Docket:
T-1640-09
Citation: 2012
FC 1162
Ottawa, Ontario,
October 2, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
BETWEEN:
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CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION
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Applicant
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and
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RICHARD WARMAN,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and MARC LEMIRE
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Respondents
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BRITISH COLUMBIA CIVIL LIBERTIES
ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION FOR FREE EXPRESSION INC.,
CANADIAN FREE SPEECH LEAGUE, AFRICAN CANADIAN LEGAL CLINIC, LEAGUE FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS OF B’NAI BRITH CANADA, CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS and FRIENDS OF SIMON
WIESENTHAL CENTRE FOR HOLOCAUST STUDIES
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Intervenors
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
OVERVIEW:
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal brought by the Canadian Human Rights Commission under s.18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7.
[2]
In
the September 9, 2009 decision, the Tribunal determined that the respondent
Marc Lemire contravened s.13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
RSC, 1985, c H-6 (hereafter “the CHRA” or “the Act” by posting an article on a
website. The Tribunal declined to issue any remedial order against Mr. Lemire
on the ground that the restrictions imposed by s 13(1) and ss 54(1) and (1.1)
of the Act are inconsistent with s 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B
to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter] and do not
constitute a reasonable limit within the meaning of s 1 of the Charter.
[3]
The
Commission seeks declarations that the Tribunal erred in law in refusing to
apply s 13(1) and in declining to exercise its discretion under subsections
54(1)(a) and/or (b) of the Act; and seeks orders to set aside the Tribunal's
conclusions to the extent that they are inconsistent with the declarations
sought and to refer the matter back to the Tribunal for a determination with
respect to the remedy.
[4]
In
these proceedings, Mr. Lemire served a notice of constitutional question on the
Attorney General of Canada and the Attorneys General of each province in
accordance with s 57 of the Federal Courts Act. The notice requests a
declaration that ss 13(1) and 54(1) and (1.1) of the CHRA are of no force or
effect pursuant to ss 24(1) [sic] and 52(1) of the Constitution Act,
1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution
Act].
[5]
The
constitutionality of s 13(1) of the CHRA was confirmed by a majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor,
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 [Taylor]. This Court is bound by that decision unless
there are grounds to distinguish the present case from the precedental
authority of that decision. Barring such grounds, the Court must follow Taylor. In doing so, the Court may set out such reasons that indicate that
the precedent may be problematic in the present environment. It is for the
Supreme Court itself to determine whether Taylor is to be overturned: Canada
v. Craig, 2012 SCC 43 at paragraph 21. That question is presently before
the Supreme Court in an appeal from the decision of the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal in Whatcott v. Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, 2010 SKCA 26,
leave granted October 28, 2010, [2010] SCCA no 155 (QL), 2010
CanLII 62501 (SCC).
In Whatcott, the constitutional questions stated address whether s
14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, SS 1979, c S-24.1
infringes s 2(a) of the Charter and, if so, whether it is saved under s
1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While the issues in that
matter concern provincial legislation, they are analogous to the matters raised
in this case and the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal considered itself bound by Taylor.
[6]
I
take notice of the legislative fact that Bill C-304, entitled An Act to
amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (protecting freedom), received
third reading in the House of Commons on June 6, 2012. Among other things, the
effect of the Bill would be to repeal s 13. Under the terms of the Bill’s coming
into force clause, the Act would be effective one year after receiving Royal
Assent. At the time of writing the Bill remained under consideration in the
Senate. This is of relevance in these proceedings only to a limited extent that
I will discuss below.
[7]
For
the reasons that follow, I find that the Tribunal was correct to decline to
apply ss 54(1)(c) and (1.1) of the Act and declare that they are of no force or
effect. However, I find that the Tribunal erred in failing to apply s 13 and
paragraphs 54(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. Consequently, the application by the
Commission is granted and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal to issue a
declaration that the article posted by Mr. Lemire was in contravention of s 13 and
to exercise its jurisdiction under paragraphs 54(1)(a) or (b) of the Act to
consider the issuance of a remedial order against Mr. Lemire.
BACKGROUND
[8]
On
November 24, 2003 the respondent Richard Warman filed a complaint with the
Commission alleging that Mr. Lemire had communicated or caused to be
communicated hate messages over the Internet in breach of s 13 of the CHRA. He
alleged that these messages discriminated against persons or groups of persons
on the basis of their religion, race, color, national or ethnic origin and
sexual orientation, because the matter exposed them to hatred or contempt.
[9]
Initially
the complaint cited the content of messages posted on the website "Freedomsite.org"
and alleged that Mr. Lemire was the owner and webmaster of that site. The
complaint also named one Craig Harrison as a respondent. Mr. Harrison was
alleged to have posted a large number of messages on the site in 2002 and
2003. The allegations against Mr. Harrison were referred to the Tribunal separately
and a decision was issued by the Tribunal on August 15, 2006 finding that his
messages were in breach of s 13: Warman v Harrison, 2006 CHRT 30.
[10]
Mr.
Lemire received notice of Mr. Warman's November 24, 2003 complaint from the
Commission in late March 2004. In responding to the Commission, through his
counsel, on April 23, 2004, Mr. Lemire acknowledged that he was the webmaster
and owner of the Freedomsite.org website and stated that he had removed the message
board from the site prior to receiving notification of Mr. Warman's complaint. The
message board, operated from 1999-2003, was a forum for discussions at the
website. Visitors could access the content as "guests". Only
registered users were allowed to post messages on the board. An article on the
Freedomsite.org website referred to in the complaint was removed after the
complaint had been filed.
[11]
Subsequent
to the filing of the complaint, additional allegedly offending material was
also found by Mr. Warman on the websites “JRBooksonline.com” and
“Stormfront.org” and referred to the Commission investigator in September 2004.
This material was included in the investigation report recommending referral to
the Tribunal in April 2005 as being linked to Mr. Lemire. In a Joint Statement
of Particulars dated December 7, 2005 Mr. Warman and the Commission alleged
that Mr. Lemire communicated, or caused to be communicated, material observed
on these websites in October 2004.
[12]
At
the hearing, Mr. Lemire denied the allegations in part on the ground that he
had not communicated or caused to be communicated most of the impugned messages.
In particular, while he acknowledged, through counsel, having participated in
the creation of JRBooksonline.com, he denied having knowledge of or being
responsible for any of the content of that website. With regard to material on
Stormfront.org, Mr. Lemire argued that the Commission had not established that
he had posted the messages and, in the alternative, that it was not
discriminatory.
[13]
Mr.
Lemire brought a motion to have s 13 and the related remedial provisions in ss 54(1)
& (1.1) of the Act found to be in breach of ss 2(a) and (b) and s 7 and not
saved by s 1 of the Charter. He also cited the Canadian Bill of
Rights, SC 1960 c 44. The Attorney General of Canada exercised his right
under s 57 of the Federal Courts Act to participate and to adduce
evidence at the hearing in respect of the constitutional questions. Several
additional interested parties were granted status to participate.
[14]
Extensive
evidentiary hearings were conducted by the Tribunal between January 29, 2007
and March 25, 2008. Submissions were presented in September 2008. The Tribunal
rendered its decision on September 2, 2009: Warman v Lemire, 2009 CHRT
26 [the decision].
[15]
On
this application, motions for intervenor status were granted for the African
Canadian Legal Clinic (hereafter the“ACLC”), League for Human Rights of the B’nai
Brith (“B’nai Brith”) , Canadian Jewish Congress (“CJC”), Friends of Simon
Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies (“SWC”), Canadian Association for Free
Expression (“CAFE”), Canadian Free Speech League (“CFSL”), Canadian Civil
Liberties Association (“CCLA”), and British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association (“BCCLA”). The respondent Attorney General of Canada and the
intervenor CJC took no part in the argument of this application. The position
of B’nai Brith and SWC was jointly presented.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
[16]
Sections
24(1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act read as follows:
Enforcement of guaranteed rights
and freedoms
24. (1) Anyone whose
rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or
denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy
as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
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Recours en cas d’atteinte aux
droits et libertés
24. (1) Toute personne,
victime de violation ou de négation des droits ou libertés qui lui sont
garantis par la présente charte, peut s’adresser à un tribunal compétent pour
obtenir la réparation que le tribunal estime convenable et juste eu égard aux
circonstances.
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Primacy of Constitution of Canada
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the
extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
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Primauté de la Constitution du
Canada
52. (1) La Constitution du Canada est la loi suprême du
Canada; elle rend inopérantes les dispositions incompatibles de toute autre
règle de droit.
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[17]
The
wording of s 13(1) of the CHRA has remained unchanged since the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the predecessor enactment in Taylor;
Hate messages
13. (1) It is a
discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert
to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly,
in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication
undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that
is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of
the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a
prohibited ground of discrimination.
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Propagande haineuse
13. (1) Constitue
un acte discriminatoire le fait, pour une personne ou un groupe de personnes
agissant d’un commun accord, d’utiliser ou de faire utiliser un téléphone de
façon répétée en recourant ou en faisant recourir aux services d’une
entreprise de télécommunication relevant de la compétence du Parlement pour
aborder ou faire aborder des questions susceptibles d’exposer à la haine ou
au mépris des personnes appartenant à un groupe identifiable sur la base des
critères énoncés à l’article 3.
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[18]
When
Taylor was decided, the remedial powers of the Tribunal were set out
in sections 53 and 54 of the CHRA. Section 53 authorized the Tribunal to order
that a person cease a discriminatory practice and take measures to prevent its
recurrence (at s 53(2)(a)), make available to the victim the rights that had
been denied (at s 53(2)(b)), compensate the victim for wages lost and expenses
(at s 53(2)(c)), and compensate the victim for the costs and expenses of
obtaining alternatives (at s 53(2)(d)). In addition, s 53(3) permitted the
Tribunal, if the person had engaged in the discriminatory practice willfully or
recklessly or the victim had suffered, to order compensation not exceeding
$5,000 to be paid. Section 53(4) authorized the Tribunal to order that
premises and facilities be adapted to accommodate disabilities if reasonable.
Section 54 allowed the Tribunal to make only the orders listed in s 53 and
prohibited orders firing or evicting employees or tenants in good faith.
[19]
In
1998, Parliament enacted amendments to the Act, which, with the prior
legislation, had the effect of conferring additional remedial powers on the
Tribunal: SC 1998, c 9, ss 27-28. A new s 53(2)(e) allowed the Tribunal to order
compensation to victims in an amount not exceeding $20,000 for their pain and
suffering. The amount which could be ordered paid under s 53(3) was raised
from $5,000 to $20,000 and 53(4) was added, permitting the compensation order
to include interest. As well, a new s 54(1)(b) empowered the Tribunal to
order, in addition to the remedial measures which were in place at the time Taylor
was decided, compensation not exceeding $10,000 for a victim specifically
identified in the communication that constituted a discriminatory practice; and
a new s 54(1)(c) provided for a penalty of not more than $10,000.
[20]
Section
54(1.1), also added in 1998, set out the factors that the member or panel must
take into account in deciding whether to order the person to pay the penalty at
s 54(1)(c), such as the nature of the discriminatory practice, the intent of
the person who engaged in the practice, any prior history, and ability to pay.
[21]
In
2001, Parliament further enacted, at s 13(2), that for greater certainty,
discriminatory practices included communications via computers or the internet:
Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41, s 88 [Anti-terrorism Act].
[22]
The
relevant provisions of the CHRA as they read now are as follows:
Purpose
2. The purpose of this Act is to extend the
laws in Canada to give effect, within the purview of matters coming within
the legislative authority of Parliament, to the principle that all
individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make
for themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have
their needs accommodated, consistent with their duties and obligations as
members of society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by
discriminatory practices based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status,
disability or conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted
or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.
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Objet
2. La présente loi a pour
objet de compléter la législation canadienne en donnant effet, dans le champ
de compétence du Parlement du Canada, au principe suivant : le droit de tous
les individus, dans la mesure compatible avec leurs devoirs et obligations au
sein de la société, à l’égalité des chances d’épanouissement et à la prise de
mesures visant à la satisfaction de leurs besoins, indépendamment des
considérations fondées sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la
couleur, la religion, l’âge, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle, l’état matrimonial,
la situation de famille, la déficience ou l’état de personne graciée.
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Prohibited grounds of
discrimination
3. (1) For all purposes
of this Act, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital
status, family status, disability and conviction for an offence for which a
pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been
ordered.
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Motifs de distinction illicite
3. (1) Pour l’application
de la présente loi, les motifs de distinction illicite sont ceux qui sont
fondés sur la race, l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion,
l’âge, le sexe, l’orientation sexuelle, l’état matrimonial, la situation de
famille, l’état de personne graciée ou la déficience.
