Supreme Court of Canada
Restaurant Le Clémenceau Inc. v.
Drouin, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 706
Date: 1987-05-14
Restaurant
Le Clémenceau Inc. Appellant
v.
Judge
Marc-André Drouin Respondent
and
Alban
D'amours, In His Capacity as Deputy Minister of Revenue of Quebec, and Raymond Hébert Mis En Cause
and
Attorney
General of Canada, Attorney General of Quebec and Attorney General For Ontario Interveners
INDEXED AS: RESTAURANT LE
CLÉMENCEAU INC. v. DROUIN
File No.: 18980.
1987: May 14.
Present: Beetz, McIntyre,
Lamer, Le Dain and La Forest JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF
APPEAL FOR QUEBEC
Administrative law — Writ of
evocation — Information laid by official of Ministère du revenu — Search and
seizure authorized by Deputy Minister of Revenue and approved by judge — Whether
judge had information necessary to determine if facts on which informant's
belief based were reasonable — Act respecting the Ministère du revenu, R.S.Q.
1977, c. M-31, s. 40 — Code of Civil Procedure, art. 846.
Taxation — Information laid
by official of Ministère du revenu — Search and seizure authorized by Deputy
Minister of Revenue and approved by judge — Whether judge had information
necessary to determine if facts on which informant's belief based were
reasonable — Writ of evocation — Act respecting the Ministère du revenu, R.S.Q.
1977, c. M-31, s. 40.
Pursuant to an information laid by an official of the
Ministère du revenu of Quebec asserting that appellant had contravened the Act
respecting the Ministère du revenu, the officers of that department searched
appellant's premises. They had previously obtained authorization from the
Deputy Minister of Revenue and, as required by s. 40 of the Act, authorization
from a judge
[Page 707]
of the Court of Sessions of the Peace to make this search.
Alleging that the information was too vague, appellant filed a
motion for a writ of evocation in the Superior Court under art. 846 C.C.P.
to challenge the decision of the judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace
authorizing the search. The Superior Court refused to issue the writ and a
majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed this judgment.
Held: The appeal should be allowed.
The supervision exercised by a judge of the Court of Sessions
of the Peace over the administrative decision to authorize a search is a
judicial function. Accordingly, the judge must look with the greatest care at
the exercise of the ministerial discretionary power. In order to perform his
duty of supervision, the judge must determine whether the facts on which the
informant's belief is based are such that his belief was indeed reasonable. As
in the case at bar none of these facts were disclosed by the information, the
judge had a duty to ask for further information, which he did not do. He
therefore did not in fact verify the reasonableness of the informant's belief
and his approval of the warrant at once gives rise to a writ of evocation.
Cases Cited
Referred to: Goodman v. Rompkey, [1982] 1 S.C.R.
589; Minister of National Revenue v. Coopers and Lybrand, [1979] 1
S.C.R. 495; M.N.R. v. Paroian, [1980] C.T.C. 131.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Act respecting the Ministère du revenu, R.S.Q. 1977, c.
M-31, s. 40.
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 846.
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Court of Appeal for Quebec, [1984] C.A. 553, [1984] R.D.F.Q. 145, dismissing
the motion for a writ of evocation, dismissed by the Superior Court,
against approval of the authorization to search. Appeal allowed.
Raymond Nepveu and André
Gauthier, for the appellant.
Michel Legendre and Yves
Ouellette, for the respondent.
[Page 708]
James M. Mabbutt, for the
Attorney General of Canada.
Yves de Montigny, for the
Attorney General of Quebec.
Lorraine E. Weinrib, for the Attorney General for Ontario.
English version of the judgment
delivered by
THE COURT—These reasons are in
support of a judgment rendered from the Bench on May 14, 1987.
Pursuant to an information laid
by an official of the Ministère du revenu of Quebec asserting that appellant,
the Restaurant Le Clémenceau Inc., had contravened the Act respecting the
Ministère du revenu, R.S.Q. 1977, c. M-31, the officers of that department
searched the appellant's premises. They had previously obtained authorization
from the Deputy Minister of Revenue and, as required by s. 40 of the Act,
authorization from a judge of the Court of the Sessions of the Peace to make
this search.
