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. … [A] GST registrant should be entitled to determine its input tax credits on the basis of information in its possession without having to resort to hiring expensive third parties, such as valuators or, as I will discuss, engineers to measure spaces on its ships or experts to try to determine what percentage of fuel is consumed to propel a ship and what percentage is consumed to produce electricity, heat or hot water. … [A] methodology that is based on the actual use of the space used to carry on an integrated business such as the one carried on by the Appellant and that involves a detailed review of all areas of its operations is a fair and reasonable method …. ...

However, that is all it does …. There is nothing in the wording of subsection 13(31) that creates the fiction of the Limited Partnership having a year-end prior to February 1, 2005—specifically … a 12-month fictional taxation year that ended on January 31, 2005. The creation of such a fictional taxation year would require very specific wording that, at a minimum, addresses the fictional existence of the Limited Partnership during this period and the beginning and end of the fictional taxation year. … [T]he Appellant’s position defeats the purpose of the two-year rolling start rule by shortening the length of time that the Limited Partnership is required to have held the property to one completed taxation year. ...

This KPMG plan, if it worked, had the tax advantage over the base case of permitting the tax-free distribution of the Gennium surplus to the family members by Satoma Trust – but instead, the Gennium dividends were retained in Satoma Trust for reinvestment. ... A more robust variant of the above tax plan (which apparently was not for the situation in which an asset-protection trust (i.e., FFLP) had already been formed) was reviewed by the KPMG GAAR Committee, who concluded that GAAR should not apply if it could be demonstrated that the s. 75(2) trust was put in place for asset-protection (or other non-tax) purposes – but otherwise it was more likely than not that GAAR would apply. ... Pilon informed of the risk of applying the GAAR did not end in 2005. … Timely advice on CRA's new approach could have led to rectification of the structure and minimized both the risk and the extent of an assessment. ...

Not only was Frigo not informed of the deficiencies relating to the GST of the suppliers … but also the tax authorities knew perfectly well that the registered suppliers had not paid the GST collected and did not ask the appellant any questions or alert it. The respondent authorized and even obliged these defaulting registrants to continue to collect GST on the respondent’s behalf. … I cannot interpret the ETA and the Regulations as imposing an undeclared obligation on every Canadian business purchasing commercial supplies to exercise additional due diligence with respect to each of its duly registered suppliers, which would include, as claims the respondent in this case, the examination of the physical establishment of the new supplier, its agreements with its personnel, its intention to use subcontractors to carry out the supply, and more — all without even being able to know if the duly registered and verified supplier is in arrears in the payment of GST collected, employee withholding taxes or provincial sales tax, or is otherwise not complying with its tax obligations. ...

Before concluding that the interchange fees were not zero-rated on the basis of the exclusion in VI‑IX‑1(a)(ii) for a service that “relates to (a) a debt that arises from … (ii) the lending of money that is primarily for use in Canada”, Sommerfeldt J found that: Regarding the “relates to” test, “there only needs to be ‘some connection’ between the interchange services and the debt described in the carve‑out, and the interchange services do not need to be ancillary or incidental to the debt” and the “ Slattery, Stantec and Miedzi Copper cases indicate that the phrases relating to, in relationship to, and, by extension, relates to, are to be given a wide or broad interpretation, and that a narrow view is to be avoided” (para. 54). ... “in a tax context, the word primarily generally means (among other things) principally, mainly, most importantly, or more than 50% ” (para. 107). ...

As … noted in City of Calgary, such supplies are parts or components of the single overall supply of electricity. … To paraphrase [O.A. ... Regarding a submission that Bell Canada (at para. 131) that it “could have purchased the electricity from a retailer and the transmission and distribution services from a Local Distributor,” he stated (at para. 132) that the “Court must make its decision based upon the supplies actually made ….” ...

