case. Finally, the Judge did not explicitly address the reasonableness of the
GIC’s decision on a substantive basis. Rather he concluded that the GIC had reasonably
considered the respondents’ “good faith efforts to
understand the concerns of the Applicants [appellants]” (Judge’s reasons
at para. 70).
V.
ISSUES
[24]
This appeal raises the following issues:
1.
Did the Judge err in finding that the
appropriate standard of review to be applied to the GIC’s decision pursuant to
subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012 is reasonableness?
2.
Did the Judge err in concluding that the GIC was
not required to determine the appellants’ treaty rights and whether the Site C
Project was an unjustified infringement of the appellants’ treaty rights in
making its decision pursuant to subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012?
3.
Did the Judge err in concluding that a judicial
review is not the appropriate forum to determine the appellants’ treaty rights and
whether they have been infringed?
VI.
ANALYSIS
1.
Did the Judge err in finding that the
appropriate standard of review to be applied to the GIC’s decision pursuant to
subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012 is reasonableness?
[25]
In considering the standard of review, this
Court must “step into the shoes” of the Judge and decide whether he identified
the appropriate standard of review and whether he applied it properly (Agraira
v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2
S.C.R. 559).
[26]
At this juncture, the Court recalls that the
decision under judicial review was made pursuant to subsection 52(4) of the CEAA
2012 which reads as follows:
52 (4)
When a matter has been referred to the Governor in Council, the Governor in
Council may decide
|
52 (4) Saisi d’une question au titre du
paragraphe (2), le gouverneur en conseil peut décider :
|
(a) that the significant adverse
environmental effects that the designated project is likely to cause are
justified in the circumstances; or
|
a) soit
que les effets environnementaux négatifs importants sont justifiables dans
les circonstances;
|
(b) that the significant adverse
environmental effects that the designated project is likely to cause are not
justified in the circumstances.
|
b) soit
que ceux-ci ne sont pas justifiables dans les circonstances.
|
[27]
The appellants submit that the Judge erred in
identifying and applying the standard of review of reasonableness to a question
of law concerning the GIC’s jurisdiction under the CEAA 2012. The issue put
before the Judge was whether the GIC was correct in deciding that it did not
need to adjudicate whether its decision would infringe treaty rights. The
appellants maintain that in any event, the issue before the GIC was a purely
legal one given that it concerns the GIC’s constitutional obligations and
jurisdictional limits. To that effect, the appellants contend that the Judge
erred in not reviewing the matter under the standard of correctness.
[28]
It bears mentioning that in support of their
position, the appellants rely on decisions rendered prior to Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 without any reference to more
recent decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in connection with the standard
of review (e.g. Smith v. Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC 7,
[2011] 1 S.C.R. 160; Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011
SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v.
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R.
708 [Newfoundland Nurses]).
[29]
Be that as it may, the appellants’ position
regarding the standard of review in the present case, framed as it is by
reference to the GIC’s jurisdiction under the CEAA 2012, is misguided. Indeed, as
stated by the Crown, the appellants fail to properly frame the context within
which the GIC renders its decisions under the CEAA 2012.
[30]
The reality is that decisions rendered by the
GIC are the result of a highly discretionary, policy-based and fact driven process.
As such, the Judge properly found that decisions of the GIC, an elected body
familiar with its legislation, are “polycentric”. Specifically, under subsection
52(4) of the CEAA 2012, the GIC’s decisions are the result of an administrative
process of consultation and accommodation with respect to Aboriginal rights and
treaty rights. It follows that judicial review of a decision of the GIC aims to
ensure that the GIC’s exercise of power delegated by Parliament is reasonable
and remains within the framework established by the CEAA 2012’s statutory
regime (Council of the Innu of Ekuanitshit v. Canada (Attorney General),
2014 FCA 189, [2014] F.C.J. No. 867 (QL) [Innu of Ekuanitshit] (leave to
appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed, File No. 36136, [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 466)).
Therefore, the Judge did not err in finding that the appropriate standard of
review to be applied to the GIC’s decision at issue is reasonableness.
2.
Did the Judge err in concluding that the GIC was
not required to determine the appellants’ treaty rights and whether the Site C
Project was an unjustified infringement of the appellants’ treaty rights in
making its decision pursuant to subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012?
(1)
The nature and scope of Treaty 8
[31]
Treaty 8 was signed in 1899 and is one of the
most important post-Confederation numbered treaties. It was designed to open up
the Canadian West and Northwest to settlement and development (Mikisew Cree
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69,
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 at paras. 2 and 24 [Mikisew]). By surrendering the
area where they lived, the First Nations were promised, amongst other things,
the exercise of hunting, trapping and fishing rights as follows:
And Her Majesty the Queen HEREBY AGREES with
the said Indians that they shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of
hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as heretofore
described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by the
Government of the country, acting under the authority of Her Majesty, and
saving and excepting such tracts as may be required or taken up from time to
time for settlement, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.
