Docket: IMM-4482-15
Citation:
2016 FC 514
Ottawa, Ontario, May 6, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer
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BETWEEN:
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HENRI JEAN
CLAUDE SEYOBOKA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review
pursuant to section 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27 [the Act], of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] Officer’s
decision where she concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated that he
was personally at risk pursuant to s 97 of the Act.
I.
Facts
[2]
The applicant is a citizen of Rwanda of mixed
Hutu and Tutsi origin. Both his father and his father-in-law were part of the
Hutu political elite prior to the genocide and he is a relative of the Hutu
President assassinated in 1994.
[3]
The applicant attented the École supérieure
militaire in Kigali and remained part of the Forces armées rwandaises
[FAR] reserve while attending university. He was called upon for active duty
between 1990 and 1993 prior to the Arusha Accord and then again in April 1994,
after President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down.
[4]
Starting from April 15, 1994, he was part of an
artillery unit fighting the Rwanda Patriotic Front [RPF]. He was later
transferred under General Kabiligi’s command and took part in roadblocks.
[5]
On May 28, 1994, the applicant fled to Zaire
after deserting the army.
[6]
On June 9, 1994, he went to Nairobi, Kenya, and
applied to immigrate to Canada, where his wife and son resided. He did not
disclose his military involvement at the time.
[7]
In July 1994, the applicant was granted refugee
status by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR]. His wife and
son also obtained refugee status in Canada.
[8]
On January 17, 1995, the applicant traveled to
Canada on a fake passport and claimed refugee status upon arrival in Toronto.
He did not disclose his military status in any of his application forms.
[9]
On October 25, 1996, he was granted refugee
status in Canada without a hearing.
[10]
In March 1998, he was interviewed by staff from
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR]. Following this
interview, the applicant disclosed his military past to Citizenship and
Immigration Canada [CIC].
[11]
In April 2002, he was informed by a member of
the ICTR that an anonymous witness had testified that he was responsible for
the murder of his neighbour Francine and her two children after she refused to
have sexual intercourse with him at a roadblock.
[12]
On December 19, 2003, the applicant met with
RCMP officers to discuss the allegations revealed by the ICTR.
[13]
On September 29, 2006, the Refugee Protection
Division [RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board [IRB] vacated the applicant’s
refugee status, finding him to be complicit in crimes against humanity and responsible
for the murder of his neighbour and her two children.
[14]
The vacation of the applicant’s refugee status
began a long process before the administrative tribunals and this Court,
summarized in the following table [emphasis reflects the basis of the present
case]:
|
Application
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Decision
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Application for Leave and Judicial
Review
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Judicial Review
|
|
Permanent
Residence as a Recognized Refugee
[November
1, 1996]
|
Refused
[May 16, 2007]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
|
Motion
for mandamus, relating to PR application
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
Refused
[September 30, 2005]
2005 FC 1290
|
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
Refugee Status Vacated
[September 29, 2006]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
Applicant declared inadmissible to Canada pursuant
to s 35(1)(a) of the Act
[July 3, 2007]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
|
Application
to reopen decision to vacate refugee status
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Refused by IRB
[April 14, 2008]
|
Granted
[August 15, 2008]
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Dismissed
[January 30, 2009]
2009 FC 104
|
|
PRRA Application
[April 23, 2009]
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Refused
[May 31, 2013]
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Granted
[August 22, 2014]
|
On consent
[September 15, 2014]
|
|
2nd
application to reopen decision to vacate refugee status
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Refused by IRB
[July 16, 2009]
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Granted
[November 16, 2009]
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Granted
[May 4, 2010]
2010 FC 488
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|
Reconsideration
of the July 16, 2009 by the IRB following JR
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Refused by IRB
[September 21, 2009]
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Granted
[March 20, 2012]
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Dismissed
[September 27, 2012]
2012 FC 1143
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|
Application
for PR on H&C grounds
[December
7, 2012]
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[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
[BLANK/EN BLANC]
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[BLANK/EN BLANC]
|
|
Reconsideration of PRRA Application
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Refused
[July 17, 2005]
|
Granted
[January 18, 2016]
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[Pending]
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[15]
In March 2014, a Department of Justice lawyer,
Me Robert Fecteau, traveled to Rwanda for an unrelated case. When he met with
the Attorney General of Rwanda, Me Fecteau was questioned as to why the Federal
Court had postponed Mr. Seyoboka’s removal to Rwanda. Me Fecteau informed the
Attorney General that he was not aware of the case and, upon his return to
Canada, communicated with Me Todd, who was in charge of the applicant’s file in
Canada. The Minister then consented to have the applicant’s PRRA application
reconsidered in light of this new information.
