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ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL Taxation — Income tax — Sum paid by employer to taxpayer for successful completion of examinations — Computation of income — Income from a source — Whether sum is a benefit in respect of, in the course of, or by virtue of an office or employment — Whether sum is a "prize for achievement in a field of endeavour ordinarily carried on by taxpayer" — Income Tax Act, 1970-71-72 (Can.). c. 63, ss. 3(a), 5(1), 6(1)(a), 56(1)(n), as amended. ... Savage received falls well within the words " récompense couronnant une oeuvre remarquable réalisée dans son domaine d ' activité habituel ". ... Solicitors for the respondent: Fasken & Calvin, Toronto. ...

In 1931 by c. 54, "‘net premiums’’ was defined by s. 13(1) (d) as follows: ‘‘ " Net premiums’ means the gross premiums received less the rebates, return premiums and premiums paid for reinsurance to companies to which sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act apply.” ...

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC Administrative law — Writ of evocation — Information laid by official of Ministère du revenu — Search and seizure authorized by Deputy Minister of Revenue and approved by judge — Whether judge had information necessary to determine if facts on which informant's belief based were reasonable — Act respecting the Ministère du revenu, R.S.Q. 1977, c. M-31, s. 40 — Code of Civil Procedure, art. 846. Taxation — Information laid by official of Ministère du revenu — Search and seizure authorized by Deputy Minister of Revenue and approved by judge — Whether judge had information necessary to determine if facts on which informant's belief based were reasonable — Writ of evocation — Act respecting the Ministère du revenu, R.S.Q. 1977, c. ... Solicitors for the appellant: Gauthier, Nepveu & Leblanc, Sept-Îles. ...

Solicitors for the respondent: Wilson, Barnes, Walker, Montello, Beach & Morga, Windsor ...   [1] [1965] S.C.R. 12. [2] (1966), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 283. [3] [1971] A.C. 297 (H.L.) [4] [1972] 1 W.L.R. 534 (H.L.). [5] (1863), 14 C.B. ...

Section 2(1) (c) of the Finance Act, 1894 provided: “2. (1) Property passing on the death of the deceased shall be deemed to include the property following, that is to say: (c) Property which would be required on the death of the deceased to be included in an account under section thirty-eight of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, as amended by section eleven of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889, if those sections were herein enacted and extended to real property as well as per- sonal property, and the words ‘voluntary’ and ‘voluntarily’ and a reference to a ‘volunteer’ were omitted therefrom; ’ ’ In addition, Section 3 of this Act provided for an exception, regarding the payment of estate duty, in the following terms: ‘3. (1) Estate duty shall not be payable in respect of property passing on the death of the deceased by reason only of a bona fide purchase from the person under whose disposition the property passes, nor in respect of the falling into possession of the reversion on any lease for lives, nor in respect of the determination of any annuity for lives, where such purchase was made, or such lease or annuity granted, for full consideration in money or money’s worth paid to the vendor or grantor for his own use or benefit or in the case of a lease for the use or benefit of any person for whom the grantor was a trustee. (2) Where any such purchase was made, or lease or annuity granted, for partial consideration in money or money’s worth paid to the vendor or grantor for his own use or benefit, or in the case of a lease for the use or benefit of any person for whom the grantor was a trustee, the value of the consideration shall be allowed as a deduction from the value of the property for the purpose of Estate duty.’’ ... It refers to ‘‘ property transferred for partial consideration in money or money’s worth paid or agreed to be paid’’. ... It would, in their Lordships’ judgment, be contrary to all principle, for the purpose of construing it, to look at the evolution even of the same enactment under some other system of law. ’ ’ I do not agree, therefore, with the submission of the respondent that the question before us is as to whether or not the agreement in question can be fairly considered to have been merely a commercial agreement, or whether, looking at the substance of it and the circumstances in which it was entered into, one may regard it as a gift. ...

., concur):— The following question was submitted to a Judge of the Supreme Court of Ontario for his advice and opinion: ‘‘ Does the Thirty-one thousand one hundred and sixty-eight dollars ($31,168.00) representing the proceeds in respect of the share of Arthur Sturgis Hardy and payable to the Trustees of the Trust Deed of the said Arthur Sturgis Hardy on the redemption of 31,168 preferred shares, being part of the redemption of 260,000 preferred shares by G. ... ’ ’ If he had not considered himself bound (as indeed he was) by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Fleck, [1952] O.W.N. 260; [1952] C.T.C. 205, Ferguson, J., before whom the application came, would have found that the money constituted capital in the hands of the trustees and not income but in view of that authority he declared otherwise. ... On January 21, 1953, a resolution was adopted by the directors which, after reciting the amount of the tax-paid undistributed income on hand, read: 4 ‘It is resolved that a stock dividend be and the same is hereby declared to be payable out of the said tax paid undistributed income to shareholders of the company as of this date in the amount of one preference share for each common share held by a shareholder. ’ ’ On the same date, a further resolution was passed, which, after reciting the issue of the 10,000 preference shares, resolved that they be redeemed, and this was done, the trustees receiving from the company the sum of $1,193. ...