(Report of Commissioners for Treaty No. 8, Appeal
Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab F.1, p. 3805).
[32]
The above Treaty 8 article reveals a tension (Mikisew
at para. 33) that remains apparent to this day: on the one hand, the First
Nations are confirmed in their hunting, trapping and fishing rights and, on the
other, the Crown is authorized to “take up” land “from time to time” for
specific and broad “purposes”. Although it is established that the Treaty 8 signatories
understood that land use as contemplated by Treaty 8 “signaled
the advancing dawn of a period of transition” (Mikisew at para.
27), it remains that each “taking up” of lands by the Crown “from time to time”
has the potential of exacerbating the inescapable tensions in maintaining the quid
pro quo achieved by the treaty.
(2)
The duty to consult in connection with claimed Aboriginal
rights
[33]
Prior to 2004 and the seminal decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation] and Taku
River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3. S.C.R. 550 [Taku River], Aboriginal peoples were
required to prove their rights in the context of often time-consuming
litigation. The approach at the time had been set forth in Sparrow: if Aboriginal
peoples were successful in proving their rights as well as a prima facie
infringement, the analysis moved to the issue of justification. At that stage, the
burden was on the Crown to justify the legislative or regulatory infringement in
establishing (i) a valid legislative objective; and (ii) a legislative scheme
consistent with the honour of the Crown, the special trust relationship and the
responsibility of the Crown vis-à-vis Aboriginal peoples (Sparrow, p.
1114). Prior to 2004, the focus of Aboriginal rights was thus on the
infringement of rights and the justification test when legislation or projects
were challenged by Aboriginal peoples. Although Sparrow affirmed a duty
to consult incumbent upon the Crown, it was only engaged as part of the justification
test (Sparrow, p. 1119).
[34]
However, with the Haida Nation and Taku
River decisions, the Supreme Court moved away from the Sparrow-based
infringement approach. Rather, it imposed on the Crown a duty to consult and
accommodate, if necessary, in the event a project might have a significant impact
on claimed Aboriginal rights:
On this point, Haida Nation
represented a shift in focus from Sparrow. Whereas the Court in Sparrow
had been concerned about sorting out the consequences of infringement, Haida
Nation attempted to head off such confrontations by imposing on the parties
a duty to consult and (if appropriate) accommodate in circumstances where the
development might have a significant impact on Aboriginal rights when and if
established … (Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC
53, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53 (QL) at para. 53 [Beckman]).
[35]
Although Haida Nation does not displace
the unfettered right of Aboriginal peoples to commence an action, it sets the
framework for dialogue between the Crown and Aboriginals for claimed rights (prior
to their proof) grounded in the central principle of the honour of the Crown. On
the basis of that principle, McLachlin C.J., writing for the Supreme Court,
stated that the Crown has a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when it “has knowledge, real or constructive, of the potential
existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that might
adversely affect it” (Haida Nation at para. 35). In order
to assess the extent of the Crown’s duty to consult, the Supreme Court also
established a spectrum as to the content of the duty. The level of consultation
and, in some cases accommodation, is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and
will vary depending on the strength of the claim made by the Aboriginal peoples.
[36]
At this juncture, it is also useful to recall
that pursuant to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, Aboriginal
and treaty rights are constitutionally protected rights and the strength of
their protection is reflected on a spectrum. At the one end of the spectrum of
section 35 rights lie claimed rights which have yet to be affirmed and
recognized (Haida Nation; Taku River). At the other end of the
spectrum lie the proven Aboriginal rights (Tshilqot’in Nation v. British
Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 [Tshilqot’in Nation]; Sparrow).
Between these claimed rights and proven rights lie treaty rights. Although
treaty rights can be defined as established rights as opposed to claimed
rights, and Aboriginal groups are entitled to what was confirmed in Treaty 8 (West
Moberly First Nations v. British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines), 2011
BCCA 247, [2011] B.C.J. No. 942 (QL) at paras. 137-140), the scope of their use
on Aboriginal peoples’ traditional territories still needs to be delineated (Mikisew
at para. 32).
(3)
The duty to consult in connection with treaty
rights
[37]
Although the duty to consult addressed in Haida
Nation was in relation to claimed Aboriginal rights and not treaty rights, it
was observed that the honour of the Crown is also at play in connection with treaty
rights:
… Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing
Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal
rights guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35
represents a promise of “rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed that
the Crown intends to fulfil its promises (Badger, supra, [R.
v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39 (QL)] at para. 41).
