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Milfort‑Laguere is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. ... Milfort-Laguere’s failure to regularize her status in Brazil in relation to the issue of exclusion by operation of Article 1E of the Convention? ... Analysis and decision [24]   The case law has developed a framework to determine whether a person meets the criteria of Article 1E of the Convention. ...

They allege that they risk being persecuted in Colombia and that they are also persons in need of protection because of their involvement in a non-governmental organization [NGO]. [3]   The Convention ground invoked by the applicants before the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] was their membership in a social group: [TRANSLATION]  “social workers seeking to defend human rights, members of an NGO that works with displaced persons in order to help them reclaim their lands” (Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] at p 371). [4]   The RPD found that the applicants did not establish a reasonable possibility of persecution based on a Convention ground or that, on a balance of probabilities, they were personally subjected to a danger of torture, to a risk to their lives or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if they were to return to Colombia. ... The RAD affirmed the decision rendered by the RPD, finding that the applicants were neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. [7]   For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed. ... Reasonableness of the decision [79]   Regarding the merits, the applicants are contesting the RPD’s findings, upheld by the RAD, that the two incidents which occurred prior to their departure from Colombia (the call on September 30, 2016, and the robbery on October 27, 2016) have no nexus to a Convention ground and do not establish a personalized risk. ...

B)         In the alternative, that the Requirement as worded is unreasonable and constitutes a far-reaching fishing expedition and totally bypasses the procedures laid out in the Tax Convention between Canada and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. [3]                 The applicant was incorporated in Luxembourg in 1998 and, for tax purposes, is a resident of Luxembourg. ... By letters dated September 17, 1998, CCRA granted waivers with respect to both these regulations (waiver from withholding tax). [12]            The applicant submits that the Canada-Grand Duchy of Luxembourg Tax Convention provides for the exchange of information between the competent authorities of both contracting states as is necessary for the carrying out of the provisions of the Convention, to underline that at no time did the officials of the CCRA communicate with the Luxembourg tax authorities with respect to any matter pertaining to the applicant's activities. [13]            The issue in dispute is whether or not the applicant is bound to disclose income earned in Canada if they were considered to have a "permanent establishment" in accordance with Article V of the Tax Convention between Canada and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. ...

Upon arrival in Ethiopia, he applied for a permanent resident visa in Canada as either a member of the Convention refugee abroad class or as a member of the humanitarian-protected person abroad designated class.   ... In due course, the Applicant fled Eritrea, evading national service, and entered Ethiopia where he is living presently. [7]   The Applicant submitted an application in 2017 for a permanent resident visa in Canada as a member of the Convention refugee abroad class or as a member of the humanitarian-protected persons abroad designated class.   ... The Officer determined that the Applicant was neither a member of the Convention refugee abroad class nor the humanitarian-protected persons abroad designated class.   ...

Dans le but de faciliter la perception et la remise de l’impôt établi par la présente loi, ou de prévenir le double paiement de cet impôt sur le même tabac, le ministre peut faire avec un vendeur telles conventions qu’il jugera à propos et telles conventions seront sujettes à la présente loi. ... Le mandat est gratuit s’il n’y a une convention ou un usage reconnu au contraire. ... Elle est une conséquence de la liberté de tester, et nous pouvons admettre la même solution dans le cas du mandat, comme étant la conséquence de la liberté des conventions, et cela sans que le contrat cesse d'être un contrat de mandat. ...