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Idem
(2) Where
the ground of discrimination is pregnancy or child-birth, the discrimination
shall be deemed to be on the ground of sex.
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Idem
(2) Une
distinction fondée sur la grossesse ou l’accouchement est réputée être fondée
sur le sexe.
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Hate messages
13. (1) It is a
discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert
to communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly,
in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication
undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that
is likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt by reason of
the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable on the basis of a
prohibited ground of discrimination.
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Propagande haineuse
13. (1) Constitue un acte
discriminatoire le fait, pour une personne ou un groupe de personnes agissant
d’un commun accord, d’utiliser ou de faire utiliser un téléphone de façon
répétée en recourant ou en faisant recourir aux services d’une entreprise de
télécommunication relevant de la compétence du Parlement pour aborder ou
faire aborder des questions susceptibles d’exposer à la haine ou au mépris
des personnes appartenant à un groupe identifiable sur la base des critères
énoncés à l’article 3.
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Interpretation
(2) For greater certainty,
subsection (1) applies in respect of a matter that is communicated by means
of a computer or a group of interconnected or related computers, including
the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in
respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by means of the
facilities of a broadcasting undertaking.
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Interprétation
(2) Il demeure entendu que le paragraphe (1)
s’applique à l’utilisation d’un ordinateur, d’un ensemble d’ordinateurs
connectés ou reliés les uns aux autres, notamment d’Internet, ou de tout
autre moyen de communication semblable mais qu’il ne s’applique pas dans les
cas où les services d’une entreprise de radiodiffusion sont utilisés.
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Interpretation
(3) For
the purposes of this section, no owner or operator of a telecommunication
undertaking communicates or causes to be communicated any matter described in
subsection (1) by reason only that the facilities of a telecommunication
undertaking owned or operated by that person are used by other persons for
the transmission of that matter.
Report
44. (1) An investigator
shall, as soon as possible after the conclusion of an investigation, submit
to the Commission a report of the findings of the investigation.
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Interprétation
(3) Pour
l’application du présent article, le propriétaire ou exploitant d’une
entreprise de télécommunication ne commet pas un acte discriminatoire du seul
fait que des tiers ont utilisé ses installations pour aborder des questions
visées au paragraphe (1).
Rapport
44. (1) L’enquêteur
présente son rapport à la Commission le plus tôt possible après la fin de
l’enquête.
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Action on receipt of report
(2) If, on receipt of a report
referred to in subsection (1), the Commission is satisfied
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Suite à donner au rapport
(2) La Commission renvoie le
plaignant à l’autorité compétente dans les cas où, sur réception du rapport,
elle est convaincue, selon le cas :
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(a) that
the complainant ought to exhaust grievance or review procedures otherwise
reasonably available, or
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a) que
le plaignant devrait épuiser les recours internes ou les procédures d’appel
ou de règlement des griefs qui lui sont normalement ouverts;
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(b) that the
complaint could more appropriately be dealt with, initially or completely, by
means of a procedure provided for under an Act of Parliament other than this
Act, shall refer the complainant to the appropriate authority.
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b) que la plainte pourrait
avantageusement être instruite, dans un premier temps ou à toutes les étapes,
selon des procédures prévues par une autre loi fédérale.
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Idem
(3) On receipt of a report
referred to in subsection (1), the Commission
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Idem
(3) Sur réception du rapport
d’enquête prévu au paragraphe (1), la Commission :
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(a) may request
the Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry under section 49 into
the complaint to which the report relates if the Commission is satisfied
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a) peut
demander au président du Tribunal de désigner, en application de l’article
49, un membre pour instruire la plainte visée par le rapport, si elle est
convaincue :
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(i) that, having
regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the
complaint is warranted, and
(ii) that the complaint to which the report relates should not
be referred pursuant to subsection (2) or dismissed on any ground mentioned
in paragraphs 41(c) to (e); or
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(i) d’une part, que, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à
la plainte, l’examen de celle-ci est justifié,
(ii) d’autre part, qu’il n’y a pas lieu de renvoyer la plainte
en application du paragraphe (2) ni de la rejeter aux termes des alinéas 41c)
à e);
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(b) shall
dismiss the complaint to which the report relates if it is satisfied
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b) rejette la plainte, si elle est
convaincue :
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(i) that, having
regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the
complaint is not warranted, or
(ii) that the complaint should be dismissed on any ground
mentioned in paragraphs 41(c) to (e).
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(i) soit que, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à la
plainte, l’examen de celle-ci n’est pas justifié,
(ii) soit que la plainte doit être rejetée pour l’un des motifs
énoncés aux alinéas 41c) à e).
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Appointment of conciliator
47. (1) Subject to
subsection (2), the Commission may, on the filing of a complaint, or if the
complaint has not been
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Nomination du conciliateur
47. (1) Sous réserve du
paragraphe (2), la Commission peut charger un conciliateur d’en arriver à un
règlement de la plainte, soit dès le dépôt de celle-ci, soit ultérieurement
dans l’un des cas suivants :
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(a) settled in
the course of investigation by an investigator,
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a) l’enquête ne mène pas à un
règlement;
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(b) referred
or dismissed under subsection 44(2) or (3) or paragraph 45(2)(a) or
46(2)(a), or
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b) la plainte n’est pas renvoyée ni
rejetée en vertu des paragraphes 44(2) ou (3) ou des alinéas 45(2)a)
ou 46(2)a);
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(c) settled after
receipt by the parties of the notice referred to in subsection 44(4),
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c) la plainte n’est
pas réglée après réception par les parties de l’avis prévu au paragraphe
44(4).
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Conduct of inquiry
50. (1) After due notice
to the Commission, the complainant, the person against whom the complaint was
made and, at the discretion of the member or panel conducting the inquiry,
any other interested party, the member or panel shall inquire into the
complaint and shall give all parties to whom notice has been given a full and
ample opportunity, in person or through counsel, to appear at the inquiry,
present evidence and make representations.
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Fonctions
50. (1) Le membre
instructeur, après avis conforme à la Commission, aux parties et, à son
appréciation, à tout intéressé, instruit la plainte pour laquelle il a été
désigné; il donne à ceux-ci la possibilité pleine et entière de comparaître
et de présenter, en personne ou par l’intermédiaire d’un avocat, des éléments
de preuve ainsi que leurs observations.
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Power to determine questions of
law or fact
(2) In the course of hearing and
determining any matter under inquiry, the member or panel may decide all
questions of law or fact necessary to determining the matter.
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Questions de droit et de fait
(2) Il tranche les questions de
droit et les questions de fait dans les affaires dont il est saisi en vertu
de la présente partie.
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Additional powers
(3) In relation to a hearing of the inquiry, the member or panel
may
(a) in the same
manner and to the same extent as a superior court of record, summon and
enforce the attendance of witnesses and compel them to give oral or written
evidence on oath and to produce any documents and things that the member or
panel considers necessary for the full hearing and consideration of the
complaint;
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Pouvoirs
(3) Pour la tenue de ses audiences, le membre instructeur a le
pouvoir :
a) d’assigner
et de contraindre les témoins à comparaître, à déposer verbalement ou par
écrit sous la foi du serment et à produire les pièces qu’il juge
indispensables à l’examen complet de la plainte, au même titre qu’une cour
supérieure d’archives;
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(b) administer
oaths;
(c) subject to
subsections (4) and (5), receive and accept any evidence and other
information, whether on oath or by affidavit or otherwise, that the member or
panel sees fit, whether or not that evidence or information is or would be
admissible in a court of law;
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b) de faire prêter serment;
c) de recevoir, sous réserve des
paragraphes (4) et (5), des éléments de preuve ou des renseignements par
déclaration verbale ou écrite sous serment ou par tout autre moyen qu’il
estime indiqué, indépendamment de leur admissibilité devant un tribunal
judiciaire;
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(d) lengthen or shorten any time limit established by
the rules of procedure; and
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d) de modifier les délais prévus par
les règles de pratique;
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(e) decide any
procedural or evidentiary question arising during the hearing.
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e) de trancher toute question de
procédure ou de preuve.
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Limitation
in relation to evidence
(4) The member or panel may not
admit or accept as evidence anything that would be inadmissible in a court by
reason of any privilege under the law of evidence.
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Restriction
(4) Il ne peut admettre en preuve
les éléments qui, dans le droit de la preuve, sont confidentiels devant les
tribunaux judiciaires.
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Conciliators as witnesses
(5) A
conciliator appointed to settle the complaint is not a competent or
compellable witness at the hearing.
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Le conciliateur n’est ni
compétent ni contraignable
(5) Le
conciliateur n’est un témoin ni compétent ni contraignable à l’instruction.
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Witness fees
(6) Any
person summoned to attend the hearing is entitled in the discretion of the
member or panel to receive the same fees and allowances as those paid to
persons summoned to attend before the Federal Court.
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Frais des témoins
(6) Les
témoins assignés à comparaître en vertu du présent article peuvent, à
l’appréciation du membre instructeur, recevoir les frais et indemnités
accordés aux témoins assignés devant la Cour fédérale.
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Duty of Commission on appearing
51. In appearing at a hearing,
presenting evidence and making representations, the Commission shall adopt
such position as, in its opinion, is in the public interest having regard to
the nature of the complaint.
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Obligations de la Commission
51. En comparaissant devant
le membre instructeur et en présentant ses éléments de preuve et ses observations,
la Commission adopte l’attitude la plus proche, à son avis, de l’intérêt
public, compte tenu de la nature de la plainte.
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Hearing in public subject to
confidentiality order
52. (1) An inquiry shall be
conducted in public, but the member or panel conducting the inquiry may, on
application, take any measures and make any order that the member or panel
considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the inquiry if the
member or panel is satisfied, during the inquiry or as a result of the inquiry
being conducted in public, that
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Instruction en principe publique
52. (1) L’instruction est
publique, mais le membre instructeur peut, sur demande en ce sens, prendre
toute mesure ou rendre toute ordonnance pour assurer la confidentialité de
l’instruction s’il est convaincu que, selon le cas :
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(a) there
is a real and substantial risk that matters involving public security will be
disclosed;
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a) il y a un risque sérieux de
divulgation de questions touchant la sécurité publique;
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(b) there is a real
and substantial risk to the fairness of the inquiry such that the need to
prevent disclosure outweighs the societal interest that the inquiry be
conducted in public;
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b) il y a un risque sérieux
d’atteinte au droit à une instruction équitable de sorte que la nécessité
d’empêcher la divulgation de renseignements l’emporte sur l’intérêt qu’a la
société à ce que l’instruction soit publique;
|
(c) there
is a real and substantial risk that the disclosure of personal or other
matters will cause undue hardship to the persons involved such that the need
to prevent disclosure outweighs the societal interest that the inquiry be
conducted in public; or
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c) il y a un risque sérieux de
divulgation de questions personnelles ou autres de sorte que la nécessité
d’empêcher leur divulgation dans l’intérêt des personnes concernées ou dans
l’intérêt public l’emporte sur l’intérêt qu’a la société à ce que
l’instruction soit publique;
|
(d) there is a
serious possibility that the life, liberty or security of a person will be endangered.
|
d) il y a une sérieuse possibilité que
la vie, la liberté ou la sécurité d’une personne puisse être mise en danger
par la publicité des débats.
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Confidentiality of application
(2) If the member or panel considers it
appropriate, the member or panel may take any measures and make any order
that the member or panel considers necessary to ensure the confidentiality of
a hearing held in respect of an application under subsection (1).
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Confidentialité
(2) Le membre instructeur peut,
s’il l’estime indiqué, prendre toute mesure ou rendre toute ordonnance qu’il
juge nécessaire pour assurer la confidentialité de la demande visée au
paragraphe (1).