II.
Decision
[16]
In her decision, the Officer considered the
following claims made by the applicant:
a)
He has not been involved either in war crimes or
crimes against humanity;
b)
He has been identified as a suspect of genocide
and murder in Canadian and Rwandese media and thus may not get a fair trial in
Rwanda, especially in a gacaca court;
c)
The Attorney General of Rwanda has recently
demonstrated an interest in him;
d)
He is a known opponent of the current
government: he belonged to the FAR and several of his family members have been
killed or persecuted because of their relations to the Hutu elite; he is a
member of the Communauté des immigrants rwandais de l’Outaouais [CIRO] and
organized a protest against President Paul Kagame in Ottawa in 2006; and he is
also a member of the Rwanda National Congress [RNC] since 2010;
e)
He is in possession of information linking Paul
Kagame to the plane crash that triggered the genocide, which he revealed to a
French judge who subsequently published the information in a book, La France dans la terreur rwandaise (Charles Onana);
f)
The Rwanda authorities have refused to deliver a
passport to him; and
g)
Hutus are persecuted in Rwanda.
[17]
The Officer noted that the IRB had refused to
reopen the exclusion decision and that the PRRA was not a means to re-examine
the RPD’s conclusions. Therefore, because the applicant was excluded from the
Convention, the PRRA application needed to be evaluated under s 97 of the Act.
[18]
The Officer found that the applicant was not
likely to be prosecuted in Rwanda because, although the authorities have been
aware of his case for several years, no proceedings have begun against him. The
newspaper articles he submitted also did not demonstrate a particular risk to
him as understood by s 97 of the Act. Moreover, the justice system in Rwanda
has significantly improved: the ICTR agreed to transfer their remaining cases
to the local justice system and the gacaca courts have been abolished.
The Officer also found that it was speculative to interpret the Attorney
General’s inquiry about his case as a continued interest in prosecuting him.
[19]
The Officer held that the applicant had not demonstrated
that he was subject to risk because of his actual or perceived opposition to
the current government. The applicant had not presented any evidence
demonstrating that his family members had been targeted because of their links
to the Hutu elite and had not proved on a balance of probabilities either his
membership in CIRO or the RNC. The Officer gave no probative value to
corroborating affidavits and letters from CIRO and RNC executive members,
because the objectivity and independence of their sources could not be
established. Moreover, the objective documentation did not show that RNC
members were targeted in Rwanda.
[20]
The Officer finally found that there was no
objective evidence which linked the information allegedly possessed by the applicant
and the information published in the Onana book; that it was common for
countries to prefer to deliver a passport to CBSA rather than to the person
subject to removal, for fear that they would destroy it; and that country
conditions did not demonstrate that Hutus were subject to persecution. The
Officer concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated that he was
personally at risk as understood by s 97 and rejected the PRRA application.
III.
Issues
[21]
This matter raises the following issues:
1.
What is the applicable standard of review?
2.
Did the Officer err in failing to hold an oral
hearing?
3.
Did the Officer err in her assessment of the
evidence?
IV.
Submissions of the Parties
A.
Applicant’s Submissions
[22]
In his written submissions, the applicant argued
that the Officer was bound by case law to re-evaluate his exclusion and
inadmissibility to Canada in accordance with Ezokola v Canada (MCI),
2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola], but abandoned this ground of review at the
hearing.
