Dickson,
J:—Coopers
and
Lybrand,
chartered
accountants,
brought
a
section
28
application
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
for
an
order
reviewing
and
setting
aside
the
decision
or
order
of
the
Director-
General,
Special
Investigations
Directorate,
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
and
His
Honour
Judge
Carl
Zalev,
Judge
of
the
County
Court
of
the
County
of
Essex.
The
impugned
decision
or
order
authorized
the
entry
and
search
of
offices
of
Coopers
and
Lybrand
and
seizure
of
certain
documents
in
possession
of
that
firm.
The
authorization
was
issued
pursuant
to
subsections
231(4)
and
(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
which
read
as
follows:
(4)
Where
the
Minister
has
reasonable
and
probable
grounds
to
believe
that
a
violation
of
this
Act
or
a
regulation
has
been
committed
or
is
likely
to
be
committed,
he
may,
with
the
approval
of
a
judge
of
a
superior
or
county
court,
which
approval
the
judge
is.
hereby
empowered
to
give
on
ex
parte
application,
authorize
in
writing
any
officer
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
together
with
such
members
of
the
Royal
Canadian
Mounted
Police
or
other
peace
officers
as
he
calls
on
to
assist
him
and
such
other
persons
as
may
be
named
therein,
to
enter
and
search,
if
necessary
by
force,
any
building,
receptacle
or
place
for
documents,
books,
records,
papers
or
things
that
may
afford
evidence
as
to
the
violation
of
any
provision
of
this
Act
or
a
regulation
and
to
seize
and
take
away
any
such
documents,
books,
records,
papers
or
things
and
retain
them
until
they
are
produced
in
any
court
proceedings.
(5)
An
application
to
a
judge
under
subsection
(4)
shall
be
supported
by
evidence
on
oath
establishing
the
facts
upon
which
the
application
is
based.
It
will
be
noted
that
in
enacting
subsections
231(4)
and
(5)
Parliament
prescribed
two
conditions
which
must
be
satisfied
prior
to
authorization
of
any
entry,
search
or
seizure
namely:
(i)
belief
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
on
reasonable
and
probable
grounds
that
a
violation
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
or
a
regulation
thereunder,
has
been
committed,
or
is
likely
to
be
committed;
and
(ii)
approval
by
a
judge
of
a
superior
or
county
court
upon
an
application
(which
may
be
ex
parte),
supported
by
evidence
on
oath
establishing
the
facts
upon
which
the
application
is
based.
According
to
the
supporting
affidavits,
Collavino
Brothers
Construction
Company
Limited
built
a
private
residence
for
one
Dan.
Bryan
at
a
cost
of
$90,397,
but
charged
Bryan,
pursuant
to
a
written
contract,
only
$43,000.
It
is
alleged
that
the
shortfall
of
$47,397
was
added
to
the
cost
of
a
plant
addition
which
Collavino
was
constructing
for
Kendan
Manufacturing
Limited,
a
company
of
which
Mr
Bryan
was
President
and
substantial
shareholder.
The
position
of
the
Minister
is
that
as
a
result
of
the
undercharge
and
overcharge,
an
undeclared
benefit
was
conferred
by
Kendan
on
a
shareholder,
Bryan,
and,
at
the
same
time,
Kendan
was
placed
in
the
position
of
being
able
to
claim
capital
cost
allowance
on
an
amount
greater
than
that
to
which
Kendan
would
otherwise
have
been
entitled.
Two
points
should
be
noted
here.
Firstly,
Coopers
and
Lybrand
is
a
well-known
and
reputable
firm
of
chartered
accountants,
and
there
is
no
suggestion
that
the
firm
is
in
any
way
implicated
in
a
violation
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
if,
indeed,
there
was
a
violation.
Secondly,
Coopers
and
Lybrand
do
not
dispute
that,
upon
the
evidence
disclosed
in
the
affidavits
filed
in
support
of
the
application
to
Judge
Zalev,
there
were
reasonable
and
probable
grounds
for
belief
on
the
part
of
the
Minister
that
a
violation
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
had
been
committed
by
Bryan
and
by
Kendan.
The
complaint
is
that
the
form
of
authorization,
although
conforming
precisely
to
the
wording
of
the
latter
part
of
subsection
231(4),
was
so
broad
as
to
authorize
seizure
of
all
documents,
of
whatever
nature,
in
the
possession
of
Coopers
and
Lybrand,
related
to
the
affairs
of
their
client,
Collavino.
