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Welsford further mentions that the Port has obtained a writ of seizure and sale for two other vessels that had been abandoned at the Port, and that he believes that if a suitable offer cannot be obtained for the Cormorant, then there could be an opportunity to market all three vessels for sale to take advantage of “economies of scale and the economic practicality of towing more than one ship at a time”. [15]   Implicitly referring to the list of elements set out in paragraph 53 of Franklin Lumber Ltd. v Essington II (The Ship) 2005 FC 95 as elements to be considered in deciding whether to sell a vessel pendente lite, the Port argues that such a sale should be ordered here because: (1)   The claims of the Administrator and of the Port vastly exceed the value of the vessel. (2)   No one has claimed ownership in the vessel. (3)   The vessel is likely to be sold at some point. (4)   Any owner may have a good defence to the Administrator’s claim, given that the sinking was likely caused by the acts of an unknown third party. (5)   The vessel can be inspected to ascertain the cause of her sinking before the sale. (6)   The vessel can only lose further value over time. (7)   The vessel is occupying a moorage that has commercial value and is not currently generating value for the Port. (8)   Liability might accrue pursuant to WAHVA to whoever is the owner of the vessel. [16]   The Administrator, CMS and Hjelle all oppose the order sought by the Port on two principal grounds. [17]   First, they say that the overarching principles in the Court’s exercise of its powers to order the judicial sale of a vessel pendente lite is the protection of creditors from the devaluation of the ship as a common asset to satisfy the claims of creditors. ... ANALYSIS [20]   This Court, in The Essington II, above, after reviewing the jurisprudence and the circumstances in which it has been recognized that there was “good reason” for the Court to exercise its powers to order the sale of a vessel before judgment, extracted the following elements to be considered in deciding on a sale pendente lite: 1. ... The first three elements identified in The Essington II assess the strength of the owners’ interest; elements 4 and 5 go to the creditors’ interest, while the sixth reflects the open-ended nature of the list. [22]   Given that no one wishes to assert an ownership interest in the Cormorant, only two elements remain to be considered in this matter: those two that affect the creditors’ interests, and the potential application of WAHVA, either as a component of the creditors’ interest or as another “good reason” for a sale before trial. [23]   The Port has failed to bring evidence of the existence of any market for the vessel. ...

However, a decision maker’s reasons are not to be reviewed in a vacuum but are to be considered in the context of the evidence, the parties’ submissions, and the process giving rise to the decision (see Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 18). [17]   The GCMS notes prepared at the time of IRCC’s September 5, 2018 and October 4, 2018 letters to Ms. ... Fray sufficient evidence of cohabitation for at least one year prior to her application and describes the sort of documentation considered acceptable. ... Conclusion [25]   Having considered the Applicant’s arguments, and finding no reviewable error in the Decision, this application for judicial review must be dismissed. ...

The Judge also considered the relevant sections in the FNEA and correctly applied the jurisprudence in the context of this case (Gadwa v. ... As observed by the respondents, there exists a well-entrenched presumption that the entirety of the evidence was considered by the Judge and the fact that certain elements are not mentioned in the reasons does not mean that the evidentiary record was not fully considered (Housen at para 46; Mahjoub v. ...

Shabbir is genuine and that it was not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act. [4]   In assessing the genuineness of the marriage, the IAD considered the factors set out in Khera v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 632 at para 10. ... SCHEDULE Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (SOR/2002-227) Règlement sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés (DORS/2002-227) Bad faith Mauvaise foi 4   (1)  For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership 4 (1)  Pour l’application du présent règlement, l’étranger n’est pas considéré comme étant l’époux, le conjoint de fait ou le partenaire conjugal d’une personne si le mariage ou la relation des conjoints de fait ou des partenaires conjugaux, selon le cas :   (a) was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act; or   a) visait principalement l’acquisition d’un statut ou d’un privilège sous le régime de la Loi;   (b) is not genuine.   ... Excluded relationships Restrictions 117 (9) A foreign national shall not be considered a member of the family class by virtue of their relationship to a sponsor if   117(9) Ne sont pas considérées comme appartenant à la catégorie du regroupement familial du fait de leur relation avec le répondant les personnes suivantes : […] […]   (d)  subject to subsection (10), the sponsor previously made an application for permanent residence and became a permanent resident and, at the time of that application, the foreign national was a non-accompanying family member of the sponsor and was not examined.   ...