This promise is realized and sovereign claims reconciled through the process of
honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act
honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them with
other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if
appropriate, accommodate.
(Haida Nation
at para. 20).
[38]
Shortly after the Haida Nation decision,
the Supreme Court confirmed that the duty to consult not only applied to
claimed rights, but also to historical treaty rights (Mikisew) and
modern treaty rights (Beckman).
[39]
It is noteworthy that the Mikisew decision
also dealt with Treaty 8 and Binnie J. stated that “the
inevitable tensions underlying implementation of Treaty 8 demand a process by
which the lands may be transferred from the one category (where the First
Nations retain rights to hunt, fish and trap) to another category (where they
do not)” (Mikisew at para. 33). On the basis of the findings in Haida
Nation for claimed Aboriginal rights, he found that the content of the
process is “dictated by the duty of the Crown to act
honourably.” (ibid).
[40]
In Mikisew, the federal government had
approved in 2000 the construction of a winter road but failed to consult with
the Mikisew Cree in this regard. Following protest by the Mikisew Cree, the
road was modified but again the Crown did not engage in consultation. The Supreme
Court acknowledged that the Crown had a treaty right to “take up” surrendered
lands but had to manage this taking up process honourably:
The Crown has a treaty right to “take up”
surrendered lands for regional transportation purposes, but the Crown is
nevertheless under an obligation to inform itself of the impact its project
will have on the exercise by the Mikisew of their hunting and trapping rights,
and to communicate its findings to the Mikisew. The Crown must then attempt to
deal with the Mikisew “in good faith, and with the intention of substantially
addressing” Mikisew concerns (Delgamuukw, at para. 168 [Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010]). This does not mean that whenever a government
proposes to do anything in the Treaty 8 surrendered lands it must consult with
all signatory First Nations, no matter how remote or unsubstantial the impact. The
duty to consult is, as stated in Haida Nation, triggered at a low
threshold, but adverse impact is a matter of degree, as is the extent of the
Crown’s duty. Here the impacts were clear, established and demonstrably adverse
to the continued exercise of the Mikisew hunting and trapping rights over the
lands in question. (Mikisew at para. 55).
[41]
The Supreme Court further found that a duty to
consult was triggered in the circumstances because the taking up would have an
impact on the treaty rights of the Mikisew Cree. However, since the Crown was
purporting to build a minor winter road on surrendered lands where the Mikisew Cree
treaty rights were subject to a “taking up” clause in Treaty 8, the Supreme
Court was of the view that the Crown’s duty to consult was at the low end of
the spectrum (Mikisew at para. 64). The Crown was thus required to
provide notice to the Mikisew Cree and to engage directly with them.
[42]
The Crown’s duty to consult in the context of the
exercise of its right to “take up” land under another post-Confederation numbered
Treaty – i.e. Treaty 3 – was recently reiterated by the Supreme Court in
Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48,
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 447 [Grassy Narrows]. Treaty 3, akin to Treaty 8 in Mikisew,
sets out a “taking up” clause. The main question raised in Grassy
Narrows was whether Ontario had the power to take up lands in the Keewatin
area under Treaty 3 entered into with the Ojibway in 1873, so as to limit the
harvesting rights under the treaty, or whether this was subject to Canada’s
approval because the Treaty was negotiated by the federal Crown (Canada) and
not the province of Ontario.
[43]
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found
that both Canada and Ontario as the “Crown” are responsible for fulfilling the
treaty promise when acting within the division of powers under the Constitution.
Ontario alone had the authority to take up lands pursuant to sections 109
(beneficial interest in lands and resources in the Province), 92(5) (power of
the management and sale of the provincial lands and the timber and wood
thereon) and 92A (power to make laws regarding non-renewable natural resources,
forestry resources, and electrical energy) of the Constitution Act, 1867,
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 in accordance with the treaty and
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In reaching this conclusion,
the Supreme Court echoed its finding in Mikisew and repeated that, in exercising
its jurisdiction over Treaty 3 lands, Ontario must do so in conformity with the
honour of the Crown and its fiduciary duties when dealing with Aboriginal
interests. Hence, Ontario must respect the harvesting rights of the Ojibway
over the land, and its right to take up “is subject to
its duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate First Nations’ interests
beforehand (Mikisew, at para. 56)” (Grassy Narrows at para.
51).
[44]
In the present case, given the magnitude of the
Site C Project, the Crown at the earliest stage of the EA approached consultation
with the appellants from the deep end of the spectrum.