[23]
The applicant submits that the Officer was
required to hold an oral hearing because she made veiled credibility findings
when she concluded that there was insufficient corroborative evidence to
support the applicant’s sworn statement on the mistreatment of his family
members. It is an error to discount an applicant’s evidence merely because
there is no corroborating documentary evidence. The Officer should have
evaluated the applicant’s sworn evidence against the burden of proof, rather
than against the sufficiency of corroborative evidence.
[24]
The applicant further submits that the Officer
erred in finding that (a) the Rwandan authorities had no interest in
prosecuting the applicant, (b) if charged, he would benefit from a fair and
just trial, and (c) he faced no risk due to his membership in opposition
groups. The Officer’s findings derived from a flawed analysis of the evidence,
where she considered the pillars of the applicant’s evidence in isolation from
one another, thus creating an impossible burden of proof. To properly assess
the applicant’s risk of prosecution in Rwanda, the Officer was required to look
at his profile as a whole (Yener v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 371 [Yener]).
B.
Respondent’s Submissions
[25]
The respondent submits that, even if all the
requirements under s 167 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002/227 [the Regulations] to hold an oral hearing are
met, they only create a presumption in favour of an oral hearing, and not a
statutory obligation to hold one (Begashaw v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 1167
[Begashaw]). The Officer may still find that the evidence lacks weight
or is insufficient to establish a legal threshold without triggering the need
for an oral hearing.
[26]
The respondent further submits that the decision
falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes. The Officer’s
decision, when read in context, discloses that she carefully considered all of
the relevant evidence in its totality. The applicant is simply taking issue
with the weight given to the evidence by the Officer.
[27]
Whether or not a decision-maker must examine the
composite profile of an applicant will depend on the nature of the claim and
the evidence provided by the claimant to demonstrate the existence of a
composite or cumulative risk. In this case, the applicant failed to meet his
burden of establishing that he fell into such a composite profile.
V.
Analysis
A.
Standard of Review
[28]
The parties do not agree on the standard of
review applicable on the issue of the oral hearing. The applicant submits that it
is a matter of procedural fairness while the respondent contends that it is a
question of mixed fact and law.
[29]
The jurisprudence is divided on this point. In Tiftikci
v Canada (MCI), 2014 FC 43 [Tiftikci], at para 17, Justice Russell
held that the failure to hold an oral hearing in the context of a PRRA was a
question of procedural fairness and called for the standard of correctness. He
relied on well-established jurisprudence from the Federal Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court of Canada, namely Sketchley v Canada (AG), 2005 FCA
404 [ Sketchley] and CUPE v Ontario, 2003 SCC 29 [CUPE].
However, in Chekroun v Canada, 2013 FC 737 [Chekroun], at para
40, Justice Strickland concluded that reasonableness applied, because the right
to an oral hearing in the PRRA context was triggered only when certain
conditions were met, which required an application of the law to the facts. In Thiruchelvam
v Canada (MCI), 2015 FC 913 [Thiruchelvam] at para 3, Justice Annis
followed Justice Strickland’s reasoning and noted that it appeared to be the
dominant trend at the Court in recent years. I agree with the majority of the
Court that the right to an oral hearing set out in s 167 of the Regulations
requires a careful analysis of the facts at hand and is, as such, better
characterized as a question of mixed facts and law.
[30]
The parties agree that the second issue should
be reviewed under the standard of reasonableness. It is trite law that the
assessment of evidence by a decision-maker deserves deference from the Court
and should only be interfered with if the decision is not justified,
intelligible, or transparent and does not fall within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law (Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, para 47 [Dunsmuir]).
B.
Did the Officer err in failing to hold an oral
hearing?
[31]
The parties agree that s 113 of the Act and s
167 of the Regulations govern when an oral hearing may be held in the context
of a PRRA and that the conditions listed in s 167 of the Regulations are
cumulative. The issue is whether the Officer made veiled credibility findings,
thus triggering the application of s 167 of the Regulations. If that is the
case, the respondent further argues that the holding of an oral hearing under
this provision is a matter of discretion, not of right, as per Begashaw.
