Search - 阿里拍卖 司法拍卖

Hants-Kings Business Development Centre Ltd, 2004 NSSC 114 … the Court found (at paragraph 17) that the relation-back theory applied and that the vendor held the land in trust for the purchaser from the date of the agreement: “In other words, while the trust relationship between vendor and purchaser may be dubious before closing, once the agreement is completed the trust relationship is solidified retroactively. …’”. ...

In finding that the registrant was not entitled to input tax credits for HST incurred in 2014 on legal fees, Favreau J stated (at paras 28, 30): … I do not see …the link between the legal fees incurred to defend the Appellant’s reputation and the earning ability of his swimming school and the commercial activities per se carried out in 2014 by the swimming school. ... After citing Haggart and Doiron, he then concluded (at para 33): … The Appellant did not meet his burden to demonstrate that a direct and clear connection existed between the charges that were laid against the Appellant and the activities he engaged in for the purpose of earning income. ...

He stated (at paras. 32-35, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]he Agency felt unable to cancel more than the interest portion indicated in … the Interpretation Bulletin of 4% of the uncollected sales tax. ... This decision is … unreasonable. ...

In finding that the ARQ had not exceeded its territorial competence in making this requirement, Hogue JCA stated: Here we are not concerned with … a seizure outside of Quebec which, it is true, could require the seizing party to approach an authority of the foreign State with a view to obtaining its collaboration in order to proceed. … The communication of the requirement to BNC through one of its branches situated outside Quebec is the sole external element that is present here. ...

. … I accept that, when determining the nature of a transaction for VAT purposes, the court must look at the economic purpose of the transaction. However, the starting point is to determine what the parties have agreed. … [T]he court only goes behind the contract if the contract does not reflect the true agreement between the parties. ...

The taxpayer argued that this meant that the contemporaneous assessment of him under s. 56(1)(a)(i) for having purportedly transferred the commuted value of his (OMERS) pension plan to the New Plan was ill-founded at the time – and that CRA’s subsequent issuance (well beyond the normal reassessment period) of a further retroactive deregistration of the New Plan represented a new basis for reassessment was not permitted by s. 152(9). ... In rejecting this argument, Graham J stated (at para. 22): The basis for reassessment is and always has been that the commuted value of the OMERS pension was transferred to a non-registered pension plan. … [D]ue to the retroactive nature of the revocation, the facts underlying that basis of reassessment were always present. ...

. … Deeming provisions create legal fictions. They assume things to exist even when they do not in reality—like, for example, the supply of a home that is not yet constructed. … Other elements found in the text, context and purpose of the statute support the interpretation that supply means the signing of an agreement of purchase and sale and not a transfer of beneficial ownership. ...

. … [O]n my interpretation a taxpayer in response to a query need only produce the agreement of purchase and sale to show the legal acquirer of the complex and easily obtained personal documents, such as utility bills, other standard invoices, and drivers’ licences to show who is personally residing in the complex. On my colleague’s view … [s]uddenly a straightforward verification exercise morphs into a sprawling examination for discovery. ...

In rejecting her claim that this interest paid was a disposition expense under the Quebec equivalent of ss. 40(1)(a)(i), Vaillancourt JCQ stated (at paras. 32-34, TaxInterpretations translation): The plaintiff … recognized having received the amounts from Groupe Norbourg without any right thereto, which constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to her argument that she paid the interest on a loan. … [T]he plaintiff paid the interest to RSM for the sole purpose of buying time to repay the receiver the sums which she had received without any right thereto. ...

Smith J found that the taxpayer did not cease to be a director at the time Atcon Group was put into receivership, stating (at paras 69 and 70): [E]ven though section 60(1) of the NBBCA provides that “(…) the business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by one or more directors”, those powers are displaced and may not be exercised by the directors until such time as the receiver or receiver‑manager has been discharged. Section 59 then provides that the receiver manager shall, upon completion of his duties, “send a copy of the final report to each of the directors”, clearly supporting the notion that directors who have not effectively resigned continue to hold office for purposes of the provincial legislation despite the court ordered appointment of EY as receiver‑manager. … I conclude that the Appellant did not cease to be a de jure director (MacDonald v. ...