It
is
urged
that
the
form
of
authorization
should
have
been
limited
to
seizure
of
documents
which
might
afford
evidence
as
to
the
violation
which
formed
the
basis
of
the
application
for
approval
of
the
authorization,
viz,
documents
related
to
the
dealings
between
Collavino,
Dan
Bryan,
and
Kendan
concerning
the
construction
of
the
Bryan
residence
and
the
construction
of
the
addition
to
the
plant
of
Kendan.
That
contention
was
accepted
by
a
majority
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
who
set
aside
the
authorization,
and
referred
the
matter
back
to
the
Director-
General
and
to
Judge
Zalev
for
the
issuance
of
a
limited
authorization.
In
this
Court
argument
centred,
not
upon
whether
the
authorization
should
have
been
so
limited,
but
upon
the
more
fundamental
question
of
Federal
Court
jurisdiction
and
whether
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
was
empowered
to
entertain
the
section
28
application
brought
by
Coopers
and
Lybrand.
Section
28
jurisdiction
to
hear
and
determine
an
application
to
review
and
set
aside
extends
only
to:
.
.
.
a
decision
or
order
other
than
a
decision
or
order
of
an
administrative
nature
not
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis,
made
in
the
course
of
proceedings
before
a
federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal.
The
convoluted
language
of
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
has
presented
many
difficulties,
as
the
cases
attest,
but
it
would
seem
clear
that
jurisdiction
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
under
that
section
depends
upon
an
affirmative
answer
to
each
of
four
questions:
(1)
Is
that
which
is
under
attack
a
“decision
or
order”
in
the
relevant
sensé?
(2)
If
so,
does
it
fit
outside
the
excluded
class,
ie
is
it
‘"other
than
a
decision
or
order
of
an
administrative
nature
not
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis”?
(3)
Was
the
decision
or
order
made
in
the
course
of
“proceedings”?
(4)
Was
the
person
or
body
whose
decision
or
order
is
challenged
a
“federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal”
as
broadly
defined
in
paragraph
2(g)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act?.
In
determining
jurisdiction
in
the
case
at
bar,
one
must
consider
separately
the
decision
of
the
Minister
and
the
order
of
the
judge.
In
respect
of
the
Minister’s
decision,
the
crucial
question
is
question
(2)
and,
in
respect
of
the
judge’s
order,
question
(4).
Traditionally,
decisions
of
a
judicial
nature
and
decisions
of
an
administrative
nature
have
been
seen
as
antithetic,
judicial
decisions
being
those
made
by
the
courts,
and
administrative
decisions
being
those
made
by
other
than
courts,
such
as
government
departments
and
officials.
Traditionally,
the
courts
have
taken
the
position
that
decisions
were
reviewable
if
they
were
made
by
judicial
persons
or
bodies,
or
by
quasi-judicial
boards
or
tribunals,
ie,
analogous
to
courts.
The
growth
of
certiorari
led
naturally
from
control
of
inferior
courts
to
control
of
administrative
agencies.
Government
ministries
and
agencies
carry
out
a
different
form
of
work
than
that
done
by
the
courts.
They
do
not
simply
take
on
closely
analogous
functions.
Their
primary
concern
is
with
policy
objectives,
rather
than
adjudication
inter
partes,
in
regulating
relations
between
individuals
and
government
in
the
distribution
of
benefits.
The
dichotomy
between
judicial
and
administrative
is
still
reasonably
easy
to
discern
but
the
great
growth
of
government
at
all
levels,
the
proliferation
of
government
agencies,
and
increased
government
involvement
in
social
and
economic
affairs
have
all
tended
to
render
classification
more
difficult.
There
is
much
overlap.
Administrative
decisions
and
orders
frequently
subsume
the
judicial
and
quasi-judicial.
Section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
expressly
recognizes
that
some
decisions
or
orders
of
an
administrative
nature
are
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis;
superimposed
upon
the
administrative
and
institutional
decision-making
process
of
an
official
may
be
the
duty
to
act
judicially.
Accordingly,
administrative
decisions
must
be
divided
between
those
which
are
reviewable,
by
certiorari
or
by
section
28
application.
or
otherwise,
and
those
which
are
non-reviewable.