[32]
In Ozomma v Canada (MCI), 2012 FC 1167 [Ozomma]
at para 52, Justice Russell attempted to clarify the distinction between veiled
credibility findings and sufficiency of evidence:
Officers can only avoid credibility findings
and decide applications on the basis of sufficiency of evidence if their
decisions show that, credibility aside, what the applicant has to say is not
sufficient, on the applicable standard of proof, to show that he or she faces a
risk under either section 96 or section 97. In other words, it has to be a
situation where a credibility finding is not necessary in order to decide the
probative value of evidence so that, whether or not an applicant is being
truthful, their evidence is not sufficient to establish persecution or a
section 97 risk. In such a situation, it is not procedurally unfair to
refuse to hold an oral hearing. [My emphasis]
[33]
At issue is the applicant’s statutory
declaration, where he alleges that his family members have been harassed,
persecuted and murdered because they were perceived as opponents of the current
government. The applicant swore he believed Paul Kagame ordered the
assassination of his father. His half-brother was also killed at the time. In
1998 his sister, niece and younger brother were also killed. The officer did
not give any weight to the applicant’s sworn statement about the mistreatment
and murder of his family because of a lack of corroborative evidence.
[34]
The Officer wrote in her decision:
Tout d’abord, je note que le demandeur n’a
pas soumis de preuves pour corroborer les faits et les évènements qu’il allègue
au sujet des mauvais traitements subis par sa famille et l’assassinat de ses
proches.
Ensuite, j’ai considéré les nombreux
documents sur les conditions de pays au Rwanda et les articles de presse soumis
par le demandeur. Or, je constante que cette preuve ne démontre pas, selon la
prépondérance des probabilités, que l’élite hutue ainsi que les soldats qui ont
servi les FAR avant et pendant le génocide sont systématiquement perçus comme
des adversaires ou des représentants de l’idéologie génocidaire et qu’ils
subissent des préjudices de la part des autorités rwandaises en étant
poursuivis et en faisant face à des sanctions illégitimes.
[35]
I do not believe that this equates to a veiled
credibility finding. While it may have been preferable for the Officer to
formulate her conclusion more clearly, the record shows that she required
corroboration because she was not satisfied, in light of the objective evidence,
that the Rwandese authorities ordered the assassination of members of the
applicant’s family.
[36]
While the applicant may believe that the
mistreatments were ordered by Paul Kagame, this sort of evidence, because he
has a personal interest in the matter, requires corroboration if it is to have
any probative value (Ferguson v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2008 FC 1067 at paras 26-28, Zhang v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 2009 FC 787 at para 6, Vijayaratnam v
Canada (MCI), 2015 FC 48, at para 71; Ibrahim v Canada (MCI), 2014
FC 837, at para 25; I(I) v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 892, at para 20).
There was no corroborative evidence coming from either the applicant or the
documentary evidence. It was reasonable for the Officer to find that incidents
of that nature would have been reflected in the documentary evidence. This is
not a case where the Officer made a credibility finding triggering the need of
an oral hearing.
C.
Did the Officer err in her assessment of the
evidence?
[37]
The applicant’s main contention is that the
Officer made a disjunctive analysis of each component of risk alleged by him
and ultimately failed to consider his profile as a whole. He takes particular
exception to the way the Officer assessed whether the Rwandan authorities were
interested in prosecuting him, whether he would be subjected to unfair
proceedings should he be prosecuted, and whether his membership in opposition
groups put him at risk. The failure to take into account an applicant’s profile
as a whole was found to be a reviewable error in Yener (para 56-57) and Boroumand
v Canada (MCI), 2007 FC 1219 (para 63). I agree with the applicant in part.
[38]
The applicant provided undisputed evidence that
the government has a special interest in him. The key piece of evidence was the
affidavit by the Department of Justice lawyer outlining his meeting with the
Attorney General of Rwanda inquiring about the applicant and why the
deportation was delayed.