(4)
The environmental assessment (EA) of the Site C
Project
[45]
It is recalled that the Site C Project required
both a federal and a provincial EA. There was thus a joint EA process that was
carried out by a JRP. The EA lasted three years. The consultation process was
set up with 29 Aboriginal groups who could potentially be impacted by the Site
C Project. The Aboriginal groups also provided input into the JRP’s mandate in
conducting the EA. The appellants took the position in the EA process that the
JRP should have the mandate to determine infringement of their treaty rights. The
JRP’s mandate was to receive information as to how the Site C Project “may adversely impact asserted or established Aboriginal and
treaty rights” (Report of the JRP, sections 2.3 and 2.6, Appeal Book
Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 2, Tab E.62, pp. 3362-3363). It did not include
determining whether the Site C Project constituted an infringement of Treaty 8
rights or “any matter of treaty interpretation” (JRP
Terms of Reference, Report of the JRP, sections 2.5(d) and (e), Appeal Book
Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 2, Tab E.62, p. 3363).
[46]
The scope of the EA process is consistent with the
CEAA 2012 which includes “taking into account” “… environmental effects” (subsection 5(1) of the CEAA
2012) and Aboriginal peoples’ “current use of lands and
resources for traditional purposes” (subparagraph 5(1)c)(iii) of the
CEAA 2012). As such, the EA process is an information-gathering process and not
a process intended to result in a binding determination of Aboriginal or treaty
rights.
[47]
Upon considering the above and reviewing the
evidence, the Judge found that the appellants were consulted extensively
before, during and after the Panel hearings (Judge’s reasons at paras. 62-70).
On this basis, he concluded that the Crown had satisfied its duty to consult in
the circumstances. He explained that although the issue of infringement of
treaty rights “needed to be part” of the
consultation process (Judge’s reasons at paras. 53 and 58), no determination of
treaty rights was required at this stage:
Based on the record before me, and contrary
to the assertions made by the Applicants [appellants], the Crown did not need
to determine infringement of the Applicant’s [appellants’] treaty
rights; they did consider those rights, did not ignore the impact of the
Project on those treaty rights or find that the negative impact could be
mitigated, and did assess the cumulative effects of the prior existing two dams
on the historical rights of the Applicants [appellants] (EIS Guidelines,
clauses 8.5.3 and 9-1).
(Judge’s reasons at para. 61) [Emphasis
added].
[48]
It is recalled that in this appeal, the
appellants have not challenged the Judge’s conclusion on the adequacy of
consultation (Appellants’ memorandum of fact and law at para. 110). The present
case therefore does not raise the issue of the appropriate level of
consultation required on the part of the Crown as in other cases (Innu of
Ekuanitshit; Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2016 FCA 187, [2016] F.C.J.
No. 705 (QL) [Gitxaala Nation]). Rather, the central issue in the
present case is whether the GIC, in exercising its authority pursuant to
subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012, was required to determine whether treaty
rights would be infringed and, if so, whether the infringement could be
justified under Sparrow. This issue requires consideration of the
consultation process that took place in the present case.
(5)
The process of consultation in the context of treaty
rights
[49]
If the Crown undeniably has a duty to consult,
Aboriginal peoples have a reciprocal duty to collaborate and provide a factual
basis for the determination of their traditional territories and/or, the scope
of their treaty rights. The path toward reconciliation is a give and take
process and “reciprocal duties flow from one of the
goals of the duty, which is to foster reconciliation through dialogue”
(Sébastien Grammond, The Terms of Coexistence – Indigenous People and
Canadian Law, (Toronto: Carswell 2013) at 287). Although a commitment to
the process does not imply a necessary agreement on the outcome, the Supreme
Court has stressed that “it does require good faith
efforts to understand each other’s concerns and move to address them” (Haida
Nation at para. 49).
[50]
Although it is uncontested that the appellants,
as signatories of Treaty 8, have treaty rights in the area covered by Treaty 8,
there is no evidence that their rights cover the entire area of 840,000 square
kilometres, an area that exceeds the size of the province of Manitoba (Mikisew
at paras. 2 and 48). Unless a treaty enumerates specific locations for
hunting, treaty rights ascertained on a treaty wide-basis have to be specified as
part of the consultation process. As such, it is insufficient for the appellants
to assert treaty rights by merely alleging preferred areas without any
specification with respect to the traditional land use area in which the rights
were historically and are currently exercised.