The
former
are
conveniently
labelled
“decisions
or
orders
of
an
administrative
nature
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis’’,
the
latter
“decisions
or
orders
not
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis.”
It
is
not
only
the
decision
to
which
attention
must
be
directed,
but
also
the
process
by
which
the
decision
is
reached.
Before
considering
the
criteria
which,
in
my
view,
serve
to
identify
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
act,
reference
may
be
made
to
two
cases
decided
in
this
Court
and
to
one
case
decided
in
the
English
courts.
The
first
is
Guay
v
LaFleur,
[1965]SCR
12;
[1964]
CTC
350;
64
DTC
5218;,
in
which
an
officer
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
was
authorized
by
the
Deputy
Minister,
pursuant
to
subsection
126(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
RSC
1952,
c
148,
to.
make
an
inquiry
into
the
affairs
of
the
respondent
and
others.
The
respondent
was
denied
the
right
to
be
present
and
represented
by
counsel
during
the
examination
of
persons
summoned
by
the
investigator.
The
refusal
was
upheld
in
this
Court.
The
Court,
in
effect,
held
that
no
judicial
power
was
being
exercised
against
those
under
investigation.
Mr
Justice
Abbott,
who
delivered
the
judgment
of
six
members
of
the
Court,
held
that
the
investigation
was
a
purely
administrative
matter
which
could
neither
decide
nor
adjudicate
upon
anything.
He
further
held
that
it
was
not
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
inquiry,
but
a
private
investigation
at
which
the
respondent
was
not
entitled
to
be
present
or
represented
by
counsel.
He
had
this
to
say,
at
16-17:
The
power.
given
to
the
Minister
under
subsection
126(4)
to
authorize
an
enquiry
to
be
made
on
his
behalf,
is
only
one
of
a
number
of
similar
powers
of
enquiry
granted
to
the
Minister
under
the
Act.
These
powers
are
granted
to
enable
the
Minister
to
obtain
the
facts
which
he
considers
necessary
to
enable
him
to
discharge
the
duty
imposed
on
him
of
assessing
and
collecting
-the
taxes
payable
under
the
Act.
The
taxpayer’s
right
is
not
affected
until
an
assessment
is
made.
Then
all
the
appeal
provisions
mentioned
in
the
Act
are
open
to
him.
Mr
Justice
Cartwright
said,
at
17:
The
function
of
the
appellant
under
the
terms
of
his
appointment
is
simply
to
gather
information;
his
duties
are
administrative,
they
are
neither
judicial
nor
quasi-judicial.
There
are,
of
course,
many
administrative
bodies
which
are
bound
by
the
maxim
“audi
alteram
partem”
but
the
condition
of
their
being
so
bound
is
that
they
have
power
to
give
a
decision
which
affects
the
rights
of,
or
imposes
liabilities
upon,
others.
Mr
Justice
Hall,
although
in
dissent,
agreed
(19)
that
the
investigator
was
not
acting
in
a
judicial
capacity,
or
performing
a
judicial
function.
In
Ft
v
Randolph
(1966),
56
DLR
(2d)
283,
this
Court
held
that
the
power
to
suspend
mail
services,
exercisable
upon
suspicion
of
criminal
activity,
pending
a
final
determination,
did
not
attract
the
rules
of
natural
justice.
In
Wiseman
v
Borneman,
[1971]
AC
297,
it
was
decided
that
a
tribunal
established
for
the
purposes
of
section
28
of
the
Finance
Act,
1960,
was
not
bound
to
observe
the
rules
of
natural
justice,
nor
to
give
the
taxpayer
the
right
to
see
and
comment
upon
material
adverse
to
the
taxpayer
placed
before
the
tribunal
by
the
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue.
In
the
course
of
his
speech,
Lord
Reid
had
this
to
say,
at
308:
It
is,
I
think,
not
entirely
irrelevant
to
have
in
mind
that
it
is
very
unusual
for
there
to
be
a
judicial
determination
of
the
question
whether
there
is
a
prima
facie
case.
Every
public
officer
who
has
to
decide
whether
to
prosecute
or
raise
proceedings
ought
first
to
decide
whether
there
is
a
prima
facie
case,
but
no
one
supposes
that
justice
requires
that
he
should
first
seek
the
comments
of
the
accused
or
the
defendant
on
the
material
before
him.
