Date: 20120327
Docket: IMM-5477-11
Citation: 2012 FC 363
Ottawa, Ontario, March 27,
2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Bédard
BETWEEN:
|
|
BAHRAM NOORI NEKOIE
|
|
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
|
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
|
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [the Act] of a decision made by
the Immigration Appeal Division (the IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board
on August 30, 2011, wherein the IAD rejected Mr. Nekoie’s (the applicant)
appeal of a departure order made against him by an immigration officer. The
immigration officer determined that the applicant was inadmissible to Canada because he failed to comply
with his residency obligation as a permanent resident. The applicant did not
challenge the legal validity of the departure order. Rather, the issue before
the IAD was whether the applicant had established sufficient humanitarian and
compassionate considerations to overcome the breach of the residency
requirement.
[2]
For the
following reasons, the application is dismissed.
I. Background
[3]
The
applicant is a citizen of Iran. He landed in Canada with his wife and two
children in March 2002 as a permanent resident in the Investor Class. Two weeks
after landing in Canada, the applicant and his family
went back to Iran because his children had to
return to school. The family returned to Canada in June 2003 and settled in Montreal.
[4]
During the
five years preceding the immigration officer’s decision, the applicant was
present in Canada for approximately 331 days
out of the 730 days required to maintain permanent residence under subsection
28(2) of the Act.
[5]
The
applicant claims that during the reference period (August 24, 2004 to August
19, 2009), he was required to spend considerable time in Iran for two main reasons. First, he had to
close his factories, lay off workers, provide employees with salaries and
benefits and sell assets that belonged to him and his family. Second, as of
2007, his presence was required in Iran
on a regular basis to deal with court proceedings in which he was involved.
II. The decision under review
[6]
The IAD
determined that there were insufficient humanitarian and compassionate
considerations to warrant granting special relief to the applicant.
[7]
First, the
IAD considered the extent of the non-compliance with the residency obligation,
or the legal impediment, and found that it was significant as the applicant
spent less than half the days in Canada,
as required by subsection 28(2) of the Act. The IAD also found that the
applicant did not take his residency obligation very seriously.
[8]
Second,
the IAD considered both the reasons for the applicant’s departure and whether
these reasons were imperious. The IAD noted that after the applicant and his
family landed in Canada, they had to return to Iran because the applicant’s children needed
to go back to school. It also noted the reasons put forward by the applicant to
explain his departure from Canada and extend his stay in Iran, after his family settled in Montreal. The IAD indicated that the
applicant said that he had to close his factories over a period of time and
compensate his workers. The IAD also mentioned that the applicant testified
that he had approximately $5 million worth of assets still in Iran and that he
needed to transfer his money slowly and over a period of time, in order to
respect Iranian law. The IAD further noted that the applicant testified that he
needed to be present in Iran because he was involved in
Court proceedings against his brother and sister-in-law, who had stolen
approximately $2 million from him in lands, machinery and workshops.
[9]
The IAD
did not challenge the truth of these statements. However, it was not satisfied
that the applicant had established that he had to stay in Iran for as long as
he did and that it was not possible for him to spend more time in Canada. The IAD remarked that it was
difficult to believe that the applicant found time to vacation outside of Iran during the reference period but was not
able to come to Canada. The IAD also noted that the
applicant could have tried to stay in Canada, while his children were attending
school in Iran.
[10]
The third
factor considered by the IAD related to the applicant’s establishment in Canada. While it found that the
applicant had some degree of establishment in Canada, the IAD noted that he had only
transferred a portion of the money that he was legally permitted to transfer to
Canada over the past 10 years. The
IAD found that the applicant did not have the degree of establishment that he
could have had, had he made all the necessary efforts to transfer his money as
quickly as possible.
[11]
Regarding
the best interests of the children, the IAD noted that they were over the age
of 18 and that the Federal Court has clearly established that only minor
children must be considered in this type of assessment (Leobrera v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 587 at para 63, [2011] 4
FCR 290). In this case, the only minor child involved was the applicant’s
grandson. The IAD acknowledged that the applicant’s grandson had a right to
know his grandparents and that this was a positive factor in its consideration,
however it did not find that this was determinative of the decision since the
child lived in Canada with his parents.
[12]
The IAD
considered the hardship caused to both the family and the applicant if the appeal
were refused. The IAD noted that the applicant’s departure from Canada would be sad for the
applicant and his family. However, it indicated that the applicant could apply
for a visitor’s visa and when he is ready to come to Canada permanently, the family could sponsor
him. The IAD found that, in the interim, the family will continue to be in the
same situation as it had been for the last five years.
