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In confirming the annulment of the Appellant’s registration, Webb JA found that its activities relating to the prevention of poverty were not being carried out for a charitable purpose, noting (at para. 16) that “the Appellant did not refer to any case that have held that the relief of poverty will include the prevention of poverty,” (at para. 17) that “it is clear that the Appellant is assisting many consumers who are employed and who have assets and therefore would not necessarily, as of the time of receiving the assistance, be considered to be in poverty,” and (at para. 18) that “just as in the United Kingdom, it will require an act Parliament to add the prevention of poverty as a charitable purpose.” ...

While dividends are generally considered to be income from property, that characterization is not inconsistent with a finding that the Appellant used the Pechiney shares in the course of carrying on a business. ...

Brown J essentially indicated that it was reasonable for the CITT to consider that if the gloves were not covered by the specific paragraph dealing with clothing items, they should not be considered to be intended to be included in that heading, stating (at para. 50): It is reasonable to interpret that list item as stating exhaustively its own criteria — meaning, in this case, that if an article of clothing or accessories is to be classified in heading 39.26, it must be made by sewing or sealing sheets of plastic together [which was not the case for the goalie gloves]. ...

In dismissing the appeal, Boyle J stated (at paras 49-50): [A] newly hypothesized formulation cannot on its own be considered either knowledge or the advancement of knowledge for these purposes. ...

In adjusting the fully-completed fair market value, he found (at para. 26) that it was preferable to deduct the costs to complete of $500,000 from the fully-completed FMV of $7,050,000, which he considered to be preferable to the “arbitrary” approach suggested by the appellant of deducting the product of the appraised value of the building and 10% (being the inverse of the 90% percentage that had been accepted by CRA and the courts as representing substantial completion) (para. 26). ...

Favreau J respected the retroactive downward adjustment, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, of the proceeds of disposition by $0.5 million but, by the same token, considered that the reverse earnout amounts of $3 million could not be excluded from the proceeds of disposition notwithstanding their contingent nature. ...

Favreau J respected the retroactive downward adjustment, pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, of the proceeds of disposition by $0.5 million but, by the same token, considered that the reverse earnout amounts of $3 million could not be excluded from the proceeds of disposition notwithstanding their contingent nature. ...

In concluding that the taxpayer was not a Canadian-controlled private corporation (and therefore not entitled to enhanced SR&D investment tax credits) as it was subject to the de facto control of the public company, as described in s. 256(5.1), Favreau J stated (at para.35, TaxInterpretations translation) that it is now well established that the determination of the required influence for a corporation to be considered as being controlled by another requires an examination of the operational and economic decisions of the corporation in question. ...

In other word, income is considered to be from an active business only when the owner provides or makes available to the renters services so as to cause the activities at the property to go beyond the simple rental of immovable property. ...

In confirming that Télé‑Métropole had infringed Bishop’s copyright by recording the song without his permission, even though it had the right to braodcast the performance and the recording was to be used only for the two broadcasts, McLachlin J stated (at pp. 478, 484-5) [T]he rights to perform and to record a work are considered sufficiently distinct that they are generally assigned separately, and administered by different entities. … Neither the wording of the [Copyright] Act, nor the object and purpose of the Act, nor practical necessity support an interpretation of these sections which would place ephemeral recordings within the introductory paragraph to s. 3(1) rather than s. 3(1)(d) [re recording right]. ...