So
there
is
nothing
inherently
unjust
in
reaching
such
a
decision
in
the
absence
of
the
other
party.
The
quoted
passage
was
adopted
in
the
later
income
tax
case
of
Peariberg
v
Varty
(Inspector
of
Taxes),
[1972]
1
WLR
534.
In
neither
case
was
the
function
of
the
official
classed
as
judicial.
It
was
administrative
to
the
extent
that
the
taxpayer
had
no
right
to
be
present
or
to
be
heard.
Whether
an
administrative
decision
or
order
is
one
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
non-judicial
basis
will
depend
in
large
measure
upon
the
legislative
intention.
If
Parliament
has
made
it
clear
that
the
person
or
body
is
required
to
act
judicially,
in
the
sense
of
being
required
to
afford
an
opportunity
to
be
heard,
the
courts
must
give
effect
to
that
intention.
But
silence
in
this
respect
is
not
conclusive.
At
common
law
the
courts
have
supplied
the
legislative
omission—see
Byles,
J
in
Cooper
v
Wandsworth
Board
of
Works
(1863),
14
CB
(NS)
180,
194—in
order
to
give
such
procedural
protection
as
will
achieve
justice
and
equity
without
frustrating
parliamentary
will
as
reflected
in
the
legislation.
As
Tucker,
LJ
observed
in
Russell
v
Duke
of
Norfolk,
[1949]
1
All
ER
109
(CA),
118:
There
are,
in
my
view,
no
words
which
are
of
universal
application
to
every
kind
of
inquiry
and
every
kind
of
domestic
tribunal.
The
requirements
of
natural
justice
must
depend
on
the
circumstances
of
the
case,
the
nature
of
the
inquiry,
the
rules
under
which
the
tribunal
is
acting,
the
subject
matter
that
is
being
dealt
with,
and
so
forth.
It
is
possible,
I
think,
to
formulate
several
criteria
for
determining
whether
a
decision
or
order
is
one
required
by
law
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis.
The
list
is
not
intended
to
be
exhaustive.
(1)
Is
there
anything
in
the
language
in
which
the
function
is
conferred
or
in
the
general
context
in
which
it
is
exercised
which
suggests
that
a
hearing
is
contemplated
before
a
decision
is
reached?
(2)
Does
the
decision
or
order
directly
or
indirectly
affect
the
rights
and
obligations
of
persons?
(3)
Is
the
adversary
process
involved?
(4)
Is
there
an
obligation
to
apply
substantive
rules
to
many
individual
cases
rather
than,
for
example,
the
obligation
to
implement
social
and
economic
policy
in
a
broad
sense?
These
are
all
factors
to
be
weighed
and
evaluated,
no
one
of
which
is
necessarily
determinative.
Thus,
as
to
(1),
the
absence
of
express
language
mandating
a
hearing
does
not
necessarily
preclude
a
duty
to
afford
a
hearing
at
common
law.
As
to
(2),
the
nature
and
severity
of
the
manner,
if
any,
in
which
individual
rights
are
affected,
and
whether
or
not
the
decision
or
order
is
final,
will
be
important,
but
the
fact
that
rights
are
affected
does
not
necessarily
carry
with
it
an
obligation
to
act
judicially.
In
Howarth
v
National
Parole
Board,
[1976]
1
SCR
453,
a
majority
of
this
Court
rejected
the
notion
of
a
right
to
natural
justice
in
a
parole
suspension
and
revocation
situation.
See
also
Martineau
and
Butters
v
Matsqui
Institution
Inmate
Disciplinary
Board,
[1978]
1
SCR
118.
In
more
general
terms,
one
must
have
regard
to
the
subject
matter
of
the
power,
the
nature
of
the
issue
to
be
decided,
and
the
importance
of
the
determination
upon
those
directly
or
indirectly
affected
thereby:
see
Durayappah
v
Fernando,
[1967]
2
AC
337.
The
more
important
the
issue
and
the
more
serious
the
sanctions,
the
stronger
the
claim
that
the
power
be
subject
in
its
exercise
to
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
process.
The
existence
of
something
in
the
nature
of
a
lis
inter
partes
and
the
presence
of
procedures,
functions
and
happenings
approximating
those
of
a
court
add
weight
to
(3).
