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If the Minister subsequently confirms her decision, having considered the charity’s objections, the charity nonetheless remains entitled to appeal the revocation to this Court. ... The interests of those who are dependent on the charity may also be considered on this branch of the test: Glooscap Heritage Society v. ... The public has a legitimate interest in the enforcement of the requirements applicable to registered charities: Glooscap Heritage Society, above at paras. 51-54. [12]   All three parts of the test must, of course, be considered based upon the evidentiary record before the Court. ...

The amount was reduced to zero because, in his opinion, this was not an SR&ED project. [38]   He testified that, even if the project had been considered an SR&ED project, some expenses would have been disallowed because they fell under marketing expenses, namely the expenses that are ineligible spending further to the FR’s review at Exhibit I-1, Tab 12. [39]   In cross-examination, he confirmed that the Appellant used the conventional method in its application. ... Although she claims that, along with Repaco, she developed a new mini-press for welding, in my opinion, that could not be considered either because, first of all, Repaco did everything for free, and so there is no expense claimed in connection with that. ... The mini-press may indeed be new to Repaco, but another company was already using it; the evidence is not conclusive on this point. [49]   The relevant exclusions from subsection 248(1) include market research and sales promotion. [50]   Having considered all the evidence brought in this appeal, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the project is an SR&ED project because it does not meet the criteria established by the case law. ...

The consequences of removal in those circumstances cannot be made good by readmitting the person to the country following the successful conclusion of their pending application [...]. [12]   In Lewis, the Federal Court of Appeal considered the extent to which the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 [Kanthasamy] might have changed the nature of the assessment that an enforcement officer is required to conduct when considering the best interests of a child whose parent seeks to defer their own removal under section 48 of the IRPA. ... Whether the short-term or long-term BIOC is being considered, it will always be contextual and there will always be a multitude of factors. ... The RPD Decision [18]   The Officer found “that most of the issues submitted within the deferral request were already considered in the RPD decision.” ...

According to the Respondent, nothing in the Applicant’s evidence pointed to any specific business opportunities or potential investments he would be investigating in Canada. [14]   In response to the Applicant’s allegation that the Officer unreasonably ignored his family and business ties to India, the Respondent says the Officer was not required to explicitly discuss every factor and it is presumed that the Officer weighed and considered all the evidence. The Respondent further says, even if the Officer may have treated the Applicant’s lack of travel history as a negative factor, this alone is insufficient to render the decision as a whole unreasonable because the Officer based the decision on other factors. [15]   The Respondent contends the Applicant is misguided in his view that the Officer should have considered family reunification as a purpose of his visit. ... An officer is presumed to have considered all the evidence before him or her unless the contrary is shown (Rahman v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 793 at para 17). ...

I find that to some extent the Applicant’s submissions did not recognize that the RPD was attempting to determine what her knowledge was on the false statements contained in the visa application, inasmuch as this aspect of the factual finding was not considered. ... However, reference in the Applicant’s memorandum to China experiencing “some of the darkest days” for religious believers was pointed out by the Respondent to actually refer to 2016 as marking 50 years since the Cultural Revolution occurred, which was considered the darkest days for China’s religious and faith believers. ... In addition, a sur place argument would not be considered significant unless the Applicant had demonstrated that her conduct would have been brought to the attention of Chinese authorities, none of which was presented. [25]   Finally, the Applicant submitted that her application should be allowed on the basis that she wanted to have additional children and could not do so if removed to China. ...

The Court is of the view that the file must be considered anew, as, in final analysis, the Applicant did specify, although very late, that he did have an adequate family relative, as required by law. ... Conclusion [22]   For all the reasons above, the Court orders that the judicial review be granted and that the matter be considered anew in recognition of the information as per the relative specified. JUDGMENT in IMM-6400-18 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that the application for judicial review be granted and the matter be considered anew. ...