[13]
The IAD
explained that it gave a lot of weight to the legal impediment of the
applicant’s residency requirement. It also noted that the applicant had not
come back to Canada at the first opportunity, that he has a house in Iran in which he could live, and that, over
the time he had been in Canada, he had not transferred to Canada the amount of money that he
could have. Accordingly, the IAD concluded that the applicant’s level of
establishment in Canada was not what it could have
been if he had really tried to transfer all of his business to Canada.
III. Issues and standards of review
[14]
The
applicant challenged the IAD’s decision on three fronts, which raised the
following issues:
- Did the IAD err in its assessment of
the evidence and the circumstances of the applicant?
- Did the IAD provide adequate
reasons?
- Did a breach in procedural fairness
arise because of errors in the translation?
[15]
It is well
established that the factual conclusions and the IAD’s assessment of
humanitarian and compassionate considerations involve a high degree of
discretion. Accordingly, the IAD’s decision should be reviewed under the
reasonableness standard (Alonso v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 683 at para 5, 170 ACWS (3d) 162; Arizaj v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 774 at para 18, 168 ACWS
(3d) 830; Ikhuiwu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 35 at para 15, 163 ACWS (3d) 438; Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at 857, 174 DLR (4th) 193).
[16]
With
respect to adequacy of reasons, the recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador
(Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 22, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 [NFLD and
Labrador Nurses’ Union] determined that the adequacy of reasons is not a
stand alone basis for setting aside a decision. This issue is to be examined
within the purview of whether the outcome of a decision is reasonable. Justice
Abella, writing for the Court, expressed the following:
14 Read as a whole, I do not see Dunsmuir
as standing for the proposition that the "adequacy" of reasons is
a stand-alone basis for quashing a decision, or as advocating that a reviewing
court undertake two discrete analyses - one for the reasons and a separate one
for the result (Donald J. M. Brown and John M. Evans, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action in Canada (loose-leaf), at ss.12: 5330 and 12: 5510).
It is a more organic exercise - the reasons must be read together with the
outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a
range of possible outcomes. This, it seems to me, is what the Court was saying
in Dunsmuir when it told reviewing courts to look at "the qualities
that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating
the reasons and to outcomes" (para. 47).
[17]
Therefore,
the first two issues raised by the applicant boil down to whether the IAD’s
decision is reasonable.
[18]
The
Court’s role when reviewing a decision against the standard of reasonableness
is defined in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at
para 47, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]:
47 . . . A
court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that
make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the
reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly
with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within
the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision
falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.
[19]
The issue
of adequate language interpretation at the hearing is a question of procedural
fairness (Mohammadian v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 191, [2001] 4 FC
85) and should be reviewed under the correctness standard.
IV. Analysis
A. Was the IAD’s decision reasonable?
[20]
The
applicant argues that the IAD did not consider all of the evidence, ignored
material facts and failed to provide adequate reasons.
[21]
The
applicant argues that merely reciting the submissions and evidence of the parties
and then stating a conclusion does not satisfy the obligation to provide
reasons. Rather, a decision maker must set out its findings and the principal
evidence upon which it based those findings. The reasons must address all of
the points in issue. The applicant relies on VIA Rail Canada Inc v National
Transportation Agency, [2001] 2 FC 25, 193 DLR (4th) 357, to support his
position.
[22]
In
particular, the applicant argues that the IAD did not explain why it rejected
his testimony and material evidence regarding the fact that he was required to
remain in Iran for his court proceedings. He
also argues that he explained to the IAD that, while he was in Canada in 2007, some of his Iranian
assets were stolen from him by his brother and sister-in-law with the help of
three other people. He supported this allegation with documentary evidence; the
applicant submitted a judgment dated September 28, 2008 from the Public
Prosecutor’s Office of Isfahan accepting the applicant’s request to safeguard
approximately US $1.2 million of property of the accused. At the time the applicant
submitted written submissions to this Court, the applicant’s file was ready to
be presented to an Iranian court of judgment.
[23]
The
applicant is of the view that the IAD should have explained why it afforded no
weight to the documentary evidence establishing the court proceedings in Iran, since there was no question regarding
his credibility.
[24]
The
applicant further argues that his level of establishment in Canada is far more
than the IAD’s decision implied and that there were extenuating circumstances
preventing him from transferring more of his assets to Canada than he did.
[25]
The
applicant also alleges that while he was investing in Canada, he was going through a parallel process
in Iran, disposing of his assets. The
applicant argues that he stated to the IAD that, in Iran, it is impossible to close down
workshops and businesses and fire all the workers immediately. He explained to
the IAD that during this process, he was only able to close down his businesses
slowly and transfer money to Canada. The applicant argues that
the IAD should have stated why these explanations were rejected.