[51]
As part of the consultation process, the
appellants therefore not only had the opportunity but the obligation to carry
their end of the consultation process and provide information in support of their
allegation that the Site C Project would infringe their specified treaty
rights. Particularly, the appellants had the duty to provide information for
the determination of their traditional territories and the scope of their
treaty rights in order to demonstrate that the potential impact of the Site C
Project was so severe so as to constitute infringement (Haida Nation
at para. 48). Here, the appellants did not provide adequate information to the
JRP to support their allegations.
[52]
In presenting land use information, the
appellants chose to do so with three other Aboriginal groups under the umbrella
of the Treaty 8 Tribal Association (T8TA). The T8TA submitted one map. A
request by BC Hydro was made for the T8TA to provide a map for each T8TA First
Nation. The request was refused and no map reflecting each of the four Nations forming
part of the T8TA, including the appellants’ traditional territory, was
submitted (Affidavit of Seanna McConnell at paras. 64-65 and 72, Appeal Book,
Tab. O, pp. 10351-10353). As indicated by BC Hydro, the combined territory of
the T8TA map showed a territory of over 121,000 km2 and included a
text box. The wording in the textbox is apposite:
… This does not represent the extent of the
four First Nations’ traditional territories or the extent of the lands over
which they exercise their [sub]section 35(1) rights, both historically and
presently.
(Traditional Land Use Study (TLUS), Appeal Book,
Tab E, p. 329).
[53]
Reference is also made at this juncture to the
TLUS methodology report (TLUS Report) that deals with the data collected and
the method used. The TLUS Report was provided by the appellants and describes
the following limitations:
… Additional studies are necessary to fill
information gaps regarding the participating First Nations’ knowledge and
the resources, criteria, thresholds and indicators necessary to sustain meaningful
practice of Treaty 8 rights into the future. (Appeal Book Compendium, Vol.
1, Part 1, Tab E.3, p. 257).
Due to constraints of time and budget, this
study considers only the results of use and occupancy mapping interviews
completed for the Project, and a limited number of contextual or harvest survey
interviews. Other existing sources of information, including ethnographic,
archival or other existing studies, were not considered in detail. Interviews lasted
approximately 2-3 hours and data collected for each land user is limited to
what the participant was able and willing to report in that time. … (Appeal
Book Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 1, Tab E.3, pp. 257-258).
All mapped values
are based on the use and knowledge of the Treaty 8 members belonging to one
of the four participating First Nations. Within
the flood zone and footprint, 63 values (17%) were mapped as approximate
locations and 32 (9%) were mapped based on second-hand knowledge. (Appeal
Book Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 1, Tab E.3, p. 260).
… No field
verification of mapped interview data was conducted. (Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 1, Tab E.3, p. 265).
… Due to time, budget and logistical constraints, the
study achieved a non-random response rate ranging from approximately 7%
(HRFN) [Halfway River First Nation] to approximately 11% (DRFN) [Doig River
First Nation] of total registered population. As
such the sample should be taken to represent the 77 participants rather than
the broader populations as a whole. (Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 1, Part 1, Tab
E.3, p. 267).
[Emphasis added]
[54]
The lack of information supporting the
appellants’ assertions of their specified treaty rights was noted by the Judge at
paragraph 69 of his reasons:
… It is also apparent from the Record that
while the Crown engaged with the Applicants [appellants] to address mitigation
and measures to be taken after issuance of the JRP, the Applicants [appellants]
refused to engage in such a dialogue once it was decided by the Applicants
[appellants] that the Project not proceeding was the only viable solution for
the Applicants [appellants], as the end result of the process.
[55]
In addition, it appears from the CAR dated
September 7, 2014 that the Prophet River First Nation exercises it Treaty 8
rights at a fair distance away from the Site C Project:
… Recognizing that the four groups
represented by T8TA during the Pre-Panel and Panel Stages of the EA have
presented TLUS information without much differentiation, Prophet River First
Nation appears to principally exercise hunting, trapping and fishing rights
~200 km north of the area to be directly impacted by the proposed Project.
(Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.65,
p. 3575).
[56]
In short, the evidence on record does not
demonstrate that the exercise of the Prophet River First Nation’s treaty rights
extends over 200 km to the Site C Project.
[57]
Be that as it may, in arguing that the GIC had
an obligation to determine any infringement of treaty rights in accordance with
the Sparrow analysis, the appellants are in reality inviting the Court
to revert to the pre-Haida Nation case law. Specifically, they contend
that claimed rights or treaty rights ought to be adjudicated by the GIC every
time an infringement is alleged by an Aboriginal group. As mentioned earlier,
that approach proved to be complex and often resulted in years of litigation (Tshilqot’in
Nation; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93 (QL); Delgamuukw).
This is what Haida Nation sought to cure and in Mikisew, Binnie
J. clearly did not accept the Sparrow-orientated approach adopted by the
Federal Court in the context of a proposed “taking up” (Mikisew at paras.
