Search - 报销 发票日期 消费日期不一致

In rejecting this claim, Russel J stated (at paras. 12-14): CIBC World Markets [2012 FCA 3] … affirmed that the Minister of National Revenue can only assess tax consistent with his/her view of the underlying facts and law. … Here, DTI’s settlement offer … was simply a “let’s split it down the middle” settlement offer. ...

In order to in effect step up the PUC of the shares in Univar Canada, the group first created (as described in greater detail in the paragraph below) a sandwich structure in which a U.S. subsidiary (“UHI”) of Univar NV held notes and all the shares (having PUC and ACB equal to their FMV) of the appellant (“UHC” – which had been formed for the purposes of these transactions), UHC held all the shares of a U.S. subsidiary (“Univar Inc.”), and Univar Inc. held all the shares of Univar Canada. ... “[S]ection 84.1…permits PUC to be stepped up through such non-arm’s length transfer to the extent of the transferor’s “hard basis” in the transferred shares. … No such latitude is permitted under section 212.1.” … If the Appellant’s position prevailed, any non-resident shareholder could reorganize its corporate structure to interpose layers of Canadian resident subsidiaries within its structure to ensure that subsection 212.1 (1) never applies. ... The exception should not apply in the situation where a non-resident owns shares of the Canadian resident purchaser corporation. … The Appellant fictionally controlled the non-resident, Univar Inc. for less than a day and at all times the Appellant was itself controlled by a non-resident, UHI. ...

The Queen, 2019 TCC 76, rev'd 2021 FCA 160-- summary under Subsection 256(8) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 256- Subsection 256(8) loss streaming rules are conditioned on an acquisition of effective control After finding that a third-party did not have a call right to acquire a further block of shares sufficient to give it a s. 251(5)(b) right to acquire control of a Lossco, Paris J found that there was no abuse of the loss-streaming rules (and, in particular, of ss. 256(8) and 251(5)(b)), stating (at paras. 134, 147): I … find that the object, spirit and purpose of subsection 111(5) is to target manipulation of losses of a corporation by a new person or group of persons, through effective control over the corporation’s actions…. [T]he circumstances referred to by the Respondent do not, in my view, indicate that Matco had effective control over the majority of the voting shares of the Appellant prior to the IPO …. ...

The appellant declined the offer …. … I am not satisfied that the CRA acted in bad faith, misled the Appellant, trapped or abused procedures that were unjustified in the circumstances. … The concept of estoppel is a common law concept that has no equivalent in Quebec civil law. ...

See summaries under Public Service Body Rebate (GST/HST) Regulations, s. 2 – government funding, Sched. ... II, s. 1 – home care services. ...

In response to a Rule 58 question imposed as to whether such “tax” (after also taking s. 207.06 into account) was “in law a penalty or a tax,” and after noting (at para. 42) that the apparent context of the question was that “[i]f section 207.05 were a penalty, a due diligence defence applies, and a successful defence renders non-qualified income free of tax,” Bocock J found that such provisions imposed a tax, stating (at paras. 44, 58): Barring ambiguity, any interpretation holding that the words “a tax is payable” creates a penalty, where penalties are otherwise exceptionally stated to be so in the legislation, impugns the coherency of the Act …. … A charge labelled as a tax may have characteristics so clearly coercive and disproportionate that one concludes it is a penalty; however, this case does not meet that standard. ...

The Investment Agreement also appears to contemplate the possibility of a sale of the Remaining Shares (or some of those shares) to a third party, without the need for Matco’s consent …. ... Furthermore, he accepted (at para. 62) testimony that: [I]t was Newco’s choice to sell the Remaining Shares to Matco, and … the decision was made to accept Matco’s offer in April 2009 because Newco needed the money for its operations and was concerned about the possibility of a decline in value of those shares …. ...

Before finding that this was justified based on carelessness or neglect, Pizzitelli J referred to the finding in Vine Estate that the onus was on the Crown to establish that the taxpayer “(a) has made a misrepresentation; and (b) such misrepresentation is attributable to neglect, carelessness or wilful default,” and before discussing Petric and Regina Shoppers, stated (at para. 98): [T]he following cases relied upon by the Appellants precede … Vine … where Webb JA set out the two step approach to analysing subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) and that is the approach I followed. ... In fact, the Appellants just seemed to ignore it, when in my opinion, having regard to their skills in and knowledge of the securities industry from working as executives for a wealth management firm and the multiple other circumstances or red flags that went up … they were clearly aware of the impact of the IPO’s value on their holdings. ...

In finding that this arrangement did not constitute a joint venture for s. 273 purposes, Teskey J first quoted (at para. 52) from an extended extract from Central Mortgage & Housing Corporation v. Graham, 43 D.L.R. (3d) 686 (N.S.S.C.) including the following passage from Williston on Contracts: [T]he decisions are in substantial agreement that the following factors must be present: (a) A contribution by the parties of money, property, effort, knowledge, skill or other asset to a common undertaking; (b) A joint property interest in the subject matter of the venture; (c) A right of mutual control or management of the enterprise; (d) Expectation of profit, or the presence of “adventure”, as it is sometimes called; (e) A right to participate in the profits; (f) Most usually, limitation of the objective to a single undertaking or ad hoc enterprise. … Teskey J then stated (at para. 55): I do not find there existed the right to participate in profits nor an expectation of profit, from the infrastructure for either party. ...

The appellant treated their $50,000 annual fee as being eligible for the small supplier exemption on the basis that the appellant’s wife was entitled to ½ in light of her responsibility for providing interior-decorating services. ... Gupta, his wife and himself is admissible because of the patent ambiguity in the contract” – and concluded (at para. 57) that “the Agreement does not accurately reflect their true intent.” ...