But,
again,
the
absence
of
procedural
rules
analogous
to
those
of
courts
will
not
be
fatal
to
the
presence
of
a
duty
to
act
judicially.
Administrative
decision
does
not
lend
itself
to
rigid
classification
of
function.
Instead,
one
finds
realistically
a
continum.
As
paradigms,
at
one
end
of
the
spectrum
are
rent
tribunals,
labour
boards
and
the
like,
the
decisions
of
which
are
eligible
for
judicial
review.
At
the
other
end
are
such
matters
as
the
appointment
of
the
head
of
a
Crown
corporation,
or
the
decision
to
purchase
a
battleship,
determinations
inappropriate
to
judicial
intervention.
The
examples
at
either
end
of
the
spectrum
are
easy
to
resolve,
but
as
one
approaches
the
middle
the
task
becomes
less
so.
One
must
weigh
the
factors
for
and
against
the
conclusion
that
the
decision
must
be
made
on
a
judicial
basis.
Reasonable
men
balancing
the
same
factors
may
differ,
but
this
does
not
connote
uncertainty
or
ad
hoc
adjudication;
it
merely
reflects
the
myriad
administrative
decision-making
situations
which
may
be
encountered
to
which
the
reasonably
well-defined
principles
must
be
applied.
Professor
D
J
Mullan
expressed
the
matter
in
the
folowing
language
in
a
thoughtful
article
Fairness:
the
New
Natural
Justice?
(1975),
25
UTLJ
280,
300:
Why
not
deal
with
problems
of
fairness
and
natural
justice
simply
on
the
basis
that,
the
nearer
one
is
to
the
type
of
function
requiring
straight
law/fact
determinations
and
resulting
in
serious
consequences
to
individuals,
the
greater
is
the
legitimacy
of
the
demand
for
procedural
protection
but
as
one
moves
through
the
spectrum
of
decision-making
functions
to
the
broad,
policy-oriented
decisions
exercised
typically
by
a
minister
of
the
crown,
the
content
of
procedural
fairness
gradually
disappears
into
nothingness,
the
emphasis
being
on
a
gradual
disappearance
not
one
punctuated
by
the
unrealistic
impression
of
clear
cut
divisions
presented
by
the
classification
process?
I
should
like
now
to
evaluate
each
of
the
four
criteria,
which
I
have
outlined,
in
relation
to
the
decision
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
to
authorize
search
and
seizure
pursuant
to
subsection
231(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act:
(1)
There
is
nothing
in
the
language
in
which
the
Minister’s
functions
are
conferred
or
in
the
general
context
which
indicates
a
duty
to
notify
the.
taxpayer
or
any
other
person,
or
to
hold
a
hearing,
before
seeking
approval
of
authorization
to
enter,
search
and
seize.
On
the
contrary,
Parliament
substituted
for
the
rules
of
natural
justice
the
objective
test
that
the
Minister,
before
acting,
have
reasonable
cause
to
believe
that
a
violation
of
the
Act
or
regulation
had
been
committed
or
was
likely
to
be
committed.
See
Lord
Reid
in
Ridge
v
Baldwin,
[1964]
AC
40
(HL),
78.
Recognizing
that
a
right
of
search
is
in
derogation
of
the
principles
of
the
common
law,
and
open
to
abuse,
Parliament
also
built
into
the
legislation
an
immediate
review
of
the
ministerial
decision
by
interposing
a
judge
between
the
revenue
and
the
taxpayer.
The
judge
sits
to
scrutinize
[with
utmost
care]
the
intended
exercise
of
ministerial
discretion.
Lacking
judicial
approval
the
ministerial
decison
is
without
effect.
Indication
of
parliamentary
intention
to
deny
the
taxpayer
the
right
to
be
heard
at
this
stage,
is
the
statement
in
subsection
231(4)
that
the
judge
is
empowered
to
give
approval
on
an
ex
parte
application.
I
take
it
that
Parliament
concluded,
perhaps
not
unreasonably,
that
the
imposition
of
procedural
steps
additional
to
those
spelled
out
in
subsection
231(4)
would
frustrate
the
object
of
the
section
conferring
the
power
and
obstruct
the
taking
of
effective
investigatory
action.