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Complaint dismissed
53. (1) At the conclusion
of an inquiry, the member or panel conducting the inquiry shall dismiss the
complaint if the member or panel finds that the complaint is not
substantiated.
|
Rejet de la plainte
53. (1) À l’issue de
l’instruction, le membre instructeur rejette la plainte qu’il juge non
fondée.
|
Complaint substantiated
(2) If at the
conclusion of the inquiry the member or panel finds that the complaint is
substantiated, the member or panel may, subject to section 54, make an order
against the person found to be engaging or to have engaged in the
discriminatory practice and include in the order any of the following terms
that the member or panel considers appropriate:
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Plainte jugée fondée
(2) À l’issue
de l’instruction, le membre instructeur qui juge la plainte fondée, peut,
sous réserve de l’article 54, ordonner, selon les circonstances, à la
personne trouvée coupable d’un acte discriminatoire :
|
(a) that the
person cease the discriminatory practice and take measures, in consultation
with the Commission on the general purposes of the measures, to redress the
practice or to prevent the same or a similar practice from occurring in
future, including
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a) de mettre fin à l’acte et de
prendre, en consultation avec la Commission relativement à leurs objectifs
généraux, des mesures de redressement ou des mesures destinées à prévenir des
actes semblables, notamment :
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(i) the adoption of a special program, plan or arrangement
referred to in subsection 16(1), or
(ii) making an application for approval and implementing a plan
under section 17;
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(i) d’adopter un programme, un plan ou un arrangement visés au
paragraphe 16(1),
(ii) de présenter une demande d’approbation et de mettre en
oeuvre un programme prévus à l’article 17;
|
(b) that
the person make available to the victim of the discriminatory practice, on
the first reasonable occasion, the rights, opportunities or privileges that
are being or were denied the victim as a result of the practice;
|
b) d’accorder à la victime, dès que
les circonstances le permettent, les droits, chances ou avantages dont l’acte
l’a privée;
|
(c) that the person compensate the victim for any or
all of the wages that the victim was deprived of and for any expenses
incurred by the victim as a result of the discriminatory practice;
|
c) d’indemniser la victime de la
totalité, ou de la fraction des pertes de salaire et des dépenses entraînées
par l’acte;
|
(d) that the person compensate the victim for any or
all additional costs of obtaining alternativegoods, services, facilities or
accommodation and for any expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the
discriminatory practice; and
|
d) d’indemniser la victime de la
totalité, ou de la fraction des frais supplémentaires occasionnés par le
recours à d’autres biens, services, installations ou moyens d’hébergement, et
des dépenses entraînées par l’acte;
|
(e) that the
person compensate the victim, by an amount not exceeding twenty thousand
dollars, for any pain and suffering that the victim experienced as a result
of the discriminatory practice.
|
e) d’indemniser jusqu’à concurrence de
20 000 $ la victime qui a souffert un préjudice moral.
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Special
compensation
(3) In
addition to any order under subsection (2), the member or panel may order the
person to pay such compensation not exceeding twenty thousand dollars to the
victim as the member or panel may determine if the member or panel finds that
the person is engaging or has engaged in the discriminatory practice wilfully
or recklessly.
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Indemnité spéciale
(3) Outre les
pouvoirs que lui confère le paragraphe (2), le membre instructeur peut
ordonner à l’auteur d’un acte discriminatoire de payer à la victime une
indemnité maximale de 20 000 $, s’il en vient à la conclusion que l’acte a
été délibéré ou inconsidéré.
|
Interest
4) Subject
to the rules made under section 48.9, an order to pay compensation under this
section may include an award of interest at a rate and for a period that the
member or panel considers appropriate.
|
Intérêts
(4) Sous
réserve des règles visées à l’article 48.9, le membre instructeur peut
accorder des intérêts sur l’indemnité au taux et pour la période qu’il estime
justifiés.
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Orders relating to hate messages
54. (1) If a member or panel finds that a complaint related to
a discriminatory practice described in section 13 is substantiated, the
member or panel may make only one or more of the following orders:
|
Cas de propagande haineuse
54. (1) Le membre instructeur qui juge fondée une plainte
tombant sous le coup de l’article 13 peut rendre :
|
(a) an
order containing terms referred to in paragraph 53(2)(a);
|
a) l’ordonnance prévue à l’alinéa
53(2)a);
|
(b) an
order under subsection 53(3) to compensate a victim specifically identified
in the communication that constituted the discriminatory practice; and
(c) an order to pay a penalty of not more
than ten thousand dollars.
|
b) l’ordonnance prévue au paragraphe
53(3) — avec ou sans intérêts — pour indemniser la victime identifiée dans la
communication constituant l’acte discriminatoire;
c) une ordonnance imposant une
sanction pécuniaire d’au plus 10 000 $.
|
Factors
(1.1) In deciding whether to order
the person to pay the penalty, the member or panel shall take into account
the following factors:
|
Facteurs
(1.1) Il
tient compte, avant d’imposer la sanction pécuniaire visée à l’alinéa (1)c)
:
|
(a) the nature, circumstances,
extent and gravity of the discriminatory practice; and
(b) the
wilfulness or intent of the person who engaged in the discriminatory
practice, any prior discriminatory practices that the person has engaged in
and the person’s ability to pay the penalty.
|
a)
de la nature et de la gravité de l’acte discriminatoire ainsi que des
circonstances l’entourant;
b) de la nature délibérée de l’acte,
des antécédents discriminatoires de son auteur et de sa capacité de payer.
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Idem
(2) No order
under subsection 53(2) may contain a term
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Idem
(2) L’ordonnance
prévue au paragraphe 53(2) ne peut exiger :
|
(a) requiring the removal of an
individual from a position if that individual accepted employment in that
position in good faith; or
|
a) le retrait d’un employé d’un poste
qu’il a accepté de bonne foi;
|
(b) requiring
the expulsion of an occupant from any premises or accommodation, if that
occupant obtained such premises or accommodation in good faith.
|
b) l’expulsion de l’occupant de bonne
foi de locaux, moyens d’hébergement ou logements.
|
DECISION UNDER REVIEW:
[23]
In
the decision, the Tribunal found that the evidence did not establish that Mr.
Lemire had actual or constructive knowledge of the content of Mr. Harrison’s
posts on the Freedomsite.org message board notwithstanding Lemire’s role as
administrator of the host website. Similarly, there was no evidence to
establish a prima facie case that Mr. Lemire was aware of posts
submitted by persons other than Mr. Harrison that could constitute hate
messages. These were posted on “threads” or strings of messages that Lemire did
not directly control or regularly visit. Mr. Lemire thus did not “communicate
or cause to communicate” these messages within the meaning of s 13 of the Act.
[24]
With
regards to JRBooksonline.com, the Tribunal found that there was “insufficient
evidence to establish, even on a prima facie basis, that Mr. Lemire or a
group of persons that includes him, communicated or caused to be communicated,
the material found on JRBooksonline.com, within the meaning of s 13” (at para
47 of the decision). Mr. Warman had alleged that the website was controlled by
Mr. Lemire. The Tribunal found that the evidence showed that while Mr. Lemire
had assisted with the registration of the domain at the outset, a third party
was the webmaster and the owner of that website and that there was no evidence
that Mr. Lemire visited the site or controlled its content.
[25]
Regarding
a poem Mr. Lemire had posted on the website Stormfront.org, the Tribunal found
that the content did not amount to hate speech as defined by the Supreme Court
in Taylor. A number of other articles posted by Mr. Lemire or of which
he evidently had actual or constructive knowledge, which were posted on his
site, Freedomsite.org, were also found to not amount to hate speech as they
fell short of expressing the required level of detestation, calumny and
vilification to meet the test.
[26]
Lemire
had control over the posting of articles in a section of the Freedomsite.org
site which published the work of authors described as “Controversial
Columnists”. Any member of the public could access that section of the
website. One of the articles posted there by Lemire was entitled “AIDS Secrets”.
The Tribunal found that the article contained material that is likely to expose
homosexuals and blacks to hatred or contempt (at para 198 of the decision), and
that Mr. Lemire repeatedly communicated the matter within the meaning of s 13
(at para 212 of the decision). The complaint was thus substantiated in respect
of that one item. Mr. Lemire has not sought judicial review of that finding.
[27]
Turning
to the issue of the constitutionality of s 13 of the Act, the Tribunal noted
that the question had been determined by the Supreme Court in Taylor.
While the Supreme Court had found that s 13(1) infringed Charter s 2(b),
it was satisfied that the enactment satisfied both aspects of the test for
justification under Charter s 1: R v Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (a
sufficiently important objective and a proportional measure to achieve it).
[28]
The
Tribunal considered that it could revisit the question of s 1 justification since
the s 13 regime had been modified by Parliament since Taylor. As such,
the Tribunal found that Taylor was distinguishable from the case at
hand. The scheme of the Act had been changed from “an exclusively remedial,
preventive and conciliatory” regime (para 262 of the decision) at the time of Taylor to one that was quasi-penal (para 279 of the decision). In the Tribunal’s
view, this stemmed largely from the amendments to the Act in 1998 mentioned at
para 19 above, which authorized the Tribunal, in addition to issuing a cease
and desist order and ordering that the victim be compensated up to the amount
of now $20,000, to order the defendant to pay a penalty of up to $10,
000 dollars having considered certain specified factors (the new s 54(1)(c) of
1998).
[29]
The
Tribunal found that the Commission’s practice of referring s 13 complaints
contributed to its finding that the nature of the scheme had changed since it
was considered in Taylor (para 283 of the decision). The Tribunal
expressed five concerns: first that the Commission referred this complaint to
the tribunal even though most of the impugned material had already been removed
from the Internet; second that the Commission had referred other complaints to
the Tribunal under s 13 in similar circumstances; third that it had declined
the respondent’s request that a mediator or conciliator be appointed; fourth
that the Commission showed a low settlement rate for s 13 complaints; and fifth
that the Commission did not generally offer to mediate s 13 complaints.
[30]
Based
on the legislative changes and concerns about the Commission's practices, the
tribunal concluded that it was not bound by Taylor as it considered that
the majority decision in that case had been premised on the assumption that the
Commission's procedures functioned in a conciliatory manner as intended by the
statute. At paragraph 290 of the decision, the tribunal stated:
In
my view, it is clear that Taylor's confidence that the human rights
process under the act merely serves to prevent discrimination and compensate
victims hinged on the absence of any penal provision akin to the one now found
at s. 54 (1) (c), as well as on the belief that the process itself was not only
structured, but actually functioned in as conciliatory manner as possible. The
evidence before me demonstrates that the situation is not as the Court
contemplated in both respects. Thus, following the reasoning of Justice
Dickson, at 933, one can no longer say that the absence of intent in s. 13 (1)
"raises no problem of minimal impairment" and "does not impinge
so deleteriously upon the s. 2 (b) freedom of expression so as to make
intolerable" the provision’s existence in a free and democratic society.
On this basis, I find that the Oakes minimum impairment test has not
been satisfied, and that s. 13 (1) goes beyond what can be defended as a
reasonable limit on free expression under s. 1 of the Charter.
[31]
The
combined effect of the legislative changes and of the Commission’s practices in
administering the revised statute compelled the conclusion, in the Tribunal’s
view, that s 13 in conjunction with ss 54(1)(c) and (1.1) no longer minimally
impaired the right to freedom of speech and could not be saved under s 1 of the
Charter. In arriving at this conclusion the Tribunal did not find that
the compensation provisions in ss 53(3) and 54(1)(b),, the cease and desist
order power in ss 54(1)(a), or the other remedial measures in s 53 were
constitutionally unsound but focused exclusively on ss 54(1)(c) and 54(1.1).
[32]
As
noted at para 21 above, s 13 had been further amended in 2001 to insert the
current version of s 13(2) which provides, for greater certainty, that the
definition of discriminatory practices set out in s 13(1) applies to
communications by means of a computer or group of interconnected or related
computers, including the Internet. The impact of the Internet on communications
contributed to the Tribunal’s Charter s 1 analysis but it did not rely
on this amendment to reach its invalidity finding.
[33]
Mr.
Lemire had also alleged that s 13 infringed on his freedom of conscience or
religion, as guaranteed under s 2(a) of the Charter. The Tribunal found
that there was no evidence that the messages in question had been made as a
matter of conscience or religious practice. Arguments that ss 13 and 54 of the
Act violated Mr. Lemire’s s 7 Charter rights were held to be inadequate
to support a constitutional remedy. The Tribunal found that the incidents cited
by Mr. Lemire in support of these arguments did not bring his life, liberty or
security of the person into question as required by the Supreme Court in Blencoe
v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307 at para 47.
Evidence that the Commission cooperated with law enforcement agencies on some
occasions was found to have no bearing on the circumstances of Mr. Lemire’s
case.
[34]
Mr.
Lemire argued in addition that the Supreme Court’s findings in Taylor were based on fundamental factual and evidentiary errors. The Tribunal did
not find it appropriate to revisit every aspect of the Supreme Court’s Charter
analysis, noting at paragraph 221 of the decision that it remained bound by
most of the findings in Taylor and by McAleer v Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission) (1999), 175 DLR (4th) 766 [McAleer]. In McAleer,
the Federal Court of Appeal had applied the Taylor findings to matters
exposing persons to hatred or contempt on grounds other than those raised in Taylor (race and religion) such as sexual orientation, as in the case of the “AIDS
Secrets” article.
[35]
Mr.