53 and 59). By importing the duty to consult, the Supreme Court emphasized that
negotiation is the preferred way of reconciling Aboriginal interests with those
of the Crown. The approach advocated by the appellants in the present case, if
accepted, would thus considerably weaken the application of the duty to consult
and re-introduce the Sparrow-oriented approach to treaty rights at the
early stage of claimed rights. There is no justification for such a reversal.
[58]
However, the right of the Crown to “take up”
land is not absolute and Aboriginal peoples are not left without a remedy.
[59]
In Badger, applying the principle of
treaty interpretation and referring to the evidence for an understanding of the
Treaty 8 “taking up clause”, the Supreme Court found that Aboriginal peoples
understood Treaty 8 as a promise that they would continue to exercise their
harvesting rights:
57 … The Indians understood that land would
be taken up for homesteads, farming, prospecting and mining and that they would
not be able to hunt in these areas or to shoot at the settlers’ farm animals or
buildings. No doubt the Indians believed that most of the Treaty No. 8
land would remain unoccupied and so would be available to them for hunting,
fishing and trapping. …
[60]
It is also significant that in the event a
“taking up” renders a treaty right “meaningless”, an action for treaty
infringement remains open. In Grassy Narrows at paragraph 52, the
Supreme Court, building on Badger and making reference to Mikisew,
stated as follows:
Where a province intends to take up lands
for the purposes of a project within its jurisdiction, the Crown must inform
itself of the impact the project will have on the exercise by the Ojibway of
their rights to hunt, fish and trap, and communicate its findings to them. It
must then deal with the Ojibway in good faith, and with the intention of
substantially addressing their concerns (Mikisew at para. 55; Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 168). The adverse
impact of the Crown’s project (and the extent of the duty to consult and
accommodate) is a matter of degree, but consultation cannot exclude
accommodation at the outset. Not every taking up will constitute an
infringement of the harvesting rights set out in Treaty 3. This said, if the
taking up leaves the Ojibway with no meaningful right to hunt, fish or trap in
relation to the territories over which they traditionally hunted, fished, and
trapped, a potential action for treaty infringement will arise
(Mikisew at para. 48). [Emphasis
added]
[61]
Finally, while Mikisew and Grassy
Narrows clarify the duty of the Crown in “taking up” land “from time to
time” they leave unresolved the issue of cumulative effects of the exercise of
“taking up” by the Crown leading to a de facto extinguishment. This issue
need not be decided in this appeal but needless to say that the answer lies in
the expectation that the Crown will always honourably manage the “taking up” of
land from “time to time” (Mikisew at para. 31) and work with Aboriginal
peoples in a spirit of reconciliation to consider the cumulative effects of
projects in the consultation process.
(6)
Conclusion regarding the GIC acting under the CEAA
2012
[62]
The GIC made its Order pursuant to subsection
52(4) of the CEAA 2012. As mentioned earlier, the appellants submit that subsection
52(4) of the CEAA 2012 does not prevent the GIC from making a determination on
the infringement of the appellants’ treaty rights and apply the Sparrow
analysis.
[63]
The appellants do not challenge the
constitutionality of subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2012. They do not argue that subsection
52(4) of the CEAA is unconstitutional because it does not specify that the GIC
must determine the infringement issue and that, as a result, this Court must invalidate
the GIC’s decision. Rather, the appellants assert that the CEAA 2012 does not
prevent the GIC from determining the infringement of treaty rights and its
justification as per Sparrow.
[64]
An overview of relevant provisions of the CEAA
2012, assessing the GIC’s functions in the context of making its decision
pursuant to subsection 52(4) of the CEAA 2102, is therefore apt at this stage. More
particularly, does the statute allow or compel the GIC to make the determination
sought by the appellants?
[65]
The core provisions of the CEAA 2012
focus on the environmental assessment of designated projects, including the
possibility pursuant to section 38, of allowing the Minister to refer an
environmental assessment to a review panel. Section 40 allows the Minister to
enter into an agreement with another jurisdiction – e.g. a province – to
jointly establish the review panel. Once a report with respect to the
environmental assessment of a designated project by a review panel is
delivered, subsection 47(1) provides that “[t]he
Minister, after taking into account the review panel’s report with respect to
the environmental assessment, must make a decision under subsection 52(1).”.