Section 2(1) (c) of the Finance Act, 1894 provided: “2. (1) Property passing on the death of the deceased shall be deemed to include the property following, that is to say: (c) Property which would be required on the death of the deceased to be included in an account under section thirty-eight of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, as amended by section eleven of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889, if those sections were herein enacted and extended to real property as well as per- sonal property, and the words ‘voluntary’ and ‘voluntarily’ and a reference to a ‘volunteer’ were omitted therefrom; ’ ’ In addition, Section 3 of this Act provided for an exception, regarding the payment of estate duty, in the following terms: ‘3. (1) Estate duty shall not be payable in respect of property passing on the death of the deceased by reason only of a bona fide purchase from the person under whose disposition the property passes, nor in respect of the falling into possession of the reversion on any lease for lives, nor in respect of the determination of any annuity for lives, where such purchase was made, or such lease or annuity granted, for full consideration in money or money’s worth paid to the vendor or grantor for his own use or benefit or in the case of a lease for the use or benefit of any person for whom the grantor was a trustee. (2) Where any such purchase was made, or lease or annuity granted, for partial consideration in money or money’s worth paid to the vendor or grantor for his own use or benefit, or in the case of a lease for the use or benefit of any person for whom the grantor was a trustee, the value of the consideration shall be allowed as a deduction from the value of the property for the purpose of Estate duty.’’ ... It refers to ‘‘ property transferred for partial consideration in money or money’s worth paid or agreed to be paid’’. ... It would, in their Lordships’ judgment, be contrary to all principle, for the purpose of construing it, to look at the evolution even of the same enactment under some other system of law. ’ ’ I do not agree, therefore, with the submission of the respondent that the question before us is as to whether or not the agreement in question can be fairly considered to have been merely a commercial agreement, or whether, looking at the substance of it and the circumstances in which it was entered into, one may regard it as a gift. ...

The Memorandum of Association and the Articles of Association adopted by each was identical and each was authorized to issue 50,000 Class ‘‘ A ” common shares and 50,000 Class “B” common shares without nominal or par value. ... Subject to the other provisions of this Part, income for a taxation year from a business or property is the profit therefrom for the year. ’ ’ Section 127 (1): ‘ In this Act, (e) “business’ includes a profession, calling, trade, manufacture or undertaking of any kind whatsoever and includes an adventure or concern in the nature of trade but does not include an office or employment;” The learned trial judge, after reviewing the evidence, said in part: “In my view, no distinction can be drawn between the five items of profit now under consideration. ... That presumption may, of course, be negatived by the evidence as was done in the ease of Sutton Lumber & Trading Company v. ...

Peu de temps après, la Compagnie Marcotte institua des procédures judiciaires contre lui, mais — pour des raisons que j’expliquerai plus tard — l’action fut retirée. ... Le paragraphe (f) de la réponse à l’avis d’appel pourrait, jusqu’à un certain point, être invoqué en faveur de cette soumission, lequel paragraphe — dans le but de sauver du temps — il est bon, Je crois, de répéter: “ (f) Le 23 décembre 1957, cette créance fut annulée par Canadian Chemical & Cellulose Co. ... Malone, CSM/os Secretary’’ En ce qui a trait à la lettre Exhibit R-2 précitée, le témoin Malone a témoigné comme suit (p. 49): ‘ ‘ Q. ...

He relies on ss. 3 and 58, the relevant portions of which should now be cited: 3. (1) There shall be included in computing the aggregate net value of the property passing on the death of a person the value of all property, wherever situated, passing on the death of such person, including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, (a) all property of which the deceased was, immediately prior to his death, competent to dispose; (2) For the purposes of this section, (a) a person shall be deemed to have been competent to dispose of any property if he had such an estate or interest therein or such general power as would, if he were sui juris, have enabled him to dispose of that property; … (e) notwithstanding anything in this section, the expression in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) ‘property of which the deceased was, immediately prior to his death, competent to dispose’ does not include the share of the spouse of the deceased in any community of property that existed between the deceased and such spouse immediately prior to his death. 58. (1) In this Act, (a) … (i) “general power” includes any power or authority enabling the donee or other holder thereof to appoint, appropriate or dispose of property as he sees fit, whether exercisable by instrument inter vivos or by will, or both, but does not include any power exercisable in a fiduciary capacity under a disposition not made by him, or exercisable as a mortgagee; [Page 816] Appellant’s argument is that immediately before his death François Faure was competent to dispose of half of the community of acquests, and as a result the word “passing” must be more broadly interpreted, and that the fact that Francois Faure, under art. 1292 C.C., was bound to obtain the consent of his wife with respect to certain dispositions is not an obstacle to such an interpretation. ... Solicitors for the respondents: Martineau, Walker, Allison, Beaulieu, Mackell & Clermont, Montreal ...   [1] [1975] C.T.C. 136. [2] [1973] F.C. 783. [3] [1962] S.C.R. 65. [4] [1968] S.C.R. 505. ...