[39]
While the respondent argues that there
may be another reason for the Attorney General’s interest in the applicant, the
only plausible explanation is that he wished to prosecute him. This is
supported by the generally hostile and outraged language used by Rwandan
newspapers to report on the applicant’s case. The applicant is referred to as “[being] among the highest-ranking Rwandans of the dozen
[genocide] suspects who fled to Canada” and reported as “[having] participated in the massacres” and being
the “son-in-law of Colonel Elie Sagatwa, one of the
leading masterminds of the Genocide”. An article published in 2011
reports that Rwanda’s Prosecutor General Martin Ngoga
“ha[d] expressed shock about the news that one of the highly ranking genocide
suspects [was being given] a new refugee hearing despite being turned down six
times” and that the applicant was an “advocate
of Hutu extremism”.
[40]
Further, the applicant’s profile had to be
considered as a whole. The cumulative impact of all elements of the applicant’s
profile had to be properly assessed by the Officer (Boroumand v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1219).
[41]
The applicant’s undisputed facts
establish the profile of a former member of the FAR with links to the Hutu
elite, who was named in an International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda indictment
in connection with the murder of a woman named Francine, having been
interviewed by investigators from ICTR and Canadian officials, found to be
complicit in the genocide by the IRB. All these facts have been publicly
reported by the media and have been the subject of an inquiry by the Attorney
General of Rwanda.
[42]
When considering this evidence as a whole the Officer’s
finding that there could be other reasons for the Attorney General’s interest
in the applicant is not reasonable.
[43]
However, this error is not sufficient in itself
to allow the judicial review because of the alternate finding by the Officer. In
her decision, she also considered whether the applicant would be subjected to
unfair proceedings should he be prosecuted. She found that this would
not be the case. She reviewed at length a Human Rights Watch article titled « Rwanda.
La justice après le genocide: 20 ans plus tard» (March 28, 2014) and the
U.S. State Department Human Rights Report: Rwanda (2013), which make it
clear that there have been drastic improvements since the 2012 abolition of gacaca
tribunals. The Officer particularly insisted on the fact that the ICTR agreed
in 2012 to transfer their remaining genocide cases to Rwanda, following years
of negotiation with the Rwandese government to guarantee the accused’s human
rights.
[44]
This was recognized by Justice Shore in Mugesera
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2012 FC 32 at paras 66
and 67 where he stated:
[66] Moreover, in the last few months,
the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
European Court of Human Rights agreed to transfer to the Rwandan authorities
Rwandans charged, inter alia, with participating in genocide and found:
• They accepted commitments made the Rwandan government;
• The Rwandan judicial system cannot be
considered as a system lacking in impartiality
and independence.
Hence, accused persons will receive a full and fair trial;
• Detention conditions for accused persons comply with
international standards, and they will not face mistreatment.
[67] These judgments from two
recognized international tribunals confirm the findings made by the Minister’s
delegate, namely, that it is reasonable to believe in the good faith of the
Rwandan government and to conclude that the rights of individuals charged with
participating in genocide will be respected and that they will not be
persecuted.
[45]
By contrast, in his submissions, the applicant
relies heavily on now outdated evidence to demonstrate the failures of the
Rwandese judicial system.
[46]
It is well-established that the Court owes
administrative decision-makers a high degree of deference on the question of
the weighing of the evidence. In Dunsmuir, at para 48, the Supreme Court
held that:
[…]deference imports respect for the
decision-making process of adjudicative bodies with regard to both the facts
and the law […] [T]he concept of "deference as respect" requires of
the courts "not submission but a respectful attention to the reasons
offered or which could be offered in support of a decision": "The
Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy", in M. Taggart, ed.,
The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286 (quoted with approval
in Baker, at para. 65, per L'Heureux-Dubé J.; Ryan, at para. 49).
[47]
In the case at bar, the Officer’s reasons for
concluding that the applicant would receive a fair trial in Rwanda if he were
prosecuted are clear and grounded in the evidence. She was entitled to prefer
more recent evidence to that which was submitted in 2009 by the applicant in
support of his PRRA application. In this situation, the Court must respect the
legislative choice that Parliament made to leave matters of fact in the hands
of the Officer’s more specialized expertise (Dunsmuir, para 49).
