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The definition of “city motor vehicle operators” found in section 2 is at the heart of this dispute: city motor vehicle operator means a motor vehicle operator who operates exclusively within a 10-mile radius of his home terminal and is not a bus operator and includes any motor vehicle operator who is classified as a city motor vehicle operator in a collective agreement entered into between his employer and a trade union acting on his behalf or who is not classified in any such agreement but is considered to be a city motor vehicle operator according to the prevailing industry practice in the geographical area where he is employed; (conducteur urbain de véhicule automobile) conducteur urbain de véhicule automobile désigne un conducteur de véhicule automobile qui exerce son activité uniquement dans un rayon de 10 milles de son terminus d’attache et qui n’est pas un conducteur d’autobus, et comprend tout conducteur de véhicule automobile classé comme conducteur urbain de véhicule automobile dans une convention collective intervenue entre son employeur et un syndicat qui agit en son nom, ou tout conducteur qui n’est pas classé aux termes d’une convention de ce genre mais qui est censé être un conducteur urbain de véhicule automobile selon la pratique courante de l’industrie dans le secteur géographique où il est employé; (city motor vehicle operator) [10]   This definition thus requires, in the absence of an applicable collective agreement, a way of determining “who is... considered to be a city motor vehicle operator according to prevailing industry practice in the geographical area [in question]”. ... In addition, the applicant considered the respondent to be a highway motor vehicle operator. ... In Rahal, Justice Gleason explained that the provisions of the Federal Courts Act, particularly paragraph 18.1(4)(d), must be considered in dealing with this question: [26] In Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 [Khosa], the Supreme Court held that judicial review pursuant to sections 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [FCA] is governed by the common law principles set out in Dunsmuir and that section 18.1(4)(d) of the FCA provides “legislative precision to the reasonableness standard” by which factual findings are to be measured (at para 46). ...

Conclusion [39]   The perceived delay, alleged error, and extraordinary circumstances, considered alone or together, do not support a decision to waive the interest. ...   [40]   When the Court of Appeal’s discussion in Telfer about the significant discretion owed under subsection 220(3.1) is considered, it becomes clear this application should be dismissed as the decision fell within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes and it was justifiable, transparent, and intelligible (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9). [41]   Accordingly, I dismiss this application for judicial review. ... Where circumstances beyond a taxpayer’s control, actions of the CRA, inability to pay, or financial hardship has prevented the taxpayer from complying with the act, the following factors will be considered when determining if the minister’s delegate will cancel or waive penalties and interest: a)   whether the taxpayer has a history of compliance with tax obligations b)   whether the taxpayer has knowingly allowed a balance to exist on which arrears interest has accrued c)   whether the taxpayer has exercised a reasonable amount of care and has not been negligent or careless in conducting their affairs under the self-assessment system d)   whether the taxpayer has acted quickly to remedy any delay or omission. ...

H&C Considerations [11]   The IAD next considered whether H&C considerations nonetheless justified the application: IRPA s 67(1)(c). ... [26]   The role of this Court on judicial review is not to re-weigh evidence, but instead ensure that all evidence tendered is considered reasonably. ... With respect to the IAD’s H&C analysis, the IAD reasonably considered all available evidence submitted. ...

The Applicant was not living in an isolated area. [34]   The Respondent also notes that the RAD considered the evidence of the Applicant’s wife regarding their observations.   ... In her analysis, Justice Mactavish notes that findings of fact made by the RPD in an exclusion proceeding are to be considered as conclusive findings of fact in an admissibility determination under s.35 of IRPA (Johnson, para 24).   ... The RAD further notes: […] I have considered whether the [Applicant] continued to work with ISIS on the belief that there existed an implied threat of death or bodily harm from ISIS if he did not comply. ...

Where the nature of a taxpayer’s activities contains elements that suggest that the activities could be considered a hobby or other personal pursuit, the venture will be considered a source of business income for the purposes of the Act if it is undertaken in a sufficiently commercial manner (Stewart, paragraph 52). [26]   Where the nature of an activity is clearly commercial, there is no need to analyze the taxpayer’s business decisions. ... [Emphasis added.] [28]   The “ reasonable expectation of profit ”, which was the test prior to Stewart, is one possible indicia of commerciality which are to be considered if there is some personal or hobby element to the activity in question. Although the reasonable expectation of profit is a factor to be considered, it is not the only factor nor is it determinative of the issue. ...

The General Division and the Appeal Division considered section 45 of the EIA and subsection 36(9) of the Regulations, but neither was asked to consider the impact, if any, of subsections 36(2) or 38(1) of the Regulations. ... Its meaning was considered in this Court’s decision in Chaulk v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA 190, [2012] F.C.J. ... I am satisfied that in the context of the facts before it, the Appeal Division properly considered the pertinent aspects of the text, context and purpose of section 45 of the EIA and related Regulations in its interpretation of the provisions. ...

He says he did not receive the Educational Letter and alleges it is therefore unfair to deny relief for not doing what the Educational Letter told him to do. [30]   The Officer considered the Applicant’s allegations and rejected them. ... I am not persuaded these facts were not considered by the Officer; in my view they were front and centre. ... It identified the correct framework and considered the facts of the case. ...

As part of his analysis on behalf of the majority of the Court in Delisle, Bastarache J. considered the purpose of the statutory provision in question in the course of interpreting it. ... Accordingly, this Court owes deference to the Tax Court on issues of mixed fact and law. [33]   It is also important to bear in mind that jurisprudence must always be considered in its proper factual context. ... As indicated in paragraph 33 above, I believe that it was referring to old documents discussing possible policies that might be considered “earlier drafts of a final position paper,” and which need not be produced. ...

Application of Rule 147(3) [35]   As noted above, subsection 147(3) of the Rules sets out various factors to be considered in exercising the Court’s discretionary power to award costs. Those factors are considered below. (1) Result of the Proceeding [36]   The Appellants succeeded in challenging sufficient aspects of the CRA’s net worth analysis to such an extent that the Appellants demonstrated that there was no unreported income. ... Therefore, the legal fees and disbursements that I have considered are those which were billed in December 2016, 2017 and 2018, which totalled $34,801.43. ...

The Lavers decision is of particular significance since in his reasons Wallace, J. also considered the question of whether the “punishment imposed" pursuant to the assessments of the Minister constitutes “true penal consequences" so as to bring the penalties consequent upon assessment proceedings within the prohibition expressed in paragraph 11(h) of the Charter. ... Giffen's well considered argument I have concluded, on the authority of R. v. ... The next question to be considered is when and for what purpose is it appropriate to use the inference drawn from a failure to testify. ...