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Muir had given consideration of $124,000 to the Corporation. Before vacating the assessment, Boyle J stated (at paras 19, 20 and 22): I find that the $124,000 was transferred by the Corporation to Ms. ...

The consideration for each ordinary share was US$3.55 per share and US$7.10 per ADS. ...

Colitto transferred, for nominal consideration, real estate to her in 2008. ...

Canada, 2020 FCA 115-- summary under Paragraph 97(2)(b) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 97- Subsection 97(2)- Paragraph 97(2)(b) the starting ACB of a partnership interest was determined exclusively under s. 97(2)(b) The taxpayer (“Iberville”), on three occasions in 2003 and 2004, contributed shopping centres worth $130M to a newly-formed partnership in consideration for promissory notes approximating the $14M cost amount of the contributed properties and for units of the partnership. ...

Canada, 2020 FCA 115-- summary under Subsection 97(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 97- Subsection 97(1) issuance of partnership units on a drop-down is irrelevant to the ACB of the partnership interest A corporate taxpayer having shopping centres with a cost amount and fair market value of $14M and $130M, respectively, contributes the properties under s. 97(2) to a newly-formed LP in consideration for boot of $14M and units with a FMV of $116M. ...

Another important contextual consideration is that Court orders or directions, when made, are law until set aside. ...

Before setting aside the Committee’s decision and remitting it for consideration by a different decision maker, Norris J stated (at paras. 69, 72-73): It was unreasonable for the Assistant Commissioner to reject the remission request simply on the basis that the information examined during the remission review “did not reveal that the CRA made any error at the audit stage or in reassessing the 2005 and 2006 tax years” when this was the very point in issue. … [T]he Assistant Commissioner … [also] simply stated the principle that errors or omissions by tax professionals “are not considered extenuating circumstances for the purpose of remission” and then treated it as a complete answer to the applicant’s submission. … Given the importance to the applicant’s request of the question of whether any errors or omissions by the tax professionals who assisted the applicant could constitute an extenuating circumstance or, more broadly, made it unreasonable or unjust to recover the 2005/2006 debt, it was essential that the Assistant Commissioner explain why he concluded that they did not. … [I]t is insufficient to simply state the rule without also explaining why an exception should not be made in this case. ...

In this regard, it stated (at paras. 167, 181-183 and 198): Canada has adduced evidence that clearly shows that establishing minimum national standards of GHG [greenhouse gas] price stringency to reduce GHG emissions is of sufficient concern to Canada as a whole that it warrants consideration in accordance with the national concern doctrine. … [P]rovincial inability is established in this case. … First, the provinces, acting alone or together, are constitutionally incapable of establishing minimum national standards of GHG price stringency to reduce GHG emissions. … Second, a failure to include one province in the scheme would jeopardize its success in the rest of Canada. … Moreover, the matter’s impact on the provinces’ freedom to legislate and on areas of provincial life that would fall under provincial heads of power is qualified and limited. ...

After canvassing authorities on the concept of a reasonable deduction, including (at para. 29) the statement in Gabco that this was a question of whether “no reasonable business man would have contracted to pay such an amount having only the business consideration of the appellant in mind,” and (at para. 31) that in Petro-Canada that “[t]here may be circumstances in which a decision to pay more than fair market value for something is a reasonable decision,” and then stated (at paras. 53-54): [I]n this case interest at the 10% rate deducted by the appellant is literally in the middle of the range of reasonable rates established by Deloitte's accountants, that is, between 7.89%, the rate used by the respondent to assess it, and 12.39%, this range having been established by considering, among other things, rates for unsecured loans. ...

Although there was no evidence as to how the purchase price, and the proceeds of the judicial sale, should be allocated between the mortgage and the debt, he found in light of the circumstances including the insolvency of the debtor that it was reasonable to allocate 99.9% and 0.1% of the purchase consideration to the mortgage and the debt, respectively and that “to achieve symmetry” (para. 116) the proceeds should also be allocated in those proportions. ...