[26]
The
applicant further argues that the reference by the IAD to his travel was
irrelevant, since all of his travel outside of Iran occurred prior to the reference period.
Despite the fact that there may have been confusion on this issue in his
testimony, the entries in his passport clearly established that his trips were
made before the reference period. In the applicant’s view, it was an error on
the part of the IAD to ignore this evidence.
[27]
The
respondent, for his part, argues that the IAD’s decision is reasonable. The
respondent alleges that the IAD considered all of the relevant factors in its
decision and assessed all of the evidence submitted by the applicant. The
respondent further contends that the IAD’s reasons are adequate. In the
respondent’s view, the IAD did not need to explain in detail the weight that it
attributed to the evidence and to each factor. The respondent insists that the
applicant raises a mere disagreement with the IAD’s decision and asks the Court
to reweigh the evidence and reassess the factors.
[28]
With
respect, I consider that the IAD’s decision is reasonable and that its reasons
are sufficient.
[29]
Section 28
of the Act outlines the residency requirement for permanent residents, but
affords immigration officers the discretion to determine whether humanitarian
and compassionate considerations should overcome a breach of the residency
obligation. The IAD is vested with the same discretion under section 67 of the
Act:
|
Appeal
allowed
67.
(1) To allow an appeal, the Immigration Appeal Division must be satisfied
that, at the time that the appeal is disposed of,
(a)
the decision appealed is wrong in law or fact or mixed law and fact;
(b)
a principle of natural justice has not been observed; or
(c)
other than in the case of an appeal by the Minister, taking into account the
best interests of a child directly affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian
and compassionate considerations warrant special relief in light of all the
circumstances of the case.
Marginal
note:Effect
(2)
If the Immigration Appeal Division allows the appeal, it shall set aside the
original decision and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should
have been made, including the making of a removal order, or refer the matter
to the appropriate decision-maker for reconsideration.
|
Fondement
de l’appel
67.
(1) Il est fait droit à l’appel sur preuve qu’au moment où il en est disposé
:
a) la décision attaquée est
erronée en droit, en fait ou en droit et en fait;
b) il y a eu manquement à un
principe de justice naturelle;
c) sauf dans le cas de
l’appel du ministre, il y a — compte tenu de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant
directement touché — des motifs d’ordre humanitaire justifiant, vu les autres
circonstances de l’affaire, la prise de mesures spéciales.
Note
marginale :Effet
(2)
La décision attaquée est cassée; y est substituée celle, accompagnée, le cas
échéant, d’une mesure de renvoi, qui aurait dû être rendue, ou l’affaire est
renvoyée devant l’instance compétente.
|
[30]
The powers
of the IAD concerning removal orders are highly discretionary and exceptional.
As explained in Chieu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 3 at para 57,
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 84 [Chieu]:
Second, in appeals under the I.A.D.'s
discretionary jurisdiction, the onus has always been on the individual facing
removal to establish why he or she should be allowed to remain in Canada. If the onus is not met, the
default position is removal. Non-citizens do not have a right to enter or
remain in Canada: Chiarelli, supra, at
p. 733, per Sopinka J. See also Singh v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, at p. 189, per Wilson J.; Kindler v.
Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, at p. 834, per La Forest
J.; and Dehghani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 1053, at p. 1070. In general, immigration is a privilege not a
right, although refugees are protected by the guarantees provided by the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Can. T.S. 1969 No. 6, entered into
force April 22, 1954, entered into force for Canada September 2, 1969 (the
"1951 Geneva Convention"), and the Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force October 4, 1967,
entered into force in Canada June 4, 1969. . . .
[31]
Further,
as more recently explained in Shaath v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 731 at para 42,
[2010] 3 FCR 117:
42 As to why paragraph 67(1)(c)
was enacted by Parliament, Justice Binnie stated:
57 In recognition that hardship
may come from removal, Parliament has provided in s. 67(1)(c) a power to
grant exceptional relief. The nature of the question posed by s. 67(1)(c) requires
the IAD to be "satisfied that, at the time that the appeal is disposed of
... sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant
special relief". Not only is it left to the IAD to determine what
constitute "humanitarian and compassionate considerations", but the
"sufficiency" of such considerations in a particular case as well.
Section 67(1)(c) calls for a fact-dependent and policy-driven assessment by the
IAD itself. . . . [Emphasis added.]
