Search - 2002年 抽纸品牌 质量排名

This was accomplished by those shares being distributed out of the trust to his wife qua capital beneficiary in 2002, followed by their immediate gifting to him. ... Mady must be determined solely by reference to that transaction. … [T]he transfer of the shares from her to Dr. ... Mady. … … [Per] Groupe Honco … “one of the main purposes” … “…implies that a taxpayer may have more than one main motive in acquiring shares”. ...

In April 2002, Aviva had been granted an option, pursuant to the shareholders’ agreement for Gestion Lagarde, to subscribe at any time after May 1, 2005 for such number of common shares of Gestion Lagarde as would result in it holding 66.3% of the class. ... In finding that s. 148 was not breached by the 2002 option, so that it was valid, Rip J stated (at paras. 48, 50): [N]either Aviva nor an assignee "held" or owned shares of Gestion Lagarde or RJCG before April 28, 2006. … Until such time as the contemplated transaction closed, it is arguable that Aviva could have carved up its rights to acquire the shares among other persons so that, at closing, it would acquire not more than 20 per cent of the target company. ... Given the validity of the April 2002 option to acquire the shares of Gestion Lagarde, that option caused such shares to not qualify as those of a Canadian-controlled private corporation, so that during the 24 months preceding the disposition on April 28, 2006 of the RJCG shares, they did not qualify as shares of a qualified small business corporation. ...

The Queen, 2012 DTC 1213 [at at 3580], 2012 TCC 255-- summary under Subsection 152(4.3) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 152- Subsection 152(4.3) no further reassessment permitted if order to vacate or vary The taxpayer was assessed four times in respect of 1999- in 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2009. ... Seven months later the 2009 reassessment (which was a nil assessment and mirrored the 2002 reassessment) was made. ... It was also irrelevant that the taxpayer did not object to the 2009 reassessment, because " Canadian Marconi is strong authority that an out-of-time reassessment is void absent an allegation of fraud or misrepresentation" (para. 62). ...

Divestitures by some indirect U.S. subsidiaries in 2002 resulted in it being over-hedged, so that it terminated a portion of its swaps at that point. ... Lamarre ACJ noted (at para. 81, see also 98) the principle that "in order to characterize the proceeds from a derivative transaction, one needs to identify the underlying item that created the risk … to which the derivative relates (which item does not necessarily need to be a transaction)" and that if, as was the case here, "it is found that the derivative was used to hedge a capital investment, any gain derived from the derivative will be on capital account. ... The Crown position "which denies capital treatment … if there is no sale or proposed sale of the underlying item being hedged … has no legal basis" (para. 97), and "the settlement of derivative contracts in advance of their maturity date does not preclude those transactions from constituting a hedge (Echo Bay …)" (para. 88). ...

In finding that the taxpayer’s claimed losses (except for an overstatement of the 2002 loss due to an “egregious error” – for which a gross negligence penalty was sustained) were fully deductible, Spiro J noted- in responding to a Crown submission based on the trading consistently generating small economic losses, so that there was no source of income – that Stewart established that “provided that one’s activity is clearly commercial, and that no personal element is involved, there is a source of income” (para. 201) and made “it clear that there is no ‘sufficiency’ test” (para. 209). ...

Of the amounts pledged by the taxpayers in 2001 and 2002 to a charitable foundation (the “Foundation”), they would borrow amounts from a subsidiary of the promoter for between 80% to 85% of the pledged amount, and contribute the balance in cash. ... " "Therefore, whether the civil law or common law meaning of the word “gift" in 118.1 is used, the result would be the same in these cases because none of the Appellants had the requisite donative intent with respect to the cash portion of the amounts transferred to the Foundation. ... " ...

In finding that the base payments made in its 1999 to 2002 taxation years did not satisfy the requirement under s. 18(1)(a) of having been incurred for the purpose of producing income from the taxpayer’s business, Owen J stated (at para. 40) that an “expenditure of the income that has been determined for a taxation period cannot be incurred as part of the process of earning that income” and that it should be considered in this regard “that the base payment only arises after the conclusion of the producer’s income earning process in respect of potash subject to the base payment tax” (para. 66) given that “[t]o compute the amount of a base payment for a year, a producer must first compute its profits for that year” (para. 64) and that “Liability for a base payment will exist only in respect of potash that has been “sold or otherwise disposed of” by a producer … [i.e.,] potash … [that] is no longer capable of producing income for the producer” (para. 65). ... The Saskatchewan legislature simply chose in the case of the base payment to substitute quantity of potash as a proxy for income to ensure that a minimum amount of tax would be collected in respect of such potash even if the producer did not have profits for the year …. ...

After noting (at para. 725) that “the purpose of the foreign affiliate regime is to allow Canadian multinationals to compete in international markets through foreign subsidiaries without attracting Canadian income tax,” Owens J stated (at para. 726) that “there is nothing exceptional, unusual or inappropriate about the Appellant’s decision to … have CESA execute the HEU Feed Agreement.” Accordingly, the transactions respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements were not described in s. 247(2)(b)(i) – nor were the BPCs and CC Contracts, which were not “commercially irrational” (para. 736) – and it thus was not relevant (regarding s. 247(2)(b)(ii)) that the primary purpose of the series respecting the HEU Feed and Urenco Agreements (but not of the BPCs and CC Contracts) in light of the use as part of the series of a foreign affiliate (CESA/DCEL) was to save Canadian tax. Turning to s. 247(2)(a) and (c), he found that in light of the depressed uranium market at the time, the HEU Feed Agreement that in a sense was accorded on CESA did not have significant value, and that it only became very valuable to CESA as a result of the significant increase in market uranium prices after 2002 (para. 787) – and a similar analysis applied to the Urenco Agreement. ...

Russell J further found that the taxpayer was not a de facto director, stating (at paras 38, 40): Jurisprudence reflects that the concept of de facto director should be limited to persons who hold themselves out as directors …. ... R., 2002 GTC 244 (TCC), Justice C. Miller observed that a person could not be considered a de facto director where the person, …did not believe he was a director and he never thought he had any authority to advise, influence or control, the management or direction of the company. ... …[S]he engaged in no acts of management … let alone any actions specific to a director. ...

Following an audit, the Minister laid income tax evasion charges against the taxpayers for their 2002 to 2007 years, resulting in a plea bargain based upon an agreed statement of facts. ... She noted that convictions based on plea bargains are not dispositive in civil proceedings, but are rather prima facie proof (paras. 31, 35), and that there was insufficient identity of issues between the current and prior proceedings – for example, the agreed facts did not deal with Grant's tax matters or the corporation's GST appeal. ...