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After noting (at para. 11) that the ordinary meaning of “refrigerator” was informed by dictionary definitions that “mention the cooling of food, but … also … contemplate cooling other items,” and (at para. 7) that there was “no dispute … that the industry does not treat wine coolers as refrigerators,” and before dismissing the appeal, Locke JA stated (at para. 20): I do not wish to suggest that the ordinary meaning of a term should always apply even where it has a meaning in the industry. But there is a presumption to that effect, and that presumption is not rebutted by the mere fact that the industry meaning of the term in question differs from the ordinary meaning. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ ...

In confirming that there was a taxable benefit, Laskin JA, stated (at paras 41, 42, 47 and 48): It is clear from … Savage that the fact that an employer has a business purpose in conferring something of economic value on its employees does not necessarily take it outside paragraph 6(1)(a). … The “personal” nature of commuting costs is well-established in the case law. … Mr. Smith’s commuting costs originated in his personal decision as to where to live …. … [A]n important factor in cases concerning employee parking is whether the employee uses a vehicle in the course of his or her employment duties. … In this case, Mr. ... Smith’s personal choices and not bound up in his employment duties or in the nature of his work as a flight attendant. … [Consistently with Schroter, it] was “an ordinary, every day expense.” … ...

. … [T]he IRPA temporary resident regime explicitly requires the conferral of temporary residency by an immigration officer. … … From June 27, 2011 to February 21, 2013, she was a refugee claimant. … From February 22, 2013 (when her refugee claim was denied) to September 15, 2015 (when permanent residency was granted to her), the appellant had no status in Canada. ...

It follows that excluding an instrument from the ambit of the word debt simply because the amount which can ultimately be claimed will only be known when the term expires would effectively mean that Parliament has spoken in vain in providing for a “debt […] that may reasonably be considered to derive its value […] from portfolio investments”. [S]ubsection 94.1(1) … contemplates in express terms that an instrument that derives its value from fluctuating portfolio investments can be a debt. ... As these three conditions are present here—i.e. there was a USD 498 million advance made to each of the issuing banks, a resulting obligation on the part of the issuing banks to repay an amount equal to the value of the Reference Assets at maturity or upon early termination, and this amount was ascertainable with precision at the due date- this suffices to dispose of the appeal …. ...

While these other factors are indicative of operational control, they are not the result of a legally-enforceable arrangement … [and are] factors that McGillivray determined to be irrelevant …. ... Silva’s ability to make the two companies disregard the terms of the development agreement – as he decided to do when he unilaterally decided that the 5% mark-up [under the Development Agreement] would not be paid to ADC. …[I]t would be difficult to imagine a stronger indicator of a non-arm’s length relationship than the fact that a company is allowed to operate out of another’s facility for free, without a lease. … Words and Phrases supply contract ...

The Centre promptly commenced this application in the FCA under s. 168(2)(b) of the Act and Rule 300(b) of the Federal Courts Rules for an order prohibiting publication of a copy of the notice of intention to revoke – and thus prohibiting the revocation itself – until a later date based on the timing of when the Minister has disposed of its objection to the notice. In dismissing the application for this order, Laskin JA stated (at paras 15, 18- 20): It is a long-established principle that irreparable harm cannot be inferred, but must be established by clear and compelling evidence … [T]he evidence … does not meet the required standard [of irreparable harm]. ... The evidence that significant numbers of parents would withdraw their children from the school within one or two months is also neither clear nor compelling. … While the Centre asserts that “[t]he loss of tuition revenue and the reduction of the donor base for School related fundraising will make ABCO financially incapable of operating the School, leading to its closure,” it has not …provided its current budget or other supporting financial information. … Its financial statements for 2016 also show an excess of revenues over expenditures of $307,242. … …[T]he evidence is in our view insufficient to establish irreparable harm. ...

In confirming the decision of the Minister to revoke the registration of the Foundation under s. 168(1)(e) (and before going on to find that the decision of the Minster to revoke under s. 168(1)(b) on the grounds that the consulting fees had not been established to satisfy the requirement for the Foundation to devote all of its resources either to charitable activities or as gifts to qualified donees), Woods JA stated (at paras 37-39, and 43): Prescient Foundation … pointed out that revocation should be limited to instances of “material or repeated non-compliance” …. [T]he Foundation failed to provide any records that demonstrated what consulting services …[Mr.O] provided for the fees he received. … [A] bald reference to consulting projects in an invoice that cannot be corroborated with other evidence does not satisfy the records requirement of the Act. It was reasonable for the Minister to conclude that the failure to maintain supporting documentation to enable verification of the consulting fees paid to … [Mr.O] justified the revocation of the registration, especially since … the Foundation showed no willingness to comply in the future…. … This Court has held that if a charity’s books and records are insufficient for the CRA to assess whether the charity is in compliance with its obligations under the Act, this may be sufficient ground upon which to revoke the charity’s charitable status …. ...

In finding that CO2 Public had de facto control of CO2 Technologies as described in s. 256(5.1), so that the latter was not a Canadian-controlled private corporation, Noël CJ stated (at paras. 26-29): … [A]ccording to Duha Printers, it can be relevant to examine the deed creating a trust that is a shareholder of a corporation in order to determine whether this instrument restricts the ability of trustees to exercise their voting rights on the shares held by the trust …. In this case, it is not necessary to determine whether Fiducie’s deed of trust imposed on the trustees this type of restriction because … that deed gave Public CO2 de facto control of the appellant following the criteria developed in McGillivray. … Fiducie’s deed of trust operated in such a way that by electing Public CO2’s board of directors, Public CO2’s shareholders also elected Fiducie’s trustees, as they had to be directors of Public CO2. … Thus, Public CO2 had the power to terminate the trustees’ functions by revoking or not renewing their mandate as directors. … [T]he mechanism put in place clearly gave Public CO2 the ability to change the appellant’s board of directors or to influence in a very direct manner those who had that ability. … ...

., to a Luxembourg s.à r.l (Alta Luxembourg – which, in turn, they held through an Alberta partnership). ... In the Court of Appeal, the Crown conceded that the gain of Alta Luxembourg was exempted from Canadian capital gains tax by virtue of the exclusion in Art. 13(4) of the Canada-Luxembourg Treaty which provided that the Alta Canada shares were not deemed immovable property (and thus not subject to Canadian capital gains tax) on the basis that the exploration licences were property of Alta Canada “in which the business of the company … was carried on.” ... He concluded (at para. 80): I agree with … MIL … that the object, spirit and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Luxembourg Convention is reflected in the words as chosen by Canada and Luxembourg. ...

In this regard, he stated (at paras. 49, 53): While the permissive word “peut” (“may”) and the imperative word “shall” seem irreconcilable …, there is no discrepancy in this case. Both versions of subsection 118.1(11) compel the Minister to assess or reassess in order to give effect to a certificate or a court decision confirming or varying the certified fair market value. … [T]he use of the word “peut” in the French version illustrates how “an official who is permitted to do a thing may, in addition, be obliged to do it” (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes …). … Although the English text does not use the word “may” to denote the fact that the Minister is allowed to assess out of time, the statutory permission is equally present because the obligation to assess out of time necessarily brings with it the right to do so. So read, both texts require the Minister to abide by a fair market value certificate or the final court decision confirming it or varying it, and for that purpose, allow the Minister to assess out of time. … Words and Phrases may ...