The RPD considered the issue of race, highlighted by counsel. However, it did not find that the allegations in this regard indicated that the son Carlos, who was the person initially targeted in the criminal extortion demands, was identified as a target based on race, but that it was based on his role as a small business owner. [7]   The RPD then examined the Applicants’ claim under section 97, whereby they need to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that it is more likely than not that they face a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Colombia from the BACRIM who targeted their son Carlos. ... In response to the Applicants’ argument that the RPD failed to consider evidence of their race, the Applicants submit that the RPD’s conclusion on the lack of nexus was reasonable, given that the RPD considered country documents, heard the wife and daughter’s testimonies that they did not experience difficulties as Afro-Colombians, and noted the racial slurs. [21]   The Ministers submit that, in any event, the determinative issue for the RPD was credibility and the Applicants do not take issue with any of the RPD’s credibility findings. ... The documents that the Applicants allege were not considered by the RPD do not contradict the RPD’s conclusions. ...

However, the officer issued an amended decision three days later; the officer had originally determined that the work of a translator and interpreter could not be considered a cultural activity within the meaning of the IRPA, but subsequently acknowledged that such work would in fact qualify as a cultural activity according to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada. ... Applicant’s position [7]   The applicant highlights two elements of the officer’s decision that, in her opinion, constitute reviewable errors. [8]   First, in the analysis that led him to conclude that the applicant did not have the intention and ability to be self-employed in Canada and to make significant contributions to economic activities in Canada, the officer considered factors that are not included in either the IRPA or the IRPR. [9]   According to the applicant, the IRPR considers only the following criteria: [translation] “relevant experience and the applicant’s intention and ability to be self‑employed and to make a significant contribution to economic activities in Canada” (Applicant’s Memorandum at paragraph 32). ... He also argues that the officer is presumed to have considered all the evidence on file unless proven otherwise (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, 2011 SCC 62 at paras 12–17). [15]   According to the respondent, in order to discharge her burden of proof, the applicant should have conducted market studies and produced a business plan and included them in her file. ...

The IAD therefore dismissed the applicant’s application to reopen his appeal. [8]   The applicant essentially alleges that the IAD considered section 71 of the Act in isolation when it was required, in his opinion, to interpret it in accordance with subsection 51(3) of the Immigration Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2002-230 (Rules), which allows “a person” to request to reinstate an appeal that was made to the IAD and then withdrawn and requires the IAD to grant such a request not only on evidence of a breach of a principle of natural justice, but also if it is otherwise in the interests of justice to do so. [9]   In the alternative, he urges the Court to make an exception to the principle of judicial comity since following Nazifpour v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 35, leave to appeal to the SCC refused, 31976 (June 28, 2007) [Nazifpour], which limited the scope of section 71 of the Act to cases where the reopening of an appeal is justified when the IAD has not observed one of the principles of natural justice, would create an injustice in the particular circumstances of this case. [10]   The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether the IAD committed a reviewable error in refusing this application to reopen an appeal based solely on section 71 of the Act. [11]   It is not disputed that this issue must be considered under the standard of reasonableness since there is no doubt that the IAD’s consideration of an application for reopening an appeal raises questions of mixed fact and law within its expertise (Pham v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1251 at para 25). ... It would certainly have been desirable for the applicant to have made an explicit reference to section 51 of the Rules, or even to section 71 of the Act, but it is not necessarily fatal in my opinion, given not only the explicit and implicit references to the Rules found in the application he made to the IAD, but also the circumscribed and limited nature of that application. [18]   Technically, this application involved only one and/or the other of two provisions of the Act and the Rules, namely section 71 of the Act, the application of which, it is true, is limited to very specific circumstances (Nazifpour at paras 78 and 80), and section 51 of the Rules, which seems at first glance to be more permissive to the extent that (i) it is addressed to “a person” who has filed and then withdrawn an appeal to the IAD, which again at first glance appears to be directed at someone in the applicant’s situation, not just a “foreign national” who has not left Canada as a result of a removal order; and (ii) it also allows the appeal to be reinstated where it is in the interests of justice to do so, and not only when the IAD commits a breach of a principle of natural justice. [19]   However, the IAD considered only one of them. ...

Such further and other relief as this Honourable Court may permit. [5]   The parties’ arguments on this motion concentrate on the factors to be considered when determining whether an extension of time should be granted. The parties appear to agree on the factors to be considered, but disagree on how those factors should be applied. [6]   Rule 8 of the Federal Courts Rules provides for extensions of time. ... Conclusion [21]   I am satisfied that each of the four enumerated factors to be considered when determining whether an extension of time should be granted favours Hilton’s requested extension of time. ...