Section 7 does not apply in the case of any air conditioner described therein     (a) that is purchased or imported for permanent installation in an ambulance or hearse or is included as permanently installed equipment in such a vehicle;   (b) that is sold under conditions that would qualify the sale as a zero-rated supply for the purposes of Part IX of the Act or that is purchased by and for the personal or official use of a person who is entitled to the tax exemptions specified in article 34 of the Convention set out in Schedule I to the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act or in article 49 of the Convention set out in Schedule II to that Act; or     (c) that is included as permanently installed equipment in an automobile, station wagon, van or truck, that is sold under conditions that would qualify the sale as a zero-rated supply for the purposes of Part IX of the Act or that is purchased by and for the personal or official use of a person who is entitled to the tax exemptions specified in article 34 of the Convention set out in Schedule I to the Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act or in article 49 of the Convention set out in Schedule II to that Act. 7. ... L’article 7 ne s’applique pas dans le cas d’un climatiseur visé à cet article qui, selon le cas:   a) est acheté ou importé pour être installé en permanence dans une ambulance ou un corbillard ou est compris dans l’équipement installé en permanence dans ces véhicules;   b) est vendu dans des conditions qui feraient de la vente une fourniture détaxée pour l’application de la partie IX de la loi ou est acheté, pour son usage personnel ou officiel, par une personne exempte d’impôts et de taxes visée à l’article 34 de la convention figurant à l’annexe I de la Loi sur les missions étrangères et les organisations internationales ou à l’article 49 de la convention figurant à l’annexe II de cette loi;   c) est inclus à titre d’équipement installé en permanence dans une automobile, une familiale, une fourgonnette ou un camion, qui est vendu dans des conditions qui feraient de la vente une fourniture détaxée pour l’application de la partie IX de la loi ou est acheté, pour son usage personnel ou officiel, par une personne exempte d’impôts et de taxes visée à l’article 34 de la convention figurant à l’annexe I de la Loi sur les missions étrangères et les organisations internationales ou à l’article 49 de la convention figurant à l’annexe II de cette loi ...

First, the applicant’s behaviour was incompatible with the alleged fear in that she went through two countries that are signatories to the Convention, Côte d’Ivoire and Morocco, but did not apply for refugee status. ...   [6]                The applicant first argues that the Panel erred by drawing a negative inference from her failure to apply for refugee status in the Convention signatory countries and, alternatively, that she ought to have been interrogated as to the reasons why she did not apply for refugee status in those countries. However, it is very well recognized by this Court that, although this factor is not a determinant, the Panel is entitled to consider, when assessing the story’s credibility, the applicant’s failure to apply for refugee status in the Convention signatory countries: Ilie v. ...

He applied for permanent residence in Canada as a member of the Convention refugee abroad class and the humanitarian protected persons abroad class. [2]   A visa officer denied his application, on the basis that the Applicant had not been truthful on his application and during his interview. ... This is the crux of the argument that the decision is unreasonable. [5]   The standard of review for whether the Applicant is a member of the Convention refugee abroad class or the country of asylum class is reasonableness: Tesfamichael v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 337 at para 8. [6]   The basic facts are not disputed. ... The officer refused his application for permanent residence under the Convention refugee abroad class, because the applicant had failed to be truthful as required by subsection 16(1) of IPRA and the officer was unable to determine he was inadmissible as required by subsection 11(1). [12]   Justice Brown summarized the jurisprudence (essentially much of the same case-law cited in this case), and concluded that where a negative credibility finding “calls into question the veracity of the totality of the [Applicant’s] answers… there was no requirement to analyze the Applicant’s assertions regarding their risk…” (Samandar, at para 22). [13]   This decision is directly applicable to this case. ...

II prétend d’abord et principalement que même si les actes écrits, faisant état des transactions entre les parties, ne contiennent aucune disposition formelle relativement à l’imputation dudit paiement de $1,000,000 fait à l’acquis de Jar Ltd, une convention verbale existait entre elles à l’effet que la totalité du montant devait être attribuée au capital dû sur le prix de vente du contrat du 4 septembre. ... Quant au moyen principal, je dirai simplement que la preuve fournie à l’effet qu’une convention verbale était intervenue relativement à l’imputation du paiement ne m’a pas convaincu. ... Et surtout je n’arrive pas à penser que des hommes d’affaires aussi avertis que les frères Alepin et un notaire aussi compétent que leur notaire auraient négligé de confirmer dans l’un ou l’autre des nombreux actes passés l’existence d’une convention susceptible d’avoir des conséquences aussi importantes. ...

The Officer concluded that the applicants were not credible and had not shown that they met the criteria to be recognized as Convention refugees, nor could they be considered persons in need of protection under IRPA sections 96 and 97. ... Thereby indicating that they did not qualify under paragraph 139(1)(e) of the Regulation in “the Convention refugee abroad class”. ... Par conséquent, vous n’êtes pas admissible à la « catégorie des réfugiés outre-frontière au sens de la Convention » selon les termes de l’alinéa 139(1)e) du Règlement. [20]   The Officer therefore refused the applicants’ applications. ...