[66]
Pursuant to subsection 52(1) the Minister, as a
decision-maker, “must decide if, taking into account
the implementation of any mitigation measures that [he or she] considerers
appropriate, the designated project … is likely to cause significant adverse
environmental effects”. If the Minister decides that the designated
project is likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, that
decision must be referred to the GIC, as was the case here. Pursuant to
subsection 52(4), when the matter is referred to the GIC, it may decide whether
the significant adverse environmental effects that the designated project is
likely to cause are justified or not justified in the circumstances. Subsection
52(4) reads as follows:
52 (4) When a matter has been referred
to the Governor in Council, the Governor in Council may decide
|
52 (4)
Saisi d’une question au titre du paragraphe (2), le gouverneur en conseil
peut décider :
|
(a) that the significant adverse environmental effects that the
designated project is likely to cause are justified in the circumstances; or
|
a) soit
que les effets environnementaux négatifs importants sont justifiables dans
les circonstances;
|
(b) that the significant adverse environmental effects that the
designated project is likely to cause are not justified in the circumstances.
|
b) soit
que ceux-ci ne sont pas justifiables dans les circonstances.
|
[67]
If the GIC finds that the significant adverse environmental
effects are justified under subsection 52(4), the Minister “must establish the conditions in relation to the
environmental effects referred to in that subsection with which the proponent
of the designated project must comply” (section 53 of the CEAA 2012).
[68]
With this framework of the CEAA 2012 in mind, it
is noted that the Supreme Court in Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeal Commission),
2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 at paragraph 39, provided some insight on how
it can be determined whether or not a statutory decision-maker such as the GIC
under the CEAA 2012 has the authority to decide question of law such as the
infringement of treaty rights:
The essential question is whether the
empowering legislation implicitly or explicitly grants to the tribunal the
jurisdiction to interpret or decide any question of law. If it does, the
tribunal will be presumed to have the concomitant jurisdiction to interpret or
decide that question in light of s. 35 or any other relevant constitutional
provision. Practical considerations will generally not suffice to rebut
the presumption that arises from authority to decide questions of law.
This is not to say, however, that practical considerations cannot be taken into
consideration in determining what is the most appropriate way of handling a
particular dispute where more than one option is available.
[69]
In the present case, subsection 52(4) of the CEAA
2012 cannot be read as conferring upon the GIC, either expressly on implicitly,
the power to determine infringement of treaty rights.
[70]
Indeed, subsection 52(4) does not reflect an
intention on the part of Parliament to convert the GIC into an adjudicative
body. The reality is that the GIC lacks the necessary hallmarks associated with
adjudicative bodies: public hearings, ability to summon witnesses and compel
production of documents and the receipt of submissions by interested parties.
[71]
The GIC as a decision-maker is not adjudicative
in nature but focuses rather on a variety of considerations – often referred to
as polycentric – and thereby seeks to balance a variety of interests (Innu
of Ekuanitshit at para. 73). Courts have recognized that the GIC is a
body concerned with both fact and policy (Canadian National Railway Co. v.
Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 135 at para. 48)
and the Judge likewise observed same at paragraph 46 of his reasons:
… the GIC … exercises its discretion to
decide on a different platform, based on polycentric considerations and a
balancing of individual and public interests, including Aboriginal interests
and concerns. …
[72]
The fact that the GIC does not possess any
expertise and is not equipped to determine contested questions of law and
complex factual issues also illustrates that it cannot exercise adjudicative
functions. A fortiori, determining whether a section 35 treaty right infringement
is justified pursuant to the Sparrow analysis is not within the realm of
the GIC. To conclude otherwise flies in the face of the CEAA 2012 statutory
scheme.
[73]
In support of their position, the appellants
also rely on Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
1038, [1989] 1 S.C.J. No. 45 (QL) [Slaight Communications]. They contend
that in order to exercise the power conferred by subsection 52(4) of the CEAA
2012 within the parameters of the Constitution, more particularly section 35,
the GIC must determine the infringement issue and perform the requisite Sparrow
analysis. Yet, the parallel the appellants attempt to draw is misplaced given
that Slaight Communications was decided in the context of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11) [Charter] and
the section 1 framework as developed in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 7 (QL). As explained earlier, the case at bar is governed by
the Haida Nation/Mikisew section 35 specific consultation and
accommodation process crafted by the Supreme Court for the purposes of
addressing claimed Aboriginal rights, treaty rights and achieving
reconciliation.
[74]
It follows that the Judge did not err in finding
that the GIC is not empowered to adjudicate rights and determine whether there
is an unjustified infringement of the appellants’ treaty rights when it is
called upon to decide if the significant environmental effects that the
designated project is likely to cause are justified pursuant to section 52 of
CEAA. Although the appellants do not challenge the consultation process, they
contend that consultation in and of itself was not sufficient. In the absence
of a challenge to the consultation process by the appellants in order to
invalidate the GIC decision, it is difficult for this Court, in the
circumstance, to find that the GIC decision is not reasonable. Indeed, throughout
the EA, Aboriginal interests – whether they are asserted or established Aboriginal
rights or Treaty 8 rights and other interests – were considered both in
assessing the potential impact of the Site C Project and seeking measures of
accommodation (CAR, Appeal Book Compendium, Vol. 2, Tab E.65, p. 3631).