It
obviously
considered
the
public
interest
entailed
in
enforcement
and
the
private
interest
affected
by
search
and
seizure,
and
concluded
that
procedural
fairness
was
achieved
by
the
section
as
drafted.
For
myself,
I
do
not
know
what
additional
procedural
protection
could
be
given
without
frustrating
parliamentary
intent.
(2)
The
ministerial
decision
does
effect
rights
even
though
such
decision
requires
confirmation.
It
is
wrong
in
my
opinion
to
say
that
because
a
decision
requires
confirmation,
rights
therefore
are
not
affected.
Rights
are
affected
when
premises
are
entered
and
documents
seized
even
though
the
Minister
does
not
make
any
final
determination
of
rights
or
duties.
(3)
The
decision
of
the
Minister
does
not
involve
the
adversary
process.
It
is
not
the
“triangular”
case
of
A
being
called
upon
to
resolve
a
dispute
between
B
and
C.
There
is
a
dispute
but
not
in
an
adversarial
sense.
The
analogy
of
a
court
is
entirely
inappropriate.
There
are
no
curial
procedural
rules
imposed
by
the
legislation.
(4)
The
governing
legislation
is
silent
as
to
substantive
rules
to
be
observed
in
individual
cases.
When
one
places
in
the
balance
the
responses
to
the
four
questions,
the
result
is
a
modified
"yes”
to
question
(2)
and
a
"nil”
return
to
each
of
the
other
three
criteria,
leading
to
the
conclusion
that
the
Minister’s
administrative
and
executive
decision
is
not
required
to
be
made
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis.
Viewed
from
the
broader
perspectives
of
power,
issue,
and
sanctions,
it
is
difficult
to
conceive
that
the
conclusion
could
be
otherwise.
The
Minister
is
not
exercising
judicial
power.
I
did
not
understand
counsel
for
Coopers
and
Lybrand
to
argue
for
more
procedural
protection
than
that
provided
by
subsection
231(4),
or
to
urge
that
the
affected
taxpayers
should
have
been
consulted
before
the
Minister
sought
judicial
approval
of
the
authorization
to
enter.
The
argument
was
made
that
the
ministerial
decision,
and
the
judicial
approval,
were
based
upon
the
same
material,
the
latter
being
a
judicial
act,
so
also
the
former.
Superficially,
this
argument
is
attractive,
but
I
do
not
think
it
can
prevail.
The
functions
and
powers
of
the
Minister,
and
those
of
the
judge,
are
entirely
different.
In
carrying
out
the
responsibilities
with
which
he
is
entrusted
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Minister
discharges
duties
which
are
fundamentally
administrative:
He
is
invested
with
investigatory
powers,
including
the
right
to
audit,
to
request
information
and
production
of
documents,
and
the
right
to
authorize
the
conduct
of
an
inquiry.
Additional
to
these
rights
is
the
right
conferred
by
subsection
231(4)
to
authorize
the
entry
and
search
of
buildings.
The
power
he
exercises
under
subsection
231(4)
is
properly
characterized
as
investigatory,
rather
than
adjudicatory.
He
will
collect
material
and
advice
from
many
sources.
In
deciding
whether
to
exercise
the
right
last
mentioned,
he
will
be
governed
by
many
considerations,
dominant
among
which
is
the
public
interest
and
his
duty
as
an
executive
officer
of
the
government
to
administer
the
Act
to
the
best
of
his
ability.
The
decision
to
seek
authority
to
enter
and
search
will
be
guided
by
public
policy
and
expediency,
having
regard
to
all
the
circumstances.
The
powers
which
the
judge
exercises
are
judicial
when
in
review
of
ministerial
administrative
discretion.
It
would
be
unusual
to
have
available
a
review
procedure
prior
to
the
application
to
the
judge,
because,
in
the
absence
of
judge’s
approval,
any
decision
on
the
part
of
the
Minister
to
authorize
seizure
of
documents
is
manifestly
without
effect.
The
judge’s
approval
is
the
control
on
the
Minister’s
decision,
while
any
further
recourse
to
the
courts
is
to
serve
as
a
control
on
the
judge’s
decision.
This
would
appear
to
be
a
sensible
reading
of
subsection
231(4).
I
am
satisfied
that
in
giving
an
authorization
under
subsection
231(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
Minister’s
actions
are
of
an
administrative
nature,
and
that
no
obligation
rests
at
law
upon
the
Minister
to
act
on
a
judicial
or
quasi-judicial
basis.