She relies on s 4(1) of the IRPR, which provides as follows: Immigration and Refugee Protection   Regulations, SOR/2002-227 Règlement sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés, DORS/2002-227 Family Relationships Regroupement familial Bad faith Mauvaise foi 4 (1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership 4 (1) Pour l’application du présent règlement, l’étranger n’est pas considéré comme étant l’époux, le conjoint de fait ou le partenaire conjugal d’une personne si le mariage ou la relation des conjoints de fait ou des partenaires conjugaux, selon le cas: (a) was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the Act; or a) visait principalement l’acquisition d’un statut ou d’un privilège sous le régime de la Loi; (b) is not genuine. b) n’est pas authentique. [15]   The Applicant takes the position that she was separated from her husband as of May 2, 2014, that her marriage was therefore not genuine as of that date, and that the resulting effect of s 4(1) is that, for purposes of s 117(1)(h) of the IRPR, Mr. ... Mkamua would not then be considered her spouse. The Respondent’s submissions to the IAD note that, although the Applicant presented a declaration dated December 6, 2014, stating that she and her spouse were separated, there were no details provided in that declaration as to when the alleged separation took place. ... [23]   In arriving at that conclusion, the Court held it was reasonable for the IAD to find that s 117(1)(h)(ii) was meant to establish an objective criterion to determine if the relative selected by the sponsor is a member of the family class, which focused on the characteristics of the listed relatives who may file an application for permanent residence rather than on the merits of such an application (Bousaleh at para 73). [24]   The Applicant submits that Bousaleh is distinguishable, because the effect of s 4(1) is that a person to whom a sponsor is married is not considered their spouse if the marriage is not genuine. ...

The Adjudicator considered Mr. Jog’s request, but noted that as the Adjudicator, he had control over the process, and declined Mr. ... Therefore, the Adjudicator’s procedural rulings are only relevant to this judicial review insofar as they may have impacted the Final Decision. [25]   In considering whether or not he should recuse himself, the Adjudicator considered the test outlined in Jose Reyes v Jonas Lang Lasalle Real Estate Services Inc, (2017 CanLII 1071 (ON LRB)) which states: It is the practice of the courts and tribunals, for the respective judge or adjudicator against whom the claim of bias is alleged to address any allegation of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. ... Jog’s submissions in relation to the BrainFX report, as this issue was addressed in the Adjudicator’s Preliminary Decision, which is not the decision under review, it need not be considered further. [33]   Another argument raised by Mr. ...

Moreover, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for him to seek refuge there. [16]   The RAD then set out the principles governing the existence of an IFA, and confirmed that it considered Mr. ... Given that their testimony was uncontested, the RAD was therefore required to accept their testimony that the Chief and extended family had both the “means” and the “motivation” to locate the Applicants in the proposed IFAs. [31]   The crux of the Applicants’ argument is that because the RAD member did not impugn their credibility, it cannot simply ignore or discount the Applicants’ evidence in favour of evidence from the RIRs without a reasonable explanation. [32]   The Minister submits that the RAD’s IFA analysis was reasonable and considered all relevant evidence. ...

This finding was not only based on the applicant’s contradictory testimony, but also on her written statements in the context of her visa application and her refugee protection claim. [20]   Nevertheless, the RAD recognized that even though the evidence indicated that the applicant’s brother was no longer in Lebanon, the cousins who had attacked her were still in Lebanon and should be considered agents of persecution. ... An applicant’s subjective reluctance to engage authorities is not enough to rebut the presumption of state protection: Ruszo v Canada (MCI), 2013 FC 1004, para 33; Navarro Canseco v Canada (MCI), 2007 FC 73, para 17; Torales Bolanos v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 388, para 60; Gallo Farias v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 578, para l9. [25]   The RAD considered Guideline 4 on women refugee claimants fearing gender-related persecution. ... She also cited excerpts of documentary evidence and case law in this regard. [32]   In light of the fact that it is the applicant who raised the issue of a lack of state protection in the context of her appeal, and that she clearly had an opportunity to address this issue and present new evidence in that regard, she cannot claim to have been surprised when the RAD considered this issue and drew its own conclusions about the evidence. ...

The Court has received and considered the written submissions and supporting affidavits filed by both parties. ... I considered the Application on its own merit, independently from [the two other applicants]. [23]   Thus, while the Foundation’s appeal is based in part on the ground that the Minister considered irrelevant information concerning the other entities, the CRA employee states that he did not use “any relevant material” (emphasis added) regarding them. ...

The leading case on the points that must be considered to determine if an activity does or does not constitute a business within the meaning of the Act is that of the Supreme Court of Canada in William Moldowan v. ... The following criteria should be considered: the profit and loss experience in past years, the taxpayer's training, the taxpayer's intended course of action, the capability of the venture as capitalized to show a profit after charging capital cost allowance. ... In other words, this objective assessment is only possible when the enterprise is considered as a whole following a reasonable period of operation. ...