Lemire contended that the manner in which the 2001 amendment to s 13(2),
specifying that it applied to computers and the internet, was adopted, as part
of the Anti-terrorism Act, demonstrated that s 13 is not a remedial
statute to prevent discrimination but rather has as its objective to control
opposition to government policies such as multiculturalism. The Tribunal,
citing the legislative history of the amendment, found that this did not
represent a change in circumstances that would justify revisiting the Supreme
Court’s findings in Taylor regarding s 13(1)’s objective (para 231 of
the decision). The amendment was adopted to clarify what was already the
interpretation of the section, that it applied to the communication of hate
messages using new technology.
[36]
The
Tribunal acknowledged that a formal declaration of invalidity was not a remedy
available to it: Cuddy Chicks Ltd v Ontario (Labour Relations Board),
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 5. Citing Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin,
2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 [Martin] at paras 26-7, the Tribunal
refused to apply s.13 and ss 54(1) and (1.1) to issue a remedial order against
Mr. Lemire for his breach of the Act.
[37]
While
not expressly stated in the Tribunal’s decision, the authority to decline to
apply the statute was exercised under s 52 (1) of the Constitution Act,
1982 (see Martin, at para 28). Mr. Lemire had also sought a remedy under
s 24(1) of the Charter before the Tribunal, as he does before this Court,
but has not articulated how s 24(1) might apply or what remedy the Tribunal or
the Court might fashion under that section for the alleged breach of his Charter
rights.
ISSUES:
[38]
The
Commission, supported by the respondent Richard Warman and the intervenors the
ACLC, B’nai Brith and the SWC, frames the issues on the present application in
the following terms:
a.
whether the
Tribunal erred in law when it found that the manner by which the Commission
exercises its statutory mandate could render sections 13 and 54(1)(a) & (b)
of the CHRA unconstitutional; and
b.
whether the
Tribunal erred when it refused to apply section 13 and section 54(1) and (1.1)
of the CHRA in their entirety when the constitutional concern could be remedied
by refusing to apply sections 54(1)(c) and (1.1) of the CHRA.
[39]
The
Commission submits that it seeks to preserve the core of the scheme established
in 1977 and applied in the modern context to Internet based communications. The
Commission does not contest the Tribunal’s ruling with respect to the penalty
provisions and, in its oral submissions, indicated that it has not taken the
position since the Tribunal’s decision in this matter that the penalty
provisions should be applied in other proceedings. It argues that the only
constitutional remedy that should have flowed from the Tribunal’s findings is
that the penalty provisions ought to be read out of the statute, applying the
doctrine of severance.
[40]
The
Commission contends that the Tribunal erred in not issuing a declaration that
the publication of the article “AIDS Secrets” constituted a breach of s 13 and
in failing to exercise the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to consider whether a remedy
ought to be granted under s 54(1)(a) – the authority to issue a cease and
desist order – or 54(1)(b) – the compensation provision. The Commission does
not contend that the Tribunal was obliged to make an order under either of
these provisions but argues that the Tribunal was bound to make the s 13(1) declaration
and consider these remedies. It seeks to have the matter remitted to the
Tribunal for these purposes.
[41]
In
oral argument, the Commission pointed out that there is no formal application
before the Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s finding that Mr. Lemire
contravened s 13(1). A request for a declaration of constitutional invalidity is
contained in the Notice of Constitutional Question which was served in May
2011. The Commission takes the position that the only issues properly before me
in this proceeding are those set out in its Notice of Application. If the
respondent Lemire is successful in defending the application, the Commission
argues, the only remedy available to the Court under s.18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act is to dismiss the application,.
[42]
Mr.
Lemire, supported by the intervenors CFSL, CAFE, the CCLA and the BCCLA, calls
for a broader consideration of the constitutionality of the hate speech regime
governed by s 13 of the Act. They strenuously object to the scope of this
application being restricted to the issues framed in the Commission’s Notice of
Application. As the Tribunal found in Mr. Lemire’s favour on his constitutional
motion, they argue, he had no basis in law to seek judicial review of that
decision. Since this Court has the authority to make a general declaration of
constitutional invalidity he should not be restrained from seeking such relief
through the vehicle of the application brought by the Commission.
[43]
As
noted by Justice Anne Mactavish in Air Canada Pilots Association v Kelly
2011 FC 120 at paragraphs 481-489, the power of this Court to grant declaratory
relief is predicated upon a finding that the Tribunal in question erred in one
of the ways identified in section 18.1(4) of the Federal Courts Act. In
that case, Justice Mactavish found that the Tribunal had not erred in its
determination of Charter invalidity. Consequently, she held, the
remedial powers conferred on the Court by subsection 18.1(3) of the Federal
Courts Act were not engaged. The proper remedy in those circumstances was
to dismiss the applications for judicial review insofar as they related to the Charter
issue. Assuming, without deciding, that a general declaration of invalidity
could ever be granted to a responding party on an application for judicial
review, she declined to grant such a remedy. The responding parties had not
given notice to the Attorneys General that they would be seeking such a remedy
and the request, in that case, was found to be a collateral attack on the
Tribunal’s remedial decision.
[44]
Here
it has been clear from the outset that the respondent Lemire and the
intervenors who support his position have been seeking a general declaration of
invalidity and they have given proper notice of the question to the Attorneys
General. While the matter is not without some doubt, I am satisfied that if I
were to dismiss the application for judicial review and uphold the Tribunal’s
decision I could exercise the jurisdiction to issue a general declaration of
invalidity with respect to s 13 and ss 54(1) and (1.1). Similarly, I am
confident that I can uphold the Tribunal’s decision in part and remit that
portion where I conclude the Tribunal fell into error.
[45]
I
see no reason to address the other arguments by Mr. Lemire and the CFSL respecting
ss 2(a) and 7 of the Charter, which the Tribunal did not accept. Those
arguments and the Tribunal’s findings are secondary to the main controversy
between the parties in respect of s 13 of the Act and s 2(b) of the Charter.
They were not supported by the evidence received by the Tribunal and are not
properly before the Court on this application. In general, I agree with the
Tribunal’s disposition of those arguments.
[46]
In
my view, the issues raised by the parties and intervenors in these proceedings that
the Court must address are as follows:
1.
Was it appropriate for the Tribunal to consider the manner by which the
Commission exercises its statutory mandate in determining whether to apply s13
of the Act?
2.
Do ss 13, 54(1) and (1.1) of the Act violate s 2(b) of the Charter and
if so, are they saved by s 1 of the Charter?
3.
What is the appropriate remedy, if ss 13, 54(1) and (1.1) of the Act, read
together, are found to be unconstitutional? Is severance available?
ANALYSIS:
Standard of
Review;
[47]
As
a result of R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 at para 81, the
tests for determining the constitutional issues that may be decided by
administrative tribunals have been merged. What is to be determined post-Conway
is whether the tribunal has the authority to decide questions of law. The
Tribunal is a specialized body that has the statutory authority to determine
questions of law (s 50(2) of the Act) and is therefore competent to consider
and apply the Charter and Charter remedies when resolving the
matters properly before it.
[48]
In
so far as the issues before the Court relate to constitutional matters, the
Tribunal’s findings are reviewable on a standard of correctness: Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para 58. “Such questions, as well as
other constitutional issues, are necessarily subject to a correctness review
because of the unique role of s. 96 courts as interpreters of the Constitution:
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] 2 S.C.R.
504, 2003 SCC 54”. This applies equally to courts established under s 101 of
the Constitution in respect of matters falling within their jurisdiction. This
Court, therefore, owes no deference to the Tribunal with respect to its
determination of the constitutional questions.
[49]
Questions
which require the Tribunal to interpret a provision in its
own enabling legislation in relation to an issue falling within its core function and expertise will presumptively attract a
reasonableness standard of review, and will only attract a correctness standard
in limited circumstances: see Smith v Alliance Pipeline Ltd., 2011 SCC
7, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 160 at para 28; Celgene Corp v Canada (AG), 2011
SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para 34, and Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission) v Canada (AG), 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 471 at para 24.
[50]
The
Tribunal’s findings of fact as to the subject-matter of the complaint referred
to it for determination are to be accorded deference and are reviewable on a
standard of reasonableness. Subsection 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal
Courts Act provides that the Court can intervene only if it considers
that the board “based its decision or order on an erroneous finding of fact
that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the
material before it”: see Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 at paragraph 38. There was no
serious attempt made in these proceedings to challenge the Tribunal’s finding
that the article “AIDS Secrets” contravened s 13(1) and it will not be
necessary for me to review the evidence in support of that finding.
In determining
whether to apply s 13 of the Act, was it appropriate for the Tribunal to
consider the manner in which the Commission exercises its statutory mandate?
[51]
The
constitutional basis for allowing Canadians to assert their Charter
rights in the most accessible form available and without the need for
bifurcated proceedings between superior courts and administrative tribunals is
beyond dispute. The denial of early access to remedies when early or immediate
access is clearly needed or when delay itself is a perpetuation
of a Charter violation is in effect a denial of an appropriate and just remedy,
as Lamer J pointed out in his dissent to Mills v The Queen, [1986] 1 SCR
863 at para 54. And as stated by the Supreme Court in Conway at
paragraph 79:
[79]
Over two decades of jurisprudence has confirmed the practical advantages
and constitutional basis for allowing Canadians to assert their Charter rights
in the most accessible forum available, without the need for bifurcated proceedings
between superior courts and administrative tribunals (Douglas College,
at pp. 603-4; Weber, at para. 60; Cooper, at para.
70; Martin, at para. 29). The denial of early access to remedies
is a denial of an appropriate and just remedy, as Lamer J. pointed out in Mills,
at p. 891. And a scheme that favours bifurcating claims is inconsistent
with the well-established principle that an administrative tribunal is to
decide all matters, including constitutional questions, whose essential factual
character falls within the tribunal’s specialized statutory jurisdiction (Weber;
Regina Police Assn.; Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et
des droits de la jeunesse); Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal); Vaughan;
Okwuobi. See also Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 49.).
[52]
In
the present case, the Tribunal has the authority to receive systemic evidence
as to how s 13 is administered and the effects of the legislation but it has no
jurisdiction to review the actions of the Commission. There is nothing in ss 50-54
of the Act, which define the Tribunal’s powers in conducting an inquiry, to
give it such authority. See, in this respect, Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 at para 50. The controversy between
the parties is over the nature and extent of the Tribunal’s review of the
Commission’s actions in this case.
[53]
It
is, therefore, clear that the Tribunal had the authority and duty to receive
systemic evidence as to how s 13 is administered and the effects of the
legislation in determining the constitutional motion brought before it. The
Tribunal's view of this responsibility is set out at paragraphs 286 to 290 of its
decision. While it acknowledged that the position advanced by the Attorney
General that it had no jurisdiction to sit in review of the decisions taken by
the Commission was correct, it considered that the real and factual context in
which the enactment exists and is applied could not be ignored.
[54]
However,
the Tribunal can only consider Charter issues that arise in the course
of a matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: Martin at para 45; Tranchemontagne
v Ontario (Director, Disability Support Program), 2006 SCC 14, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 513 at para 24. The question is
whether the remedy in question is one that the legislature intended would fit
within the statutory framework of the particular tribunal; Conway at
paragraph 82..
[55]
The
CHRA establishes two distinct institutions, each of which has a particular role
as described by the statute. It sets out a complete mechanism for dealing with
human rights complaints. Central to this mechanism is the Commission. Under
the scheme of the Act, the Commission is the body empowered to accept, manage
and process complaints of discriminatory practices. The Tribunal has no
statutory mandate under the Act with respect to its administration, except as
set out in s 50 which provides that "it shall inquire into the
complaint" when a request is made by the Commission that it do so. These
factors suggest that the legislature did not intend that the Tribunal would
have the authority to find the Act inoperative based on the manner in which the
statute was administered.
[56]
In
particular, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over the exercise of the
Commission’s discretion under CHRA s 44(3) (rejecting or referring a complaint)
and s 47 (appointing a conciliator). The proper way to challenge a Commission
decision in respect of such matters is through judicial review by the Federal
Court.
[57]
In
exercising its authority, the Tribunal cannot collaterally question a
Commission decision that is within the statutory authority of that body. This
is properly left to judicial review: Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at p 853 (QL and WL para 53);
Sam Lévy et Associés Inc c Mayrand, 2005 FC 702, aff’d by 2006 FCA 205,
leave to appeal to the SCC ref’d, [2006] CSCR no 317 (QL), at para 169; and Canada
v Prentice, 2005 FCA 395, leave to appeal to SCC ref’d [2006] CSCR no 26
(QL), at paras 32-33.