Perram and Jackman JJ stated (at para. 11) that “where parties to a conveyance have agreed the purchase price for a transfer on sale then the consideration for the transfer is that agreed price” and that the “ordinary meaning of the language used by the parties [in the EBA] … suggests that what was to be paid by the Bottler to PepsiCo/SVC or their nominated seller was a price being paid for the concentrate and therefore ‘as consideration for’ the sale of the concentrate” (para. 13). ... In his reasons, Colvin J stated (at para. 197): [T]he EBAs … are properly construed as agreements to bottle, sell and distribute branded products, not as agreements for the supply of concentrate. It follows … that the amounts provided for by the EBAs as the prices for units of concentrate were partly amounts in consideration for the use of the trade marks which the Bottler was licensed to use. ...

., the Commissioners had been “enriched” only by £75), Lord Reed stated (at paras 29-30): … [T]he Managers could not both claim reimbursement of the output tax which they had paid to the Commissioners…on the basis that their supplies were exempt from VAT, and simultaneously assert an entitlement to retain the amounts which they had deducted as input tax, on the basis that their supplies were taxable. The Commissioners were not, therefore, enriched by the Managers’ retention of the notional £25, and the Managers have, in principle, no defence to a claim by the Lead Claimants for the restitution of that amount. … On the first issue, Lord Reed first noted (at para 33), respecting the requirement that the enrichment be at the claimant’s expense: The Lead Claimants owed no money to the Commissioners. Furthermore, the payment of the tax element of the invoices submitted by the Managers to the Lead Claimants was not the cause of the payment of tax by the Managers to the Commissioners: …the Managers were liable to account for tax to the Commissioners once they had supplied the relevant services He then found (at paras 71-73):...There was a transfer of value, comprising the notional £100, from the Lead Claimants to the Managers, under the contract between them. … There was a subsequent transfer of value, comprising the notional £75, from the Managers to the Commissioners. … These two transfers cannot be collapsed into a single transfer of value from the Lead Claimants to the Commissioners. … The first transfer did not even bring about the second transfer as a matter of causation.... ...

., Ms Ellison] “because of a court order under the Family Law Act 1975 ” (Australia). ... Jagot J found for the Commissioner (i.e., no rollover relief to Mr Ellison) partly on the basis of her doubts that there had been such a prior transfer (concluding (at para. 164) that “the orders vested statutory rights and a beneficial interest of some kind in Ms Ellison but … I do not consider that interest can be characterised as beneficial ownership.”) ... She made a guarded finding (at para. 148) that a person could have a proprietary interest in a specified portion of a larger pool of fungible assets, stating: [T]he weight of authority is that there can be a valid trust over a fungible pool of assets provided the assets and relevant proportions for the different beneficiaries are identified with sufficient certainty. … If, given the terms of the declaration and the nature of the property, the trustee is constituted as nothing more than a bare trustee on behalf of the beneficiary in respect of the beneficiary’s proportional interest, it may well be that there has been a change of ownership …. ...

. … [S]. 227(4.2) provides that “a security interest does not include a prescribed security interest”, and thus specifically envisions that the deemed trust will not have absolute priority. ... What must therefore be determined is whether a court-ordered super-priority charge under the CCAA falls within that definition. … After noting the definition of security interest in s. 224(1.3) (referenced in s. 227(4.1),) she further stated (at para. 62): … [T]he list of illustrative security interests makes it clear that a super-priority charge created under the CCAA cannot fall within its meaning. ... The fact that Parliament chose to provide a list of examples whose nature is so unlike that of a court-ordered super-priority charge demonstrates that it must have had a very different type of interest in mind when drafting s. 224(1.3) … She also stated (at para. 72): [C]ourts should still recognize the distinct nature of Her Majesty’s interest and ensure that they grant a charge with priority over the deemed trust only when necessary. … In the concurring reasons of Karakatsanis J (writing for herself and another Justice), she agreed that s. 227(4.1) does not satisfy the requirements for a trust, and then stated (at paras. 172-173): First, given my conclusion about the content of the Crown’s right under s. 227(4.1) of the ITA for the purposes of the CCAA (requiring that it at least be paid in full under a plan of compromise), ranking a priming charge ahead of the Crown’s deemed trust does not conflict with the ITA provision. ...