[75]
Furthermore, in the GIC’s decision itself, six
(6) paragraphs out of eleven (11) relate to Aboriginal groups, evidencing the
fact that the GIC turned its mind to whether the Crown’s duty to consult had
been met and whether the Aboriginal interests and concerns had been considered.
Specifically, the GIC’s Order states that (i) the consultation process was undertaken
by the Government of Canada; (ii) the consultation process provided the opportunity
for dialogue and an exchange of information to ensure that the concerns and
interest of the Aboriginal groups were considered; (iii) opportunities for the
Aboriginal groups to review and comment were provided; (iv) the Minister would consider
the views and information of Aboriginal groups in determining the conditions to
be imposed on the proponent; (v) the consultation process undertaken was consistent
with the honour of the Crown; and (vi) the concerns of Aboriginal groups were
balanced with other societal interests.
[76]
On the basis of the Record before this Court,
specifically the information obtained through the EA process, the evidence
provided by the appellants, the consideration of asserted or established Aboriginal
rights, i.e. Treaty 8 rights and other interests throughout the
consultation process, as well as the GIC’s statutory powers under subsection
52(4) of the CEAA 2102, the GIC’s decision cannot be found to have been unreasonable.
3.
Did the Judge err in concluding that a judicial
review is not the appropriate forum to determine the appellants’ treaty rights and
whether they have been infringed?
[77]
Finally, the appellants submit that the Judge
made an error in finding that judicial review is not the appropriate forum to
determine if Treaty 8 rights were infringed and that an action would be the
more appropriate course to determine the issue of infringement of the
appellants’ treaty rights (Judge’s reasons at para. 53). The appellants’
contention in this regard also fails.
[78]
A judicial review is a summary proceeding and,
generally, the only material that is considered by the Court is the material
that was before the decision-maker. In the present case, for purposes of
addressing the issue of whether the Site C Project infringes the appellants’
treaty rights, a full discovery, examination of expert evidence, as well as historical
testimonial and documentary evidence would be necessary and cannot be provided
through an application for judicial review. Judicial review is not the proper
forum to determine whether the appellants’ rights are unjustifiably infringed. But
more importantly, to contend otherwise ignores the jurisdiction of the province
of British Columbia and its role in the environmental assessment process. Since
the province of British Columbia is purporting to take up land under Treaty 8,
it would necessarily have to be a party to the proceedings (Grassy Narrows).
[79]
The appellants also make reference to Beckman
in order to support their contention, but again this case is of no
assistance. More particularly, Beckman raised questions about the
interpretation and implementation of modern comprehensive land claims treaties
between the Crown and First Nations, namely the Little Salmon/Carmacks First
Nation Final Agreement (LSCFN Treaty). In its decision, the Supreme Court
observed that judicial review is a flexible process and thus “perfectly capable of taking into account the constitutional
dimension of the rights asserted by the First Nation” (para. 47). However,
this statement cannot be read as implying that treaty rights can be adjudicated
and infringement determined in the context of a judicial review.
[80]
Beckman dealt
with the consultation provisions in the LSCFN Treaty and whether the honour of
the Crown and the duty to consult had been breached. However, questions of Aboriginal
and treaty rights and the issue of whether these rights have been infringed
require full discovery, the examination of a myriad of expert evidence in the
field of ethnography, genealogy, linguistics, anthropology, geography, as well
as oral history and historical documentary evidence (Tshilqot’in Nation;
Delgamuukw). It is not uncommon for a trial related to section 35 rights to
exceed 300 days of evidence and argument (ibid.). Clearly, an
application for judicial review is not typically the best forum for this kind
of resolution.
[81]
The appellants add that they would be precluded
from pursuing an action for treaty right infringement in parallel to the GIC’s
decision because it would constitute a form of “collateral attack”. Again, this
contention fails. At this stage, no decision or determination has been made
with respect to the appellants’ treaty rights.
[82]
It follows that the Judge correctly identified reasonableness
as the standard of review and applied it properly in the circumstances. The
intervention of this Court is not warranted.
VII.
CONCLUSION
[83]
For all of these reasons, I propose to dismiss
the appeal with costs.
“Richard Boivin”
“I agree
Johanne Trudel
J.A.”
“I agree
Yves de
Montigny J.A.”