[58]
The
concern that the Commission referred this complaint to the Tribunal even though
most of the impugned material had been moved from the Internet is, in effect a
comment on the Commission's decision to request that the Tribunal hold an
inquiry. That is outside the tribunal's mandate. The Tribunal compounded the
error when it commented on other complaints that had been referred to it in
similar circumstances and remarked on the low settlement rate for s 13
complaints and on the fact that the Commission did not generally offer to
mediate such matters Those questions were not before the Tribunal for inquiry.
[59]
The
Member took a critical view of the manner in which the Commission’s
investigation was conducted and factored that into his conclusion that the scheme
was constitutionally flawed. The Member considered that the Commission should
have made additional efforts to communicate with Mr. Lemire and questioned that
the Commission proceeded with the complaint when Mr. Lemire had taken down the
message board and deleted the post found to constitute a hate message from his
website prior to the proceedings.
[60]
In
this instance, the Member accepted Mr. Lemire’s contention that the complainant
and the Commission declined to mediate or conciliate a settlement to the
complaint. This is not borne out by the record of the Tribunal proceedings.
Repeated efforts were made to engage Mr. Lemire in mediating or negotiating a
settlement of the complaint. However, they were conditional on Lemire’s
acceptance of a cease and desist order, which he refused to accept.
[61]
The
Member’s analysis that this complaint had not been handled in a sufficiently
conciliatory and remedial fashion does not reflect the record. The Member
declined to receive information pertaining to the settlement efforts on the
ground that such information was privileged. However, he allowed Mr. Lemire to repeatedly
question Mr Warman and Commission staff as to why the complaint had not been
withdrawn following removal of the “AIDS Secrets” article. The proceedings were
adjourned on at least one occasion, February 1, 2007, to allow such discussions
to take place.
[62]
Absent
a cease and desist order there was nothing to prevent the strategic removal of
material in violation of the Act and reposting of it as soon as the complaint
had been withdrawn. Mr. Lemire argued on this application that had he done so the
complaint could be filed again. “Relaying a one page complaint doesn’t seem to
be too much of a hassle” as his counsel put it in oral argument. I disagree.
Bad faith of this nature would render the process essentially meaningless and
ineffective and is hardly consistent with the objectives of the legislation.
[63]
As
was noted by counsel for the Attorney General of Canada before the Tribunal,
the hearing went beyond the scope of the Tribunal’s mandate to determine the
factual and legal issues and became an inquiry into the manner in which the
complainant and the Commission conducted themselves in relation to the
complaint. The Tribunal stepped over the line of its proper role – adjudication
of the complaint – and assumed the role the Court would have upon an
application for judicial review of the actions or decisions of the Commission.
[64]
Section
13 cases, while few in number, tend to be among the most intractable handled by
the Commission due to the nature of hate speech. They do not lend themselves
easily to mediation or conciliation. See for example Richard Moon, Report to
the Canadian Human Rights Commission Concerning Section 13 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Hate Speech on the Internet (October
2008), online: Canadian Human Rights Commission
http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/publications/report_moon_rapport/toc_tdm-eng.aspx [Moon
Report] at p.10: “In
contrast to other discrimination complaints, conciliation tends to play
only a minor role in
section 13 cases because the expression that is the subject of the
complaint is often extreme in character, and because the parties ordinarily
have no relationship prior to the complaint.” See also Lawrence McNamara,
“Tackling Racial Hatred: Conciliation, Reconciliation and Football” (2000) 6(2)
Austl J H R 5 at pp 24-25; and Philip Bryden and William Black, “Mediation as a
Tool for Resolving Human Rights Disputes: Evaluation of the BC Human Rights
Commission’s Early Mediation Project” (2004) 37 UBC L Rev 73. These cases
represent a small part of the workload for both the Commission and the
Tribunal. The Commission’s Annual Report 2006 (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 2006), online: http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/pdf/ar_2006_ra_en.pdf
[2006 Report] at pp 7, 24 shows that between 2002 and 2006 the
Commission received 57 s 13 allegations of which 55 were complaints of hate
messages on the internet. Twenty-nine of the 55 complaints were sent to the Tribunal.
In all the Commission dealt with 6,003 allegations of all types during the
years 2002-2006 (2006 Report at p 7), 591 of which were referred to the
Tribunal (2006 Report at p 21). Section 13 complaints represented only
1% to 2 % of the total number of complaints dealt with by the Commission.
[65]
While
the Tribunal Member clearly understood the difficulties presented by such
proceedings, it was unreasonable of him to expect that this matter could have
been resolved by conciliation or that the Commission and Mr. Warman would
abandon the complaint when Lemire removed the one article found to communicate
hate for which Lemire was found to be directly responsible. Decisions were
required from the Tribunal on the nature of the content found on Lemire’s site
and on the extent of his involvement with the other websites.
[66]
The
Member directly linked his finding that Mr. Lemire had “amended his conduct by
removing the impugned material as soon as he learned of the complaint against
him” to his conclusion that the process Lemire experienced was not what the
Supreme Court understood in Taylor. However, the fundamental structure
of the human rights process under the Act has not changed since Taylor. Referring a complaint to conciliation is and was but one of the many routes
that the Commission may pursue to resolve a complaint. The structure on which
the Supreme Court based its decision and upon which the Tribunal sought to
distinguish Taylor has not changed. What changed, as the Tribunal
properly found, were the remedies.
[67]
As
counsel for the Commission pointed out in argument, the practical difficulties
that may arise when the Tribunal strays outside of its mandate, as experienced
in this case, were foreshadowed by the following comment of Mr. Justice Lamer
in concurring reasons in Cooper, above, at paragraph 65:
I
would add a practical note of caution with respect to a tribunal's jurisdiction
to consider Charter arguments. First, as already noted, a tribunal does not
have any special expertise except in the area of factual determinations in the
human rights context. Second, any efficiencies that are prima facie
gained by avoiding the court system will be lost when the inevitable judicial
review proceeding is brought in the Federal Court. Third, the unfettered
ability of a tribunal to accept any evidence it sees fit is well suited to a
human rights complaint determination but is inappropriate when addressing the
constitutionality of a legislative provision. Finally, and perhaps most
decisively, the added complexity, cost, and time that would be involved when a
tribunal is to hear a constitutional question would erode to a large degree the
primary goal sought in creating the tribunals, i.e., the efficient and timely
adjudication of human rights complaints.
[68]
The
hearings before the Tribunal in this matter took more than 18 months to
complete. Many of the hearing days were expended on evidence relating to the
Commission’s investigation and treatment of s 13 cases despite repeated
objections. Another year was required to produce the decision. The “inevitable
judicial review proceeding” followed. As forecast by Chief Justice Lamer in Cooper,
the added complexity, cost and time involved in hearing this matter eroded any
pretence of an efficient and timely adjudication of the complaint.
[69]
The
Tribunal erred in focusing its attention on the Commission’s administration of
the statute in this case, a subject beyond its mandate and the scope of its
authority.
[70]
I
will turn now to the constitutional question. As the Commission submits, s 13
of the Act may be found to be unconstitutional only if the legislation itself
is the source of the Charter violation. Administration of the statute by
the Commission cannot, in itself, render the statute unconstitutional: Eldridge
v British Columbia (AG), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at para 20 [Eldridge]; and
Thomson v Alberta (Transportation and Safety Board), 2003 ABCA 256,
leave to appeal to SCC ref’d, [2003] SCCA No 510 (QL) at para 44 [Thomson].
[71]
If
the Commission has performed its statutory mandate in a manner inconsistent
with the Charter, s 24(1) is the appropriate provision of the Charter
upon which to grant a remedy, not s 52(1): Eldridge at para 20;
Thomson at para 44; and Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v Canada
(Minister of Justice), 2000 SCC 69, [2000] 2
SCR 1120 at para 133. Section 24 remedies which do not involve striking
down the legislation would include such things as a stay of proceedings, the
exclusion of evidence in the particular matter or the referral back to the
administrative decision-maker with appropriate directions as to how the matter
ought to be decided. Those are all remedies which the Court could grant on
judicial review.
Do ss 13, 54(1) and (1.1) of the CHRA
violate s 2(b) of the Charter and, if so, are they saved by s 1 of the Charter?
[72]
I start from the proposition, as did the Tribunal, that Taylor remains binding unless persuaded that it is no longer precedental authority
due to changed factual and legal circumstances since it was decided. Mr.
Lemire, the CCLA, the BCCLA and the CFSL argue that the inclusion of a penalty
provision in the s 13 regime is sufficient to distinguish this case from Taylor. Alternatively, they contend that the extension of the regime to the
Internet is an alternate ground on which to uphold the Tribunal’s decision,
notwithstanding that the Tribunal did not rely on that ground: Perka v. The
Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232 at page 240:
In both civil and
criminal matters it is open to a respondent to advance any argument to sustain
the judgment below, and he is not limited to appellants’ points of law. A party
cannot, however, raise an entirely new argument which has not been raised below
and in relation to which it might have been necessary to adduce evidence at
trial.
[73]
The
Commission, Mr. Warman, B’nai Brith and the ACLC submit that Taylor is
still applicable to the modified s 13 regime. They accept that ss 54(1)(c)
& (1.1) of the CHRA (the penalty provisions) can not be justified under s 1
of the Charter but contend that this constitutional infirmity is not
sufficient to strike down the s 13 regime as a whole.
[74]
The
arguments raised by the parties who urge the Court to distinguish Taylor are, in essence, that the regime has become too punitive – this is the
argument adopted by the Tribunal – and that the Internet has considerably
broadened the application of s.13 – this argument was not accepted by the
Tribunal. As a result, they contend, s 13 now fails the minimal impairment test
and/or the proportionality of the effects test of s 1 of the Charter.
[75]
It
is trite law that a court cannot assess the constitutionality of a provision in
a factual vacuum: MacKay v Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357
at paras 8-9; and Martin at para 30. The courts must look at the social
context and the legislative facts that surround the impugned legislation: RJR-MacDonald
Inc v Canada (AG), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [RJR-MacDonald], at paras
129 and 132-133; Rocket v Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, [1990] SCJ No 65 (QL) at para 28 ; and Re Upper Churchill
Water Rights Reversion Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 at p 318. In this case, some
of the legislative effects of s 13 can only be “measured” through the actions
of the Commission to which the CHRA gives substantial discretionary power and
important responsibilities.
[76]
As
stated in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 at
para 97 the effects of the legislation have to be considered because: “It is
possible that those effects might, over time, acquire such significance as to
become the dominant feature of the legislation, thereby displacing the original
purpose.” And at para 98 the Court stated:
There
are two types of effect which must be examined in order to properly categorize
the dominant feature of the legislative scheme: legal effect, and practical
effect (Morgentaler, supra, at pp. 482-88). The legal effect has
been described as “how the legislation as a whole affects the rights and
liabilities of those subject to its terms, and is determined from the terms of
the legislation itself” (Morgentaler, at p. 482). […] the second type of
effect mentioned in Morgentaler, supra, at p. 483, [. . .] is the
“actual or predicted practical effect of the legislation in operation”.
[77]
The
Oakes test requires an analysis of the factual and contextual background
of the impugned legislation. Where the statute itself does not carry any
infringing effects but the complaint is with administrative actions, as in Little
Sisters, the legislation in question should be upheld. In this context, in
determining whether the statute is unconstitutional, the actions of the CHRC
are relevant to the extent that the Act authorizes the Commission to act
unconstitutionally. Absent such a finding, the proper means to obtain a remedy
would have been to seek judicial review of the Commission’s actions: Eldridge
at para 20; Thomson at para 44 and Sam Lévy et Associés Inc at
para 169.
a) Freedom of
Expression
[78]
It
is important to recall at the outset of this analysis that even hate speech is
protected under s 2(b) of the Charter: Taylor at para 30. As
indicated in Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (AG),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, [1989] SCJ No 36 (QL) [Irwin Toy],
s 2(b) covers nearly any form of expression except physical violence, which
hate speech is not: Taylor, at para 32; and R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [1990] SCJ No
131
(QL)
at para 37.
In determining if s 2(b) applies we must not look at the content of the
expression: Keegstra, at paras 30 and 32. The content and value of the
expression are only relevant at the s 1 justification stage: Taylor, at
para 31.
b) Objective and
Context of s 13
[79]
Most
of the interested parties agree that the objectives of s 13, the suppression of
hate speech and the promotion of equality, are pressing and substantial. Only
Mr. Lemire and the CFSL appear to take issue with that proposition. Neither, in
my view, have submitted any valid argument as to why the objective of s 13 is
not pressing and substantial and why this Court should depart from Taylor on that point.
[80]
Lemire
and the intervenors in support of his position contend that the Internet has
resulted in a radical change in communications and provides a means to instantly
counter hate speech that was not available when Taylor was decided.