[32]
The IAD
noted that in the exercise of its discretion under section 67 of the Act, it
followed the criteria put forward in the IAD decisions Bufete Arce v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003] IADD No. 370 (QL) (IRB)
and Kok v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2003] IADD
No. 514 (QL) (IRB), which were endorsed by the Federal Court in Ambat v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 292 at para 27,
386 FTR 35 [Ambat]. In Ambat at para 27, the Court listed the
factors that were applied by the IAD in determining whether there were
sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations to warrant special
relief:
27 The IAD considered the
statutory provision allowing special relief found in paragraph 67(1)(c) of the
IRPA. The IAD then stated that in considering whether the Applicant's breach of
the residency obligation was overcome that it was guided by the IAD decisions
in Bufete Arce, Dorothy Chicay v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
(IAD VA2-02515), [2003] I.A.D.D. No. 370, and Yun Kuen Kok & Kwai Leung
Kok v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (IAD VA2-02277), [2003]
I.A.D.D. No. 514. Those two cases suggest that in addition to the best
interests of a child directly affected, there are other particularly relevant
factors to consider in these types of appeals. The IAD listed these at para 38:
(i) the extent of the non-compliance with
the residency obligation;
(ii) the reasons for the departure and
stay abroad;
(iii) the degree of establishment in Canada, initially and at the time of
hearing;
(iv) family ties to Canada;
(v) whether attempts to return to Canada were made at the first
opportunity;
(vi) hardship and dislocation to family
members in Canada if the appellant is removed
from or is refused admission to Canada;
(vii) hardship to the appellant if
removed from or refused admissions to Canada;
and.
(viii) whether there are other unique or
special circumstances that merit special relief.
[33]
The
criteria used by the IAD are appropriate for this type of analysis; they are
the criteria taken from Ribic v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1985] IABD No. 4 (QL) (IRB)
and adapted to removal orders in Chieu, above, at para 40. This
Court has affirmed their use for analyses by the IAD regarding departure orders
issued for failure to fulfill residency obligations pursuant to section 28 of
the Act (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Sidhu, 2011
FC 1056 at para 43 (available on Can LII); Tai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2011 FC 248 at para 36, 47 (available on Can LII)). These
factors are not exhaustive and can vary, depending on the special circumstances
of each case. Furthermore, it is at the discretion of the IAD to determine the
weight to be accorded to each factor and to each piece of evidence; this Court
ought not to interfere with those determinations (Tai, above, at para
82) regardless of whether or not the Court agrees with the outcomes (Shaath,
above, at para 57).
[34]
It is
clear from the IAD’s decision that it considered all of the evidence the
applicant submitted and that it understood his allegations and arguments. The
IAD assessed all of the factors and proceeded to explain how the evidence
related to each factor, as well as how much weight should be assigned to
various elements. The IAD also described which elements it found most
significant to its analysis and concluded that it found that the applicant did
not meet his burden of proof.
[35]
The IAD
considered the legal impediment in this case and found that it was significant.
The IAD also examined all the reasons put forward by the applicant to explain
why he had to spend considerable time in Iran and could not be in Canada: he had to sell his assets in
Iran; gradually close down his factories; and his presence was required in Iran due to ongoing court proceedings. The
IAD concluded that the applicant failed to show that he was obliged to stay in Iran for as long as he did and that it was
impossible for him to spend more time in Canada. It was clear to the IAD that the
applicant did not return to Canada at the first available
opportunity.
[36]
I disagree
with the applicant’s contention that his travel outside Iran was irrelevant since it took place
outside the reference period and that the IAD should not have considered it.
While the applicant’s testimony about his travel was somewhat confused, he
clearly mentioned that he had spent approximately one month travelling outside
of Iran during the reference period.
The applicant argues that the IAD should have cleared up the confusion by
looking at the entries in the applicant’s passport. With respect, the onus was
on the applicant and the IAD’s finding is based on the applicant’s own
testimony.
[37]
Regarding
the applicant’s degree of establishment in Canada, the IAD considered the
applicant’s explanation that he had to transfer money slowly out of Iran. However, it found that the applicant
still had not transferred all of the money to which he was legally entitled,
with significant portions remaining in Iran.
[38]
The IAD
also considered the best interests of the applicant’s grandson and considered
it as a positive factor for the applicant. It was not, however, determinative
as the child’s best interests were looked after by remaining with his parents
in Canada.
[39]
The IAD
also assessed the hardship on the applicant and his family. It found that the
applicant could come to Canada as a visitor and could be
sponsored by his family when he is ready to establish himself permanently in Canada.