[48]
I note that the Officer did not directly address
the question of conditions in detention centres, but simply generally held that
the sanctions he would face would not amount to the risk described in s 97 of
the Act. In light of the reasoning above, this was not unreasonable. While it
is true that the U.S. State Department 2013 Report indicates that prison
conditions are harsh, it also notes that they are constantly improving, and
that each prison had dormitories, toilets, sports facilities, a health center,
a guest hall, a kitchen, water, and electricity, as required by a 2006
presidential order governing prison conditions. The illegal detention, torture
and abuse reported by the U.S State Department concern military detention
centres, where people deemed ‘security risks’ are often held. The applicant has
not demonstrated that he would fit in such a profile.
[49]
This brings us to the question of the Officer’s
treatment of the applicant’s alleged profile as a political opponent of the
current Rwandese government. While the documentary evidence highlights the risk
facing opponents of the Kagame government in Rwanda, I find that it was
reasonable for the Officer to conclude that the applicant would not be
perceived as such.
[50]
The applicant’s submissions on his profile as a
political opponent rested on two particular points: his membership in CIRO, and
his membership in the RNC. Regarding his membership in CIRO, the Officer
acknowledged that the applicant had taken part in some of their activities,
including a 2006 vigil on Parliament Hill which he helped organized, but noted
that he had not submitted evidence attesting to a leadership role within the
organization. In support of his allegations, the applicant provided an
affidavit from Martin Barakengera, another member of CIRO, who alleged having
been intimidated by the staff from the High Commission of Rwanda in Ottawa
following the vigil.
[51]
In his affidavit, Mr. Barakengera neither
explains his role within CIRO, nor his relationship with the applicant, and his
description of the activity does not correspond to the description provided to
the authorities by the applicant during the organization of the event. Given
this contradiction and the impossibility to establish the reliability of the
affidavit, the Officer concluded that it was a self-serving document and gave
it no probative value.
[52]
To support his membership in the RNC, the
applicant alleged that he had had Skype conversations with a founder of the
party, Patrick Karegeya , later assassinated in South Africa, and adduced a
photocopy of his membership card, letters from Emmanuel Hakizimana, the RNC
coordinator in Canada, and critical emails on Kagame he sent to online
discussion groups. The Officer noted that the applicant had not adduced
corroborative evidence to establish his relationship with Karegeya and that he
had only submitted a copy not translated of the front side of his RNC membership
card, and no other evidence as to his active membership, such as donation
receipts or receipts for membership fees. She also noted that, while Mr.
Hakizimana identified the applicant as an active member of the group, Mr.
Hakizimana did not formally identify himself in his letter, did not use
official letterhead, or seek corroborative evidence of the threats he alleged.
As to the emails, the Officer found that she could not identify the recipients,
or whether they had been read at all. She further relied on a research report
from the IRB on the RNC to conclude that RNC members were not more at risk than
other political opponents in Rwanda.
[53]
For these reasons, she found that the applicant
had not demonstrated that he was a member of the RNC, or that he was at risk of
being perceived as a political opponent of Kagame. I find that the record does
not show that the Officer erred in ignoring or misinterpreting evidence on the
question of the applicant’s political membership and, overall, I am of the opinion
that the Officer committed no reviewable error in her assessment of the risk
faced by the applicant if prosecuted upon his return to Rwanda.
VI.
Conclusion
[54]
To summarize, the role of the Court in the
context of an application for judicial review is to ensure that overall the
decision-maker carefully balances the interests at stake and grounds his
conclusions in the evidence before him in order to arrive at an acceptable
outcome with respect to the facts and the law.
[55]
In this case, nothing in the record indicates
that the Officer failed to take into account Mr. Seyoboka’s interests or that
she erroneously ignored the evidence before her. The truth is that Mr. Seyoboka
benefitted from the protection of Canada for many years, in spite of being a
suspected war criminal, and justifiably so: there is no doubt that for many
years, his life and human rights could not be guaranteed in Rwanda. But that is
no longer the case. In the past few years, Rwanda has brought its justice
system up to international standards, as acknowledged by the Appeals Chamber of
the ICTR, and can safeguard Mr. Seyoboka’s right to a fair trial in his country
of origin should he be prosecuted. It is now time for him to face his past
actions, and let justice run its course.
[56]
For these reasons, the application for judicial
review is dismissed with no question for certification.
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