Educating and counter-arguing through the Internet is a more effective means to
counter hate speech than to prohibit and infringe freedom of expression, they
argue, while the effect of s 13 is to censure legitimate debate in the search
for truth. In their view, the meaning of the term “hate” is subjective and
vague and inaccessible to the public who post messages on the Internet.
[81]
Lemire
further questions the legitimacy of the finding in Taylor, that hate
speech can cause substantial pyschological stress, arguing that the Supreme
Court relied not on expert evidence, such as he presented to the Tribunal, but on
extrinsic research, to reach that conclusion.
[82]
On
the question of the objective, Chief Justice Dickson stated in Taylor, at para 42:
[42] In seeking to prevent the
harms caused by hate propaganda, the objective behind s. 13(1) is obviously one
of pressing and substantial importance sufficient to warrant some limitation
upon the freedom of expression. It is worth stressing, however, the heightened
importance attached to this objective by reason of international human rights
instruments to which Canada is a party and ss. 15 and 27 of the Charter.
[83]
In
arriving at this conclusion, the Chief Justice looked at the purpose of the
CHRA, found in s 2 of the CHRA, the legislative history and the evidence of
harm caused by hate speech (Taylor, at paras 39-41). He also indicated
that the objective was compatible with international law as well as other Charter
values, equality and multiculturalism (at paras 43-45):
[43]
The stance taken by the international community in protecting human rights is
relevant in reviewing legislation under s. 1, and especially in assessing the
significance of a government objective (Slaight Communications Inc. v.
Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038). Both Article 4 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Can.
T.S. 1970 No. 28, and Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), as well as the jurisprudence of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950) (see, e.g., Glimmerveen v. Netherlands,
Eur. Comm. H. R., Applications Nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, October 11, 1979,D.R.
18, p. 187) demonstrate that the commitment of the international community to
eradicate discrimination extends to the prohibition of the dissemination of
ideas based on racial or religious superiority.
[44]
Indeed, in 1983 a complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Committee by Mr.
Taylor and the Western Guard Party alleging a violation of the freedom of
expression guaranteed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights was rejected on the ground that "the opinions which Mr. Taylor
seeks to disseminate through the telephone system clearly constitute the
advocacy of racial or religious hatred which Canada has an obligation under
article 20(2) of the Covenant to prohibit": Taylor and Western Guard
Party v. Canada, Communication No. 104/1981, Report of the Human Rights
Committee, 38 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40) 231 (1983), para. 8(b),
decision reported in part at (1983), 5 C.H.R.R.D/2097. This conclusion is
indicative of the approach taken in the realm of international human rights,
and thus emphasizes the substantial weight which must be given the aim of
preventing the harms caused by hate propaganda.
[45]
That the values of equality and multiculturalism are enshrined in ss. 15 and 27
of the Charter further magnify the weightiness of Parliament's objective in
enacting s. 13(1). These Charter provisions indicate that the guiding
principles in undertaking the s. 1 inquiry include respect and concern for the
dignity and equality of the individual and a recognition that one's concept of
self may in large part be a function of membership in a particular cultural
group. As the harm flowing from hate propaganda works in opposition to these
linchpin Charter principles, the importance of taking steps to limit its
pernicious effects becomes manifest.
[84]
Chief
Justice Dickson arrived at the same conclusion in Keegstra at paras 58
to 80. He stated at para 80:
[80]
In my opinion, it would be impossible to deny that Parliament's objective in
enacting s. 319(2) is of the utmost importance. Parliament has recognized the
substantial harm that can flow from hate propaganda, and in trying to prevent the
pain suffered by target group members and to reduce racial, ethnic and
religious tension in Canada has decided to suppress the willful promotion of
hatred against identifiable groups. The nature of Parliament's objective is
supported not only by the work of numerous study groups, but also by our
collective historical knowledge of the potentially catastrophic effects of the
promotion of hatred (Jones, supra, per La Forest J., at pp. 299-300).
Additionally, the international commitment to eradicate hate propaganda and the
stress placed upon equality and multiculturalism in the Charter strongly
buttress the importance of this objective. I consequently find that the first
part of the test under s. 1 of the Charter is easily satisfied and that
a powerfully convincing legislative objective exists such as to justify some
limit on freedom of expression.
[85]
These
international commitments have not changed and remain valid: Moon Report
at pp 17-19; and Canadian Human Rights Commission, Freedom of Expression and
Freedom from Hate in the Internet Age (Ottawa: Special Report to
Parliament, 2009) [CHRC Special Report] at pp 9-10. The jurisprudence of
the Tribunal on the topic is quite extensive: see Citron v Zundel (18
January 2002), TD 1/02, online: CHRT http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/aspinc/search/vhtml-eng.asp?doid=252&lg=_e&isruling=0&arch=true
[Citron], at paras 174-180; and Schnell v Machiavelli and Associates
Emprize Inc (20 August 2002), TD 11/02, online:
http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/aspinc/search/vhtml-eng.asp?doid=285&lg=_e&isruling=0&arch=true
[Schnell], at para 144. As B’nai Brith has submitted, a number of
recent studies and reports confirm that the dangers of hate propaganda remain
substantial today. This is supported by the CHRC Special Report, at Part
I. The danger of hate speech was also recognized by the Supreme Court in Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100, 2005 SCC
40 [Mugesera], in the context of inciting crimes against
humanity.
[86]
In
this case, the Tribunal agreed that the suppression of hate speech remains a
valid objective. The Tribunal heard the opinion evidence presented by Mr.
Lemire and reached the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to
revisit the findings of Taylor on this point (see the decision at paras
226-240). On a question such as this, which involves a mixed question of fact
and law, the Court owes deference to the Tribunal: RJR-MacDonald, at
para 151.
[87]
Until recently, it was clear that Parliament continued to support
the objective of s 13 as evidenced by the amendments to give the regime
stronger remedies. The mandate to promote equality and seek resolution of human
rights conflicts through the administration of s 13 was given to the CHRC. As
noted above, the House of Commons has recently supported a private member’s
bill to repeal the section, the effect of which would be to leave the
suppression of hate speech to criminal prosecution. This is part of the social
and political context of the legislation that must be considered when applying
the Oakes test: Ross v New Brunswick School District No 15,
[1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [Ross], at para 78; Rocket, at para 28; RJR-MacDonald
at paras 62-63.
[88]
Notwithstanding
the recent legislative effort to repeal s 13, I have no difficulty concluding
that the objective of the enactment continues to be substantial and pressing.
c) Rational
Connection
[89]
Mr.
Lemire submits in support of his position that there is no rational connection
between the objective and the means used to achieve the objective. The Tribunal
was not persuaded that the extension of the scope of s 13 to the Internet
demonstrated the absence of a rational connection between the provision and its
objectives, as was argued, because the same material may be freely available in
a library or bookstore.
[90]
On
this application, Mr. Lemire and the intervenors supporting his position make
two points; the first concerning the lack of evidence of harm was dealt with
above . The second is the lack of evidence that s 13 has had a positive effect
on diminishing hate speech on the Internet. They argue that s 13 has no effect
on hate speech originating in other countries and posted by their nationals
(see the Moon Report at pp 26-27) as it has no extraterritorial
application.
[91]
The
Tribunal found that there was no evidence with respect to the availability
outside of the Internet of the message which Mr. Lemire was found to have
communicated within the meaning of s 13. Dissemination of printed material
likely to expose persons to hatred or contempt could constitute a discriminatory
practice under provincial legislation. Communication through the Internet is
also consistently been found to be repeated communications within s. 13's
meaning. Such communications, the Tribunal wrote, are not necessarily
comparable to messages conveyed in print form through traditional means.
[92]
In
discussing the question of the rational connection between Parliament’s
objective in enacting s 13 and the means chosen, Chief Justice Dickson had the
following to say in Taylor, at paras 51, 53-54:
[51]
In my view, once it is accepted that hate propaganda produces effects
deleterious to the guiding principles of s. 2 of the Canadian Human Rights
Act, there remains no question that s. 13(1) is rationally connected to the
aim of restricting activities antithetical to the promotion of equality and
tolerance in society. The section labels as discriminatory the transmission of
messages likely to expose individuals to hatred or contempt by reason of their
being identifiable on the basis of certain characteristics, including race and
religion. Sections 41 and 42 of the Act [now s 54] allow the Human Rights
Tribunal to issue a cease and desist order against an individual found to be
engaging in this discriminatory practice, and this order can be enforced upon application
to the Federal Court of Canada by the Commission (s. 43). In sum, when
conjoined with the remedial provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
s. 13(1) operates to suppress hate propaganda and its harmful consequences, and
hence is rationally connected to furthering the object sought by Parliament.
.
. .
[53]
… In addition, although criminal law is not devoid of impact upon the
rehabilitation of offenders, the conciliatory nature of the human rights
procedure and the absence of criminal sanctions make s. 13(1) especially well
suited to encourage reform of the communicator of hate propaganda.
[54]
… In combating discrimination legislative efforts to suppress hate propaganda
are but one available form of response, and the fact that the international
community considers such laws to be an important weapon against racial and
religious intolerance strongly suggests that s. 13(1) cannot be viewed as
ineffectual.
[93]
In
comparison with the recorded telephone messages in Taylor, the websites
in question here are very different mediums of communication. Where Mr. Taylor
went out into the community and passed out pieces of paper urging people to
call a number for a message, the website Lemire controlled is but one of many
in the Internet universe that requires some effort to find and access the
content. However, at most it would require either the entry of the site uniform
resource locator (“URL”) in the browser address bar or a few key words in a web
search engine. This is the modern equivalent of Mr. Taylor’s little pieces of
paper bearing the telephone number. The communications are available to any
member of the public who has access to a computer and an internet service
provider account. In this instance, the Tribunal found, Mr. Lemire advertised
the Freedomsite.org website on Stormfront.org and invited visitors.
[94]
I
acknowledge the force of the argument that callers to Taylor’s recorded message
received just one perspective whereas to-day, multiple perspectives are
available on the Internet . It is true that there are opportunities to contest
and refute that were not available in listening to a recorded message. Is that
reason enough to distinguish the Internet environment from that considered by
the Supreme Court in Taylor? I don’t think so. While it may be possible
in some instances to respond to information presented or offer counterarguments
that is not always the case.
[95]
Apart
from the technology, there is little to choose between Taylor’s callers
and like-minded individuals looking for confirmation of their views on a white
supremacist web site. And the suggestion that they are open to countervailing
views can not be taken seriously.
[96]
The
Internet has made it considerably easier to access hate speech than the strategies
employed by Mr. Taylor: Canadian Human Rights Commission v Winnicki 2005
FC 1493 at para 32. It has also made it more difficult to restrain such
activities: Moon Report at pp 26-27; Yaman Akdeniz, “Governing Racist
Content on the Internet: National and International Responses” (2007) 56 UNBLJ
103. The Internet is an inexpensive means of mass distribution of ideas,
recruitment of followers and promotion of intolerance. It also permits a
degree of anonymity to people who might not publicly express hateful ideas if
they were being held accountable for them.
[97]
As
indicated by Chief Justice Dickson in Keegstra, at para 129, there are
many ways to regulate hate speech, and Parliament is entitled to use more than
one approach to reach its goal.
[129]
… It is important, in my opinion, not to hold any illusions about the ability
of this one provision [s. 319(2) of the Criminal
Code] to rid our society of hate propaganda and its associated
harms. Indeed, to become overly complacent, forgetting that there are a great
many ways in which to address the problem of racial and religious intolerance,
could be dangerous. Obviously, a variety of measures need be employed in the
quest to achieve such lofty and important goals.
[98]
The Tribunal has previously held that the Internet facilitates
hate speech and thus s 13 should apply with greater force to that medium: Schnell,
at para 156; see also Chris Gosnell, “Hate Speech on the Internet: A Question
of Context” (1997-1998) 23 Queen’s LJ 369. The Ontario Court of Appeal has
expressed a similar view with regards to defamation on the Internet: Black v
Breeden, 2010 ONCA 547 at para 65; and Barrick Gold v Lopehandia,
239 DLR (4th) 577, [2004] OJ No 2329 (QL) at
paras 29-35.
[99]
As
found by the Tribunal at para 231 of the decision, the conclusion in Taylor on rational connection to the legislative objective still applies. I am of
the same view.
d) Minimal
Impairment
[100] This is the
stage of the analysis at which the Tribunal found that s 13 was no longer
justified. The Tribunal held that the monetary penalty of s 54(1)(c) of the
CHRA no longer minimally impaired s 2(b) of the Charter. The Tribunal
based this finding on the ground that one of the reasons for minimal impairment
in Taylor was the conciliatory nature of the Act. The Member found that
this was no longer true based on the administration of the Act by the
Commission and based on what he considered to be the “now penal nature” of the
Act.