[40]
In my
view, the applicant’s arguments amount to a mere disagreement with the IAD’s
assessment of the evidence and to the weight that it accorded to each factor.
It is not the Court’s role to reassess the evidence and reweigh the factors and
the Court cannot substitute its own view of the evidence with that of the
IAD’s. This principle was clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)
v Khosa, 2009
SCC 12 at para 59, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339:
59 Reasonableness is a single standard that takes its
colour from the context. One of the objectives of Dunsmuir was to
liberate judicial review courts from what came to be seen as undue complexity
and formalism. Where the reasonableness standard applies, it requires
deference. Reviewing courts cannot substitute their own appreciation of the
appropriate solution, but must rather determine if the outcome falls within
"a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect
of the facts and law" (Dunsmuir, at para. 47). There might be more than
one reasonable outcome. However, as long as the process and the outcome fit
comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and
intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view
of a preferable outcome.
[Emphasis added]
[41]
I also
consider that the IAD’s reasons are sufficient. This Court has affirmed that
the duty to provide reasons does not require a decision maker to mention every
piece of evidence, its probative value and how it relates to the conclusions (Cepeda-Gutierrez
c Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
157 FTR 35 at para 16, 83 ACWS (3d) 264). The Supreme Court of Canada
reaffirmed this principle in NFLD and Labrador Nurses’ Union, above, at
para 16 and 17, and made it clear that:
16 Reasons may not include all the
arguments, statutory provisions, jurisprudence or other details the reviewing
judge would have preferred, but that does not impugn the validity of either the
reasons or the result under a reasonableness analysis. A decision-maker is not
required to make an explicit finding on each constituent element, however
subordinate, leading to its final conclusion (Service Employees'
International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District Staff Nurses Assn.,
[1975] 1 S.C.R. 382, at p. 391). In other words, if the reasons allow the
reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it
to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes,
the Dunsmuir criteria are met.
17 . . . Reviewing judges
should pay "respectful attention" to the decision-maker's reasons,
and be cautious about substituting their own view of the proper outcome by
designating certain omissions in the reasons to be fateful.
[42]
The
reasons must not be read microscopically, but rather, they must be taken as a
whole (Liang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
2003 FC 1501 at para 41-42, 128 ACWS (3d) 262). Furthermore, the IAD was not
required to explain in detail the weight that it attributed to each piece of
evidence and to each factor. The IAD’s decision is reasonable because it allows
the applicant to understand why it dismissed the appeal. It also allows this
Court to determine whether the IAD’s conclusions are within the range of
acceptable outcomes. In my view, the reasons meet the standard of a justified,
transparent and intelligible decision pursuant to the criteria outlined in Dunsmuir,
above, at para 47 and the outcome is reasonable. Accordingly, I find no reason
to interfere with the IAD’s decision.
B. Did a breach of procedural fairness arise because of a
lack of adequate translation?
[43]
The
applicant argues that the quality of translation at a hearing raises a breach
of procedural fairness.
[44]
The
applicant alleges that there were material errors in the transcript due to
inadequate translation and he submitted his own certified translations to
demonstrate this. More specifically, he points out that the transcript on
record incorrectly refers to the issuance of a contract in relation to court
proceedings. The certified translation shows that the applicant was speaking
about a court decree ordering the seizure of assets worth US $2 million. The
applicant alleges that the interpreter also failed to interpret key parts of
his testimony. For example, the applicant clearly explained that he took no
vacations during the five-year reference period but the interpreter did not
repeat that statement to the IAD. The applicant argues that it is very likely
that errors in translation contributed to the IAD’s analysis and conclusion.
[45]
The
arguments raised by the applicant cannot succeed.
[46]
First, I
find that the error regarding the court decree is immaterial as nothing leads
me to conclude that this error had any impact on the IAD’s conclusions. Whether
a contract was issued or a court decree was ordered does not affect the IAD’s
findings on whether the applicant’s reasons for remaining in Iran were sufficient to warrant humanitarian
and compassionate relief from his residency obligations.
[47]
Second, as
mentioned above, despite any error that could have occurred in the translation
of the applicant’s testimony about his travel outside of Iran, there is no
doubt that he stated at the hearing that he was out of Iran for approximately one month during the
reference period.
[48]
In conclusion,
while I acknowledge that the interpreter may have made some small errors during
the hearing, I do not find, given the evidence submitted by the applicant, that
these errors amounted to any breach of natural justice.
[49]
For all of
the above reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed. The
parties did not submit any question for certification and no serious question
of importance arises in this case.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S
JUDGMENT is that the application is dismissed. No question is certified.
“Marie-Josée
Bédard”
Email this Content