The appellant filed a motion for
a writ of evocation in the Superior Court pursuant to art. 846 of the Code
of Civil Procedure to challenge the decision of the judge of the Court of
the Sessions of the Peace authorizing the search. The appellant argued that the
information was too vague and s. 40 of the Act unconstitutional. The Superior
Court denied the writ and the majority in the Court of Appeal affirmed this
judgment.
Section 40 of the Act
respecting the Ministère du revenu requires judicial intervention before an
official is allowed to exercise the powers of search and seizure mentioned
therein. It reads as follows:
40. (1) With the approval of a judge of the Sessions
which may be granted on demand ex parte following an information made under
oath, the Minister may, for all purposes respecting the application of a fiscal
law, authorize in writing any functionary of the Ministère du revenu or any
other person whom he designates, and any peace officer whom such officer or
person calls to his aid, to enter and search, by force, if need be, any
building, receptacle or place to seek therein for docu-
[Page 709]
ments, books, registers,
papers or other things that may be used as evidence of an offence against a
fiscal law or a regulation made by the Gouvernement under such law, to seize
and remove such documents, books, registers, papers or other things and keep
them until they have been produced in judicial proceedings.
(2) The search contemplated
in subsection I shall not be made before seven hours or after twenty hours, or
on a non-juridical day, except under written authorization of the judge who
approved it.
(3) The Minister shall, upon
request, allow the examination of any document, book, register, paper or other
thing seized, by its owner or the person in whose hands it was at the time of
the seizure.
The supervision exercised by the
judge of the Court of the Sessions of the Peace over the administrative
decision in these circumstances is a judicial function. Accordingly, the judge
must look with the greatest care at the exercise of the ministerial
discretionary power (see Goodman v. Rompkey, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 589; Minister
of National Revenue v. Coopers and Lybrand, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 495, on the
federal Income Tax Act ). In order to do this, he must know all the facts
necessary for him to make an informed decision and to exercise genuine
supervision.
In M.N.R. v. Paroian,
[1980] C.T.C. 131, at p. 138, Morden J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal states
the same rule in connection with the federal Income Tax Act :
The function of the judge is
the most important safeguard. It is implicit in the provision that the judge is
not to act as a rubber stamp. "The judge sits to scrutinize (with utmost
care) the intended exercise of ministerial discretion." MNR v. Coopers
and Lybrand, supra, at 506. He has a duty to consider the cogency of the
evidence put before him in determining what facts it "establishes".
He surely has a discretion, in a proper case, to withhold his approval, if he considers
that the facts do not justify it.
In the case at bar the judge of
the Court of the Sessions of the Peace had before him only an information in
which the official stated that he believed that the appellant had made false or
misleading returns for August 1977, in that it had failed to include the sum of
$299.20 tax collected.
[Page 710]
He further asserted that this
belief was reasonable and rested on an investigation he had undertaken, though
he did not disclose its nature, and during which he had discovered certain
facts. In order to perform his duty of supervision, the judge had to determine
whether the facts on which the informant's belief was based were such that his
belief was indeed reasonable. None of these facts are disclosed by the information.
The judge then had a duty to ask for further information, which he elected not
to do. In the case at bar, in view of what was before the judge, he could not
and in fact did not verify the reasonableness of the informant's belief and his
approval of the warrant accordingly at once gives rise to a writ of evocation.
These are the reasons for which
the Court allowed the appeal, and set aside the judgments of the Court of
Appeal and the Superior Court.
It is ordered that the writ of
evocation be issued and, proceeding on the merits by consent of the parties.
The Court declares the warrant,
the search and the seizure to be null and void and unlawful and quashes the
search warrant authorized by the defendant judge.
The Court orders that all the
effects seized and any copies that may have been made of these effects since
the search be returned.
The whole with costs throughout.
However, no costs will be awarded for or against the interveners.
Appeal allowed with
costs.
Solicitors for the
appellant: Gauthier, Nepveu & Leblanc, Sept-Îles.
Solicitors for the
respondent and the mis en cause: Ouellette, Desruisseaux, Veillette, Montréal.
Solicitor for the
intervener the Attorney General of Canada: F. Iacobucci, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the
intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Daniel Jacoby, Ste-Foy.
Solicitor for the
intervener the Attorney General for Ontario: Richard F. Chaloner, Toronto.