[101] The
concept of minimal impairment requires that Parliament choose the least
restrictive means that can actually create results to meet the objective of the
legislation: Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37,
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 at para 53; Keegstra at para Ql 130 / WL 135; and Peter
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed, loose-leaf
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007) [Hogg] at pp 38-36 to 38-43. The legislative history
of s 13 indicates that Parliament concluded that cease and desist orders were
no longer sufficient to meet the objective of the legislation. The Tribunal has
commented on the inadequacy of such orders: Citron, at para 298.
Parliament has to choose between imperfect alternatives and Courts owe some
deference to the legislative choice: Ross at para 88; and Canada (Attorney General) v JTI-Macdonald Corp, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610, 2007 SCC 30
[JTI-Macdonald Corp], at para 41. This is especially true when the
impugned legislation, like the CHRA, seeks to protect vulnerable groups: Ross
at para 86; Irwin Toy at para 79; R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [Edwards Books] at para 141; and Robert J Sharpe
and Kent Roach, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 4th ed
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) [Sharpe & Roach] at pp 81-82.
[102] In Citron
at para 294 and in Schnell at para 160, the Tribunal upheld the
constitutionality of s 13 with the penalty provision. In this matter, the
Tribunal distinguished those rulings on the basis that at the time they were
decided, data on the activities of the Commission was not available to be
considered. Since, as I have earlier discussed, it was not open to the Tribunal
to review the manner in which the Commission conducts its investigations, this
can not justify arriving at a different conclusion than in the prior Tribunal
decisions and in Taylor.
[103] The Tribunal
found at paragraphs 287 to 290 of its decision that the majority in Taylor:
[287]
…was clearly of the view, and relied upon its perception, that many, if not
all, of the conciliatory measures provided for in the Act would find their way
into all s. 13 proceedings…
[289]
As I have pointed out several times in this decision, Mr. Lemire had not only
"amended" his conduct by removing the impugned material, but sought
conciliation and mediation as soon as he learned of the complaint against him.
The process understood by the Supreme Court was not what Mr. Lemire experienced.
[290]
In my view, it is clear that Taylor's confidence that the human rights
process under the Act merely serves to prevent discrimination and compensate
victims hinged on the absence of any penal provision akin to the one now found
at s. 54 (1) (c), as well as on the belief that the process itself was not only
structured, but actually functioned in as conciliatory a manner as possible.
The evidence before me demonstrates that the situation is not as the Court
contemplated in both respects. …
[104] Unlike the Tribunal,
I find no support in Taylor for the proposition that the majority was
“clearly of the view …that many, if not all, of the conciliatory measures
provided for in the Act would find their way into all s 13 proceedings”, that
[t]he process understood by the Supreme Court was not what Mr. Lemire
experienced” or that “…the situation is not as the Court contemplated in both
respects…” There is no evidence either in Taylor or in the Tribunal
decision of what the Commission’s actual pre-referral practices were when Taylor was decided and how, or whether they have changed. The Tribunal’s view of the
Supreme Court’s understanding of the process is based entirely upon comments in
the dissenting decision of Justice McLachlin, as she then was.
[105] Moreover, the Tribunal
appears to have interpreted Taylor as meaning that the only
justification for s 13 was that it was solely conciliatory and remedial.
However, this is not the case. Chief Justice Dickson indicated that the minimal
impairment test was met because s 13 was less penal and more
conciliatory than criminal law.
[106] The only
non-remedial aspects of the regime are the penalty provisions adopted in 1998.
[107] It is true that
the majority recognized that human rights legislation generally operates in a
less confrontational manner in contrast with criminal procedure and that the
opportunities for a conciliatory settlement made s 13 especially well-suited to
encourage reform of the communicator of hate propaganda. But the majority’s
description of its understanding of the human rights complaint process that was
in place at the time, as set out in paragraph 20 of Taylor, was based on
the discussion by the Federal Court of Appeal, in the decision appealed from,
which focused on how the Commission process met the requirements of natural
justice such as notice, disclosure, the opportunity to be heard and access to
judicial review. The Tribunal read into the majority’s reasons an emphasis on
conciliation that, in my respectful view, is not there.
[108] Nonetheless, I
agree with the Tribunal that the addition of the penalty provision has
fundamentally altered the nature of the s 13 process and brought it
uncomfortably close to the state’s ultimate control measure, criminal
prosecution, with which it was favourably compared by the Court in Taylor.
[109] I note here that
the discussion of the penalty provision in this matter has been somewhat artificial.
When it was clear that Mr. Lemire would not be held accountable for the
JRBooksonline.com content, the Commission abandoned its request for a financial
penalty. The greater concern for Lemire, as the record makes clear, was always
the possibility of a “cease and desist” order.
[110] As discussed by
the Tribunal, the financial penalty which could be imposed under s 54(1)(c) may
have true penal consequences as described in R v Wigglesworth, [1987] 2
SCR 541 at para 24 – either imprisonment or a fine which by its magnitude would
appear to be imposed for the purpose of “redressing the wrong done to society
at large”. The maximum amount is not insignificant and failure to pay it could
result in contempt proceedings in this Court with a possible sanction of
imprisonment until the contempt was purged.
[111] The penalty in
this instance is distinguishable from that discussed in Martineau v Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737 at paras 36 and 45. In that
case, the Court found that a demand for an “ascertained forfeiture” of $315,458.00
under the Customs Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (2d Supp) was not intended to punish an
offender in order to produce a deterrent effect and redress a wrong to society
but rather to be a mechanism to ensure compliance with the statute. The amount
was determined through a mathematical calculation based on the value of the
property involved that had been falsely declared.
[112] I note that in
its written submissions to the tribunal, the Attorney General took the position
that the penalty provisions were constitutionally valid because they were part
of a broader regulatory scheme within federal jurisdiction; the conduct to
which they were addressed is not criminal in nature; and the administrative
penalty was not punitive but had other objects to ensure compliance with the
preventative and remedial provisions of the Act. The Attorney General argued
further that the penalties could be the subject of mediation and conciliation
and must be tailored to the respondent's ability to pay.
[113] In my view, the
penalty is inherently punitive. Like a fine, it goes into the general revenue
fund and not towards any compensatory measure such as an education or victim’s
fund. In Schnell, at paragraph 163, the Tribunal noted that s
54(1)(c)
was designed to express “society’s opprobrium for the discriminator’s
conduct.” That view of the purpose of the penalty is enhanced by the factors
set out in s. 54(1.1) which are similar to those which a criminal court would
consider in determining the fine to be imposed on someone found guilty of an
offence. Included is the wilfulness or recklessness of the respondent’s
discriminatory practice, his or her prior discriminatory practices and his or
her ability to pay.
[114] I agree with the
Tribunal that these are all reasons to support a finding that the s 13 regime
with these aspects can no longer be considered exclusively remedial. I part
company with the Tribunal on its conclusion that this applies to the regime as
a whole. As discussed below, I am satisfied that with severance of the
problematic aspects, the regime can be preserved.
[115] Mr. Lemire and
certain of the intervenors also contend that the concept of hate is too vague,
that the application of s 13 to the Internet has made the scope of the provision
too broad, and that the lack of a defence of truth and the lack of an intent
requirement in s 13 makes the provision too harsh.
[116] On the issue of
intent, Chief Justice Dickson stated in Taylor, at paras 67-68 and 70:
[67]
An intent to discriminate is not a precondition of a finding of discrimination
under human rights codes (Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v.
Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, at pp. 549-50; Bhinder v.
Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, at p. 586). The
preoccupation with effects, and not with intent, is readily explicable when one
considers that systemic discrimination is much more widespread in our society
than is intentional discrimination. To import a subjective intent requirement
into human rights provisions, rather than allowing tribunals to focus solely
upon effects, would thus defeat one of the primary goals of anti-discrimination
statutes. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that to ignore intent
in determining whether a discriminatory practice has taken place according to
s. 13(1) increases the degree of restriction upon the constitutionally
protected freedom of expression. This result flows from the realization that an
individual open to condemnation and censure because his or her words may have
an unintended effect will be more likely to exercise caution via
self-censorship.
[68]
The absence of an intent requirement in the Canadian Human Rights Act
thus presents the Court with a conflict between the objective of eradicating
the discriminatory effects of certain expressive activities and the need to
keep to a minimum restrictions upon the freedom of expression. This conflict is
perhaps best discussed under the "effects" segment of the Oakes
proportionality test, for the question is not so much whether the objective of
s. 13(1) can be accomplished in a less restrictive way as it is whether the
sacrifice required in order to combat successfully discriminatory effects is so
severe as to make the impact of s. 13(1) upon the freedom of expression
unacceptable. Nevertheless, putting aside this categorizational point, it seems
to me that the important Parliamentary objective behind s. 13(1) can only be achieved
by ignoring intent, and therefore the minimal impairment requirement of the
Oakes proportionality test is not transgressed.
[70]
In sum, it is my opinion that the absence of an intent component in s. 13(1)
raises no problem of minimal impairment when one considers that the objective
of the section requires an emphasis upon discriminatory effects. Moreover, and
this is where I am perhaps jumping ahead to the "effects" component
of the proportionality test, the purpose and impact of human rights codes is to
prevent discriminatory effects rather than to stigmatize and punish those who
discriminate. Consequently, in this context the absence of intent in s. 13(1)
does not impinge so deleteriously upon the s. 2(b) freedom of expression
so as to make intolerable the challenged provision's existence in a free and
democratic society.
[117] I see no reason
to depart from the holding in Taylor that intent is not appropriate in
non-criminal human rights schemes. Discrimination, even if committed unintentionally,
remains discrimination. Adding an intent requirement would render s 13
ineffectual as it would make the provision nearly as difficult to establish as
the criminal provision. Evidence of animus or the lack thereof may, however,
assist the Tribunal to determine the appropriate remedy under s 54 of the CHRA.
[118] With respect to
the question of whether the lack of a defence of truth was fatal, Chief Justice
Dickson had these comments in Taylor, at paras 73-74:
[73]
Although I have found the absence of an intent requirement in s. 13(1) to be
constitutionally acceptable, the section evinces yet another feature which is
said to give it a fatally broad scope. In contrast to s. 319(2) of the Criminal
Code, s. 13(1) provides no defences to the discriminatory practice it describes,
and most especially does not contain an exemption for truthful statements.
Accepting that the value of truth in all facets of life, including the
political, is central to the s. 2(b) guarantee, the question becomes
whether a restriction upon freedom of expression is excessive where it operates
to suppress statements which are either truthful or perceived to be truthful.
[74]
In Keegstra, I dealt in considerable detail with hate propaganda and the
defence of truth, though in relation to the criminal offence of wilfully
promoting hatred against an identifiable group. It was not strictly necessary
in that appeal to decide whether or not this defence was essential to the
constitutional validity of the impugned criminal provision, but I nevertheless
offered an opinion on the matter, stating (at p. 781):
The
way in which I have defined the s. 319(2) offence, in the context of the
objective sought by society and the value of the prohibited expression, gives
me some doubt as to whether the Charter mandates that truthful
statements communicated with an intention to promote hatred need be
excepted from criminal condemnation. Truth may be used for widely disparate
ends, and I find it difficult to accept that circumstances exist where
factually accurate statements can be used for no other purpose than to stir up
hatred against a racial or religious group. It would seem to follow that there
is no reason why the individual who intentionally employs such statements to
achieve harmful ends must under the Charter be protected from
criminal censure.
[119] The parties have
raised no new arguments with regards to those two points and I cannot see how
this Court could depart from the above-cited reasoning of Chief Justice Dickson
in Taylor. A statement, even if in essence technically true, may still
constitute hate speech in certain contexts and cause harm. As I discuss below, controversial
issues may be addressed without promoting hatred.
[120] It is true that
the application of s 13 to Internet communications has significantly broadened
its scope. However, this has not necessarily resulted in greater impairment of
the protected freedom. The reasoning in Taylor, in this respect, did not
directly address the scope of the communication covered by s 13 but its effect
on free speech. Apart from the penalty provision, which is addressed below, the
effects remain the same.
[121] I would note
here that the application of s 13 to the Internet is not, in my view, dependent
on the 2001 amendment which was, as it states, enacted “for greater certainty”.
Section 13 as it read before the enactment of that amendment was broad enough
to encompass Internet based telecommunications. This does not appear to have
been questioned in these proceedings and the Tribunal did not rely on the 2001
amendment in reaching its conclusion. It did place great weight on the changing
nature of the communications environment since Taylor, as did the
parties supporting the Tribunal’s decision.