Hence
the
ministerial
decision
falls
outside
section
28
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
and
is
not
subject
to
review
by
that
court.
Jurisdiction
in
respect
of
the
decision
of
the
judge
stands
on
a
different
footing.
Acting
pursuant
to
section
231
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
he
is
discharging
his
institutional
role
as
an
impartial
arbiter
according
to
the
stylized
procedures
and
restraints
of
a
court.
The
definition
of
“federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal”
in
paragraph
2(g)
expressly
excludes
persons
appointed
under
section
96
of
the
British
North
America
Act,
1867.
Judge
Zalev
is
such
a
judge.
The
vexing
problem
of
whether
a
section
96
judge
is
acting
under
the
relevant
legislation
in
the
capacity
of
judge,
or
as
persona
designate,
arose
in
Herman
v
Deputy
Attorney
General
of
Canada,
[1978]
CTC
728;
78
DTC
6456.
In
reasons
for
judgment
in
Herman,
recently
delivered,
I
sought
to
canvass
the
governing
authorities,
which
I
will
not
again
attempt.
Upon
the
authorities,
I
concluded
that
a
judge
acts
as
persona
designate
only
if
“exercising
a
peculiar,
and
distinct,
and
exceptional
jurisdiction,
separate
from
and
unrelated
to
the
tasks
which
he
performs
from
day-to-day
as
a
judge,
and
having
nothing
in
common
with
the
Court
of
which
he
is
a
member.”
A
judge
does
not
become
persona
designete
merely
through
the
exercise
of
powers
conferred
by
a
statute
other
than
the
provincial
Judicature
Act
or
its
counterpart.
Given
its
widest
sweep,
section
28
could
make
subject
to
review
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
decisions
or
orders
of
provincial
federally-appointed
judges,
pursuant
to
such
federal
enactments
as
the
Criminal
Code,
the
Divorce
Act,
or
the
Bills
of
Exchange
Act.
That
could
not
have
been
intended.
It
would
seem
to
have
been
the
will
of
Parliament,
in
enacting
the
concluding
words
of
paragraph
2(g)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act,
that
Ordinarily
the
acts
of
federally-appointed
provincial
judges,
pursuant
to
authority
given
to
them
by
federal
statutes,
will
not
be
subject
to
supervision
by
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal.
In
Herman,
the
order
under
attack
was
one
made
by
a
section
96
judge,
pursuant
to
section
232
of
the
Income
Tex
Act,
and
related
o
solicitor-client
privilege.
The
Court
concluded
that
the
judge
was
acting
qua
judge,
and
not
as
persona
designate.
Although
there
are
obvious
points
of
difference,
much
of
the
reasoning
in
Herman
applies
with
equal
force
in
the
present
case
leading
to
the
conclusion
that
Judge
Zalev
was
not
a
“federal
board,
commission
or
other
tribunal.”
The
close
functional
relation
between
section
231
and
section
232
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
the
decision
in
Herman
as
to
section
232,
suggest
that
the
same
result
should
be
reached
in
respect
of
the
judge
acting
under
section
231.
In
my
opinion,
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
did
not
have
a
right
of
review
in
the
case
at
bar.
Whether
an
appeal
lies
to
the
provincial
courts
from
the
authorization
of
the
Minister
and
approval
of
a
judge,
pursuant
to
subsection
231(4)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
is
a
question
I
would
wish
to
leave
open
as
it
does
not
arise
for
decision
in
the
present
appeal.
I
would
equally
wish
to
leave
for
another
occasion
the
question
whether
recourse
could
be
had
to
replevin,
or
to
one
of
the
prerogative
writs.
I
would
allow
the
appeal,
set
aside
the
judgment
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal,
dismiss
the
respondents’
application
with
costs
and
restore
the
decision
or
order
of
the
Director-General,
Special
Investigations
Directorate,
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Taxation,
and
Judge
Carl
Zalev.
Pursuant
to
the
terms
upon
which
leave
to
appeal
to
this
Court
was
granted,
the
costs
of
the
application
for
leave
to
appeal,
and
of
the
appeal,
should
be
paid
by
the
appellant
to
the
respondents
on
a
solicitor
and
client
basis.