[122] On the point of
vagueness, raised by Mr. Lemire and the CFSL, the argument was rejected by the
Supreme Court and the Tribunal. Taylor has created a very restrictive
definition of what constitutes hate speech. This limits the application of s 13
and makes the infringement on freedom of expression minimal. Taylor, at
para 81:
[81]
As the preceding discussion shows, the freedom of expression is not
unnecessarily impaired by s. 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The
terms of the section, in particular the phrase "hatred or contempt",
are sufficiently precise and narrow to limit its impact to those expressive
activities which are repugnant to Parliament's objective of promoting equality
and tolerance in society. That no special provision exists to emphasize the
importance of minimally impairing the freedom of expression does not create in
s. 13(1) an overly wide or loose scope, for both its purpose and the common
law's traditional desire to protect expressive activity permit an
interpretation solicitous of this important freedom.
[123] Concerns about
the possibility of an extension of s 13 to the traditional media, raised by the
BCCLA, are diminished by the very narrow definition of what constitutes hate
approved in Taylor. In Elmasry v Roger’s Publishing Ltd 2008 BCHRT 378 [Elmasry], for example,
the complaint was dismissed on that ground.
[124] The cases of Whatcott
and Owens v Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) 2006 SKCA 41 [Owens] in Saskatchewan, Boissoin
v Lund, 2009 ABQB 592 [Lund] in
Alberta and Elmasry in British Columbia show that the restricted definition
of hate does serve as an effective limit on the broadness of hate speech
legislation. On this point, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal had this to say in
Whatcott, at paras 73-74:
[73]
Some of the words and phrases taken in isolation are demeaning. It is not
enough that particular words or phrases may be considered to meet the standard
established in Taylor for "hatred" of calumny, detestation and
vilification. It is doubtful if any of the words and phrases isolated by the
Tribunal or the Queen's Bench judge would, standing alone, meet the test set
out in Taylor for hatred, i.e., detestation, calumny and vilification.
Moreover, when examined in the context of a debate about the actions of the
Saskatoon School Board, the entire flyer would not be seen by a reasonable
person as communicating the level of emotion required to expose persons on the
basis of their sexual orientation to a level of hatred within the meaning of
that term as prescribed in Bell.
[74]
To use the derogatory form of a word is not by itself hatred. Many in Canadian
society would find it offensive, may refrain from using such a word and not
associate with persons who use the word. In balancing the right of freedom of
expression against the limitation contained in s. 14(1)(b) of the Code,
one must not seize on a word or phrase in isolation and censor persons who use
the offensive form of a word or phrase in a publication. There, of course, will
be circumstances in which a word or phrase in another context, or without any
context, may well breach s. 14(1)(b) of the Code. This does not give a
license to use such words or phrases, but neither is it obviously hatred within
the meaning of s. 14(1)(b) of the Code.
[125] The Tribunal has
itself provided more precise guidelines as to what constitutes hate speech: see
Warman v Kouba, 2006 CHRT 50 at paras
24-81. These are:
(a)
The targeted group is portrayed as a powerful menace that is taking control of
the major institutions in society and depriving others of their livelihoods,
safety, freedom of speech and general well-being;
(b)
The messages use "true stories", news reports, pictures and
references from purportedly reputable sources to make negative generalizations
about the targeted group;
(c)
The targeted group is portrayed as preying upon children, the aged, the
vulnerable, etc.; (d) The targeted group is blamed for the current problems in
society and the world;
(e)
The targeted group is portrayed as dangerous or violent by nature;
(f)
The messages convey the idea that members of the targeted group are devoid of
any redeeming qualities and are innately evil;
(g)
The messages communicate the idea that nothing but the banishment, segregation
or eradication of this group of people will save others from the harm being
done by this group; (h) The targeted group is de-humanized through comparisons
to and associations with animals, vermin, excrement, and other noxious
substances;
(i)
Highly inflammatory and derogatory language is used in the messages to create a
tone of extreme hatred and contempt;
(j)
The messages trivialize or celebrate past persecution or tragedy involving
members of the targeted group; and
(k)
The messages contain calls to take violent action against the targeted group.
[126] These
“hallmarks” of hate speech can not be characterized as vague and imprecise. They
were applied in the present case to exclude many of the messages that formed
part of the complaint. In the result, only one article met the stringent test:
the “AIDS Secrets” article. It is thus possible to discuss controversial topics
without infringing s 13 and causing harm to vulnerable groups. Simply put,
there are ways to convey expression that is respectful of others and not
hateful. This is in accord with the values of s 2(b) of the Charter and the
free exercise of democratic institutions.
e)
Proportionality of Effects
[127] Chief Justice
Dickson discussed this element of the s 1 Charter analysis in Taylor, at para 83:
[83]
It will be apparent from the preceding discussion that I do not view the
effects of s. 13(1) upon the freedom of expression to be so deleterious as to
make intolerable its existence in a free and democratic society. The section
furthers a government objective of great significance and impinges upon
expression exhibiting only tenuous links with the rationale underlying the
freedom of expression guarantee. Moreover, operating in the context of the
procedural and remedial provisions of the Canadian Human Rights Act, s.
13(1) plays a minimal role in the imposition of moral, financial or
incarcerating sanctions, the primary goal being to act directly for the benefit
of those likely to be exposed to the harms caused by hate propaganda. It is
therefore my opinion that the degree of limitation imposed upon the freedom of
expression by s. 13(1) is not unduly harsh, and that the third requirement of
the Oakes proportionality approach is satisfied.
[128] He also noted in
Keegstra at paras 135-136 in relation to the criminal prohibition, that
the expressive activity at which it was aimed is “only tenuously connected with
the values underlying the guarantee of freedom of speech”. Further, few
concerns he stated “can be as central to the concept of a free and democratic
society as the dissipation of racism and the especially strong value that
Canadian society attaches to this goal must never be forgotten in assessing the
effects of an impugned legislative measure.”
[129] Hate speech has
little value and s 13 minimally impairs freedom of expression. Considering the
deference this court owes to Parliament, considering the minimal value hate
speech possesses and considering the context and the objective of the Act, I
find that the minimal harm caused by s 13 to freedom of expression is far
outweighed by the benefit it provides to vulnerable groups and to the promotion
of equality.
[130] I conclude,
therefore, that s 13 and s 54 of the Act are justifiable in a free and
democratic society and that the Tribunal erred in declining to apply the
legislation .
What is the appropriate remedy if ss 13(1)
54(1) and (1.1) of the CHRA, read together, are found to be unconstitutional?
[131] As indicated
above, and in light of my finding that the penalty provisions in ss 54(1)(c)
and (1.1) cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, the appropriate remedy
to apply is severance. Severance would minimally intrude in the legislative
domain, respect the objective of the legislation, and respect the values of the
Charter.
[132] The doctrine of
severance was explained by the Supreme Court in Schachter v Canada [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] SCJ No 68 (QL) [Schachter]
at paras 26, 31:
[26]
The flexibility of the language of s. 52 is not a new development in Canadian
constitutional law. The courts have always struck down laws only to the extent
of the inconsistency using the doctrine of severance or "reading
down". Severance is used by the courts so as to interfere with the laws
adopted by the legislature as little as possible. Generally speaking, when only
a part of a statute or provision violates the Constitution, it is common sense
that only the offending portion should be declared to be of no force or effect,
and the rest should be spared.
…
[31]
Therefore, the doctrine of severance requires that a court define carefully the
extent of the inconsistency between the statute in question and the
requirements of the Constitution, and then declare inoperative (a) the
inconsistent portion, and (b) such part of the remainder of which it cannot be
safely assumed that the legislature would have enacted it without the
inconsistent portion.
[133] See also Gerald
A Beaudouin and Pierre Thibault, La Constitution du Canada, 3rd
ed (Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004) at pp 862-864; Henri Brun, Guy
Tremblay and Eugénie Brouillet, Droit Constitutionnel, 5th ed
(Cowansville (QC): éditions Yvon
Blais, 2008) at pp 1004-1005; Sharpe & Roach at pp 390-391; and Hogg at pp 40-12
to 40-15.
[134] The classic test
for severance was set out in Attorney General for Alberta v Attorney General
for Canada, [1947] AC 503 at p 518, [1947] JCJ No 5 (QL),
at para 16:
The
real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part
declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or, as it has sometimes
been put, whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that
the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that
is ultra vires at all.
[135] At paragraph 72
of Schachter Chief Justice Lamer observed:
It
is sensible to consider the significance of the remaining portion when asking
whether it is safe to assume that the legislature would have enacted the
remaining portion. If the remaining portion is very significant, or of a long
standing nature, it strengthens the assumption that it would have been enacted
without the impermissible portion…The significance of the remaining portion may
be enhanced where the Constitution specifically encourages that sort of
provision.
[136] Applying the
doctrine of severance requires that the Court carefully define the extent of
the inconsistency between the statute in question and the requirements of the
Constitution. In this case, s 54(1)(c) & (1.1) of the CHRA can readily be
severed from s 13(1). These provisions were not part of the statute when it was
considered in Taylor. The offending parts are not inextricably bound up
with that part of the legislation held to be valid in Taylor. The
remaining portion of the legislation is very significant and of a long-standing
nature. It may safely be assumed that the legislator would have enacted s 13
without a penalty provision as it had done so at the time of its initial
adoption in 1977.
[137] This is not a
case in which the Tribunal found that the section could not be administered in
a way that is consistent with the Supreme Court's findings in Taylor as
the section read prior to the 1998 amendments. Although the Tribunal expressed
concerns as to the evidence that it had heard with respect to the
administration of the statute in this and other cases in recent years, its
conclusion turned primarily on the penalty provisions. The Tribunal did not
express any view on the question of severance.
[138] For that reason,
I do not accept the arguments advanced in these proceedings that the penalty
provisions are so integrated with s 13 that they can no longer be severed. The
Tribunal’s concerns with respect to the lack of a conciliatory approach by the
Commission were not an inevitable consequence of the law or an effect of the
law itself.
[139] Severance of the
problematic sections and preservation of the core of the s. 13 regime would be in
accord with the objective of the CHRA (see s 2 of the CHRA; Taylor at
para 39; and Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 at para 12). It is also
compatible with the view of the Supreme Court and the Ontario Court of Appeal
that a just remedy must take into consideration other Charter values and
human rights conferred on vulnerable groups: Haig v Canada (1992) 94 DLR (4th) 1 (ON CA) at para 22; and Edwards Books
at para 136.
CONCLUSION:
[140] I find that the
Tribunal erred in refusing to apply s 13 and to exercise its discretion under
paragraphs 54(1)(a) and/or (b) of the Act to determine a remedy. Since it found
the publication of the article “AIDS Secrets” to be in breach of s 13 the
adjudicator should have issued a declaration to that effect and should have proceeded
to consider ordering a remedy under ss 54(1)(a) and (b).
[141] Having found
that ss 54(1)(c) & (1.1) did not survive constitutional scrutiny, the
appropriate remedy for the Tribunal to have applied would have been to sever
those provisions from s 13. The Tribunal erred in failing to consider whether s
13 remained constitutionally viable if it declined to apply the penalty
provisions. The adjudicator erred in adopting an all or nothing approach to the
constitutional remedy. The balance of s 13 could stand without applying the
later enacted punitive provisions.
[142] The application
for judicial review is, therefore, granted and the matter is remitted to the
Tribunal to determine a remedy for the breach of s 13 under s.54(1)(a) or (b).
The request for a declaration that s 13 is no longer of any force or effect is
denied.
COSTS:
[143] The applicant made
no request for costs in its Notice of Application and Memorandum of Fact and
Law. For that reason, despite its success on this application, none will be
awarded.
[144] Mr. Warman requested
his costs during his oral submissions but not in his Memorandum of Fact and Law.
While his record was prepared by counsel, he represented himself on the hearing
of this application. He shall have his costs for the preparation of his record
and any out of pocket expenses incurred in preparing for the hearing.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT
is that:
1.
The
application for judicial review is granted and the matter is remitted to the
Tribunal to;
a. issue a
declaration that the publication of the article “AIDS Secrets” by the
respondent Marc Lemire constituted a breach of s 13 of the Canadian Human
Rights Act ; and
b. for determination
of whether a remedy for the breach is to be imposed under ss 13 and 54(1)(a)
and (b) of the Act;
2.
It
is declared that ss 54 (1) (c) and 54 (1.1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act
are of no force or effect pursuant to s 52 (1) of The Constitution Act,
1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11,1982;
3.
The
respondent Richard Warman is awarded costs for the preparation of his record
and his out of pocket disbursements for attendance at the hearing against the
respondent Marc Lemire.
“Richard G. Mosley”